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ABSTRACT 
 
There is perhaps no problem confronting Christian theism more than that of the problem 
from evil. Evil in the world is not merely a problem for the Christian worldview, however, but 
also for various other metaphysical systems. This project takes up a comparative analysis of four 
major worldviews—naturalism, pantheism, process panentheism, and theism—and argues that of 
the four, theism provides not only the best explanation for the phenomena of evil in the world but 
it also gives an overall thicker worldview response to the challenges that evil presents. But 
theism in-and-of-itself is not enough. A specific form of theism is needed—a form of theism that 
is grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine Trinity—that accounts for both God’s 
aseity and His being essentially loving. Having compared each of the four worldviews and 
having argued for the need of a Trinitarian concept of God, this project then takes up the 
challenge of providing a uniquely Christian theodicy, which I have dubbed the Trinitarian 
Perichoretic Theodicy (TPT). TPT offers a way forward in answering not only the 
theological/philosophical issues related to the problem from evil but it also provides a framework 
for responding to those sufferers who have been affected by the presence of evil in the world.  
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CHAPTER 1: WHY GOD AND EVIL MATTER? 
 
  Introduction 
 There is, perhaps, no problem confronting Christian theism more than the so-called 
problem of evil. As William Lane Craig acknowledges, “The problem of evil is certainly the 
greatest obstacle to belief in the existence of God.”1 For, after all, if God were all-powerful and 
all-good, why would He allow evil to exist in the world? If He were good, surely He would want 
to stop any evil that He could. If He were all-powerful there should be nothing keeping Him 
from eliminating evil in the world. It would seem, then, that God is, if He exists, either unloving 
or incapable of stopping the evil that we see and experience. This famous objection by David 
Hume2 is by no means the only problem facing the question of God’s existence and evil in the 
world. Why is there evil at all? Why is God not doing more about evil in the world?  
 Questions like these stir at our hearts and beg for answers—answers not only to our 
intellectual inquiries, but also to the existential realities that come along with the existence of 
evil in the world. In the midst of their existential plight, people find themselves asking, “Why did 
God allow this to happen to me or to this group of people?” When looking back to such events as 
September 11, 2001, when many Americans died because of the attacks of terrorists, or natural 
disasters that devastate whole people groups, as in the events of the tsunami of 2004 off the coast 
of the Indian Ocean, hurricane Katrina in 2005, the earthquake of Pakistan and Kashmir in 2005, 
and, most recently, the typhoon that hit the Philippines in 2013, people are left asking “Where 
                                                 
 1 Craig, “Problem of Evil.” http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-problem-of-evil [accessed November 2, 
2013]. 
 
 2  David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1998), pt X, 63. 
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was God in the midst of all of these tragedies?” How should Christians respond? How are 
Christians to make sense of all of this in light of their own convictions about God and His 
relationship to the world? Moreover, will God make right the wrongs that take place in His good 
creation?  
 On top of an already complicated issue, it must be taken into consideration that not just 
one problem of evil exists. There is the philosophical/ theological problem of evil as well as the 
existential/religious problem of evil.3 One may also include related issues such as the question of 
Hell and divine hiddenness. All of these relate to the larger problem of evil. Regarding the 
philosophical/theological problem, as John Feinberg rightly points out: one’s conception of God 
plays a significant role in how one answers the question of evil.4 For not all concepts of God are 
equal. Even among people within the same general worldview, there are substantial differences 
between their ideas of God. Which view of God, if God indeed exists, is the correct view of 
God? Is there any reason to think that one conception of God is better than another when 
considering the problem of evil in the world? The question of God’s nature is especially 
important to Christian theists. Unlike Jews or Muslims, who hold to God as one person, 
Christians believe that God is tri-personal. Is there any reason to think that God is one way over 
the other? What ultimate difference, if any, does it make if God is mono-personal or tri-personal?    
                                                 
 3 This point will be worked out more fully in chapter one. It will suffice now to simply state, briefly, there 
are different problems of evil. Yet, one may even question the bundling together of the existential, religious, and 
emotional as referring to ‘one’ distinct problem.     
 
 4 John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 2004), 23-24.   
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 The problem of evil not only affects theists of every stripe, but all people who have been 
confronted by the tragedies and horrors of evil in the world. Each worldview5 must confront the 
reality and problems brought about by evil—problems that touch every tangent of our finite 
earthly existence. While each worldview provides an answer to such questions, not all worldview 
responses are on par with one other. Some worldviews provide a thicker response to the question 
of evil than others.6 The problem of evil raises questions related to the meaning and purpose of 
life and whether or not this life is all that there is. Is there any meaning to our finite existence or 
to the suffering we experience in the world? Is this all there is to life? Should we echo the words 
of the Apostle Paul and suggest that if this life is all there is, then “let us eat and drink, for 
tomorrow we die.”7As theologian Paul Tillich reminds us, each one of us stands in between 
being and non-being. We all teeter on the edge of life and death.8 But even if this life is all that 
there is, can a person find meaning and purpose in the face of suffering? For a serious seeker, she 
must contend with the question of what constitutes a thick worldview response to evil and how 
such a response differs from a thin worldview response. What criteria should one use when 
analyzing worldview responses to evil in the world? Which worldviews are even live options in 
the face of evil?    
                                                 
 5 While worldviews are as prevalent as there are human persons, there are, nevertheless, general features 
that places people within the confines of a broader worldview, mostly in response to how a person answers the 
question of God and ultimate reality. 
 
 6 When philosophers speak of “thick” or “thin” with respect to possible worlds or worldviews, they have in 
mind the extent to which a person finds value, meaning, and purpose within that world. A “thin” world is one where 
there is no objective value, meaning, or purpose; whereas a “thick” world is one that is teaming with such attributes. 
For a fuller discussion, see J. P. Moreland, Kingdom Triangle (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007), 26-29. 
 
 7 I Corinthians 15:32. Some consider Paul to have in mind Mender’s comedy Thais.   
 
 8 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1957), 66-75.  
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 Any adequate response to the problem of evil must answer such questions as the ones 
raised above. How does Christian theism fare with such questions in comparison to other 
worldviews? Does Christianity have within it, not only the resources to present a rational 
explanation for why evil exists in the world and an answer to what God is doing about evil (or, at 
least, why He allows it), but also the capacity to provide a response to the existential dimension 
of evil in the world? In this project I will argue that, in comparison to other major worldviews, 
Christianity provides a thick response, not only to the intellectual problem of evil, but also to the 
existential/religious problem as well. In addition, Christian theism provides a thicker response 
than other theistic worldviews. Particularly, within the central teachings of Christian theism, and 
especially the uniquely Christian teachings such as the tri-personal nature of the Christian God, 
the incarnation and resurrection of the Son of God, and the Kingdom of God, Christians have a 
robust answer to the problem of evil. I concur with William Lane Craig when he says, “As a 
Christian theist, I’m persuaded that the problem of evil, terrible as it is, does not in the end 
constitute a disproof of the existence of God. On the contrary, in fact, I think that Christian 
theism is man’s last best hope of solving the problem of evil.”9   
Purpose and Method 
 Why another work on the problem of evil? Has not much ink been spilled over this one 
topic already? Can anything new be said that has not already been said? In response to this 
challenge, there are at least four reasons why this work is needed.  
 First, while it is true that much has been written on this topic, even within the last thirty 
years or so, the problem of evil still remains a significant challenge to Christian theism. As noted 
                                                 
 9 Craig, “Problem of Evil.” 
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earlier, evil affects everyone in some way or another, and it is not just a challenge to Christianity, 
but to all worldviews. This work, in part, will consider how the Christian worldview compares 
with other major worldview systems in making sense of evil in the world. As will be argued, 
other worldviews, when confronted with evil, have difficulties of their own.  
 A second purpose of this present work is to provide a uniquely Christian response to the 
problem of evil. Philosophers of religion have largely led the charge in confronting the 
intellectual challenges brought on by the various arguments from evil. Though there have been 
some significant attempts at answering the existential problem from evil, as well, this area has 
not received nearly as much attention.10 Regarding the intellectual problem, Alvin Plantinga, in 
his monumental work, God, Freedom, and Evil, has largely put to rest the so-called logical 
problem from evil, so much so, that hardly anyone, including most atheists, accepts it as a real 
threat to theism. Even its more modest cousin, the evidential problem from evil,11 has received 
much attention by skeptical theists, such as William Alston12 and Stephen Wykstra,13 and a 
                                                 
 10 William Hasker, “On Regretting the Evils of This World,” in The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, 
edited by Michael L. Peterson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 152-167; Richard Rice, 
Suffering and the Search for Meaning (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014); Though not as prominent by 
philosophers of religion, there have been several pastorally and popular level works aimed at the existential 
problem. Consider John Thomas and Gary Habermas, Enduring Your Season of Suffering (Lynchburg, VA: Liberty 
University Press, 2011); Gary Habermas, Why is God Ignoring Me?: What to do When it Feels Like He’s Giving You 
the Silent Treatment (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, 2010); Phillip Yancey, Where Is God When It 
Hurts? A Comforting, Healing Guide for Coping with Hard Times (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990). See also 
John Swinton, Raging with Compassion (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2007). 
 
 11 William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” in The Problem of Evil, edited 
by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 26-37; Paul 
Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by 
Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 12-29.  
 
 12 William P. Alston, “The Inductive Argument from Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition,” in The 
Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1996), 97-125. 
 
 13 Stephen J. Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the 
Evils of ‘Appearance,’” in The Problem of Evil, edited by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138-160. 
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variety of other prominent philosophers.14 But where have the theologians been? This is not to 
say that no theologians have given the topic of evil due consideration;15 but, in large, theologians 
have been somewhat absent, or, at least, the ones who have been writing have largely ignored the 
work of philosophers of religion. What is said of theologians can also be said by-in-large of 
biblical scholars.16 But philosophers of religion, particularly those who are convinced of the truth 
claims of Christianity, are not entirely off the hook. Many of them have done their defense 
within the realm of a generic theism. How do we get from a generic theism to a more distinctly 
Christian theism in responding to evil? Part of my aim here is to take seriously Alvin Plantinga’s 
charge, in his highly influential essay, “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”17 Plantinga writes: 
 Christian philosophers, however, are the philosophers of the Christian community; and it is 
part of their task as Christian philosophers to serve the Christian community. But the 
Christian community has its own questions, its own concerns, its own topics for 
investigation, its own agenda, and its own research program. Christian philosophers ought 
not merely take their inspiration from what’s going on at Princeton or Berkley or Harvard, 
attractive and scintillating as that may be; for perhaps those questions and topics are not the 
ones, or not the only ones, they should be thinking about as the philosophers of the Christian 
                                                 
 14 William Hasker, The Triumph of God Over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2008); Daniel Howard-Snyder, “God, Evil, and Suffering,” In Reasons for the Hope Within, 
edited by Michael J. Murray. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 76-114; Michael L. 
Peterson, God and Evil: An Introduction to the Issues (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Alvin Plantinga, 
“Epistemic Probability and Evil,” in The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 69-96; Richard Swinburne, “Some Major Stands of Theodicy,” 
The Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1996): 30-48; Peter van Inwagen, “The Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” The 
Evidential Argument from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1996), 151-174.   
 
 15 Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross: Christian Thought and the Problem of Evil (Leicester: Apollos, 
1994); Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, translated by Margaret Kohl. First Fortress Press 
edition (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993); William A. Dembski, The End of Christianity: Finding a Good 
God in an Evil World (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 2009); John R. Schneider, “Seeing God Where the 
Wild Things Are: An Essay on the Defeat of Horrendous Evil,” Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by 
Perter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004): 226-262. 
 
 16 N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press), 2006; Terence E. 
Fretheim, Creation Untamed: The Bible, God, and Natural Disasters (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010). 
 
 17 Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” in The Analytic Theist: an Alvin Plantinga Reader, 
edited by James T. Sennett (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), 296-315.  
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community. There are other philosophical topics the Christian community must work at, and 
other topics the Christian community must work at philosophically. And obviously, 
Christian philosophers are the ones who must do the philosophical work involved. If they 
devote their best efforts to the topics fashionable in the non-Christian philosophical world, 
they will neglect a crucial and central part of their task as Christian philosophers. What is 
needed here is more independence, more autonomy with respect to the projects and concerns 
of the non-theistic philosophical world.18 
 
Elsewhere he continues, 
 
 But this means that the Christian philosophical community need not devote all of its efforts 
to attempting to refute opposing claims and/or to arguing for its own claims, in each case 
from premises accepted by the bulk of the philosophical community at large. It ought to do 
this, indeed, but it ought to do more. For if it does only this, it will neglect a pressing 
philosophical task: systematizing, deepening, clarifying Christian thought on these topics. 
So here again: my plea is for the Christian philosopher, the Christian philosophical 
community, to display, first, more independence and autonomy: we needn’t take as our 
research projects just those projects that currently enjoy widespread popularity; we have our 
own questions to think about. Secondly, we must display more integrity. We must not 
automatically assimilate what is current or fashionable or popular by way of philosophical 
opinion and procedures; for much of it comports ill with Christian ways of thinking. And 
finally, we must display more Christian self-confidence or courage or boldness. We have a 
perfect right to our pre-philosophical views: why, therefore, should we be intimidated by 
what the rest of the philosophical world thinks plausible or implausible?19 
 
 As a part of the Christian philosophical community, the problem of evil should, no less, 
be considered from a uniquely Christian perspective. As Plantinga argues, the Christian 
community has its own questions about the problems arising from evil in the world. A question I 
want to consider in this present work is whether generic theism can provide the kind of robust 
answer to evil that is needed. Moreover, I want to consider how the unique doctrines of 
Christianity, such as the Trinity, incarnation, resurrection of Jesus, and kingdom of God play a 
vital role in answering the problem of evil. Along the same lines, how does the reality of evil in 
the world shape every area of Christian theology? Lastly, I want to consider, from the Christian 
                                                 
 18 Ibid., 298-299.  
 
 19 Ibid., 312.  
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perspective, what it is that God is doing about evil in the world? How does God’s activity in the 
world, according to the Christian worldview, compare, say, with other theistic worldviews?  
 Thirdly, this project aims to be an attempt at constructive theology, or, perhaps, analytic 
theology, and integrative in nature, bringing together the best insights from theologians, 
philosophers, and biblical scholars on the problem of evil. Sadly, philosophers are often 
unsatisfied with the work of theologians; whereas, biblical scholars and theologians often think 
they can begin and do their disciplines apart from philosophy. The truth is, as a part of the 
Christian community, all of these disciplines are needed and are working toward a common 
objective. This is all the more the case when considering the problem of evil.   
 Fourth, and lastly, this work serves to bring together a response to both the intellectual 
and existential problems of evil. Philosophers have rightly understood these two problems as 
distinct and that we should approach them differently; however, they have done so almost at the 
risk of severing the two. While evil raises significant intellectual problems for the theist, it is also 
a very real existential feature of reality that the theist must deal with. For any worldview that 
seeks to confront the problem of evil, it must do so in a multi-dimensional way. It must not only 
meet the intellectual demands raised by the problem of evil, but it should also provide a response 
to the existential dimension. Christian theism, as I shall argue, provides a robust answer to both 
dimensions of the problem of evil.  
 So how might one go about such a task? There are four legs to my approach. First, I 
begin by comparing different worldview responses to the problem of evil. While there are many 
views on God’s nature and relationship to the world, there are at least three, understood in 
generally broad terms, which serve as “live options”: theism, pantheism, and panentheism. The 
God of theism is typically understood to be personal, creator of all things, omnipotent, 
9 
 
omniscient, omnibenevolent, eternal, and the like.20 God, for theists, exists independently of the 
world. As the Creator of all things, the world depends on God and not the other way around. 
Pantheists, on the other hand, generally hold to God as both impersonal and identical (in some 
sense or another) with the world. But there is a third option—panentheism. Panentheism is a 
mixture of theism and pantheism. Panentheists understand God as, in some sense, dependent on 
the world for it actualization, but, yet, God transcends the world. Taken along with naturalism, 
theism, pantheism, and panentheism become the major worldview contenders for explaining evil 
in the world. Each of the three theological worldviews has quite a different take on the nature 
and existence of evil and on what God is doing (or can do) about evil in the world. But 
naturalists, too, must explain evil’s place in the world.        
 Having argued for theism as the best explanation for the phenomena of evil in the world, 
I move to the second leg of my method—consideration on whether or not generic theism is a 
viable option for answering the questions raised by evil in the world. By “generic theism” I have 
in mind the classical concept of God held by Jews, Muslims, Christians, and certain African and 
Hindu religions. According to this view, God is the omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, 
eternal, and personal, uncaused Creator of all things. The term “generic” does not mean how 
people commonly take it today, as if the thing in question is “cheap” or “of poor quality”; rather, 
generic connotes the idea of something being “wide-spread” or “common.” In this case, generic 
theism means the common or wide-spread understanding of God, one that many theistic 
worldviews could adopt. It would be helpful to clarify up front that I do not fundamentally 
disagree with this understanding of God. Thinking of God in such a way helps to bring into 
                                                 
 20 Though, even here, some theists may not emphasize all of the specified attributes above in order to 
answer why God allows evil. For example, adherents of a view such as finite godism limit God’s omnipotence in 
order to accommodate for certain features of their worldview.    
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sharper focus certain core features of what God is like. However, generic theism is, as I will 
argue, inadequate in providing a robust answer to the question of evil in the world. The Christian 
concept of God, a God who is essentially tri-personal, provides the kind of explanatory power 
needed to make sense of not only the intellectual problem of evil, but also the religious or 
existential problem.  
 The third leg will examine various theodicies that have been proposed to justify why God 
allows evil in the world. Many, if not most, of the theodicies considered provide valuable 
insights for why God allows evil. But in-and-of-themselves these theodicies fall short, again, in 
providing proper explanatory power. Most of the theodicies considered adopt a greater good 
hypothesis, that is to say, that evils are in some sense necessary in order to bring about a greater 
good in God’s overarching purposes. As will be argued, there are problems with taking this route 
for the Christian theist, namely, that it requires 1) an overly meticulous form of sovereignty, 
often taking away human responsibility and 2) that there are no gratuitous evils in the world. 
Lastly, most of the theodicies considered can be used to work with a great number of theisms, 
and do not do much by way of arguing specifically for Christian theism. This leads to the last 
part of my proposal.      
  In the fourth leg of this project I will attempt to tease out a new theodicy. A theodicy is 
an attempt at justifying God’s goodness in the face of evil in the world.21 I am hesitant to use the 
word “theodicy” in describing my aim in this project, since theodicies are often viewed as 
inadequate or incapable of providing a satisfying answer to all of the evils that we encounter, and 
since I believe I am doing more than offering a theodicy. According to C. Stephen Layman, 
when offering a response to evil, the theist has four argumentative strategies available: 1) offer a 
                                                 
 21 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 243. 
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theodicy; 2) show that the arguments from evil against theism are flawed; 3) argue that, though 
evil counts against theism, natural theology and religious experience warrant theism and thus 
“override” the evidence of evil against theism; and 4) argue that though theism does not answer 
all of the evils that take place in the world, it provides an explanation that is as good or better 
than its metaphysical competitors. Layman calls this last approach “The Comparative 
Response.”22 This work will seek to forge (1) and (4) as an argumentative strategy. After all, the 
Christian worldview, worked out from reflection on the pages of the Bible, is itself, in a real 
sense, a response to evil.23 This point is often neglected in discussions related to the problem of 
evil. But what makes the proposal here different from other theodicies? The chief difference is 
that the theodicy I am proposing is one that examines the comprehensive response of a 
worldview system, namely the Christian worldview, to the problem of evil. I am aware that there 
is not just one Christian theism and that, even among the major divisions of Christianity, such as 
Protestants or Catholics, there are divisions upon divisions. This approach, then, will be 
something like putting forth a mere Christian theism. My goal is not to argue for one stripe of 
Christian theism over another, but, rather, to look at the chief features of the Christian 
worldview, beliefs that are shared by most all Christian traditions. It is inevitable in a project like 
this to emphasize certain beliefs (or twists on beliefs) over others, and there is no doubt that, 
perhaps, my own traditional biases will come out. I will do all that I can to keep such biases in 
check. It may be that if this project is successful other Christian traditions will have to modify or 
adjust some of the aspects of this proposal to fit with their own traditions.  
                                                 
 22 C. Peter Layman, “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 54 (2003): 1. Cf. Jeremy Evans, The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs 
(Broadman & Holman Publishing, 2013), 113-131. 
 
 23 I owe this insight to John Hick, who, in Evil and the God of Love, attempts to provide a Christian 
theodicy. See also N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God.    
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 In certain ways, the theodicy that I am here proposing, which I have dubbed, the 
Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy, is an extension of the free will theodicy/defense, though it 
will certainly contain important elements from various other theodicies, such as soul-making 
theodicies and natural law/creation order theodicies. Why trinitarian? That a theodicy begin with 
the Trinity is important for various reasons. First, the Christian view of God as a tri-unity of 
persons sets it apart from the various other theistic contenders, in that, God, as a tri-personal 
being, is, in His very nature, essentially good and loving, which, as I shall argue, is a harder 
thesis to defend if God is merely unitarian or one person. Second, if God is tri-personal, as 
Christians believe, then at the center of all reality is a loving relationship among persons. As will 
be argued, that God exists as a tri-unity of persons in loving relationship has explanatory power 
for 1) why God created humans with certain creaturely freedoms, 2) why human creaturely 
communities, and the rest of creation, too, require significant interdependence and inter-
relationality for things to work properly, 3) why evil works against such features in God’s good 
world, and 4) what God is doing about evil in the world (particularly through the work of the 
incarnate and raised Son and the empowering work of the Holy Spirit).  
 The Christian concept of perichoresis also plays a significant part in the theodicy that I 
am putting forth. Perichoresis is an ancient Christian doctrine, which expresses the 
interpenetrating relationship between the persons of the Trinity. Some of the Church Fathers, 
particularly from the Eastern tradition, have understood the notion of perichoresis as giving 
insight not only to the Trinity, but also to the incarnation and life in the Kingdom.24 This project 
                                                 
 24 Verna Harrison, “Perichoresis in the Greek Fathers,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(1991), 63-65.  
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will especially consider the connections between perichoresis and the Trinity, firstly, and, 
secondly, perichoresis with respect to the Kingdom of God.    
Key Terms and Concepts 
 As with any philosophical or theological work, it is of upmost importance to consider key 
terminology in order to avoid ambiguity or equivocation. Below I seek to establish parameters 
for thinking about some of the key concepts surrounding discussions on the problem from evil. I 
give consideration to the various kinds and types of evil (e.g., moral, natural, and gratuitous) as 
well as the often neglected distinction between pain and suffering. While philosophers and 
theologians are often careful to distinguish between moral, natural, and gratuitous evils, that is 
not always the case with respect to pain and suffering. Generally, the latter are often lumped 
together without giving any significant consideration to the possible distinctions between them. 
Lastly, I consider what theists mean when they speak of God and creation as being good.          
Evil, Kinds of Evil, and the Good 
 When asked to define evil, our response might be like that of Augustine’s on time: “If no 
one asks me, I know; but if I wish to explain it to one who asks, I know not.”25 Some have 
concluded that evil is indefinable, much like the word “person.” We know a person when we see 
one, even if we cannot arrive at a clear or concise definition of what constitutes personhood. 
Perhaps the same is true of evil. Perhaps we do not have sufficient conditions for classifying 
something as evil. Nevertheless, even if that is the case, it does not mean that we have no 
                                                 
 25 Augustine, Confessions, 11.14.   
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parameters or boundaries for considering just what it means to call something evil. In what 
follows, I seek to sketch out some parameters for thinking about evil.26  
 Before moving on to a discussion on the nature of evil, it would be helpful to make some 
preliminary distinctions between different kinds of evil. Philosophers and theologians have 
recognized that evil comes in two forms: moral evil and natural evil. Moral evils are such that 
the evil produced is the result of a moral agent. Murder, rape, genocide, and bio-chemical 
warfare are all examples of evil produced by a moral agent. Natural evils, on the other hand, 
refer to those evils that come about through some kind of non-human means. When human (or 
animal) life has been devastated by such natural events as hurricanes, tornados, or tsunamis, such 
is classified as natural evil. Natural evils may also come about through disease. Some 
philosophers even classify certain unintentional actions brought by human agents as belonging to 
natural evil. An example of such a case might include a child injured due to dashing out in front 
of an oncoming vehicle. In such a case the driver would not be held morally culpable, since the 
action was not intentional on the part of the driver.27 It may also be helpful to consider that some 
evils, which appear to be a result of natural processes, are, rather, the result of moral agency. 
Examples of this variety include evils caused by pollution or forest fires. One final category is 
the notion of gratuitous or horrendous evils. Gratuitous evils are those kinds of evils that are 
seemingly pointless to us. They seem to serve no purpose for why they occur in the world. There 
seems to be no justification for why God might allow such evils.   
                                                 
 26 For now I only deal with the Christian understanding of evil. I will flesh out other perspectives when 
examining how the adherents of other worldviews think about evil in chapter one.   
 
 27 Bruce R. Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), xi. 
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 Classifying evils as “moral,” “natural,” or “gratuitous” sheds some light on thinking 
about evil, but such a classification does nothing by way of telling us just what evil is. How 
should we understand the nature of evil? Christians have generally sided with Augustine’s view 
that evil is privatio boni—the “absence” or “privation” of good.28 In the Enchiridion, Augustine 
described privatio boni as follows:      
 In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health; for 
when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present—namely, the 
diseases and wounds—go away from the body and dwell elsewhere: they altogether cease to 
exist; for the wound or disease is not a substance but a defect in the fleshly substance—the 
flesh itself being a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils—that is, 
privations of the good which we call health—are accidents. Just in the same way, what are 
called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. And when they are cured, 
they are not transferred elsewhere: when they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot 
exist anywhere else.29     
 
As Augustine worked out his views on evil, he had one eye on neo-Platonic thought and the 
other on the narrative of Genesis. From Genesis, Augustine understood that God created all 
things good and that the whole taken together was “very good.” Evil, for Augustine, is something 
that exists in reality; however, it does not have being of its own. Much like a parasite needs its 
host in order to remain alive, evil, for Augustine, could not exist apart from the good.30 Working 
from within a Neo-Platonic framework, Augustine equated being with goodness. A thing that it 
is a good without any evil is considered to be a “perfect good.”31 An example of such a good 
would be God, who is “supremely and unchangeably good.”32 Yet, because God is supremely or 
                                                 
 28 Augustine, Enchiridion, 11   
 
 29 Ibid.   
 
 30 This perspective on evil is not new to Augustine, but was promoted by other Church Fathers, such as 
Athanasius, who saw evil as “non-being.” Evil is, says Athanasius, “the negation and antithesis of good.” See 
Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 1.4.   
 
 31 Augustine, Enchiridion, 13. 
 
 32 Ibid., 12.  
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unchangeably good, He, unlike all created goods, is incapable of corruption. Goods that have 
been corrupted are “faulty” or “imperfect” goods.33 But because God created all things good, as 
put forth by the Genesis narrative, no particular thing can exist and be completely corrupt at the 
same time; otherwise, it would cease to be.34  
 Philosopher of religion, John Hick, who also stands broadly within the Christian 
tradition, finds Augustine’s view wanting. Hick, in Evil and the God of Love, seems to affirm the 
biblical teaching that God is supremely good, and that creation itself, too, is good, in a derivative 
way. Yet, he questions whether Augustine (and Aquinas) too readily accepts the neo-Platonic 
equation of being with goodness, going beyond the simple affirmation of Scripture.35 
Augustine’s defense of holding to the neo-Platonic equation of good with being rests in his 
acceptance of the greater chain of being, “the claim that certain characteristics, which are 
necessarily present in different degrees in every existent thing—principally ‘measure, form, and 
order’,—are intrinsically good. To possess these characteristics is to be a part of the continuum 
of entities constituting the created universe, so that to exist is, as such, to be good.”36 However, 
says Hick, Augustine provides no philosophical arguments for accepting this principle; rather, it 
is a holdover from the neo-Platonic view of reality. Further, claims Hick, “there appears to be no 
basis within Christian theology for affirming the intrinsic goodness of existence in any other than 
the biblical sense that God wills and values the world that he has created.”37 For Hick, to affirm 
                                                 
 
 33 Ibid., 13.  
 
 34 Ibid.  
 
 35 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 172.   
 
 36 Ibid., 171. 
 
 37 Ibid.  
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that creation is good is only to affirm that it “is willed and valued by God.”38 But such an 
affirmation of creation’s goodness, says Hick, “does not entail any metaphysical doctrine of the 
identity of being and goodness; nor does there appear to be any adequate reason to adopt such a 
doctrine.”39  
 So how are we to think of evil? Hick believes that one must distinguish between the 
theological insight that “evil is the going wrong of something good,” which he thinks follows 
from the Christian teaching on God and creation, and evil as “nothingness or nonbeing.”40 The 
Augustinian approach to evil, however, is inadequate, in that, it does not fully capture evil’s true 
nature in light of human experience. There is no doubt that evil is a reality for Hick. It is both a 
“positive” and “powerful” element of human experience. “Empirically,” says Hick, “it is not 
merely the absence of something else but a reality with its own distinctive and often terrifying 
quality of power.”41 It does not take much reflection to see the limitations and inadequacy of the 
privation understanding of evil as an empirical description. Hick argues, 
 What we call evil in nature can, it is true, often be regarded as consisting in the corruption or 
perversion or disintegration of something which, apart from such disruption, is good. . . . 
Volcanic eruptions, droughts, tornadoes, hurricanes, and planetary collisions can perhaps 
likewise be regarded as breakdowns in some imagined ideal ordering of nature. In all such 
cases the evil state of affairs can plausibly be seen as the collapse of a good state of affairs, 
and as tending toward non-existence, at least in the relative sense of the dissolution of a 
previously established arrangement of life or matter. But does such an account really lay 
bare that aspect of the event or of the situation that makes us call it evil? Do we regard a 
volcanic eruption, for example, as evil considered simply as a loss of a previous ‘measure, 
form and order’? Do we not, on the contrary, regard it as evil only if it causes harm to 
human, or at least to sentient life? Is the eruption of a volcano an uninhabited island, or 
(assuming it to be uninhabited) on Venus, an evil? Or again, is the natural decay of 
vegetation in virgin jungle to be accounted evil? Or the burning up of a star or the 
                                                 
 38 Ibid., 172.  
 
 39 Ibid.  
 
 40 Ibid., 180.  
 
 41 Ibid., 55.  
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fragmentation of a meteor a million million light years distant from us in space? If not, the 
quality of evil is not attributed to physical disintegration as such, but only in so far as it 
impinges deleteriously upon the realm of the personal, or at least upon the sphere of animal 
life. It is in fact not loss of ‘measure, form and order’ per se that is evil, but only this 
considered as a cause of pain and suffering.42  
 
It is not so much, then, that natural occurrences, such as tornados or tsunamis, are evils in and of 
themselves, but, rather, how such events move into the realm of the personal or sphere of animal 
life, causing pain, suffering, and destruction. But even in those cases of evils caused by human 
agency, it seems that the privation view is all the more inadequate of a response. It is not merely 
the devaluation or absence of the good, but “it can be a terrifying positive force in the world.”43 
Hick explains, “Cruelty is not merely an extreme absence of kindness, but is something with a 
demonic power of its own. Hatred is not merely lack of love, or malevolence merely in minimum 
degree of goodwill.”44Moral evils, it would seem, go beyond “merely privations of their 
corresponding moral goods.”45 
 Given Hick’s critique of Augustine’s notion of the privation view, how should one think 
of evil? Is there any hope for the privationist view? In their essay, “Evil is Privation,” Bill Anglin 
and Stewart Goetz argue that privationists are at least minimally committed to the belief that 
“evil is evil just insofar as there is a privation of something which ought to be there.”46 This 
seems right, to me at least, but it does nothing by the way of answering Hick’s objection that 
something like hatred seems to go beyond a mere lack of love. If a theist is going to maintain the 
                                                 
 42 Ibid., 55-56.  
  
 43 Ibid., 57.  
 
 44 Ibid.  
 
 45 Ibid.  
 
 46 Bill Anglin and Steward Goetz, “Evil Is Privation.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13, 
no. 1 (1982), 4.  
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privation view, it must, at least, be able to accommodate Hick’s objection regarding the positive 
nature of evil in the world. Perhaps, reflection on the goodness of God and the goodness of 
creation will provide some insights, here.   
 Most theists recognize that God is essentially good. This is especially the case for 
Christian theists. Christians, along with Jews, hold to a further claim that all that God made is 
good. At the climax of the creation account in Genesis 1, we read that God pronounced all He 
had made was “very good.”47 Therefore, in working out a view of evil, Christians, and, perhaps, 
Jews too, will want to preserve both God’s goodness and the goodness of what God had made, 
something that the privation view does well. As noted earlier, God is essentially good; creation, 
on the other hand, is good in a derivative sense, in that it is contingently so. By saying that 
creation is “derivatively” and “contingently” good, I do not mean that God could have created 
something evil, but only that God, who is the creator of all things, is the only being who is good 
necessarily. Any other thing that exists is dependent on God for its existence, thus contingent. 
Those things that are derivatively good are so because they find their source in God, who is 
necessarily good.  
 But what, here, do Christians mean by “good”? Thomas Morris suggests a two-fold claim 
for understanding God’s goodness. First, a theist might think of God as being wholly good. By 
this, the Christian theist means that God has no defects or blemishes. As Morris points out, this 
understanding of God’s goodness means that “God never does anything which is ultimately 
wrong or evil” and that “His character contains no flaw, and he is subject to no moral 
                                                 
 47 Genesis 1:31.  
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weakness.”48 Secondly, as previously noted, God is necessarily good.49 To speak of God as 
necessarily good means that “God is so firmly entrenched in goodness, or alternately, that 
goodness is so entrenched in God, that it is strictly impossible for there to be in him any sort of 
flaw or defect,” that is to say, “he is utterly invulnerable to evil.”50 It goes to follow that if God is 
essentially good, then those actions which God perform must also be good.51  
 But how are we to understand the goodness of creation? Biblical scholars and theologians 
often debate on whether interpreters should understand Scripture, on certain issues, as using 
“being” language or “functional” language. In his recent book, The Lost World of Genesis One, 
Hebrew and Ancient Near-Eastern scholar, John Walton, builds a case that the Genesis one 
narrative is one of “functional” ontology and not “material” ontology. When pondering 
existence, we can think of something as existing in more than one way, says Walton. For 
example, as I look at my coffee cup, I think of its material composition. I consider the various 
types of material used to compose my cup, the various elements within the paint, the smoothness 
of the edges, and so on. However, I can also look at my coffee cup and think in a different way 
on why it exists as it does. What is its purpose? Why is it shaped as it is? The former 
understanding of my coffee cup has to do with questions concerning material ontology; whereas 
the latter has to do with questions concerning its functional ontology. Walton argues that people 
from the ancient near-eastern world were far less concerned about material existence as they 
                                                 
 48 Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Vancouver: Regent 
College Publishing, 1991), 48.  
 
 49 Ibid.  
 
 50 Ibid.  
 
 51 Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God, 133.  
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were about functional existence. Much of the problem for modern interpreters has to do with 
how we moderns view ontology. Walton explains: 
 When we speak of cosmic ontology these days, it can be seen that our culture views 
existence, and therefore meaning, in material terms. Our material view of ontology in turn 
determines how we think about creation, and it is easy to see how. If ontology defines the 
terms of existence, and creation means to bring something into existence, then one’s 
ontology sets the parameters by which one thinks about creation. Creation of a chair would 
be a very different process than the creation of a company. Since in our culture we believe 
that existence is material, we consequently believe that to create something means to bring 
its material properties into existence. Thus our discussions of origins tend to focus on 
material origins.52   
 
However, “people in the ancient world,” argues Walton, “believed that something existed not by 
virtue of its material properties, but by virtue of its having a function in an ordered system.”53 By 
“ordered system,” we are not speaking in scientific terms; rather, it has to do with “an ordered 
system in human terms, that is, in relation to society and culture.”54 Walton continues,  
 In this sort of functional ontology, the sun does not exist in virtue of its material properties, 
or even in its function as a burning ball of gas. Rather it exists by virtue of the role that it has 
in its sphere of existence, particularly in the way that it functions for humankind and human 
society. . . . In a functional ontology, to bring something into existence would require giving 
it a function or a role in an ordered system, rather than giving it material properties. 
Consequently, something could be manufactured physically but still not “exist” if it has not 
become functional.55 
    
Walton’s view of the Genesis 1 narrative is controversial, since many theologians today still 
think of the narrative of Genesis 1 in terms of having to do with material origins. My purpose, 
here, is not to solve the debate between “function” and “material” ontology in the ancient world; 
                                                 
 52 John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 24-25.   
 
 53 Ibid., 26.  
 
 54 Ibid.  
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rather, it is to bring Walton’s insight on ontology into our discussion on the nature of the 
goodness of creation.  
 When we think of the goodness of God’s creation, perhaps much of what the biblical 
writers had in mind had to do with, not merely the substance of the thing made, which 
privationist theories have often placed emphasis on, but also the function given to that thing that 
was made. This insight, it seems, is one that those who promote the privation theory of evil often 
fail to emphasize. Evil does not have to do with the corruption of the thing only but also a 
disruption to the order and function that God assigned to certain things within creation.  
 So as not to equivocate on terms, confusing Walton’s emphasis on function within an 
ordered system with how I’m going to use the notion in this project, it may be helpful to think of 
God establishing more than one order—or, perhaps better, distinctions within that one order—the 
natural order of creation and the moral order of creation. By natural order, I mean the order in 
which God established the world or universe to function in a certain way. Here, one might 
include such things as the laws of nature, or, more accurately, law-like regulating principles. 
These regulating principles generally describe the ‘goings on’ of the universe, such as the need 
for things like gravity or plate tectonics crashing into one another in order for the world to 
operate as it does. If, indeed, God created the universe to operate in such a way, then, perhaps, 
when the text describes all that God had made as good, it may include such things. Now, surely, 
the biblical writers did not have a scientific worldview when they wrote about the goodness of 
creation, nor did they posit such things as law-like regulating principles behind the ‘goings on’ in 
the world (at least not as far as we know); nevertheless, they did understand that reality 
functioned in an orderly way, and this was the result of God’s bringing it about to do so. The 
emphasis on goodness, then, is not so much on the “how” God brought about order within 
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creation (whatever that may include), but, rather, that there is order to the way things are to 
function in the world that God has made. That stones fall to the ground when dropped or waves 
crash into the shore of a beach are examples of the goodness of creation, because these are part 
of the fabric of the natural created order as God intended.  
 Much of the same could be said with respect to the moral ordering of things. The moral 
order of creation has to do with God’s establishing that some of His creatures with a capacity to 
perform certain morally significant actions are to function in a certain way within the larger 
framework of the natural order. There is a moral fabric that runs through the whole of God’s 
intentions for these creaturely moral agents to operate within such a world. Goodness, here, then, 
refers to the order in which moral agents are intended to function within the world that God has 
made. When humans and, perhaps, angels too, comply with how God intended them to function 
as moral agents, then such is good, since these kinds of things line up with the fabric of the moral 
order God intended for creation.  
 Whether Genesis 1 establishes material origins or not is debatable, but Genesis 1 is not 
the only passage within Scripture which emphasizes that the spacio-temporal universe came into 
existence ex nihilo.56 Traditionally, Christians have held to the belief that God brought all things 
into existence out of nothing, using no pre-existing materials to make and form the universe, as 
Platonists thought and as Process theologians today believe.57 If God created all things, then that 
which God brought into existence is good. Otherwise, if God created something that was 
                                                 
 56 John 1:3; 1 Corinthians 8:6; Colossians 1:16-18; Hebrews 1:2-3, 10-12. Theologians have based the 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo on arguments from God’s eternality. For an excellent defense of creation ex nihilo, see 
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(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005).  
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essentially evil, then God is to be held responsible for the origin of that evil. Further, if, as I have 
been arguing, goodness in creation refers to, not only the thing created, but also to the ordering 
of how things are to function, including how moral agents are to function within the larger 
universe, then an evil is not merely the privation of the good of some “thing,” but can also be 
ascribed to the absence of some good as it relates to God’s intentions for the created order, 
particularly the moral order.  
 Privation, then, would seem to be an important aspect of something being ‘evil’ or having 
‘badness’. Here, we might concur with Brian Davies when speaking of our descriptions of 
something that is evil. 
  To say that something is bad or in a bad way assumes that we have a sense of what it would 
be like for it not to be so (just as to say that someone is ill assumes that we have a sense of 
what it would be like for someone to be well). If ‘good’ is a logically attributive adjective . . 
. , it sets a standard for things as we describe them as being bad since its use depends on our 
understanding of a noun. We do not understand what is being said when told that something 
is a bad X unless we have a sense of what it would be to be a good X. If rotten apples were 
the norm, we would not understand what a bad apple is. So we are indeed complaining when 
calling something bad . . . . And in doing so we are, I think, always noting that something is 
not as good as it could or should be.58 
 
The key in understanding the privationist view of evil is not so much in understanding that the 
privation of the good in view is the good’s opposite, but, rather, that something is not how it 
should be. It is out of sorts, so to speak.59 So when Hick speaks of hatred as not being merely a 
lack of love, he is right, since a lack of love might also include something like indifference or 
greediness. That is not to say, however, that when a person exhibits hatred toward another that 
nothing is lacking. As Davies rightly notes, we understand that something is a bad X because we 
have a sense of what some good X looks like. When a person exhibits hatred toward another 
                                                 
 58 Brian Davies, “Reply to Mark Robson on Evil as Privation,” New Blackfriars 94, 1053 (September 
2013): 567.  
 
 59 Perhaps we too readily bifurcate between ontology and morality when it comes to a thing’s goodness.  
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person, it may be the case that love is lacking, but there might also be other qualities missing, 
such as a lack of kindness or a desire to bring about unity. But beyond these, hatred toward 
others breaks into a failure to maintain God’s intentions in keeping with the moral order of 
creation. We know what it looks like for things like harmony and peace to be exhibited within 
creation. Hatred is in contrast to and brings about a lack in such an order.  
 Whether I have answered Hick’s objection or not remains to be seen. Nevertheless, both 
Hick and the privationist account of evil recognize that evil is a reality in the world. Before 
finishing this section, it would be helpful to consider one final point. Certain religions like 
Zoroastrianism, and even some Christians, believe that reality consists of two eternal opposing 
forces, such as God and Satan. The Christian view has classically rejected this way of thinking, 
since as noted above, God alone is the creator of all things and a necessary being. Satan, who is a 
created being and contingent, owes his existence to God, along with any power that he may have. 
Christians thus reject any notion that evil is eternal or personal and that it is an entity equal to 
God. 
 In summary, it seems that we can draw four conclusions about the nature of evil from the 
Christian perspective: 1) evil is a part of reality and not just an illusion; 2) evil is not a creation 
of God, nor is it a substance, person, or force; 3) evil cannot exist apart from the good (though it 
is true that good can exist apart from evil); and 4) evil is the absence, privation, or lack of some 
good, whether in a thing or in God’s intentions for the moral created order.  
Pain and Suffering 
 In the literature on the problem of evil, too often the words “pain” and “suffering” are 
used interchangeably. There are, as we shall see, certain important reasons for not equating the 
two. I would also contend with Eleonore Stump that the problem from evil has more to do with 
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suffering, and not so much natural evil, since, as she rightly expresses, had there not been any 
sentient beings who are affected by things such as hurricanes or tsunamis, there would be no 
cause to raise question about the evils that occur in nature. Even with respect to moral evils, that 
which we are most concerned with is the suffering that results from the moral actions of human 
creatures.60 
 Pain, then, can be construed in one of two ways: physical pain and mental pain. Physical 
pain, as I take it, has to do with our physical equipment and it can occur on a variety of levels or 
degrees. For example, pricking my finger does not amount to the same sensation of discomfort as 
breaking my leg. Both experiences result in pain, but not of the same sort or degree.  
 Mental pain, on the other hand, has to do with those pains that are more emotionally or 
psychologically oriented. A person can experience mental pain without having any physical 
sensation whatsoever. Modern day lepers are examples of people who experience mental anguish 
brought on because of their physical deformities, rejection by the people around them, or their 
inabilities to accomplish certain daily tasks, yet, they feel no bodily pain. Surgeon and leprosy 
specialist, Paul Brand, recounts a story of a young girl named Tanya, whose rare genetic defect, 
commonly known as “congenital indifference to pain,” resulted in her eventually having both 
legs amputated, the loss of most of her fingers, a lacerated tongue due to an obsessive habit of 
chewing on it, constant dislocated elbows, and chronic sepsis caused by ulcers on her limbs and 
appendages. At one point in his book, The Gift of Pain, Brand tells a story of Tanya’s mother 
finding her as a young child doodling on a piece of paper with what seemed to be red liquid. But 
to her shock and horror, Tanya had bitten off the tip of her finger and was making designs out of 
                                                 
 60 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 4. 
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her own blood, while all the time going on as if nothing had ever happened to her.61 Tanya, and 
many like her, cannot feel pain physically. Their nerve receptors do not function properly. When 
they do damage to their bodies, they are often not aware of it, resulting in certain deformities 
because of infection and gangrene, which requires the removal of the person’s limbs or 
appendages. Yet, their inability to have the physical sensation of pain, nevertheless, causes much 
mental anguish. In his years of working with lepers, and others with nerve related complications, 
Brand has concluded that life without physical pain can bring about just as much suffering as a 
life with it. On this point Brand says, “If I held in my hands the power to eliminate physical pain 
from the world, I would not exercise it. My work with pain-deprived patients has proved to me 
that pain protects us from destroying ourselves.”62 This is not to trivialize the horrible effects of 
physical pain. Physical pain, if unchecked, “saps physical strength and mental energy, and can 
come to dominate a person’s entire life.” 63 Yet, for most people, says Brand, we live our lives 
somewhere between the two extremes of painlessness and chronic illness.64  
  Despite its often debilitating effects, it would seem, then, that pain has a significantly 
important role in the way that we live our lives daily, without which we would not function 
properly in the world. Take, for example, something as seemingly trivial as shifting one’s weight 
while standing. Those whose pain receptors are working optimally shift their weight often while 
standing or they change up their patterns when walking. Such shifting and changing are brought 
on by minor physical discomforts that the person experiences. Failure to make shifts while 
                                                 
 61 Paul Brand and Philip Yancey, The Gift of Pain: Why We Hurt and What We Can Do about It (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1997), 4-5. 
 
 62 Ibid., 219.  
 
 63 Ibid.    
 
 64 Ibid.  
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standing or to change one’s pattern while walking can result in serious bodily complications, 
which is what happens to lepers when they do not consciously change their walking patterns or 
shift their weight when standing. There are, however, other reasons to think pain is only prima 
facie bad. As Eleonore Stump argues: 
 Furthermore, even pain is bad only prima facie, other things being equal; and other things 
are not always equal. To see this, consider that, for a variety of reasons, human beings 
voluntarily submit themselves to pain they could otherwise avoid—that is, pain that is not 
necessary for life or health. Perhaps the most obvious case in our culture has to do with 
athletics, where the best athletes put themselves through agonies in the interests of athletic 
excellence. We might suppose that in cases of this sort pain is only a necessary 
accompaniment to something that we would be glad enough to have without the pain if we 
could. But even if, contrary to appearances, this is true as regards athletics, not all cases in 
which people voluntarily accept pain they could forgo can be similarly explained away. 
Many women refuse anesthetics in childbirth, for example, although the baby would be born 
without the mother’s pain just as well as with it.65   
 
Yet, when people willing submit themselves to certain pains, we often do not consider such as an 
evil, as Stump continues, 
 We are not inclined to raise the problem of evil in connection with the voluntarily accepted 
pains of childbirth, not only because the sufferer has in some sense chosen the pain, but also 
because it seems that, at least in the view of the women who have chosen to forgo 
anesthetics, the experience of so-called natural childbirth (that is, childbirth with its 
attendant pain) is, somehow, a great good.66 
  
While the experience of childbirth can be extremely painful, it does not seem that such pains, 
when voluntarily chosen apart from anesthetics, are the kinds of pains that would raise the 
problem from evil, nor does it seem that it warrants some kind of justification or explanation.  
 It may be the case that both physical and mental pain might lead to suffering, but not all 
suffering is a result of pain. At the heart of suffering, Stump argues, is the notion of what a 
person most cares about. There is both an objective and subjective side to it; but not only that, 
                                                 
 65 Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness, 5-6.  
 
 66 Ibid., 6.  
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the nature of suffering itself is two-sided.67 Regarding the objective side, “Every human person,” 
says Stump, “has some care about what kind of person she is and about her flourishing as that 
kind of person. For that reason, part of what it is for her to suffer is for her to be kept, to one 
degree or another, from flourishing.”68 The subjective element, however, has to do with the 
desires of a person’s heart. On this Stump says, “Although a thing that is a heart’s desire for 
some person may (or may not) have considerable intrinsic value, the very great value it has for 
that person is a function of her commitment to it.”69 The value of a person’s heart’s desire is 
derivative from one’s care and love for it. Suffering results when we lose or when we are denied 
those things that are most desirable to our hearts. Essentially, what is bad about suffering, 
according to Stump, can be formulated in the following way:  “What is bad about the evil a 
human being suffers is that it undermines (partly or entirely) her flourishing, or it deprives her 
(in part or in whole) of the desires of her heart, or both.”70 
 Stump thinks that making a connection between what a person most cares about and 
suffering helps to explain, for example, why a person who voluntarily goes through certain 
instances of pain, such as in the case of a woman going through childbirth apart from anesthetic 
or an epidural (though she has it available to her), does not seem to be an instance that would 
raise questions pertaining to the problem from evil. As Stump explains, ordinarily pains 
associated with childbirth do not undermine a mother’s flourishing; moreover, if a mother so 
chooses voluntarily to give birth apart from medication or some other pain-reducing means, 
                                                 
 67 Ibid., 10.   
 
 68 Ibid.  
 
 69 Ibid.  
 
 70 Ibid., 11.  
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enduring such pain does not take away from her that which she cares most about. What makes 
suffering bad, then, “is that it undermines or destroys what the sufferer centrally cares about, her 
own flourishing or the desires of her heart or both.”71 However, it may not always be obvious to 
the sufferer that she is indeed suffering or that she even knows what her heart’s desire is. On the 
other side of it, she may not be aware that she is indeed flourishing or that she has obtained her 
heart’s desire. Stump has us imagine a person who thinks that she is perfectly healthy, only to 
come down with an illness and suddenly die. Yet, there may be a person who has had cancer. 
This person may have gone through treatment, while the whole time thinking that she still has 
the cancer, only to find out some time later that she is now cancer-free. The period between 
treatment and finding out she is cancer-free she thinks that she still has the cancer, when in fact 
she is healthy. Such does not mean that a person never knows when she is flourishing or when 
she has the desires of her heart; rather, all it implies is that a person’s views on her own 
flourishing or when she has the desires of her heart are not infallible. Stump’s conclusion 
regarding suffering is that it is more like ill health than it is like pain.72 On this last point she 
says, “Unlike pain, the state of our bodily health is not a matter that is invariably known to us by 
introspection or to those around us by ordinary observation. In the same way, neither 
introspection nor observation is invariably sufficient to recognize suffering. Suffering can have 
an opacity that pain typically does not.”73 
 Suffering, then, as I will be using it in this project, is concerned with that which occurs in 
human creatures (and, perhaps, angels, too); it is that which depletes the soul, keeping a person 
                                                 
 71 Ibid.  
 
 72 Ibid., 11-12.   
 
 73 Ibid., 12-13.   
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from flourishing or from having the desires of his heart. The suffering of a person may be 
connected to pain, either physical or mental; however, that need not be the case. If suffering has 
to do with a lack of flourishing or the obtaining of the desires of one’s heart, there are certain 
types of suffering, then, that are in no way tied to pain. 
Summary of Chapters 
 Having provided some working definitions in this chapter, it will now be helpful to give a 
short survey of where this project is heading. Chapters Two through Six will examine and 
evaluate four major metaphysical systems’ responses to evil in the world. I argue that of the four 
metaphysical systems, theism provides the best explanation for understanding the phenomenon 
of evil in the world and the best explanation for what God can do about evil. I will also take 
space in Chapter Six to begin arguing for expanded theism, particularly why Christian theism, 
which understands God as tri-personal, provides a more robust theistic response to evil in the 
world than other theistic views.  
In Chapter Seven I focus on the nature of the Trinity and the doctrine of perichoresis, 
both of which play a key role in the theodicy proposed in the following chapter. Along with the 
Trinity and perichoresis, several other important Christian doctrines—creation, imago Dei, fall, 
gospel, church, theosis, and kingdom of God—are considered. Finally, I begin to argue, but work 
out more extensively in Chapter Eight, that God had specific intentions in creating, which must 
be taken into consideration when offering a theodicy. I will argue that from the beginning what 
God wanted to bring about in creation is the kingdom of God—a kingdom which resembles 
God’s own perichoretic life. If the kingdom of God was the telos of creation, then God did not 
need evil in order to accomplish His goals in creating; rather all that it required was for humans 
(and, perhaps, other creatures, too, such as angels) to have a certain function within the created 
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order, along with certain capacities (particularly human libertarian freedom), challenges, and so 
forth, in order for God to bring such a kingdom about through them. Yet, given the finite nature 
of anything that is not God, evil was bound to come about, particularly if such creatures were 
given libertarian freedom. The manifestation of evil was no surprise to God. Even before 
creating God made provisions, particularly through the plan of the atoning work of the Son and 
through the life-renewing work of the Holy Spirit. All of this lays the ground work for an attempt 
at proposing a theodicy in Chapter Eight, to which I now turn.  
I begin Chapter Eight by comparing three prominent theodicies: (1) Free-will 
theodicy/defense; (2) Soul-making theodicy; and (3) ‘O Felix Culpa’ theodicy. While each of 
these theodicies have certain benefits and should be worked into a response to the problem from 
evil, none provide a full answer to the question of evil in the world. Having worked through each 
of the theodicies, I then offer, what I have dubbed, “the Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy” (TPT) 
as a possible candidate.  After working out TPT, I argue that God is active in the world, working 
and fighting against evil. Central to God’s work in the world is through that of human agency. 
Humans, particularly those who are united with Christ in the Spirit, are enabled to do God’s 
work in defeating evil by means of the Son’s work in His incarnation, death, and resurrection, 
and through the empowering ministry of the Holy Spirit in the life of the church. I will then 
emphasize that it is because of God’s work that Christians have hope in conquering evil, not only 
in the world to come, where there will be no more sorrow or suffering and all things made new, 
but also in the here and now. In this way, TPT not only provides a response to the 
philosophical/theological problem from evil, but also to the religious/existential problem. Having 
worked out a proposed theodicy, the final chapter concludes the work, wrapping up all that has 
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been said and gives consideration to two objections surrounding the coherence of the doctrine of 
the Trinity. 
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CHAPTER 2: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 1  
NATURALISM 
 
 
 
 The problem of evil in the world is often couched as a religious or theological issue. 
Doubtless such is the case, but the problem of evil is also a metaphysical problem. According to 
Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman, the task of metaphysics, as a philosophical discipline, 
is to “get behind all appearances and describe things as they really are.”1 What we want to know 
is whether evil is a real feature of our world. Why is it here (if this can be explained)? Why is it 
the way that it is? Why is there so much evil in the world? What best explains the phenomena of 
evil? But for theological systems, this becomes complicated in a different way. We want to 
know, given God, why evil? What is God doing about evil, if indeed God is doing or can do 
anything about evil?  Yet, evil in the world is also a moral problem. Given a person’s worldview, 
how should one respond to evil? Is there a moral obligation to respond to evil? Since theists are 
not the only ones who raise questions about the phenomenon of evil in the world, it would seem 
reasonable to presume that all worldviews or metaphysical systems2 must contend with evil in 
the world (if there is indeed evil in the world).  
 In the next five chapters I compare and contrast four possible worldview responses to 
evil: naturalism, pantheism, panentheism, and theism.3 For this chapter, specifically, I consider 
                                                 
 1 Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman, eds., “Introduction: What is Metaphysics?,” in 
Metaphysics: The Big Questions (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 2.  
 
 2 I recognize that there are various ways of classifying worldviews. Here, I am classifying worldviews 
based on their metaphysical commitments on God and God’s relationship to the world. Hence the terms 
“worldview” and “metaphysical systems” are used interchangeably.  
 
 3 Why these four and not others? Anytime that one takes on a project such as this, one must make choices 
between alternatives for economy’s sake. Surely various other worldviews could have been considered, such as 
polytheism, henotheism, finite godism, and deism, just to name a few. There are two general reasons why I chose 
these four over others. First, each of the four worldviews considered in these chapter provides a unique perspective 
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naturalism. But before going forward in comparing each metaphysical system’s response to evil, 
I lay out the ground rules for evaluating metaphysical systems. Once the ground rules are in 
place, I then consider each of the metaphysical systems separately. Compared to the other 
metaphysical systems, I argue theism provides not only the best explanation for the phenomenon 
of evil in the world, but it also provides an overall thicker worldview response. Lastly, I consider 
the limitations of generic theism and argue that in order to provide a robust answer to the 
problem of evil—both the intellectual and existential problems—one must move from restricted 
(generic, bare, etc.) theism to expanded theism, particularly Christian theism. There is good 
reason to make this move, especially as one considers the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. As I 
will argue in later chapters, generic theism is lacking in explaining how God can be essentially 
loving—a requirement for being essentially good—and yet a necessary eternal being.  
Evaluating Metaphysical Systems 
 In Chapter One I put forth my argumentative strategy to answering the problem of evil as 
two-fold. Following C. Stephen Layman, I begin with the comparative response. From there I 
move on to present a theodicy. This chapter will focus on the former.   
 As I understand it, the comparative response need not argue that theism explains all evils 
well; rather, all that is required is that theism on the whole explains evil as well as (or better 
than) its metaphysical rivals. But what would showing that theism explains evil as well as (or 
better than) its metaphysical rivals accomplish? According to Layman, 
                                                 
on God’s relationship to the world and ultimate reality. Naturalists obviously deny that any god or gods exist. For 
the naturalist, the physical space-time universe is all that there is. If something does exist beyond the space-time 
universe, as proposed by various multi-verse theories, it would have to be more of the same. Metaphorically 
speaking, there is nothing outside the machinery of nature. The other three contenders—pantheism, panentheism, 
and theism—are theological systems, yet, each has a unique perspective on God and God’s relationship to the 
universe. Second, all four worldviews are broad metaphysical systems, accommodating for multiple perspectives 
within each. For example, the three major monotheistic religions all fall under theism, yet, there is room within 
theism to accommodate for all three perspectives.    
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 Minimally, showing this would undermine the assumption that the problem of evil is a 
problem for theists only. For example, if naturalism explains evil no better than does theism, 
then if evil is a problem for theism, evil is a problem for naturalism too. Furthermore, if 
theism explains evil as well as naturalism does, then the phenomenon of evil does not 
provide a reason for accepting naturalism over theism. Finally, if theism explains evil better 
than naturalism does, then the phenomenon of evil might actually provide a reason to accept 
theism over naturalism.4 
 
The comparative approach, as I will employ it here, is something akin to, or perhaps, a form of 
inference to the best explanation (IBE), a type of abductive reasoning often used in law courts, 
forensics, AI, history, and archeology.  
 Abductive reasoning differs from both deductive and inductive reasoning. Abduction 
does not guarantee that the conclusion follows logically and formally from the premises if they 
are true, like deductive arguments do; rather, it is more like induction in that the conclusion is 
warranted, though not guaranteed. However, unlike induction, which emphasizes a movement 
from the particulars of some set to a generalization (as understood by Aristotle) or statistical 
probability (as understood in a modern sense), abduction is concerned more with plausibility.5  
 IBE seeks to choose the best hypothesis from a pool of possible alternatives to describe 
some phenomenon in question. David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell describe the argument 
pattern in the following way: 
 We begin with a set of data points—states of affairs or established facts, the aforementioned 
phenomena in question—and construct a pool of possible explanation candidates. On the 
basis of a principled set of criteria we winnow the list down to the best explanation among 
the possibilities, and then hopefully achieve sufficient warrant to infer to it as the likely true 
explanation. The inference does not settle the matter, but produces new opportunities to 
subject the explanation to critical scrutiny to assess its effectiveness at providing further 
explanation of additional observations. Three important components of such an inference 
pattern, then, are (1) the set of salient facts requiring explanation, (2) the list of explanation 
                                                 
 4 C. Stephen Layman, “Moral Evil: The Comparative Response,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 53 (2003), 1-2.  
 
 5 For a good discussion on the differences between the three types of reasoning, particularly the views of 
Charles Saunders Peirce on comparing the three, see Douglas Walton, Abductive Reasoning (Tuscaloosa, AL: The 
University of Alabama Press, 2013), 2-17, 31-36.   
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candidates, and (3) the criteria by which we reduce the candidates down to the one that is the 
best.6  
 
In our case, then, the salient facts or state of affairs include, not only the types and kinds of evil 
in the world (moral and natural), but also the quantity and intensity of such evils, or, at least, how 
such evils appear to us, something of the phenomenology of encountering putative instances of 
evil. As noted, the candidates for explanation I consider include naturalism, pantheism, 
panentheism, and theism. No doubt others could have been chosen, but for economy’s sake, 
these four hypotheses have the most potential as live possibilities for explaining evil in the 
world. Each was chosen based on (1) how the metaphysical theory provides a unique perspective 
on God and the God-world relation and/or ultimate reality, and (2) the broadness of each 
metaphysical system, especially in how each can accommodate a variety of other perspectives 
that fall under those broader categories. Regarding this second criterion, if the broader 
metaphysical system fails in explaining the phenomenon of evil as well as or explains it less well 
than its metaphysical rivals, then so too do those perspectives that fall under it.7 Lastly, there are 
criteria by which to choose between alternative hypotheses. Let us consider such criteria, 
especially in relation to evaluating metaphysical systems as hypotheses or theories.  
 A metaphysical theory is a type of theory such that it sets out to provide an explanation or 
response to a metaphysical question. Metaphysical theories function much like how scientific 
                                                 
 6 David Baggett and Ronnie Campbell, “Omnibenevolence, Moral Apologetics, and Doubly Ramified 
Natural Theology,” Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2 (2013), 338-339.  
 
 7 For if all B’s make up a subset of A, and if A fails, then so too do all B’s. So, for example,  if theism, as a 
metaphysical system, explains less well the phenomenon of evil in the world than its metaphysical rivals, then it 
fails, and so too do all individuated perspectives (e.g., Christianity or Islam) falling under theism as an overall 
metaphysical system. But all things considered, even if, say, theism fares less well than naturalism at explaining the 
phenomenon of evil in the world, it does not mean that theism fails as an overall system. One might have other 
reasons for thinking that theism is true. Furthermore, one should recognize, however, that there are certain 
combinations that rise above these four major worldview distinctions, such as something like Christian panentheism. 
We should, then, understand this principle only as a general principle of sorts and avoid reductionism in our thinking 
about worldviews.        
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theories work, seeking to unify our experiences and make them understandable.8 Philosopher 
William Hasker provides three important criteria for evaluating metaphysical theories: factual 
adequacy, logical consistency, and explanatory power.9  
 Concerning factual adequacy, like any given scientific theory, metaphysical theories, too, 
are falsifiable, that is to say, such theories can be shown to be false. Moreover, just as scientific 
theories are built on the data that one knows to be true, so too are metaphysical theories. The 
problem, then, is this: when evaluating metaphysical theories, what are the facts that everyone 
agrees upon? For a first approximation, consider Hasker’s idea in this regard. Hasker suggests 
that the facts used to construct a metaphysical theory “must be consistent with what you know by 
other means to be true, and a theory which is inconsistent with what everybody knows (if there is 
anything which is known to everyone!) cannot be acceptable to anyone.”10   
 Hasker’s second criterion, logical consistency, suggests that a theory cannot propose two 
logically inconsistent statements. While some inconsistencies are easy to spot, others are not 
always easy to identify. An example of logical inconsistency may be that God is both timeless 
and, yet, knows what is occurring now in the world, or that a loving God seemingly does nothing 
to stop evil from occurring in the world. To some, these may seem only prima facie 
inconsistent.11  
                                                 
 8 Though, it should be noted that the two are not quite identical, especially given the nature of metaphysical 
inquiry, as we shall see below. William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1984), 25-26.    
 
 9 Ibid., 26. 
 
 10 Ibid. 
 
 11 Ibid., 27. For an extended discussion on the debate over different notions of logical consistency, 
coherence, and the divine attributes, see Ronald H. Nash, The Concept of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1983), 12-14. 
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 Explanatory power, the last of Hasker’s criteria, is important for any metaphysical theory 
in that it brings unity to the data. While all of the data may be correct and in proper order, such is 
meaningless without some kind of explanation. Thus when comparing metaphysical theories, it is 
not enough to have the data and logical consistency. Explanatory power is what helps the 
metaphysician to evaluate the various theories.12  
 There are additional criteria not mentioned by Hasker, but that are, nonetheless, 
important. For instance, there is explanatory scope, which refers to how broad a theory reaches in 
explaining the data. Another criterion is the amount of ad hoc-ness present. The less ad hoc, that 
is to say, the less “artificial” or “contrived” some theory is, the better.13 A further criterion is 
plausibility. Plausibility is evaluated by two questions: (1) how plausible of an explanation is the 
theory in itself? and (2) how plausible of an explanation the hypothesis is relative to the other 
hypotheses?14 The last criterion is that of livability. What good is a theory if, after having shown 
that it explains the data well or that it is logically consistent, it proves not to be hypothesis that 
one can live consistently with from day-to-day.    
 What does the process of comparing metaphysical rivals look like? As we have already 
noted, comparing metaphysical theories is much like comparing scientific theories. British 
philosopher Basil Mitchell compared examining metaphysical systems or worldviews to the task 
of critical exegesis or history.15 The exegete, historian, scientist, or metaphysician does not stop 
with the first piece of information or evidence that confirms her theory; rather, she keeps looking 
                                                 
 12 Hasker, Metaphysics, 27-28. 
 
 13 Baggett and Campbell, 113.  
 
 14 Walton, Abductive Reasoning, 241. 
 
 15 Basil Mitchell, The Justification of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 45-53.  
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for additional data. In this regard, metaphysical theories are falsifiable, since new information 
can always be added that disconfirms a theory. Yet, the more confirmation that one has the more 
probable or plausible the theory becomes.16 Thomas Morris provides the following illustration: 
     Suppose we are in a windowless room and we are considering two rival hypotheses: It is 
raining outside and it is sunny outside. There are many events that would be expected to 
occur if the rain hypothesis were true, such as: water beating on the roof, a friend coming in 
soaked, water running in the street, etc. Suppose we hear the sound of water beating on the 
roof (an observation of one of the above events). This observation confirms and raises the 
probability of the rain hypothesis. Do we then know that the rain hypothesis is true, that it is 
raining outside?17 
 
The obvious answer is “no”, since there could always be other possible explanations for the 
data.18 For all we know someone may be standing outside with a water hose spraying the roof.  
Let’s suppose further that we were to observe other phenomena, such as a friend walking into the 
house soaking wet or the sound of cars swishing by on what seems to be wet roads. Taken 
separately, each event might have an independent explanation. The person with a water hose may 
have sprayed our friend and the sound of water swishing on the road may have been caused by a 
street sweeper having just washed the street. Independently, each event may provide 
confirmation to the rain hypothesis, but not decisively. However, if each of the events were taken 
together, says Morris,  
their cumulative effect would be to raise the probability of the rain hypothesis so high that 
we would be fully justified in believing that it is raining outside. The belief can be said to be 
a justified subjective response to and result of the cumulative probability given to the rain 
hypothesis by the three confirming observations.19  
                                                 
 16 Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1988), 63. 
 
 17 Thomas V. Morris. Francis Schaeffer’s Apologetics: A Critique (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1976), 96. 
  
 
18 I am not here claiming that certainty is required for knowledge. One might just as easily arrive at 
knowledge through non-deductive means of inquiry (e.g., induction and abduction).  
 
 19 Ibid.  
 
41 
 
 
And this, we believe, can lead to knowledge. 
 It should be noted, however, that such a formal procedure, says Morris, is not the kind of 
thing that takes place on a day-to-day basis. He continues: 
 [W]e do not go through such a formal procedure of consciously making and categorizing 
observations for which we consider rival explanations, just to decide whether it is raining 
outside. But we do naturally react to the individual and cumulative effects of sights and 
sounds (etc.) in determining what is and what is not going on around us in our environment 
(broadly speaking). This is how we live daily. There is a human capacity to naturally 
respond to evidences, confirmation, and probability without necessarily ever being 
consciously aware that this is what is going on. Such a response is basic to every act of 
responsible decision making, whether decisions of physical action or of belief.20 
 
Morris’s point is well taken. Things such as experience and one’s overall character disposition, 
as well as a variety of background beliefs, all play a crucial role in the formation of a person’s 
worldview. The natural capacity to respond to evidence and the like, as Morris explains, often 
takes place without our ever being aware of it. That being said, even when formally discussing 
worldviews or metaphysical systems, not everyone will naturally begin on the same page. There 
will be disagreements over starting points or on what criteria should be included or excluded. As 
C. Stephen Layman says, “one unavoidably makes controversial assumptions about a series of 
issues, e.g., the nature of explanations, how best to formulate theism and its rivals, the nature of 
good and evil, and so on.”21 However, as Layman continues, “That the assumptions are 
controversial is not, I take it, a good reason to reject the Comparative Response.”22 Any well-
argued philosophical position will come up against opposition, employing controversial premises 
not held by everyone. “This being so,” argues Layman, “both theism and its rivals will 
                                                 
 20 Ibid.  
 
 21 C. Stephen Layman, “Natural Evil: The Comparative Response,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 54 (2003): 2.   
 
 22 Ibid.  
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unavoidably make use of controversial premises. Therefore, in the absence of a case to the effect 
that theism employs more controversial premises than its rivals do, the observation that theism 
employs controversial assumptions is without force.”23 
The Classification of Evil  
 Having considered method, it will be helpful to take a further look at how evil will be 
understood in this chapter. In Chapter One I defended the classical Christian understanding of 
evil as privation of the good. In the sense that I argued for, evil as privation may not only include 
privation of the good of some “thing,” but also the privation of some good in God’s created 
order, particularly the moral order.  When analyzing metaphysical systems, the above 
understanding of evil will not do, since it is too specific to theism, especially Christian theism. 
As Michael Peterson suggests, “the attempt to offer a specific definition at this point frequently 
ladens the meaning of evil with preconceived ideas and thus hinders objective discussion.”24 
Following Peterson, then, this chapter will not presuppose the definition argued for in Chapter 
One; rather, it will consider evil in a much broader way, consisting of the kinds of things we 
generally call evil.25  
 What sorts of things might one include in such a “broad” and “commonsense” 
understanding of evil? Peterson suggests the following: “The set of commonly recognized evils 
includes, at the very least, such things as extreme pain and suffering, physical deformities, 
psychological abnormalities, the prosperity of bad people, the demise of good people, disrupted 
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social relations, unfulfilled potential, a host of character defects, and natural catastrophes.”26 
Such items on the list are commonly considered as evil, without having the negative effect of 
“prejudicing” the discussion. The list, suggests Peterson, indicates all of the things to which the 
term “evil” applies (extension), without specifying all that the term implies (intension).27   
 Most philosophers giving consideration to the problem from evil recognize two kinds of 
evil in the world: moral evil and natural evil. As explained in Chapter One, moral evils are those 
evils that come about through moral agency. The phenomenon of moral evil can be broken down 
into subcategories, which include (1) human wrongdoing, (2) suffering caused by human 
wrongdoing, and (3) the total amount of suffering that comes about through human 
wrongdoing.28 Natural evil, on the other hand, includes those kinds of evils or suffering that are 
not caused by a moral agent; rather, such evils are brought about by things such as animal 
attacks, hurricanes, tornados, floods, landslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, famines, and 
disease; however, it should be noted that such events are not themselves evils.  
Furthermore, one must consider that the line between natural evil and moral evil is not 
always clear. Some evils are brought about by human negligence, such as pollution, the failure to 
evacuate during a natural disaster, or the spread of infectious diseases. As Layman notes, 
“Foolishness is a moral vice, any suffering or loss that results in such cases is at least in part a 
moral evil.”29 In those cases where humans are cruel to animals or inflict pain and suffering upon 
an animal without morally sufficient reason, such would be a moral evil. Yet, things like animal 
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predation of a human would count as natural evil.30 Lastly, it must be noted that sometimes 
disease can cause humans to lose function of certain cognitive abilities, inhibiting them from 
making morally responsible choices.31    
 Having given consideration to methodology and a general understanding of evil, I now 
turn to the naturalist’s response to evil. I offer a brief description of naturalism, following by a 
look at how naturalism explains the phenomena of evil in the world. In subsequent chapters, I 
then consider the other three metaphysical systems, followed by a comparison and contrast of 
each of the systems according to the criteria for evaluating metaphysical systems.  
Naturalism and Evil 
 Among metaphysical alternatives in the West, perhaps naturalism is the greatest rival to 
theism. But what is naturalism? How should one understand the naturalistic conception of 
reality? To what extent does naturalism explain evil in the world? How does naturalism as an 
overarching Weltanschauung respond to evil in the world?  
 Nailing down a definition of naturalism is not an easy task; this is in part due to how one 
thinks of the word nature. As Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro suggest, one might take in 
the older, broader sense of everything having a nature as being “natural.” We may speak of 
humans, rabbits, rocks, angels, or God as all having a nature.32 But that is not, of course, how 
most people in the West take the words “nature” and “natural” today, unless one is steeped in 
philosophy or has studied theology. Much of recent Western thinking has been shaped by the 
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enterprise of scientific thinking, which has, in turn, shaped how we in the West have come to 
think of nature.  
 Science has become for many the primary tool by which we come to understand the 
world. Philosopher John Post outlines this train of thought well: 
 According to a number of influential philosophers, the sciences cumulatively tell us, in 
effect, that everything can be accounted for in purely natural terms. The ability of the 
sciences to explain matters within their scope is already very great, and it is increasing all 
the time. The worldview this entails, according to many, is naturalism: Everything is a 
collection of entities of the sort the sciences are about, and all truth is determined ultimately 
by the truths about these basic scientific entities.33    
 
All naturalists, to some extent, place a high emphasis on scientific inquiry; however, some 
naturalists, more so than others, take science to be not just one of many ways of understanding 
the world, but the primary or only means by which we come to know things about our world. 
Such an epistemology has come to be known as scientism.  
 Philosophers have rightly distinguished between methodological naturalism and 
philosophical or metaphysical naturalism. Too often the two have been conflated, which is a 
mistake, since a conflation of the two leads to the false assumption that all naturalists are 
atheists. Methodological naturalism primarily concerns itself with a certain epistemology—a 
way of knowing the material world grounded in science; whereas metaphysical naturalism, while 
accepting the epistemological view of methodological naturalism, goes beyond to accept certain 
metaphysical commitments and implications about the nature of reality. A methodological 
naturalist may hold to belief in God; yet, she is deeply committed to scientific exploration and 
inquiry, while rejecting scientific design arguments such as those put forth by adherents of 
Intelligent Design (ID). Further, a methodological naturalist may or may not be committed to 
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materialism.34 Nevertheless, scientific explanation, by its very nature, naturalists say, leaves out 
any appeals to the supernatural or religious; all explanations appeal to the purely physical.35 
While a worthy discussion in and of itself, our primary concern is not methodological naturalism 
but metaphysical naturalism (henceforth naturalism), to which we shall now turn.   
 Metaphysical naturalists accept the conclusions of methodological naturalism but go 
beyond by concluding that physical reality is all that there is—a view known as “physicalist 
materialism,” “physicalism,” or “materialism.”36 Regarding materialism, naturalistic philosopher 
John Searle has this to say:  
There is a sense in which materialism is the religion of our time, at least among most of the 
professional experts in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and other 
disciplines that study the mind. Like more traditional religions, it is accepted without 
question and it provides the framework within which other questions can be posed, 
addressed, and answered.37  
 
The universe, or nature (read: all physical reality), according to the naturalistic point of view, is a 
closed system of cause and effect. There is no ultimate cause for the universe, such as a god, 
gods, ground of being, or underlying force; rather, the universe as we know it is self-sufficient 
and arrived to where it is now through a series of blind, purposeless natural processes. Mental 
states, suggests Searle, if they do have real existence, “must in some sense be reducible to, they 
                                                 
 34 It should be noted that while methodological naturalists place a high view on science in their 
epistemology, not all are committed to scientism, nor are all materialists or moral relativists. For further discussion 
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65, no.1 (March 2013): 37-45. For a critique of methodological naturalism, see Stephen C. Dilley, “Philosophical 
Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism: Strange Bedfellows?” Philosophia Christi 12, no. 1 (2010): 118-141. 
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must be nothing but, physical states of some kind.”38 As Post suggests, such physicalist 
materialism reduces “all the properties of things to the properties of the basic physical entities.”39  
 Following Layman, then, I take naturalism to mean the view that there is a material 
reality that is essentially physical, that exists either necessarily, eternally, or by chance, that is 
self-organizing—that is to say, it is not organized by a deity or force of sorts—and that every 
ultimate explanation is inanimate.40 But to what extent can naturalism account for evil? How 
plausible is evil given naturalism?  
Naturalism and Life 
 If naturalism is to succeed at explaining evil, then it seems that naturalism must, at least, 
be capable to explain life.41 The naturalistic understanding of life begins with the Big Bang, by 
which the entirety of the universe, including all space, time, and matter, exploded into existence 
some 13.5 billion years ago. Resulting from the Big Bang, galaxies, stars, and planets all formed. 
On one small planet—earth—life emerged from non-life out of a pre-biotic soup through 
evolutionary processes. As philosopher J. P. Moreland describes it,  
the process of evolution, understood in either neo-Darwinian or punctuated equilibrium 
terms, gave rise to all the life forms we see including human beings. Thus, all organisms and 
their parts exist and are what they are because they contributed to (or at least did not hinder) 
the struggle for reproductive advantage, more specifically, because they contributed to the 
tasks of feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproducing.42  
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 Given naturalism’s grand story, how surprising is life? As Stephen Layman argues, there 
can be no life unless the universe has been “fine-tuned” for life to exist.43 Layman is referring to 
the “anthropic principle,” which states that the universe has certain fundamental features that if 
they were slightly different, there could be no life in the universe as we know it.44 But how likely 
should we expect the anthropic principle to be, given naturalism? It does not seem likely. If the 
universe came into existence at a finite point in time, as the Big Bang model of cosmology 
suggests, then one might always ask why the laws of nature turned out as they did. Why these 
laws? Why this universe?45 Perhaps, one might reply by saying that there was something in place 
prior to the Big Bang? But as John Barrow and Frank Tipler suggest with respect to the Big Bang 
singularity, “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed 
before the singularity, so, if the universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a 
creation ex nihilo.”46 In other words, there was no mechanism in place prior to the Big Bang that 
                                                 
 43 Layman, “Moral Evil,” 14.   
 
 44 Astrophysicists often make a distinction between the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP) and the Strong 
Anthropic Principle (SAP). John Barrow and Frank J. Tipler define the two as follow: 
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And 
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would assure the laws to turn out just as they did in our universe. As a self-organizing reality, the 
universe surely could have existed in a variety of forms.47 Without something in place, it seems 
highly improbable that the universe just churned out such principles and regularities that are 
necessary for the existence of life in our universe. Robin Collins gives the following example of 
just such a principle: 
 The force of gravity is determined by Newton’s law F = Gm1m2/42. Here G is what is 
known as the gravitational constant¸ and is basically a number that determines the force of 
gravity in any given circumstance. For instance, the gravitational attraction between the 
moon and the earth is given by first multiplying the mass of the moon (m1) times the mass of 
the earth (m2), and then dividing by the distance between them squared (r
2). Finally, one 
multiplies this result by the number G to obtain the total force. Clearly the force is directly 
proportional to G: for example, if G were double, the force between the moon and the earth 
would double.48 
 
Collins goes on to explain: 
 
 [S]ome calculations indicate that the force of gravity must be fine-tuned to one part in 1040 
in order for life to occur. What does such fine-tuning mean? To understand it, imagine a 
radio dial, going from 0 to 2G0 where G0 represents the current value of the gravitational 
constant. Moreover, imagine the dial being broken up into 1040—that is, ten thousand, 
billion, billion, billion, billion—evenly spaced tick marks. To claim that the strength of 
gravity must be fine-tuned to one part in 1040 is simply to claim that, in order for life to 
exist, the constant of gravity cannot vary by even one tick mark along the dial from its 
current value of G0.
49
  
 
The example given here by Collins is just one of many recognized constants.50   
 Not all naturalists agree that the Big Bang is the final stop. In order to explain the 
anthropic principle, some naturalists have turned toward multiple universe theories. Such 
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theories stress a multitude of distinct physical universes that exist (or could have existed), and, 
for all we know, there could be (have been) an infinite number of such universes.51 One such 
model is the oscillating big bang model, by which the universe, at random, expands and 
contracts, perhaps ad infintum. If such a process of exploding and collapsing has been going on 
for all eternity, then eventually we should expect the coming about of such a fine-tuned universe 
as our own. While such a theory may increase the probability of one or more universes 
eventually producing life,52 it nevertheless complicates the naturalistic hypothesis by adding a 
further feature, going merely from a self-organizing reality to a mechanism that generates a large 
(perhaps an infinite) number of universes at random.53   
 The oscillating model is, by no means, the only model available. There are a variety of 
other multiverse scenarios. Despite the model taken, as physicist Paul Davies suggests, the 
multiverse hypothesis merely shifts the problem elsewhere. Such a theory requires “many 
assumptions.” He explains: 
  First, there has to be a universe-generating mechanism, such as eternal inflation. This 
mechanism is supposed to involve a natural, lawlike process—in the case of eternal 
inflation, a quantum ‘nucleation’ of pocket universes, to be precise. But that raises the 
obvious question of the source of the quantum laws (not to mention the laws of gravitation, 
including the causal structures of spacetime on which those laws depend) that permit 
inflation. In the standard multiverse theory, the universe-generating laws are just accepted as 
given: they don’t come out of the multiverse theory. Second, one has to assume that 
although different pocket universes have different laws, perhaps distributed randomly, 
nevertheless laws of some sort exist in every universe. Moreover, these laws are very 
specific in form: they are described by mathematical equations (as opposed to, say, ethical 
or aesthetic principles). Indeed, the entire subject is based on the assumption that the 
multiverse can be captured by (a rather restricted subset of) mathematics.54 
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Even if one were to couple the multiverse scenario with something like string/M theory, explains 
Davies, such mathematical specifications must be accepted as a given. But even here there could 
be other different unified theories, such as N theory, that one could propose. Davies questions 
such theories. Often theorists choose theories based on their elegance. He goes on to argue, “But 
this is to import a new factor into the argument—questions of aesthetics and taste. We are then 
on shaky ground indeed. It may be that M theory looks beautiful to its creators, but ugly to N 
theorists, who think that their theory is the most elegant. But then the O theorists disagree with 
both groups. . .”55   
Naturalism and Consciousness 
 Despite the difficulty of the presence of life given naturalism, there are still yet other 
problems with the naturalistic paradigm as it relates to the question of evil. Such difficulties 
include the notion of consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human responsibility. 
We begin with the problem of consciousness. 
 If naturalism is to explain either moral or natural evil, then it must also be capable of 
explaining the presence of sentient creatures that are capable of suffering. Yet, in order to do 
this, it must also explain the presence of creatures with consciousness. How successful is 
naturalism in this respect?56  
 Granting something like evolutionary theory, naturalists have reason to expect life. But 
what of life with consciousness? Surely there are all kinds of creatures without consciousness, 
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such as plants and certain lower-level life forms. And given the way in which evolution works, 
things could have gone quite differently from how it did. We could have been stuck in a world 
with single-cell organisms, or a world that consisted primarily of plants and lower-level life 
forms. How is it that life transitioned from life apart from consciousness to life with 
consciousness, according to the Darwinian schema?    
 Philosopher Thomas Nagel, who is himself not a theist, finds “physico-chemical 
reductionism” in the field of biology “hard to believe.”57 In his book, Mind and Cosmos, Nagel 
sets out to build a case against materialism based on the difficulties of consciousness coming 
about from within a purely materialist understanding of reality. For physicalists, consciousness 
reduces to chemical reactions within the brain. Though a bit outdated, philosopher Bertrand 
Russell paints a portrait of the physicalist conception of the connection between the human body 
and mind: 
 Of this physical world, uninteresting in itself, man is a part. His body, like other matter, is 
composed of electrons and protons, which, so far as we know, obey the same laws as those 
not forming part of animals or plants. There are some who maintain that physiology can 
never be reduced to physics, but their arguments are not very convincing and it seems 
prudent to suppose that they are mistaken. What we call our “thoughts” seem to depend 
upon the organization of tracks in the brain in the same sort of way in which journeys 
depend upon roads and railways. The energy used in thinking seems to have a chemical 
origin, for instance a deficiency of iodine will turn a clever man into an idiot. Mental 
phenomena seem to be bound up with material structure. If this be so, we cannot suppose 
that a solitary electron or proton can “think”; we might as well expect a solitary individual to 
play a football match. We also cannot suppose that an individual’s thinking survives bodily 
death, since that destroys the organization of the brain and dissipates the energy which 
utilized the brain tracks. 58 
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It is exactly this type of understanding of physico-chemical reductionism that Nagel questions. 
 For Nagel, any attempt at equating the physical with the mental ultimately fails. One such 
strategy is conceptual behaviorism, which attempts to identify mental phenomena with 
“behavior” or “behavioral dispositions” or “forms of behavioral organization.”59 Other attempts, 
claims Nagel, are primarily verificationist in nature, in that, all that could be said about the 
content of a mental statement is that which could be confirmed, warranted, or verified about it by 
some observer. “In one way or another,” says Nagel, “they reduce mental attributes to the 
externally observable conditions on the basis of which we attribute mental states to others.”60 
While there is no doubt that there is a vital connection between “mental phenomena” and 
“behavioral manifestations,” such theories are inadequate and insufficient in analyzing the 
mental, since  
they leave out something essential that lies beyond the externally observable grounds for 
attributing mental states to others, namely, the aspect of mental phenomena that is evident 
from the first-person, inner point of view of the conscious subject: for example, the way 
sugar tastes to you or the way red looks or anger feels, each of which seems to be something 
more than behavioral responses and discriminatory capacities that these experiences.61 
 
In other words, the physical processes cannot adequately explain the subjectivity of our 
experiences.  
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 Yet, Nagel finds untenable even those nonanalytic attempts that suggest mental 
phenomena are truly something inside of us, such as J. J. C. Smart’s psycho-physical identity 
theory. Psycho-physical identity theories equate some mental event, such as a pain or taste 
sensation (Φ), with a corresponding physical event (Ψ). In other words, mental events are 
identical (theoretically, not analytically) to their corresponding physical events: Ψ = Φ much like 
Water = H2O. However, this raises a serious question for the materialist: “What is it about Φ that 
makes it also Ψ?” 62 In order for the identity to be a scientific truth, rather than a conceptual one, 
the property that Ψ has must be such that it is conceptually distinct from those “physical 
properties that define Φ.”63 In an effort to avoid dualism, says Nagel, materialists must retreat 
back into some form of analytical behaviorism, whereby “[w]hat makes the brain process a 
mental process . . . is not an additional intrinsic property but a relational one—a relation to 
physical behavior.”64 There are, nevertheless, problems with this kind of theory. Again, Nagel 
argues, something seems to be missing. Just as with the behavioral theories before them, such 
explanations do little by way of explaining subjective appearances. Furthermore, Nagel suggests 
that these kinds of solutions proposed by identity theorists suffer from Saul Kripke’s critique that 
whereas “Water=H2O” is a necessary truth, the relation between Ψ/Φ is contingent in nature. 
When one has H2O one needs nothing more to have water. The physical components H-2-O are 
sufficient for having water. It remains what it is apart from any kind of perceptual experience. 
But is this the case for the relation between Ψ and Φ?65 It would seem not, as Nagel explains: 
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 So if Ψ really is Φ in this sense, and nothing else, then Φ by itself, once its physical 
properties are understood, should be sufficient for the taste of sugar, the feeling of pain, or 
whatever it is supposed to be identical with. But it doesn’t seem to be. It seems conceivable, 
for any Φ, that there should be Φ without any experience at all. Experiences of taste seems 
to be something extra, contingently related to the brain state—something produced rather 
than constituted by the brain state. So it cannot be identical to the brain state in the way that 
water is identical to H2O.
66 
  
Based on a purely naturalistic understanding of the world, the physical sciences seem to 
be quite incapable of explaining the connection between mind and body, and thus seem 
incapable of providing a clear explanation as to how mental events arise out of purely physical 
processes. Mental events, while no doubt connected to physical experiences, nevertheless seem 
to be something quite different in nature.67 Naturalism as a Weltanschauung does not give us 
reason to expect conscious life arising from purely physical processes. 
 Naturalism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility 
But what of the metaphysics of good and evil? Furthermore, how should we understand 
human responsibility from a naturalistic perspective? If naturalism is to explain evil, particularly 
moral evil and certain forms of natural evil, then it must, at least, provide some basis for judging 
whether some action is evil or not. For a naturalist, what structure is in place to judge some 
action as being right or wrong, just and unjust?68  
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 A naturalist has available to her at least four options. First, she could opt for some kind of 
anti-realism, such as emotivism, according to which there is no such thing as moral facts but only 
human emotional responses. Anti-realism, coupled with naturalism, would lead one to doubt 
whether naturalism could explain moral evil at all. It would not explain it so much as explain it 
away. Not wanting to go the way of the anti-realist, the naturalist could, secondly, adopt 
something along the lines of Platonism, the idea that moral truths exist independently of physical 
reality, or thirdly moral supervenience (moral naturalism), the understanding that moral truths in 
some sense supervene on conscious intelligent moral creatures. Of these three options, anti-
realism may or may not find support from naturalism, but as noted, it does not do much by way 
of explaining evil, as we are considering evil in this chapter. Platonism and supervenience, on the 
other hand, in and of themselves, do not seem to be a given from naturalism. We would not 
expect either given naturalism. Platonism appeals to non-natural properties and objects, and 
supervenience sounds a bit like a promissory note, and assertion more than an explanation. In 
addition, both options would be an addition to the naturalistic hypothesis.69 There is a fourth 
option for the naturalist, however. Perhaps evolution itself is the key to understanding values?  
  According to Richard Dawkins, the sense of “right and wrong” can be traced back to our 
“Darwinian past.”70 If we are to understand the origins of morality, then it must be the by-
product of natural selection. While natural selection explains aspects of our species’ survival, 
such as, “hunger” or “sexual lust,” why do human beings have the “powerful urge” to contribute 
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to relief efforts or to take care of widows and orphans? Dawkins believes that these powerful 
urges are founded in our genes. He goes on to explain: 
 The logic of Darwinism concludes that the unit in the hierarchy of life which survives and 
passes through the filter of natural selection will tend to be selfish. The units that survive in 
the world will be the ones that succeeded in surviving at the expense of their rivals at their 
own level in the hierarchy. . . . The whole idea of the selfish gene, with the stress properly 
applied to the last word, is that the unit of natural selection (i.e. the unit of self-interest) is 
not the selfish organism, nor the selfish group or selfish species or selfish ecosystem, but the 
selfish gene. It is the gene that, in the form of information, either survives for many 
generations or does not. Unlike the gene (and arguably the meme), the organism, the group 
and the species are not the right kind of entity to serve as a unit in this sense, because they 
do not make exact copies of themselves, and do not compete in a pool of such self-
replicating entities. That is precisely what genes do, and that is the – essentially logical – 
justification for singling the gene out as the unit of ‘selfishness’ in the special Darwinian 
sense of selfish.71 
 
 The way genes insure survival is to program the organism toward selfishness. There are times, 
says Dawkins, when our genes make sure of their survival by “influencing” the organism “to 
behave altruistically.”72 Two ways that genes program an organism toward altruism are: 1) 
“kinship” and 2) “reciprocal altruism.”73  When an organism takes care of its offspring or 
“genetic kin,” it becomes more likely that the genes will survive through several generations. 
The concept of reciprocal altruism is akin to our notion of “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch 
mine.” Reciprocal altruism may even occur between species. Nevertheless, this practice is 
prevalent among human beings and may explain why there are consequences for those who do 
not fulfill their end of the deal.  
 Resting on the Darwinian notions of kinship and reciprocation are some “secondary 
structures.”  For example, “reputation,” explains Dawkins, is important to human society. One 
                                                 
 71 Ibid., 245-246. For a similar view see Victor J. Stenger God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows 
that God Does Not Exist (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2007), p. 209.   
 
 72 Ibid. 
 
 73 Ibid. 
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individual might have a reputation for kindness while another individual might be known for his 
conniving. Reputation is a way that an individual might foster reciprocation among one’s 
species, thus preserving one’s genes.  One other example, argues Dawkins, is “conspicuous 
generosity.” By this, Dawkins means that an individual among a species may participate in “risk-
taking” or “ostentatious generosity” in order to “buy mates” or to “buy success.” 74 Dawkins 
believes that these four reasons are “good Darwinian reasons”75 why individuals behave 
altruistically. Hence our moral behaviors, like other behaviors necessary for survival, are “by-
products” from our evolutionary past.76 
 Having dismissed morality grounded in the character of God or divine revelation, 
Dawkins argues for something like a “consensus” for morality.  
 How, then, do we decide what is right and what is wrong? No matter how we answer that 
question, there is a consensus about what we do as a matter of fact consider right and wrong: 
a consensus that prevails surprisingly widely. The consensus has no obvious connection with 
religion. It extends, however, to most religious people whether or not they think their morals 
come from scripture. With notable exceptions . . . most people pay lip service to the same 
broad liberal consensus of ethical principles. The majority of us don’t cause needless 
suffering; we believe in free speech and protect it even if we disagree with what is being 
said; we pay our taxes; we don’t cheat, don’t kill, don’t commit incest, don’t do things to 
others that we would not wish done to us.77 
  
He goes on to propose that humans should adopt something akin to a “New Ten 
Commandments.”  “Don’t cause harm” or “Do not do to others what you would want them to do 
to you” just to name a few of the proposed commandments.78 He believes that a list, such as the 
                                                 
 74 Ibid. 
 
 75 Ibid. 
 
76 Such attempts at explaining why we behave altruistically, however, in no way accounts for moral 
obligation. They do nothing by way of giving us reasons as to why we should behave in such-and-such a manner. 
 
 77 Ibid., 298. 
 
 78 Ibid., 298-299. Interestingly, Dawkins found his proposed (and I should add, only potential) list of “New 
Ten Commandments” while doing an internet search. He did not, himself, construct the list, but borrowed it from 
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one he duplicates, could be produced by any “decent” individual living today; however, such a 
list, while not set in stone, exemplifies the spirit of the age (Zeitgeist) in which we live. For 
instance, the modern world has moved beyond slavery or racial and gender inequality, such 
offensive and oppressive treatment that is condoned by the Bible.79  This “shift” of moral 
conscience is, Dawkins believes, in a positive direction.80 It is an improvement from times 
before. What was acceptable, even generations ago, is no longer acceptable by today’s standards. 
Such things as derogatory language or racial slurs, while still going on today, are looked down 
upon by the majority of the world. Even regarding the way in which war is approached today, 
says Dawkins, the aim is to have as few casualties as possible.81 But what is the cause of this 
shift? Ultimately, it is not clear what the cause might be, claims Dawkins, but  
 [f]or my purposes it is enough that, as a matter of observed fact, it does move, and it is not 
driven by religion – and certainly not by scripture. It is probably not a single force like 
                                                 
someone’s website. Most of the commandments on the list he could agree with, while nuancing some or adding a 
few of his own. The point, then, argues Dawkins, is not that this particular list should be the complete list, but rather 
the list exemplifies some of the major moral agreements that exist among people. It would seem that, in order to 
have a true “consensus”, one would have to observe all cultures—something that, from what I can tell, Dawkins has 
not done. Furthermore, given Dawkins’ proclivity toward science, his observations are by no means empirical in and 
of themselves. One would think that with such a bent toward science, one would provide the appropriate data to 
support one’s conclusions. None is given. Perhaps Dawkins is blind to the significant impact the Judeo-Christian 
worldview has had upon Western thinking? Even outspoken atheist Jürgen Habermas recognizes the immense debt 
recent discussions on human rights owes to the Judeo-Christian worldview: “Christianity has functioned for the 
normative self-understanding of modernity as more than just a precursor or a catalyst. Egalitarian universalism, from 
which sprang the ideas of freedom and a social solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the 
individual morality of conscience, human rights, and democracy, is the direct heir to the Judaic ethic of justice and 
the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical 
appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no alternative to it. And in light of current challenges of a 
postnational constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle 
postmodern talk.” See Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp. 150-51. 
   
79 Dawkins, in reading of the Christian Bible, or any other sacred text for that matter, does so without any 
hermeneutical sophistication, nor does he provide any interaction with key interpreters of Scripture from the three 
major Christian traditions. But beyond that, again it seems that Dawkins is oblivious to the key role that the 
Christian Scriptures and worldview have played in social reform, particularly in the fight over such issues as slavery 
and inequality.   
  
80 One might ask: “Positive in what sense?” Dawkins is not at all clear on this?   
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gravity, but a complex interplay of disparate forces . . . . Whatever its cause, the manifest 
phenomenon of Zeitgeist progression is more than enough to undermine the claim that we 
need God in order to be good, or to decide what is good.82 
 
Dawkins has presented what he thinks is a clear model, which serves as a substitute for any kind 
of morality based on the character of God or divine revelation. But Dawkins’ model is far from 
clear.  
 Can natural selection provide for us a proper basis for moral choice? It would seem not. 
In his two-fold theory, Dawkins posits two separate theses:  
 (1) our genes determine our urges, and 
 
 (2) humans have freedom to reject such urges.  
 
Regarding (2), Dawkins has this to say: 
 
 We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and, if necessary, the selfish memes 
of our indoctrination. We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing 
pure, disinterested altruism – something that has no place in nature, something that has 
never existed before in the whole history of the world. We are built as gene machines and 
cultured as meme machines, but we have the power to turn against our creators. We, alone 
on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.83  
 
But (1) and (2) are contradictory. Given the naturalistic worldview coupled with evolutionary 
theory humans are to be understood in strictly physicalist terms. If we are to understand human 
morality from a naturalistic evolutionary standpoint, is there room left for any kind of libertarian 
or contra-causal “free choice” in how humans are to behave. In the words of David Berlinski: “If 
evolutionary psychology is true, some form of genetic determinism must be true as well. Genetic 
determinism is simply the thesis that the human mind is the expression of its human genes. No 
                                                 
 82 Ibid., 308.  
 
 83 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1989 as quoted in 
Goetz and Taliaferro, Naturalism, 88.   
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slippage is rationally possible.”84 Similarly, Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro make the point 
that  
while Dawkins enthusiastically promotes a naturalistic, reductive explanation of the 
development of morality and values, he believes that we now have morality and values to 
justify resisting our biological urges and natural impulses. The natural world has, in a sense, 
produced beings that are in a position to critique the natural world.85  
 
On the one hand, Dawkins has gone out of his way to show how altruistic moral choices are the 
by-product of Darwinian evolution, yet, on the other, he wants to affirm that humans have the 
ability to accept or reject those altruistic moral choices of our genes.  
    Furthermore, Dawkins has failed to answer two critical questions: how human beings 
are to decide right and wrong (i.e., how to come up with this proposed consensus) and why 
human beings “ought” to act morally. Concerning the first question, Dawkins promotes an 
agnostic approach as to how humans are to decide between right and wrong. All that is important 
for Dawkins is that a basic consensus exists.86 By making this move, Dawkins is able to sidestep 
the issue and move from his Darwinian explanation for the origin of morality to his notion of 
consensus and the moral Zeitgeist. Why should there be a consensus at all? Why should we think 
that such a consensus corresponds with moral truth? How is it that Dawkins effect the shift from 
moral epistemology to moral ontology? Furthermore, why is there a progression in moral 
conscience? Are these progressions of moral behavior the telos of natural selection?  It would 
seem not. According to natural selection, it is not guaranteed that we were supposed to turn out 
the way that we have, or that the species, Homo sapiens, would have ever existed in the first 
                                                 
 84 David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 
2008), 177. 
 
 85 Goetz and Taliaferro, Naturalism , 89. 
 
 86 Dawkins, 298. 
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place. As J. Budziszewski makes clear, “Darwinism is not a predictive theory.”87 Budziszewski 
goes on to say that “[a]n evolutionary ethicist of this . . . sort does not claim that Darwinism itself 
provides the foundation for ethics. What it does tell us, he thinks, is the general features of 
human nature that ethics must come to terms with.”88 Budziszewski’s point is significant. All 
that evolutionary biology can give us about ethical standards is a description of how humans 
behave as a result of their genetic predispositions. Furthermore, as Goetz and Taliaferro point 
out, ultimately, Darwinianism cannot condemn evil: 
  If naturalistic determinism is true, then all the evil that has occurred was determined to occur 
by naturalistic causes. Deterministic naturalists may be deeply committed to fighting 
injustice – indeed, there is no doubt that many self-described naturalistic determinists are 
profoundly committed to promoting justice and other virtues . . . . But while theists maintain 
that evil is an aberration, an unnecessary violation of the natural goodness of the cosmos and 
its purpose, deterministic naturalists see evil as an essential part of nature, a necessary 
feature of reality and not at all in violation of the purposes of the cosmos.89 
 
How does Dawkins answer the second question of why we ought to act morally? He does not. 
On the one hand, Dawkins readily admits that absolute moral standards need not exist for us to 
act morally, yet, on the other hand, he has provided no reason why we ought to act morally at 
all.90 All he has provided is a description of “positive” behavior. As Arthur Holmes asks, “how 
can empirical facts (or anything else that ‘is,’ for that matter) impose duties or obligations on 
us?”91 As the Humean dictum goes, one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. Darwinian 
                                                 
 87J. Budziszewski, “Phillip Johnson Was Right: The Rivalry of Naturalism and Natural Law,” in Darwin’s 
Nemesis: Phillip Johnson and the Intelligent Design Movement, ed. William A. Dembski (Downers Gove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2006), 250.    
  
 88 Ibid., 251. 
 
 89 Goetz and Taliaferro, 93.  
 
 90 Dawkins, 265. 
 
 91 Arthur F. Holmes, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press,2007), 70.  
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determinism ultimately reduces the “ought” to causes rather than to give commands for how we 
should live.92 It would seem, then, that Naturalism as a metaphysical system is incapable of 
explaining both the metaphysics of good and evil and human responsibility.  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 92 Ibid., 76. 
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CHAPTER 3: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 2  
PANTHEISM 
 
 
 
 Having considered naturalism and evil, I now turn to pantheism as an overall worldview 
response to evil. It will be important to consider, first, how the pantheistic picture of the world 
differs from the naturalistic understanding, and second, to what extent pantheism can explain the 
presence of evil. As with naturalism, four areas will be considered: life, consciousness, the 
metaphysics of good and evil, and human responsibility. Lastly, and quite differently from 
naturalism, as a theological system, how does the God of pantheism respond to evil in the world? 
What is God doing? What can the God of pantheism do?1 
 As with any metaphysical system, it is important, at the risk of reductionism, to recognize 
that there is more than one variety of pantheism,2 and that pantheism can fit with a variety of 
ontologies.3 But this should not keep us from arriving at a basic understanding of pantheistic 
teaching. 
 Erick Steinhart suggests that pantheism affirms, minimally, that “(1) all existing things 
are unified; and (2) the maximally-inclusive unity is divine.”4 Similarly, philosopher Michael P. 
Levine defines pantheism as the view that  
                                                 
1 Though throughout this chapter I engage various pantheistic thinkers, my primary interlocutor is Michael 
Levine, who has done more in recent years to put forth a systematic work on pantheism. His Pantheism: A Non-
theistic Concept of Deity is the definitive work on the pantheistic worldview from a modern philosopher of religion.  
 
 2 Norman Geisler and William Watkins identify six varieties: absolute, emanational, developmental, modal, 
multilevel, and permeational. See Perspectives: Understanding and Evaluating Today’s World Views (San 
Borodino, CA: Here’s Life Publishers, 1984), 71. 
 
 3 For example, Erick Steinhart suggests that there are at least three live possibilities for ontologies among 
pantheists: (1) materialism; (2) Platonism; and (3) class-theoretical Pythagoreanism. See “Pantheism and Current 
Ontology,” Religious Studies 40 (2004): 63.   
 
 4 Ibid.  
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there exists an “all-inclusive unity” that is “divine.”5 John W. Grula defines pantheism as “the 
doctrine that God is not a personality or transcendent supernatural being but that all laws, forces, 
manifestations, and so forth of the self-existing natural universe constitute an all-inclusive divine 
Unity.”6 According to Paul Harrison, pantheists hold that the Universe and Nature alone should 
receive the “deepest reverence.”7 For the pantheist “all things are linked in a profound unity.”8 
There is a deep interconnection and interdependence among all things, among which, humans are 
an inseparable part.9 While pantheists do not always agree on the extent of unity and divinity 
involved, both factors are, nevertheless, central.    
 Pantheistic thought can be found in a diverse group of forms, such as scientific 
pantheism, New Age thought, deep ecology movements, Taoism, Zen Buddhism, Hinduism, 
ancient stoicism, and natured-oriented paganism.10 Some pantheists refuse to use “God” 
language, so as to not confuse their understanding of the divine with theistic conceptions, while 
others find no problem saying things like “the Universe is God.”11 Certain Hindu forms of 
pantheism are multileveled in that they are also polytheistic. The gods are all part of the all-
encompassing “Absolute.” Take, for example, this passage from The Bhagavad Gita, whereby 
                                                 
 5 Michael P. Levine, Pantheism: A Non-theistic Concept of Deity (London: Routledge, 1994), 25. 
 
 6 John W. Grula, “Pantheism Reconsidered: Ecotheology as a Successor to the Judeo-Christian, 
Enlightenment, and Postmodernist Paradigms,” Zygon 43, no. 1 (March 2008): 160.   
 
 7 Paul Harrison, Elements of Pantheism: A Spirituality of Nature and the Universe, 3rd edition (Lexington, 
KY: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 1. 
 
 8 Ibid.  
 
 9 Ibid.  
 
 10 Ibid., 3.   
 
 11 Ibid.  
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the Hindu god, Krishna, who is the incarnation of Brahman, allows the ancient warrior Arjuna to 
capture a glimpse of “the supreme mystery of the Self.”12 Arjuna responds,  
 
15. O Lord, I see within your body all the gods and every kind of living creatures. I see 
Brahma, the Creator, seated on a lotus; I see the ancient sages and the celestial 
serpents. 
16 I see infinite mouths and arms, stomach and eyes, and you are embodied in every 
form. I see you everywhere, without beginning, middle, or end. You are Lord of all 
creation, and the cosmos is your body. 
17    You wear a crown and carry a mace and discus; your radiance is blinding and 
immeasurable. I see you, who are so difficult to behold, shining like a fiery sun 
blazing in every direction. 
18 You are supreme, changeless Reality, the one thing to be known. You are the refuge 
of all creation, the immortal spirit, the eternal guardian of eternal dharma. 
19 You are without beginning, middle, or end; you touch everything with your infinite 
power. The sun and moon are your eyes, and your mouth is fire; your radiance 
warms the cosmos. 
20 O Lord, your presence fills the heavens and the earth and reaches in every direction. 
I see the three worlds trembling before this vision of your wonderful and terrible 
form.13 
  
One can gain a clear depiction from this passage of how all things, ultimately, despite their many 
manifestations, belong to one “supreme, changeless Reality.”  
 Pantheists give the “Universe” or “Nature” the same primacy that theistic religions give 
to their conception of God. It is the “Universe” or the “All” or the “One” or the “Ultimate” or the 
“Unity,” rather than a theistic deity, that awakens within people a sense of awe, wonder, love, 
and acceptance, and hence the Universe should be revered.14 It is this reverence toward the 
Universe, which is also divine (in some sense), that separates pantheists from naturalists. Yet, 
there are at least two ways in which pantheists distinguish their views of the divine from those of 
                                                 
 12 The Bhagavad Gita, 11.1  
 
 13 The Bhagavad Gita, 11.15-20.  
 
 14 Harrison, Elements of Pantheism, 3.   
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theism. First, unlike the god of theism, a being that is ontologically transcendent and separate 
from the universe, God in pantheistic thought is radically immanent (at least ontologically).15 
Second, God for pantheists is non-personal.16 God does not act or will or want or desire. Such 
thinking about God is anthropomorphic and is avoided, at least by most pantheists.   
 One of the more notable Western pantheists is Benedict de Spinoza. Like many other 
forms of pantheism (e.g., as the passage above from the Bhagavad Gita represents), though not 
all,17 Spinoza’s brand of pantheism is monistic—the view that there is only one Being and that 
all other parts of reality are in some way identical with this Being, or, at least, modes of it are.18 
The following passage clearly represents Spinoza’s notion of monism: 
 I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the divine nature, since . . . outside God no 
substance can exist from which the divine nature could suffer. All things, I say, are in God, 
and everything which takes place takes place by the laws alone of the infinite nature of God, 
and follows . . . from the necessity of His essence. Therefore, in no way whatever can it be 
asserted that God suffers from anything, or that substance extended, even if it be supposed 
divisible, is unworthy of the divine nature, provided only it be allowed that it is eternal and 
infinite.19 
 
For Spinoza, substances are independent existing entities. He agreed with theists that God is an 
infinite substance and that no contingency exists in God. But if it is the case that God is an 
infinite substance, he argued, then there could be no such thing as independent substances; 
rather, all individual things are extensions or “modes” of the attributes of God. If God is 
                                                 
15 Levine argues that transcendence is not completely absent from pantheistic thought, especially as one 
considers concepts of transcendence and immanence found in certain metaphysical principles of Taoist and 
Confucianist thought. See Pantheism, 111-113. 
 
16 Ibid., 95.  
 
17 Levine argues that while many pantheists are monists, it is not the case that all pantheists are. Rather, like 
most other people, they are pluralists. See Pantheism, 71-92.  
 
 18 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 65.  
 
19 Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics: Part I (Chicago: The Great Books Foundation, reprint 1956), 19.  
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infinite—an infinity that includes the world—and if there is no contingency in God, then there 
would also be no contingency in the world. Spinoza’s brand of pantheism is highly deterministic, 
as are most forms of pantheism.20  
 Robert Corrington, in discussing his particular version of pantheism, makes a distinction 
between natura naturans (nature naturing) and natura naturata (nature natured). Such a 
distinction is fundamental to his own “Deep pantheism.” Both natura naturans and natura 
naturata are “dimensions of and in nature, not separate orders one in and one out of nature.”21 Of 
the two, natura naturans is the more difficult to explain. Corrington describes it as “nature 
creating itself out of itself alone.”22 There is no “extra-natural creator”; rather “[n]ature is eternal 
and continually self-renewing,” says Corrington. Nature naturing refers to “the dimension of 
nature churning with potencies, potencies that spawn innumerable orders of the world.”23  
Natura naturata, on the other hand, is better defined with respect to “the orders of the world,” 
similar to what Christians call “creation.”24 Rather than there being some kind of “order of 
orders,” there are, instead, “innumerable orders” within nature nurtured, some of which are 
“powerful sacred orders” or “sacred folds” or “numinous orders” “central to human religious 
                                                 
 20 David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2004), 96. Theists would, of course, reject Spinoza’s view of God’s infinity and his understanding of 
substances. Moreover, some theists holding to a form of essentialism would no doubt hold that God does have some 
contingent properties. Such properties are not, however, essential to God’s being. See Ronald H. Nash, The Concept 
of God: An Exploration of Contemporary Difficulties with the Attributes of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1983), 16-17; Jay Wesley Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, 
Simplicity and Immutability (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 82-105.  
 
 21 Robert S. Corrington, “Deep Pantheism,” Journal for the Study of Religion 1, no. 4 (2007), 505.  
   
 22 Ibid. 
   
 23 Ibid.  
 
 24 Ibid.  
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experience.”25 These sacred folds, in some way, find their origin in natura naturans. Corrington 
goes on to explain: “nature contains deep unconscious depths from which sacred powers 
emerge” and such “sacred folds, semiotically dense, have neither internal consciousness nor 
intentionality.”26 Corrington, however, hesitates to say that all of nature is itself sacred. He 
reserves the term “sacred” for those “numinous orders” within nature. Yet, human encounter 
with such sacred folds brings about a religious experience such that it “shakes the self to the core 
of its being and conveys something of the power of nature.”27 Corrington summarizes his view of 
Deep Pantheism as follows: 
 Deep Pantheism is a form of pantheism in that it affirms that nature is all that there is and 
that there is no divine agency located somehow outside of nature. It is ‘deep’ in the sense 
that it recognizes a churning unconscious depth of nature from whence all orders, sacred or 
otherwise, come. The gods and goddesses we encounter in sacred folds are all ejects from 
the primal potencies of nature naturing. They combine power and meaning, as Tillich would 
say, but in ambiguous ways that do not have a teleological cumulative force. So I would say 
that the sacred is in and of nature and that nature per se is neither sacred nor non-sacred.28 
 
 Corrington’s view of pantheism diverges from the Hindu and Spinozistic variants on one 
central point. Unlike the Hindu and Sponozistic versions, there is no one overarching divine to 
which all things ultimately belong; rather, there are various divine touching points or, as 
Corrington calls them, “sacred folds” throughout nature. There is not one thing which orders all 
of the other orders; rather, in some sense, the various orders work together to “combine power 
and meaning” without some ultimate direction or telos in view. So, for Corrington, the divine or 
sacred is found within nature, but it is not all-encompassing. Such encounters with various sacred 
                                                 
 25 Ibid., 505-506.  
  
 26 Ibid., 506.   
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folds (“gods and goddesses”) bring about awe and wonder. In this sense, Deep Pantheism is 
considerably religious.  
 So, given the diversity of pantheistic thought, how ought one to define pantheism? There 
seems to be at least seven major strands that make up pantheistic thought: 
 (1) All things are interconnected and deeply unified 
 (2) This all-inclusive unity is divine (in some sense) 
 (3) The all-inclusive divine unity is the self-creating and self-organizing cause of all things 
 (4) The all-inclusive divine unity is either eternal or necessary or both 
 (5) The divine is non-personal 
 (6) The divine neither transcends the world nor is it ontological distinct from the world 
 (7) The divine unity is the object of one’s ultimate concern, worship, and pleasure 
 
I take pantheism to mean the view that there is a reality such that all things are unified and that 
this all-inclusive unity is divine (in some sense); that the non-theistic concept of the divine is 
neither personal nor ontologically distinct from the world (as compared with theistic conceptions 
of God); and that the all-inclusive divine unity is the self-creating and self-organizing cause of 
all things, eternal and/or necessary, and the object of one’s ultimate concern.     
Pantheism and Life 
 How does pantheism as an overall metaphysical system explain the phenomenon of evil? 
To account for evil, pantheism, like naturalism, must be able to explain life, but in order to 
explain life it must be able to explain the existence of the universe as it is. Pantheists of all 
stripes recognize that something like the “Universe,” “Nature,” “God,” “All,” “One,” or “all-
inclusive divine Unity” (henceforth AIDU) is either eternal or necessary. As noted already, 
pantheists reject anything like a transcendent god of theism, who exists apart from the space-time 
universe, creating the heavens and the earth. Paul Harrison, in critiquing the Thomistic 
Cosmological Argument (TCA), finds no reason, given our having “no problem imagining an 
infinite future,” as to why there cannot also be a chain of causes that extend infinitely into the 
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past.29  Furthermore, Harrison thinks that the TCA is logically flawed, namely, because it takes 
as its key premise that everything requires a cause for its existence. Yet, the theistic God himself 
exists apart from any cause. If something can exist apart from a cause, then why could not that 
thing be the Universe itself?30 Harrison goes on to argue, 
 When we say that something has a cause, we mean that something preceded it which 
brought it about – cause precedes effect. But by definition the Universe includes all time and 
space, and no time could have preceded it. It seems unreasonable to ask for the cause of a 
totality that includes all space and all time. The only answer theists provide to this argument 
is to modify the premise to say “Everything except the first cause requires a cause.” But to 
skeptics this merely seems like an evasion, not an answer.31 
 
Given there is no external creator, one is left pondering where it all came from. Harrison 
suggests two options: (1) the universe is self-created; or (2) the universe has existed eternally. 
According to Michael Levine, the creation of the universe is something of a mystery. 
Most pantheists reject anything like a creation ex nihilo, as theists hold. But, Levine says creation 
ex nihilo does not necessarily conflict with the central tenets of pantheism. Nevertheless, 
pantheists have other options. One might simply take creation as “brute fact”, as most atheists 
and naturalists do; however, Levine opts for something more like emanationism—if one were to 
take some doctrine on creation from a pantheistic perspective, that is. Emanationism is the view 
that “creation” is a flowing forth from God, rather than God, in some sense, making, forming, or 
fashioning the world. Such a view recognizes that God is “in” the world and the world is “in” 
God.32 Regarding emanationism as a form of creation, Levine says the following: 
                                                 
 29 Harrison, Elements of Pantheism, 37.   
 
 30 Ibid.    
 
 31 Ibid. Harrison’s argument is deeply flawed. It does not seem that he clearly understands major aspects of 
Thomas’ CA, particularly the notions “potentiality,” “actuality,” “essential cause.” Harrison especially falls short of 
understanding Thomas’ idea of God as actus purus (pure act); but for now, his discussion will serve as a jumping off 
point for understanding the pantheist perspective on the universe and life.   
 
32 Levine, Pantheism, 195. 
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 [E]manationism appears to provide a doctrine which—if not an explicit ground on which to 
base pantheism—is at least one that is seen as congenial. As a doctrine of creation, it may 
even provide a partial basis for pantheism—as it has (arguably) for Plotinus, Eriugena, and 
even for Spinoza where “God” is the immanent cause of all things. The view that God is the 
“immanent cause” of things is a kind of creation doctrine for Spinoza and a basis for Unity. 
So far as Lao Tzu has a doctrine of creation it too is emanationist. “The Tao engenders one, 
One engenders two, Two engenders three. And three engenders the myriad things” (Tao Te 
Ching, XLII). The Tao is “the primordial natural force, possessing an infinite supply of 
power and creativity. Not only does the Tao create things—it is responsible for, or makes 
possible, their growth. “It nourishes them and develops them . . . provides for them and 
shelters them” (Tao Te Ching, LI).  
  Emantionism tends to affirm rather than deny a common ontological, substantial and 
evaluative base among everything that exists (e.g. whatever it is which creatively emanates, 
it is “Good”). It is therefore seen as in keeping with the central tenets of pantheism, and 
where pantheists adhere to a doctrine of creation it tends to be emanationist. Since Unity 
must partly be explained evaluatively, the fact that emanationism is often linked to the 
“Good” provides further reason for supposing it consonant with pantheism.33  
 
Perhaps, then, if pantheists were to have a doctrine of creation, something like emanationism 
might hold to be the best option.34  
 In addition to being eternal and self-existent, the all-inclusive divine unity is self-
organizing. Most pantheistic systems are compatible with something like neo-Darwinian 
evolution, especially those pantheistic systems which place a high view on science and nature.35 
                                                 
 
33 Levine, Pantheism, 195-196.  
 
 34 Others, however, are doubtful that emanation is a viable option for the pantheists. Douglas Hedley argues 
that Levine makes a serious mistake in conflating “subtle theism” with pantheism simply because each is concerned 
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holds to “a transcendent creative unity who may or may not be deemed personal.” Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists 
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and reality. Emanation has to do primarily with the production of lower things from the higher. See “Pantheism, 
Trinitarian Theism and the Idea of Unity: Reflections on the Christian Concept of God,” Religious Studies 32, no. 1 
(Mar 1996): 62-65, 70. Accessed December 23, 2012. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019794. Cf. Keith Ward, God: 
A Guide for the Perplexed (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), 158-162, who suggests that those who are often 
labeled as “pantheists” are panentheists instead. Anytime that God transcends nature, then one is faced with a 
panentheisitc conception of God. It seems to me that something like this would be the case with respect to 
emanationistic accounts of creation.   
 
 35 Harrions, Elements of Pantheism, 38-39.  
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Even those that do not emphasize evolution, they nevertheless understand life existing as a series 
of cycles of birth and rebirth. All life is intricately connected and interdependent.  
 Let us begin by considering the claim that AIDU is necessary. For something to be 
necessary, it must be the case that it exists in such a way in all possible worlds. There is no 
possible world in which it exists differently—in its essential nature—from the way it does. 
Theists generally claim that God is a necessary being, that is to say, that which makes God what 
God is (God’s essential nature) must be the case in all possible worlds. It could not be otherwise. 
But can a pantheist claim that the divine is necessary? The idea of necessity raises a significant 
problem for pantheists. Many pantheists hold that the world is either in some sense identical to 
the divine or, at least, an expression of the divine, that is, creation flows forth out from the 
divine. Yet, in any case, this would prove to be incompatible with the idea that the divine is 
necessary and self-existent, particularly if we think that there is any kind of contingency in the 
world. For the “All” or the “Ultimate” or “God” to share being with the world would result in its 
being limited by the world.36 Further, as H. P. Owen put it, “Alternatively, if the world is (as it 
manifestly is and must be) contingent, and if it is part of God, he cannot be necessary.”37 To say 
that some being is both necessary and contingent results in a contradiction, which Owens likens 
to saying that some “figure is both a circle and a square.”38 Especially if one were to take 
Spinoza’s brand of pantheism, one in which there is no contingency in the universe, then one 
would have a highly deterministic universe. For some forms of pantheism, creation flows by 
necessity from God. This stands in stark contrast to theistic views that recognize that God creates 
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ex nihilo out of His free decision.  But as David Clark and Norman Geisler suggest: “Now there 
is nothing inherently incoherent with viewing creation as necessary. . . . If God creates 
necessarily, then God must create. If creation is necessary, then God cannot not create.”39 
Whether the universe is an extension of God, as in Spinoza, or the universe flows from God, as 
with Levine, such a universe would have significant implications for human responsibility and 
evil in the world (which we will consider below).  
But let us consider the claim that AIDU is eternal. What does it mean to say that 
something is eternal? At minimum, to say that something is eternal means that it has no 
beginning or ending. In theism, this is known as the everlasting view of eternity, in which God 
exists without a beginning or end.40 This everlasting eternal view of the world seems to be the 
view that most Hindus and Buddhists41 hold and the view that Harrison and Corrington favor. 
Though, like most pantheistic views on nature and the universe, it is difficult to pin down just 
exactly what it is that one believes. Harrison finds as a live possibility something like the 
multiverse hypothesis or Stephen Hawking’s suggestion that space-time curves back on itself 
much like that of a sphere.42 For Hindus, the cosmos has expanded and retracted many times 
(which sounds much like certain forms of the multiverse hypothesis). Buddhists, too, hold that 
there is no ultimate beginning to the world.43 Whichever is the case, there would be no true 
                                                 
39 David K. Clark and Norman L. Geisler, Apologetics in the New Age (Eugen, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1990), 
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40 See Nicholas Wolterstorf , “God Everlasting,” in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. Steven M. 
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beginning or end. As considered in our discussion on naturalism, there are some significant 
problems with the idea of the multi-verse, particularly in view of the anthropic principle. I will 
not rehearse those here. Rather, I will consider some difficulties with the notion of an infinite 
past.  
As noted earlier, Harrison sees no problem with the idea of an infinite past. After all, we 
can imagine a limitless future (though, this too, has some issues of its own, as we will see), so 
why cannot the same be true of the past? When assessing the TCA, Harrison suggests that there 
must be another cause—something that caused God. If God is the final stop, then why could the 
universe itself not also be the final stop? He argues: 
The argument for a creator God also has a very serious logical flaw. It is based on the 
premise that everything requires a cause – and yet theists accept that one thing does exist 
without a cause: God himself. This tends to undermine the basic premise of the argument. 
God is thought to exist without a cause. But if one thing can be self-existing, why can this 
one thing not be the Universe itself?44  
         
Part of the problem with Harrison’s argument, like many others who misunderstand TCA, is that 
Thomas is not primarily concerned with arguing for a temporal cause—he actually held to the 
possibility of infinitely long temporal regress of causes and effects within the space-time 
universe—rather, the ultimate cause exists as a prior cause logically, which would not need a 
cause for its existence—such a cause would be necessary. Here we might follow Stephen Davis 
and make a distinction between “linear causation” and “hierarchical causation,” where linear 
causation has to do with causation in a temporal or linear fashion and hierarchical causation is 
concerned with causes that are logically related to some object.45 Let us suppose that some object 
x is the temporal or linear cause of some object y. We can imagine y remaining in existence even 
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if x were to cease to exist. For example, a shoe depends on its being formed by a shoemaker. The 
shoemaker could cease to exist while the shoe remains. In this case, the shoe is dependent only 
temporally or linearly on its formation from the shoemaker; however, the shoe can remain in 
existence despite what happens with respect to the shoemaker. But how might we understand the 
notion of hierarchical causation and logical dependency? Perhaps Greek mythology can lend us 
an example. In Greek mythology there is a character known as Atlas who eternally holds the 
world on his shoulders. If Atlas were to cease to exist, then the world would no longer be 
sustained. In this case, the world is dependent on Atlas for its continually being sustained in 
existence. The dependency is not in any way temporal or linear (or, at least, not merely so); 
rather, it is a logical kind of dependency. For Aquinas, God not only created the world, but God 
sustains the world in existence. If God were to cease to exist (which is impossible), then so, too, 
would the world. If God were to remove his sustaining power, then the world would cease to 
exist. It is this kind of dependency—logical dependency—that Aquinas had in mind with respect 
to causation in his second “Way.”  
But how is it that we can have something like a linear regress but not a hierarchical one? 
Unfortunately, Aquinas does not tell us. Stephen Davis suggests two possibilities. Aquinas, says 
Davis, was opposed to the idea of an actual infinite. In the world, there cannot be an infinite 
number of members of any one thing. For example, it would be impossible to have an infinite 
number of, say, dogs, cats, people, or atoms in existence all at once or at the same time.46 Davis 
goes on to say, “Now if there were an infinite number of linear causal ancestors of some 
presently existing thing—some human being, say—those ancestors would not all have to be 
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existing right now. . . . Most of them would presumably be dead and gone. No actual infinite 
would be required to exist all at once.”47 Rather, what we have in the world is a potential 
infinite—the idea that the world is ever increasing toward an infinite without ever reaching it. 
But why couldn’t this be the case with respect to hierarchical causation, in which the effect 
depends on the continued existence of its cause? Here Davis responds: “the effect cannot exist 
unless all its hierarchical causes simultaneously exist.”48 In other words, “if there were an 
existing human being who had an infinite number of hierarchical causes, that would require the 
existence all at once, here and now, of every one of them—an actual infinite,”49 which for 
Aquinas, would be impossible.  
 The objector might obviously retort back by asking: “Why couldn’t there be something 
like an infinite temporal regress in the world?” or, at least, “Why couldn’t the past extend 
backwards infinitely?” In response to such questions, theistic philosophers, pace Aquinas, have 
argued that it is impossible for infinite temporal regress to exist in the world, since such would in 
reality be an actual infinite. In their formation of the Kalam cosmological argument, William 
Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair have put the argument against the actuality of an infinite 
temporal regress in the following way: 
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist. 
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite. 
 2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.50 
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But why think that an actual infinite could not exist in the world? Craig and Sinclair provide a 
variety of thought experiments illustrating the kinds of absurdities that result from the 
instantiation of an actual infinite in the world. The primary example is that of Hilbert’s Hotel, 
which goes as follows. Suppose we have a hotel with a finite number of rooms, and none of 
those rooms has a vacancy. If a guest were to show up, the doorman would have to kindly turn 
the guest away, since all of the rooms are currently occupied. Now let’s suppose that, rather than 
the hotel having a finite number of rooms, it contains an infinite number of rooms, with each of 
the rooms currently occupied by a guest. But in this scenario, if a guest was to show up, the 
doorman could easily accommodate him. “Sure,” says the doorman, “we can make room.” The 
doorman proceeds to move each guest over one room. The guest in room #1 he moves to room 
#2, the guest in room #2 to room #3, and so on ad infinitum. Having moved all of the guests over 
one space, room #1 now becomes vacant. The doorman checks the guest in and all rooms are 
now once again occupied. Things get stranger, suggest Craig and Sinclair. Suppose an infinite 
number of guests show up at the desk. Just as what happened with the one guest, the doorman 
now shifts each person over. But rather than moving all of the guests only one room over, he 
places each person in a room twice his own, such that the person in room #1 goes into room 2#, 
the person in room #2 goes into room #4, the person in room #3 goes into room #6, so on ad 
infinitum until all of the even rooms are now occupied, leaving vacancies in all of the odd 
numbered rooms for the guests, and thus all of the guests would be accommodated.51 These are 
just two examples of the kinds of bazaar occurrences that would take place if an actual infinite 
existed in reality.   
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Per 2.12, then, an infinite temporal regress of events would constitute an actual infinite. 
Such would also mean that a beginningless set of past events or moments would constitute an 
actual infinite. But do Craig and Sinclair’s thought experiments automatically rule out the notion 
of an infinite set of past events? Stephen Davis suggests that these kinds of thought experiments 
argue only against the notion that an infinite series of a set can exist at any given time. In order to 
demonstrate this, Davis gives the example of a library. Rather than an infinitely large library 
containing an infinite set of books all at once, suppose that the library was a smaller one with an 
emphasis on the longevity of it rather than its size. Suppose further that this particular library 
only contains one book in its collection at a time, and each year the librarian destroys the book 
and then replaces it with a new one. While a book’s life is only a year in the library’s collection, 
the library itself has existed an infinite number of years.52 Davis goes on to argue: 
 Here then truly would be a library with an infinitely large collection of books, but it would 
seem that Craig’s paradoxes no longer apply. Taking away one book at any given time 
would reduce the collection in size (to zero); adding ten books would increase the size of the 
collection (to eleven), etc. If I am right, the critic . . . can argue that there is no incoherence 
in the idea of an infinite number of past events. As long as past time is infinite, the infinite 
number of past events can occur in serial order, one at a time (or any finite number at a 
time); at no one time do an infinite number of events occur.53  
  
If this kind of objection is correct, then, perhaps, the pantheist has good grounds for thinking the 
universe is infinitely old.     
It is important to note that the kind of argument Davis puts forth assumes an A-Theory of 
time and something like presentism—the ontological view that the only temporal objects, items, 
or things that exist are those that exists in the present.54 According to presentism, the past no 
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54 Craig and Sinclair, “The Kalam Cosmological Argument,” 115. Philosophers of time make distinction 
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longer exists and the future has not yet occurred? Whether presentism is true or not is not 
something that I can consider here, but for our purposes we will assume that something like 
presentism is true.  
If something like presentism were true, would it allow for an infinite set of past events, as 
Davis’s presumed critic might argue? It does not seem so. Craig and Sinclair provide an 
independent argument based on the notion of successive addition. The argument goes as follows: 
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be an actual infinite. 
2.22 The temporal series of events is a collection formed by successive addition. 
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of events cannot be an actual infinite.55  
 
This argument does not so much argue against the possibility of an actual infinite, as did the 
previous one, but only against the notion that an actual infinite can be formed through successive 
addition. By “successive addition,” Craig and Sinclair mean “the accrual of one new element at a 
(later) time.”56 The crucial element in the process is the temporality of it. What they are 
concerned with is the “temporal process of successive addition of one element after another.”57 
No one would doubt the impossibility of an actual infinite by successive addition in the case that 
there is a beginning point that is moving toward infinity. Suppose we have a finite number n. If 
one were to make an addition to it, say, n + 1, then what we are left with is a finite number. But 
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the problem is more complicated than that. Craig and Sinclair put the problem in the following 
way: 
 The question then arises whether, as a result of time’s asymmetry, an actually infinite 
collection, although incapable of being formed by successive addition by beginning at a 
point and adding members, nevertheless could be formed by successive addition by never 
beginning but ending at a point, that is to say, ending at a point after having added one 
member after another from eternity. In this case, one is not engaged in the impossible task of 
trying to convert a potential into an actual infinite by successive addition. Rather at every 
point the series already is actually infinite, although allegedly successively formed.58 
 
But this, too, is problematic. Here is why. If one cannot expect to count to an infinite, how can 
one expect to count down from an infinite? Moreover, if one cannot traverse the infinite by 
moving in one direction, then how can one expect to traverse an infinite going the other. Craig 
and Sinclair continue: 
 In order for us to have “arrived” at today, temporal existence has, so to speak, traversed an 
infinite number of prior events. But before the present event could occur, the event 
immediately prior to it would have to occur; and before that event could occur, the event 
immediately prior to it would have to occur; and so on ad infinitum. One gets driven back 
and back into the infinite past, making it impossible for any event to occur. Thus, if the 
series of past events were beginningless, the present event could not have occurred, which is 
absurd.59      
 
They further support this claim by providing a thought experiment. Suppose we have a person 
named Tristram Shandy, who has set out to write his autobiography. It takes Shandy a full year 
to write about one day’s worth of events. Shandy opines that at such a rate he will never finish 
his autobiography. Sadly, since Shandy is mortal, surely he would die before finishing a year’s 
worth of his life. But let us suppose that Shandy somehow comes by way of immortality. Would 
not this change the game and allow him to complete his task? The great atheist philosopher, 
Bertrand Russell, seemed to think so. Given an average of one day per year, all that one would 
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need in order to write about an infinite number of days is an infinite number of years. Such 
would be plenty of time for Shandy to accomplish his autobiography, provided that he is diligent 
in his task. But Russell’s solution will not do. Despite Shandy’s best efforts, the opposite would 
seem to be true. Rather than finishing the book, provided he lived forever and had an infinite 
amount of time to complete it, Shandy would only get further and further behind. Each day that 
he writes would only lead to another year of laborious work. But that is not the only difficulty. If 
Russell’s argument was correct, why is it, then, that Shandy did not finish his autobiography 
sooner, say, yesterday, the day before, or last month? After all, could not he have finished it at 
any time in the past? But such would be absurd, since he has been writing an infinitely long 
time.60 Thus one can conclude that a temporal series of events cannot become an actual infinite 
through successive addition.  
 Given such arguments as the ones presented here by Craig and Sinclair, it would seem 
that the pantheist does not stand on good ground for thinking that the universe is eternal; rather, 
it would seem more likely that the universe began to exist at a finite time in the past, which 
would align with standard Big Bang cosmology. If that is the case, then the universe cannot, 
itself, be necessary; rather, it must be contingent and dependent on something else for its 
existence. But that would raise a significant problem for the pantheist, since in some sense or 
another, the universe is identical with God. But as H. P. Owens argued, “if God to any extent 
transcends the world—if there is any element of his being that is not contained in the world—
pantheism, in the strict sense, is false.”61 This would seem to hold for those pantheists who argue 
that the universe is in some sense a self-expression of or emanation out of God. Owen further 
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argues, “Merely to speak of the world as a self-expression of the One is to imply that the One has 
a separate nature to express.”62  
 Despite those immense difficulties that come with expressing how AIDU can be either 
eternal or necessary, it does seem that, depending on the kind in consideration, pantheism has 
one up on explaining the complexity of life in the universe. Unlike the turn in recent forms of 
naturalism, which posits something like an eternal universe generator that perpetually or 
eternally produces universes, the pantheist can chalk it up to the divine. Though not personal, the 
pantheistic concept of deity functions as an eternal organizer of sorts. The various laws or forces 
at work in nature are all encompassed in the divine Unity.   
Assuming something like neo-Darwinian evolution, pantheists have a mechanism for 
how life emerges on earth. Harrison believes that evolution is a “successful scientific explanation 
of how design emerges in the most complex things” and that it is “a wonderful mechanism for 
perfecting design, and like any great designer, it has both creativity and rigorous discipline.”63 
Evolution is creative in the sense that it brings about new variations through random mutations 
and sexual reproduction.64 The environment weeds out poor design, allowing those organisms 
that are best adapted to thrive and those that are not to die off. Harrison further describes 
evolution in pantheistic terms in the following way: 
 For pantheists, evolution is a universal force that works even on non-living things. From the 
very instant of our universe, every individual thing has existed in the midst of other things, 
and has had to adapt to the community of beings in which it finds itself. Evolution is at work 
even in the realms of mind and society. Ideas, scientific theories, technologies and products 
are tested against each other and the most effective survive.65  
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When Harrison speaks of evolution as a “force,” he does not go into great detail about what he 
means by that. Is such a force eternal? Is it necessary? Has it always been a part of the nature of 
the universe? Is evolution one of many of the forces that are part of AIDU or is it the driving 
force behind everything? All this needs fleshing out. But what is clear for Harrison, and for most 
pantheists, is that the force cannot be personal in nature. It should be noted, however, that some 
pantheists such as Plotinus and Spinoza do see something like a Mind at work in creation. It is, 
as Norman Geisler describes it, an “immanent providence” at work.66 In his assessment, Geisler 
recognizes that the providence takes place from within creation rather than over or beyond it, as 
it does in theism, and it is the immanent nature of God that leads him to suggest that it is 
pantheistic. If one accepts emanationist accounts of God,67 then the pantheistic view can 
accommodate for a kind of Intelligence at work in the world, which is an improvement over a 
purely atheistic or naturalistic understanding that all things came about through mindless or 
purposeless chance.68  
Pantheism and Consciousness 
Despite the limitations of explaining either the eternality or the necessity of AIDU, and 
assuming something like neo-Darwinian evolution, pantheism fares much better at explaining 
life than does naturalism, but how well does it fare at explaining consciousness? As noted, an 
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explanation of consciousness is required for providing an adequate explanation of evil in the 
world, particularly any kind of suffering. Again, it would seem that pantheism fares better than 
naturalism when it comes to the notion of consciousness. Pantheism has available to it a wide 
variety of resources regarding consciousness. There are some pantheists who are also 
physicalists. Interestingly enough, this tends to be a Westernized pantheism influenced by 
naturalism.69 Such pantheists will run up against the same kinds of issues we saw that naturalists 
face regarding the nature of consciousness. Thus I will not consider physicalist pantheism here. 
Non-physicalist pantheists, however, may ascribe to something like panpsychism, 
animism, idealism, or a general dualism in order to explain consciousness in the world. While 
not a pantheist himself, philosopher Thomas Nagel has recently gravitated toward 
panpsychism—the view that all things in the physical world are also mental—as a means to 
explain not only consciousness, but also cognition and values, which, he argues, is something 
that psycho-physical reductionist theories cannot do.70 Animism is the view that a living soul is 
behind the organization and animation of the world, including plants, inanimate objects, and 
natural phenomena. Idealist pantheists are monists, recognizing that the material world is maya 
(illusion) and does not really exist. Mind or spirit is ultimate.71 Lastly, some pantheists are also 
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separates physicalist pantheists from naturalists is that of worship. But why then call oneself a pantheist at all? Why 
not hold to something like religious naturalism? For an example of a recent work advocating religious naturalism, 
see Loyal Rue, Nature is Enough: Religious Naturalism and the Meaning of Life (Albany, New York: Suny Press, 
2011). Cf. Sam Harris, Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality without Religion (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). 
 
70 Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, 56-57. While I do not deal with it in this chapter, it seems that panpsychism 
has some major difficulties, particularly the combination problem. I discuss these difficulties more fully when I 
consider the process pantheistic view of panexperientialism in the next chapter. 
 
 71 An idealist understanding would raise many questions of its own. Would all suffering be an illusion? Or 
would all suffering primarily be a matter of mental pain? Furthermore, would such a view align with the salient facts 
of pain and suffering that we see taking place in the world, especially how we think of physical pain? For a modern 
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dualists.72 It is a misconception that all pantheists are monists. For pantheistic dualists, the key is 
not in understanding whether just one kind of substance exists or not; rather, emphasis is placed 
on the Unity. Though pantheism does not entail any one of these options, all seem to fit well 
within a pantheistic scheme, and each provide a possible explanation for consciousness in the 
world.73  
Pantheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility 
 But what of moral responsibility and the metaphysics of good and evil? Before discussing 
human responsibility, it may be helpful to consider whether pantheism has any basis for values. 
A central tenet of theism is that God is perfectly good. When theists speak of God as “good,” 
they mean that God is good both ontologically and morally speaking.74 Within the very nature of 
God, there is no evil or badness, nor any sort of metaphysical deficiency. Furthermore, not only 
is God himself good, from the theistic perspective, but God cannot perform any action that is 
rightly deemed irremediably immoral or unjust or wrong or bad. By this is not meant that God’s 
goodness is to be understood Ockhamistically, but rather, substantively; God, in the ultimate 
sense, is constitutive of goodness itself. God is the Good, essentially, by which all other goods 
find their source; and God always does that which is right. Theists generally draw a distinction, 
here, between the Creator, who is infinite, and the creature, who is finite. Since the world is 
ontologically distinct from and dependent on God ontologically, though originally created as 
                                                 
idealist pantheistic perspective see T. L. S. Sprigge, The God of Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
   
72 Levine, Pantheism, 114-115; Harrison, Elements of Pantheism, 85-87. 
 
73 Though, it seems to me that the only viable option, other than dualism, is something like panpsychism, 
which I will consider extensively in chapter three, when discussing process panentheistic views. 
  
74 Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God: An Inquiry into Divine Attributes (Ithica, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989).  
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good, it can be corrupted and flawed. Creation’s original goodness, or any other good for that 
matter, is derivative from God and not so essentially. Such good things possess potentiality. 
Pantheists, however, do not see things quite the same way. Rather than seeing AIDU as 
supremely good or perfectly good as theists do, some strands of pantheism see God as neither 
good nor evil; rather, the divine transcends such qualities. Consider the following passage from 
the Bhagavad Gita: 
 One man believes he is the slayer, another believes he is the slain. Both are ignorant; there is 
neither slayer nor slain. You were never born; you will never die. You have never changed; 
you can never change. Unborn, eternal, immutable, immemorial, you do not die when the 
body dies. Realizing that which is indestructible, eternal, unborn, and unchanging, how can 
you slay or cause another to slay.75 
 
This passage affirms that ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are false categories and ultimately an illusion. But 
even for those Western pantheists who are more naturalistic in orientation, the categories of good 
and evil seem to be nothing more than human invention. Regarding good and evil, Harrison 
claims: 
The focus of pantheist reverence is not a good God. The Universe is neither good nor evil. 
The human categories of good and evil do not apply. It simply is. Again, this conception is 
easier to square with reality than the idea of an omnipotent and perfectly good God who 
allows or even causes devastating hurricanes, floods, epidemics claiming millions of lives—
actions that in human terms would usually be seen as monstrously evil. The question why 
God would allow pain and evil to exist is one of the most difficult of all for theists to 
answer. Pantheists do not have to answer it. The Universe is what it is.76  
 
Furthermore, 
 
 [T]he Universe has provided us all with an indescribably beautiful home and a 
consciousness with which to appreciate it. True, it could wipe us out tomorrow in a 
hurricane or a meteor strike—as could the “loving” God of theist religion. But natural 
disasters are easier to accept if you do not imagine there is a personal God sending them to 
destroy the innocent and the guilty alike, or creating a world in which such things happen. 
Nature does not plan or act out of anger or retribution: if a natural catastrophe strikes, it is 
                                                 
 75 Bhagavad Gita, 19-21. 
   
76 Harrison, Elements of Pantheism, 44.  
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simply the working out of the laws of nature on the social and physical structures of 
humankind.77  
 
For Harrison, like many pantheistic Hindus, it would seem that the categories of good and evil 
are not the kinds of categories that one can ascribe to reality in any objective sense—they are 
merely “human categories.” Yet, it is interesting that Harrison criticizes the actions of the God of 
theism on what seems to be objective standards that hold true in all circumstances. If they are not 
objective in nature, then why the big fuss? It seems that Harrison feels the existential pull and 
weight of the injustice of such actions that he attributes to the theistic God. If there were such a 
God, He should not act in such a way. But why think that some set of actions are “monstrously 
evil” unless there is such a standard by which one can judge them? To claim that good and evil 
are only human categories takes the bite out of Harrison’s objection. Why think these human 
categories ought to apply toward God at all? Harrison does not say. But what of Harrison’s 
argument that natural disasters are easier to accept for pantheists over against theism? We 
cannot, here, deal with Harrison’s criticism of theism.78 For Harrison’s type of pantheism, the 
same God whom the pantheist worships is the same God that can wipe them out in an instant. 
Because AIDU is non-personal, it is indifferent to such tragedies. Furthermore, if one takes 
Harrison’s line of thought, could we truly call such tragedies “evil” in an objective sense? That is 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 44. 
   
78 The theistic response to evils that occur through nature will be considered more fully in later chapters. 
For now, theists no doubt would reject Harrison’s caricature and oversimplification of God’s dealings with humanity 
through natural disasters. It is not at all clear that the majority of theists think that something like ‘God’s dealing 
with people through nature’ is God’s primary modus operandi for bringing about judgment on people. Most Jewish 
and Christian theists recognize that the Old Testament Scriptures portray certain instances of God using natural 
disaster to punish wickedness, but such instances are the exception and not the norm. Sadly, some theists, in light of 
recent tragedies, have suggested that certain natural disasters were the result of God’s judgment on a nation or group 
of peoples or because of a certain sin. Such statements are unwarranted and are a matter of conjecture. There is no 
reason to think that God’s use of nature to judge is a central part of theism. One cannot but help get the impression 
that Harrison is throwing out a straw man argument in order to make the pantheistic view more palatable for his 
readers.   
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just the way things happen. If we are to accept the pantheistic God of Harrison and the Gita, then 
the criticism of Michael Peterson et al is fitting of such an understanding of the pantheistic God 
and evil: 
Perhaps the most striking point to be made, however, is that the God of pantheism cannot 
distinguish between good and evil. All actions performed in the universe are equally 
manifestations of the power of God; the notion that some of these actions are in an ultimate 
sense “good” and others “evil” must in the end be dismissed as an illusion. Pantheists may 
be, and often are, extremely upright and scrupulous in their personal ethics, but in the 
ultimate perspective good and evil—or, what we call good and evil—are transcended.79 
 
The pantheistic God, though the power of being in all things, cannot and does not really do 
anything about evil. Pantheists consider the divine Unity as the source of value in the world, yet 
it can make no real distinction between “good” and “evil.”80    
 Not all pantheists, however, wish to deny that good and evil are objective categories in 
the world. But what counts as “good” and “evil” for such pantheists? How do they handle the 
concept of evil within their systems? According to Levine, the traditional “problem of evil” does 
not apply to pantheists, since pantheists reject those aspects of theism that generate the problem 
(e.g., that God is all-good and all-powerful and yet evil exists in the world; that such things as 
gratuitous evils exist and that a Good and all-loving God does nothing about them; and so on); 
rather, the problem from evil is “peculiar” to theism alone. For theists, says Levine, ‘“[e]vil’ is 
essentially metaphysical rather than a moral concept; or it is a moral concept with a particular 
theistic metaphysical commitment.”81 Nevertheless, pantheists have their own formulation of the 
problem. He continues, “The pantheist may prefer, as most contemporary ethical theorists do, to 
                                                 
79 Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger, Reason and Religious 
Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 82-83. 
  
 80 Hasker, Metaphysics, 110. 
   
81 Levine, Pantheism, 197.  
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talk of what is morally or ethically right and wrong. The term ‘evil’ could be retained and 
applied to particular (usually extreme) instances of moral wrongness, but it would be understood 
in a sense that divorces it from its original theological and metaphysical context.”82 With respect 
to the divine Unity, pantheists do not claim that the divine Unity is all-good or omnibenevolent, 
nor is the divine Unity a “perfect being” (or a being at all, for that matter). “In theism,” claims 
Levine, “it is assumed that what is divine cannot also be (in part) evil. But why assume this is the 
case with pantheism?”83 He continues, “[t]here seems to be little reason to suppose that what is 
divine cannot also, in part, be evil. To say that everything that exists constitutes divine Unity (i.e. 
pantheism’s essential claim) need not be interpreted in such a way that it entails that all parts and 
every aspect of the Unity is divine or good. There can be a Unity and it can be divine without 
everything about it always, or even sometimes, being divine.”84 Evil seems to be, then, for the 
pantheists, primarily a moral issue, fundamentally connected to the pantheist’s conception 
AIDU. To claim that some action is “evil,” it must be seen (in some sense) as a disruption of the 
divine Unity. But what exactly is “evil” for the pantheist? What exactly is the “good”? Are we to 
understand good and evil primarily in moral terms? Levine does not say. It is clear, however, that 
he rejects the theistic understanding of evil as privation.85 It may be that “privation” applies to 
pantheists in the sense that evil reflects a “disunity or the absence of whatever it is the pantheistic 
                                                 
82 Ibid. Though, it seems, here, that Levine is confusing categories. He is blurring the lines between the 
“good” and the “right.” Issues of moral goodness have to do with axiological matters, while issues of moral 
rightness are deontological in nature. For a helpful discussion, see David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The 
Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44. 
  
83 Ibid., 208.  
 
84 Ibid.  
 
85 Ibid., 212-214.  
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Unity is predicated upon.”86 It is not at all clear what Levine means by this. But what of the 
good? In his discussion on evil, Levine gives little attention to it. Should the notion of good, 
then, be predicated on whatever brings about pantheistic Unity?87  
 Levine does, however, hold to a form of moral realism, which, as he claims, is generally 
the case for pantheists (or at least the brand of pantheism that he is promoting). There are 
objectively real moral facts in the world. Some things are ethically right or wrong independent of 
human beliefs about them. According to Levine, pantheists do not equate moral properties with 
natural properties, as some naturalists are wont to do. Such properties are not empirically 
verifiable. Rather, the pantheist, like the theist, will find such moral facts as “X is wrong” in 
something other than the natural; such facts are grounded in the non-natural.88 For theists, “X is 
wrong” finds explanation and partial analysis in God’s will and nature. Pantheists, on the other 
hand, find such facts explained and partially analyzed in “terms of (even if not reducible to) non-
natural facts about the divine Unity.”89 Like Spinoza, Levine finds a strong connection between 
metaphysics and ethics. Regarding this point, Levine elaborates: “The belief in a divine Unity, 
and some kind of identification with that Unity, is seen as the basis for an ethical framework (and 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 213.   
 
87 But that is the rub—on pantheism, everything contributes to the divine Unity. It seems that Levine is 
picking and choosing what does and does not contribute to AIDU, perhaps to make the pantheistic conception of 
God more palatable to his readers.     
 
88 Ibid., 221. A “non-natural fact,” says Adams, “is one which does not consist simply in any fact or 
complex of facts which can be stated entirely in the languages of physics, chemistry, biology, and human 
psychology.” See Robert M. Adams, “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in The Virtue of 
Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 105 as quoted in 
Levine, Pantheism, 221.  
    
89 Ibid. It should be noted that Levine leaves open the possibility of a pantheist holding to something like 
ethical naturalism, if the pantheist were to make a case much in the same way that Richard Swinburne does for 
naturalistic theistic ethics. 
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‘way of life’) that extends beyond the human to non-human and non-living things. The divine 
Unity is, after all, ‘all-inclusive.’”90  
The close connection and intricate interrelatedness between the human, non-human, 
earth, and divine Unity often lends to strong emphasis on environmental ethics. Pantheists often 
find such interrelatedness as advantageous over other systems. On this point Levine explains: 
“The pantheist’s ethic, her environmental ethic and her ethics more generally, will be 
metaphysically based in terms of the divine Unity. It will be based on the Unifying principle 
which accounts for an important commonality, and it will be the grounds for extending one’s 
notion of the moral community to other living and non-living things. Everything that is part of 
the divine Unity (as everything is) is also part of the moral community.”91 Here, Levine cites 
Taoism as an example of how this may work. For Taoists, the Tao (the way) is the unifying 
principle. What it means for one to act correctly is for one to act in accordance with the Tao. 
Levine explains: 
 In the context of the Tao Tê Ching (Taoism’s primary “scripture”) what the Tao is and how 
to act in accordance with it are explained in terms of one another. The Tao Tê Ching, like 
most other primary sacred sources, is at one and the same time an ethical treatise on how to 
live and a metaphysical treatise analyzing reality. One does not understand the Tao unless 
one understands what it means to live in accordance with it. Ethics are intrinsically related to 
the Tao, and “value” is associated with it at the most basic level.92 
     
Another example available to the pantheist is the Hindu notion of karma, which can also be 
interpreted pantheistically. One can act either in accordance with or in defiance of the “all-
                                                 
90 Ibid., 222.   
 
91 Ibid., 233.  
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pervasive principle” found within the karmic system.93 The principle by its very nature is 
“associated with value,” promoting the good.94      
In working out his pantheistic understanding of ethics, Levine opts for something similar 
to the divine command theory found in theism. He does not mean by “command” that AIDU 
gives commands as such and that such commands are to be followed; rather, the notion of 
commands have more to do with living in accordance to the Unity. For the pantheist, then, living 
in accordance with AIDU is the “ethically good” thing to do, while living defiantly toward or 
violating the Unity is “ethically wrong.”95 “What is right and wrong,” says Levine, “is to be 
explained by reference, essential reference in some cases, to the divine Unity, just as what is 
right and wrong for the theist is, in some cases, to be explained by reference to the nature of 
God.”96   
It seems, here, that Levine has provided a step up over naturalists and other pantheists, 
such as Harrison, in providing a way of thinking objectively about the metaphysics of good and 
evil and moral responsibility. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with Levine’s system. 
First, while Levine finds the notions of “good” and “evil” and “moral rightness” and “moral 
wrongness” in relation to that which promotes or deviates from the pantheistic Unity, there is 
ambiguity in regards to just what it is that makes up that Unity. Levine spends quite a bit of 
space discussing what the divine Unity is not, but he never nails down just exactly what the 
                                                 
93 It is important to keep in mind that Levine distinguishes between the Divine Unity and monism. For 
Levine, Divine Unity neither entails nor requires monism, which many have falsely misunderstood. It is for this 
reason that Levine believes that one can act in accordance to or against the Unity. 
  
 94 Ibid., 238. 
 
95 Interestingly enough, this sounds more like natural law than it does a form of divine command theory. 
  
 96 Ibid. 
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divine Unity is.97 This is a common pattern among pantheists. If the pantheist expects his 
understanding of the God-world relation to be taken seriously, then he would need to bring 
greater clarity to just what he means by the divine Unity. Philosophically speaking, the way in 
which pantheists describe the divine Unity leaves one to question whether it really makes much 
difference if pantheism is true rather than if no God existed at all? As William Hasker says about 
the divine Unity, “Considering what is known of the universe, it is hard to see how it is a unity in 
any stronger sense than that it is a single space-time continuum in which things are interrelated 
according to a single set of natural laws.”98  
Second, while Levine is quick to argue that pantheism avoids the theistic problems of evil 
and that pantheism has a problem of evil unique to its own system, he does not say just what 
such a problem is. Levine defines evil ambiguously as that which disrupts the divine Unity. 
However, to say that evil disrupts the divine Unity does not really tell us anything much about 
evil itself. Moreover, Levine acknowledges that such a view of evil may count as a kind of 
“privation,” yet he is adamant that the pantheistic system avoids the theistic notion of evil based 
on a theistic metaphysic.99 But given that Levine holds to an objectivist view of moral rightness 
and wrongness, he is acknowledging that there is a way that something ought to be—a moral 
order of sorts (e.g., the Tao). But to suggest that something ought to be a certain way indicates 
that something is just not quite right—a kind of privation of the good. If this line of thinking is 
correct, then it is questionable whether Levine, and other pantheists, have fully escaped the 
problem of evil claimed to be “unique” to theism. But of course, the God of pantheism escapes 
                                                 
 97 For an extensive discussion on this issue, see Michael P. Levine, “Pantheism, Substance and Unity,” 
International Journal of Philosophy of Religion 32, no. 1 (Aug. 1992): 1-23. 
     
 98 Hasker, Metaphysics, 110.   
 
99 One wonders if pantheists like Levine, Harrison, and Corrington take the problem of evil seriously. The 
inability to articulate what is intuitively an extremely difficult problem is a deficiency in any worldview. 
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the charge of the problem from evil in the sense that the pantheistic conception of God is neither 
all-loving nor all-powerful. Furthermore, the God of the pantheist is not the perfect being of the 
of God theism. But it should be noted that the God of pantheism is also non-responsive to evil in 
the world. Supposing that something like the Tao is true, what can such a unifying principle do 
about evil or the disruption of the divine Unity other than to suggest (if we can speak of a 
principle suggesting) a way that one ought to follow? Moreover, what can the divine Unity itself 
do? It would seem nothing more, at most, than to promote the good, and even that much is 
suspect. In Levine’s form of pantheism, humans are the only moral agents in the world; yet, 
humans are expected to do what the divine Unity itself cannot do—administer justice. What if 
humans reject the good? What then? Such a view of the God-world relation leaves us to question 
whether final justice will ever come about. Will the world’s wrongs ever be put to rights? We 
might think that some eternal principle, such as karma, may bring about final justice for 
atrocities performed by people. But how can a principle or force bring about justice? A force or 
principle has no intentions nor does it have any intelligence.100 But moreover, the notion of final 
justice could only be the case if there is such a thing as an afterlife. Levine, however, rejects both 
personal immortality and the hope for an afterlife. It is hard to see, then, how final justice can 
ever be fully brought about in such world.     
                                                 
100 Take, for example, the following argument from Layman regarding such impersonal laws: “Given that 
reincarnation and karma hold in the absence of any deity, the universe is governed not only by physical laws (such 
as the law of gravity) but by impersonal moral laws. These moral laws must be quite complex, for they have to 
regulate the connection between each soul’s moral record in one life and that soul’s total circumstances in the next 
life, including which body it has, its environment, and the degree of happiness (or misery) it experiences. Thus these 
impersonal moral laws must somehow take into account every act, every intention, and every choice of every moral 
agent and ensure that the agent receives nothing less than his or her just desserts in the next life. Now, the degree of 
complexity involved here is obviously very high, and it serves a moral end, namely, justice. But a highly complex 
structure that promotes justice can hardly be accepted as brute fact. Such a moral order cries out for explanation in 
terms of an intelligent cause. And if the moral order is on a scale far surpassing what can be attributed to human 
intelligence, an appeal to divine intelligence is justified. Hence, the moral order postulated by nontheistic 
reincarnation paradoxically provides evidence for the existence of a personal God.” C. Stephen Layman, “A Moral 
Argument for the Existence of God,” in Is Goodness without God Good Enough, edited by Robert K. Garcia and 
Nathan L. King (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 58-59. 
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Concluding Matters 
 In the last two chapters I sought to accomplish two tasks. First, I sought to set out a 
methodology for comparing how metaphysical systems explain the phenomenon of evil in the 
world. Moreover, I sought to do so without assuming a particularly theistic understanding of evil, 
but one that could be accepted by most everyone. Second, I then considered how well naturalism 
and pantheism answered the question of evil in the world based on their own metaphysical 
assumptions. I will hold off on comparing them until Chapter Six. Let us now consider in the 
next two chapters panentheism and theism.   
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CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 3  
PROCESS PANENTHISM 
 
 
Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters I began by comparing how well naturalism and pantheism 
explain the phenomenon of evil in the world. In the next two chapters I continue the comparative 
approach by giving consideration to panentheism and theism as possible candidates. Given that, 
like pantheism, there are a broad variety of panentheists—even among many Christians—I will 
focus attention primarily on Process panentheism. Having surveyed panentheism and theism as 
possible hypotheses for explaining the phenomenon of evil in the world, I will then compare 
those theories with the results from the previous chapters. Compared to the other systems, I 
argue that theism provides not only a better explanation for the phenomenon of evil in the world, 
but it also provides a more robust and overall thicker worldview response. Lastly, I consider the 
limitations of generic theism and argue that in order to provide a robust answer to the problem of 
evil, one must move from restricted theism to expanded theism, particularly Christian theism. 
There is good reason to make this move, especially as one considers the Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity. As I will argue, generic theism is lacking in explaining how God can be essentially 
loving—a requirement for being essentially good—and yet a necessary eternal being.    
Defining Panentheism  
 Like naturalism or pantheism, panentheism comes in many stripes and flavors. In its 
basic sense, the word ‘panentheism’ means something like “all-is-God-ism”1 or that the world is 
                                                 
1 John W. Cooper, Pantheism—The Other God of the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 26.   
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in God. On the one hand, like pantheism, the entirety of the world is (in some sense) in God, but 
God has an identity and unity all His own. Yet, unlike pantheism, this unity is not identical with 
all of God’s finite parts.2 In this way, panentheism resembles theism in that God (in some sense) 
transcends the world.  
The operative feature of how one understands panentheism lies in what one means by the 
word “in.” In a helpful typology, Niels Henrik Gregersen provides three possible forms of 
panentheism: “soteriological panentheism,” “expressivist panentheism,” and “dipolar 
panentheism.”3 Soteriological panentheism recognizes the “world’s being ‘in God’”4 is a gift and 
by the redeeming grace of God, and it is not something that is automatic. Moreover, not 
everything shares in God’s divine life, for example, sin and evil have no place in it. God 
becomes “all in all” (1 Cor 15:28) at the eschatological redemption and culmination of creation 
(Rom 8:18-21). On the other hand, expressivist panentheism is a form that follows Hegelian 
thought, in that the Spirit moves out from God into the processes of world history, only to 
eventually return back to God. Lastly, dipolar panentheism holds that God has two poles, one 
that is infinite, eternal, unchanging, and abstract while the other is finite, temporal, relative, and 
concrete. Gregersen identifies the process thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles 
                                                 
2 William Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1984), 
111; Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our 
Being, eds. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2004), 22. 
 
 3 Gregersen, “Three Varieties of Panentheism,” 21. For an extensive discussion on various distinctions 
among panentheists, see Cooper, Panentheism, 27-30. Cooper identifies five basic distinctions: 1) explicit and 
implicit panentheism; 2) personal and nonpersonal panentheism; 3) part-whole and relational panentheism; 4) 
voluntary and/or natural panentheism; and 5) classical (divine determinist) or modern (cooperative) panentheism.  
 
 4 Ibid. 
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Hartshorne, along with most other American process philosophers and theologians, with this 
latter form of panentheism.5  
Gregersen makes some further distinctions. He begins by qualifying what he means by 
generic panentheism. There are two basic features: 1) God contains the world and the world is 
(in some sense) in God; yet, God is also greater than the world; and 2) there are bilateral 
relations between the world and God, though the world is a creature and returns to God (again, in 
some sense). Regarding this latter point, the world affects God just as much as God affects the 
world. Having laid out his understanding of generic panentheism, Gregersen differentiates 
between what he calls “Strict (Dipolar) Panentheism” (henceforth SP) and “Qualified (Christian) 
Panentheism” (henceforth QP). SP has two basic features. First, analogous to how a soul must 
have a body, God, too, must have a world. It does not have to be this world. It could be any 
number of worlds—but God must coexist with a world in order to become fully actualized. 
Second, God and the world coexist and codetermine one another by metaphysical necessity. Not 
only does God influence the world but all temporal experiences become part of God’s nature. By 
necessity the world participates in divine life. QP differs from SP in that God could exist apart 
from the world. The soul and body analogy functions as a helpful metaphor to show divine 
immanence, but it does not require metaphysical necessity as does SP. Yet, QP, like SP, 
recognizes that once God has created the world, which is an act of divine grace, the world 
codetermines God, “so that temporal events may influence God and creatures share in the life of 
God; all that is redeemed participates in divine life.”6 Both SP and QP differ from classical 
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theism in that the relationship between the world and God is unilateral. While God affects the 
world, the world in no way affects God. As Gregersen spells it out: 
 The real difference, according to Thomas, is that the natures and activities of the creatures 
do not have a real feedback effect on God. There is, in other words, no return from the world 
into God. As pure activity (actus purus), God is the eternal realization of all positive 
predicates. Accordingly there is nothing God can “learn” in relation to the creatures, no 
“challenges” to be met, no free acts to “wait for.” The world is utterly dependent on God for 
its existence while the world cannot really affect the being or mind of God (Summa 
Theologia 1.28.a.1). In short, Thomas rejects not the first but only the second tenet of 
generic panentheism, as defined above.7 
 
It is this aspect of God’s real relatedness to the world that panentheists have criticized classical 
theism of rejecting and which sets them apart.8    
Besides God’s real relatedness to the world, there are several other reasons that 
panentheists gravitate to such a view on the God-world relation. Process philosopher and 
panentheist David Ray Griffin finds atheistic naturalism inadequate. For instance, atheistic 
naturalism, which equates the mind with the brain, cannot account for how the brain makes sense 
of human experience, since matter itself is devoid of any such experience. Moreover, it cannot 
account for the universal acceptance of religious experience, nor can it account for human 
freedom.9 Griffin further points out that atheistic naturalism cannot explain “the apparent 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 24. 
  
8 Ibid., 23-24. Panentheists have also accused classical theists of denying God’s immanence. But Gregersen 
makes it clear that such is not the case. According to Gregersen, Thomas Aquinas understood that God is in 
everything; however, by this Aquinas did not mean that God somehow makes up or is in the substance of all things. 
Rather, he meant that God is the active agent in all things. God is actively sustaining and keeping all things in 
existence through His power and causation. That is why Aquinas could use the body/soul metaphor and speak of 
God as immanent. See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, 1.8.a.1.  
    
 9 David Ray Griffin, “Panentheism: A Postmodern Revelation,” in In Whom We Live and Move and Have 
Our Being, eds. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co, 2004), 
41-42. 
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objectivity of mathematics and logic,” nor “the order of the universe.”10 Phillip Clayton lists a 
variety of reasons some have accepted panentheism as a viable option, especially when 
compared to theism: 1) Panentheism may be more fulfilling than traditional theism; 2) 
panentheism is more compatible than traditional theism with recent findings in science; 3) 
panentheism does a better job of making sense of certain religious beliefs, such as divine action; 
4) panentheism provides a mediating metaphysical position between eastern and western 
philosophy; 5) panentheism avoids certain objections to the problem of evil, which is a burden 
for traditional theism; and 6) classical theism has certain ethical and political implications not 
shared by panentheism.11  
John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, in their book, Process Theology, provide 
additional reasons for rejecting traditional theism over process panentheism. Process 
panentheism rejects any notion of a God who controls all things, who is a cosmic moralist, who 
is unchanging and passionless, and male—all of which, according to the authors, is the classical 
theistic perspective of God.12 When the authors speak of God controlling all things, they mean 
that all events and all details within the world are determined by God. They also deny that God is 
immutable as understood by classical theists. They have in mind Thomas Aquinas’ 
understanding of God as being “altogether immutable,” which he develops from his 
                                                 
 10 Ibid., 42. Interestingly enough, Griffin calls his own view “naturalistic theism.” As we will see, the 
reason for such a label has to do with the fact that for process theologians and philosophers God is neither 
metaphysically prior to nature nor is God the primary metaphysical category (p. 43).  
   
11 Phillip Clayton, “Panentheism in Metaphysical and Scientific Perspective,” in In Whom We Live and 
Move and Have Our Being, eds. Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co, 2004), 73-74.  
     
12 John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin, Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1976), 8-10. 
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understanding of God as actus purus. 13 It follows that if God is immutable then God is 
impassible, that is to say, God does not suffer in any sense—He is passionless. Their rejection of 
God as a cosmic moralist has to do with the denial of an understanding of God as a lawgiver and 
judge who has arbitrarily set laws in place. Such an understanding to the authors is a worst case 
scenario. They also reject the notion that God’s primary concern for His creatures is that they 
have certain moral attitudes. This, they think, is a secondary issue for humans, which, if such a 
position were true, would have God making it a primary one. Lastly, God as male paints a 
portrait of God as “sexually one-sided.”14    
Having observed some major distinctions between panentheists and having given some 
reasons as to why panentheists gravitate toward their understanding of the God-world relation, I 
will now spell out the kind of panentheism that will be considered in this chapter. Here I want to 
focus more on the SP and dipolar (and perhaps the expresivist) forms of panentheism 
distinguished by Gregersen above. QP, while a form of panentheism, boarders closely to theism, 
and especially the kind of theism that I am going to consider in Chapter Five.15 As specified, QP 
does not require that God create a world. In this case, God is metaphysically primary, which is 
similar to classical theism. The key qualifying difference between QP and classical theism is that 
God, for QP, is really affected by His creatures and that the creatures, in some sense, 
codetermine God, though Gregersen is unclear on what he means by “codetermine.” Theism can 
sympathize with such a view, given that many modern theists have rejected the classical theistic 
teaching that God is immutable in the absolute sense and, hence, not altogether impassible as 
                                                 
13 Aquinas, Summa Theologia, 1.9.a.1   
 
14 Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 8-10. 
 
15 I believe that Christian theism provides the resources to gain some of the same results sought after in this 
form of panentheism, for example a God who is really related to the world, yet without the intended consequences of 
panentheism. 
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theists such as Thomas Aquinas believed. But it may be argued, as many theists have done, one 
can avoid panentheism by adopting something like theological essentialism, which I will 
consider more extensively in Chapter Five. For now, we shall consider the philosophical and 
theological process thought of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. 
Alfred North Whitehead 
 Perhaps no thinker in twentieth century has done more to bring back metaphysics as a 
respectable enterprise within theological circles than Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947). 
Philosopher Stephen T. Davis has suggested that “Whitehead’s philosophical system is one of 
the most brilliant intellectual accomplishments of the twentieth century.”16 He is one of the first 
thinkers to formulate a systematic process philosophy,17 which is most fully represented in his 
magnum opus, Process and Reality.18  
Primary Categories 
 As with all process thought, central is the notion that everything that is “actual” is in 
process. Whitehead calls his own system a “philosophy of organism”19 and Victor Lowe 
expresses it in the following way: “Whitehead’s amazing philosophical achievement is the 
construction of a system of the world according to which the basic fact of existence is 
everywhere some process of self-realization, growing out of previous processes and itself adding 
                                                 
 16 Stephen T. Davis, “Is the God of Process Theology a Valid Option,” in Disputed Issues: Contending for 
Christian Faith in Today’s Academic Setting (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 121.  
 
 17 Norman Geisler and William D. Watkins, “Process Theology: a Survey and an Appraisal,” in Themelios 
11, no. 1 (1986): 16. 
 
 18 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, Corrected edition, eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. 
Sherburne (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1978). 
 
 19 Ibid., 21.  
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a new pulse of individuality and a new value to the world.”20 Lowe further describes 
Whitehead’s system as “pluralistic.”21 The reason for this has to do with Whitehead’s rejection 
of the view that there is only one individual who is “ultimate.”22  
 Fundamental to Whitehead’s “philosophy of organism” is the postulation that 
“creativity,” the “many,” and the “one” make up the “Ultimate.”23 This stands in stark contrast to 
classical theism, which understands God as ultimate and all other entities that exist as contingent 
and owing their existence to God. Moreover, the classical theistic understanding of God holds 
that God is eternal, immutable, and impassible. God is not affected by anything outside of 
Himself. This is not the case with Whitehead’s view, however.   
 In working out his speculative philosophy, Whitehead employed a variety of new terms 
and concepts to articulate the contours of his overall system. There are three primary terms that 
are critical for understanding Whitehead’s philosophy: “actual entities,” “prehension,” and 
“creativity.”24 Actual entities, or “actual occasions” as they are sometimes called, refer to “the 
final real things of which the world is made up.”25 Whitehead did not think that one can go 
behind actual entities. All are uniquely different and are considered to be “drops of experience”; 
                                                 
 20 Victor Lowe, “Whitehead’s Metaphysical System,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, eds 
Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr, and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis, IN: Bob’s-Merrill Educational Publishing, 
1971), p. 3. 
 
 21 Ibid. 
 
 22 Ibid. 
 
 23 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 21. 
 
 24 Charles Hartshorne and Creighton Peden, Whitehead’s View of Reality (New York, NY: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1981), 7. 
 
 25 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 18. 
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nevertheless, they are “interdependent.”26 He viewed actual entities as the ‘“cells’ of the 
universe.”27 Lowe describes Whitehead’s notion of actual entities in the following way: 
 Each pulse of existence—Whitehead calls them “actual entities”—requires the antecedent 
others as its constituents, yet achieves individuality as a unique, finite synthesis; and when 
its growth is completed, stays in the universe as one of the infinite number of settled facts 
from which the individuals of the future will arise.28 
 
Thus unlike philosophical systems that stress “being” over “becoming,” actual entities do not 
have sustained permanence over time. Each actual entity is, in the words of Charles Hartshorne, 
“a momentary state or single instance of process or becoming.”29 But becoming does not have to 
do so much with change, for actual entities are unchanging. Rather, becoming has more to do 
with “addition” and not “subtraction.”30  
 According to Whitehead, each experience is not independent, but interrelated, dependent, 
and inseparable from other experiences. Each momentary experience (actual occasion) is related 
to previous experiences. He refers to such a relation as a “prehension.”31 As John Cobb and 
David Griffin suggest in regards to prehensions: “The present occasion ‘prehends’ or ‘feels’ the 
previous occasions. The present occasion is nothing but its process of unifying the particular 
prehensions with which it begins.”32 The entire process of the unification of experience is known 
                                                 
 26 Ibid. 
 
 27 Lowe, 13. 
 
 28 Ibid., 4. 
 
 29 Hartshorne, “Whitehead’s View,” 7. 
 
 30 Ibid. 
 
 31 Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 19; Whitehead, Process and Reality, 19. 
 
 32 Ibid., 19-20. 
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as “concrescence.”33  There are two aspects to every prehension, the first is the “objective 
datum,” which has to do primarily with the “content” of the prehension, whereas the second, the 
“subjective form,” refers to the thing that has been felt, and how it has been felt.34 Griffin gives 
an analogy of how the two might occur. Say, for example, that a person sees a big dog walking 
down the street; the “objective datum” is found in the content of the prehension. In this case, it 
refers to the big dog as appearing to the person (the experience). The “subjective form,” 
however, refers to the kind of emotion that is produced by the datum.35    
 Another important feature of Whitehead’s thought is “creativity.” It is for Whitehead the 
central metaphysical principle of the universe—“the universal of universals.”36 Whitehead goes 
on to say that “[i]t is the ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe 
disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.”37 According 
to Hartshorne, creativity is Whitehead’s    
   “intuition” . . . of the act of existing. That this is not a single substance or a mere attribute 
seems clear. It is not God, because each creature exists by its own act of existing, dependent 
to be sure upon antecedent acts, including the antecedent actions of deity. But finally each 
actuality exists by its own self-activity: it is creative, however trivially, of new 
determinateness, thereby enriching reality as previously there, including divine reality as 
previously there.38 
 
                                                 
33 David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 
2004), 277.   
 
 34 David Ray Griffin, A Process Christology (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1973), 168. 
 
 35 Grifin, God, Power, and Evil, 277. 
 
 36 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 21. 
 
 37 Ibid. 
 
 
38
 Charles E. Hartshorne, Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion: The Aquinas 
Lecture, 1976 (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Publications, 1976), 42. 
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Thus, in some sense, because all that is actual is in process, including God, and because all that is 
actual is interrelated and interdependent, creatures “enrich” or “enhance” and “contribute” to the 
“divine life.”39 Moreover, because each actual entity is in the process of becoming, and because 
such self-creation is necessary and not contingent—a fundamental aspect of reality—this raises 
several implications about God and the God-world relation. If all actual entities possess the 
ability of self-creation, necessarily, then such is, as Griffin says, “beyond all volition, even 
God’s.”40 
God and the World 
 As noted throughout, Whitehead rejects the Aristotelian view of God simply as the 
“unmoved mover” that has pervaded classical Christian thought. God does not stand over and 
against the world. Moreover, He did not create the world out of nothing, nor is God “before all 
creation”; rather, God is “with all creation.”41 In Whitehead’s view, God is no exception to 
metaphysical principles; “He is their chief exemplification.”42 Thus God and the world are 
intricately connected. Not only does God affect the world, but the world affects God.  
 Whitehead understands God as having two poles which make up His essential nature. In 
other words, God’s nature is “dipolar.”43 The first pole he calls the “primordial” pole. The 
primordial pole of God is infinite and unlimited in regards to potentiality. Moreover, it is 
                                                 
 39 Ibid., 43. 
 
 40 David Ray Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, 278. 
 
 41 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343. 
 
 42 Ibid.  
 
 43 Ibid., 345. 
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impersonal and “conceptual.”44 In regards to the primordial side of God’s nature, Whitehead 
makes the following comment: 
 One side of God’s nature is constituted by his conceptual experience. This experience is the 
primordial fact in the world, limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore 
infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions. This side of his nature is free, complete, 
primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious.45 
 
God’s second pole, the “consequent” pole, is “personal,” “conscious,” and concrete. It “is the 
realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his 
wisdom.”46 This side of God’s nature, says Whitehead, “originates with physical experience 
derived from the temporal world, and then requires integration with the primordial side. It is 
determined, incomplete, consequent, ‘everlasting,’ fully actual, and conscious.”47 
 For Whitehead, God is not the all-powerful sovereign who reigns over creation. His 
power is not unlimited “controlling” omnipotence, but, rather, it is “persuasive.” The reason for 
this has to do, not so much with a moral issue, or whether or not God limits His power, but 
because it is impossible for God. On this point Griffin explains: “God does not refrain from 
controlling the creatures simply because it is better for God to use persuasion, but because it is 
necessarily the case that God cannot completely control the creatures.”48  
 Whitehead rejected Aristotle’s notion that God could not be aware of the world. Instead, 
in his view, God knows and loves His creatures intimately. For God to be “moved” by His 
creatures, demonstrates God’s ability to sympathize with them, or, in other words, to “love” 
                                                 
 44 Ibid. 
 
 45 Ibid. 
 
 46 Ibid. 
 
 47 Ibid. 
 
 48 Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, 246. 
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them. Love is God’s chief attribute. Whitehead criticized Aquinas on this point. In the Thomistic 
view, any relation that takes place between God and His creatures is only a real relation for the 
creature, not for God. God is not affected by the creature. For Whitehead, only a God that can 
sympathize with His creatures is a God worthy of worship.49  
 Because God’s primary means of interacting with the world is through persuasion, He 
provides each actual entity with an “initial aim.”50 In providing the initial aim, God’s purpose is 
that the subject will choose through the occasion the best option. However, whatever actualizes 
is up to the subject. That which the subject chooses becomes the “subjective aim.”51 Cobb and 
Griffin provide a helpful explanation of the outcome of God’s work in Creation: 
 The subject may choose to actualize the initial aim; but it may also choose from among the 
other real possibilities open to it, given its context. In other words, God seeks to persuade 
each occasion toward the possibility for its own existence which would be best for it; but 
God cannot control the finite occasion’s self-actualization. Accordingly, the divine creative 
activity involves risk. The obvious point is that, since God is not in complete control of the 
events of the world, the occurrence of genuine evil is not incompatible with God’s 
beneficence toward all his creatures.52 
 
Thus the ultimate outcome for the shape of the world is not up to God, so to speak, but up to God 
and the world, since each actual entity has within it the capability of self-creation and self-
actualization.   
Charles Hartshorne 
 Having examined several of the core categories and tenets of Whitehead’s philosophy, it 
is now possible to examine and explicate more clearly the process theology of Charles 
                                                 
 49 Hartshorne, Whitehead’s View, 12. 
 
 50 Cobb and Griffin, 52. 
 
 51 Ibid., 52-53. 
 
 52 Ibid., 53. 
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Hartshorne. One central feature of Hartshorne’s system is his attack on classical Christian 
theism. Like Whitehead before him, Hartshorne rejects many of the core tenets of classical 
Christian theism. Hartshorne works out his own system by recognizing the inadequacies of the 
classical Christian view while embracing the process metaphysics espoused by Whitehead. In 
what follows, an examination of Hartshorne’s critique of classical Christian theology will be 
considered, along with an examination of Hartshorne’s own conception of God.    
Critique of Classical Theism 
 Too often, says Hartshorne, philosophers and theologians in the West have stressed 
“being” over “becoming.” Greek philosophy often depreciated “becoming” and placed emphasis 
on “being.” This is true of Aristotle who argued that God is the “unmoved mover.” Because of 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the notion of God as immutable, he rejected that God could have any 
real knowledge of a changing world. Christian theologians, especially during the Middle Ages, 
adopted the Aristotelian understanding of the immutable and impassible God. Christian theists, 
however, argues Hartshorne, are not willing to let go of the notion that God is aware of what is 
happening within a changing world. This prima facie seems to be contradictory.53 
This notion of immutability is also carried over to a view of God’s omniscience. On this point 
Hartshorne says, 
 And indeed, immutable omniscience, implying the immutability of all truth, consorts ill with 
the view that becoming is real. If there is novel reality, then to that extent the truth also must 
be novel. To say of future events that they “are going to be” is to imply that their entire 
character is a present fact, though a fact which, with our human limitations, we have not yet 
reached. But there the fact is, waiting for us to reach it, or there it is offstage, waiting to 
come on. In this view, genuine becoming is missing. The truth, the reality, is eternally there, 
                                                 
 53 Charles Hartshorne, “The Development of Process Philosophy,” in Process Theology: Basic Writings by 
Key Thinkers of a Major Modern Movement, ed. Ewert H. Cousins (New York: Newman Press, 1971), 48. 
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spread out to the divine gaze, though our present experience, being localized in the eternal 
panorama, cannot behold most of it.”54 
 
If such a conception of immutable omniscience is the case, then it is hard to see how anything 
can truly have freedom, even God Himself. “Whatever God is, that he could not fail to be: hence 
if God is the decider who wills ‘let there be such and such a world,’ he could not have failed to 
be that very decider. Wherein is the freedom?”55 Moreover, such a conception seems to make 
God religiously unavailable to His creatures. Hartshorne believes that worship of “the infinity of 
God’s power” is “idolatry.”56 This is a charge that he often brings against classical theists. 
The Concept of God  
 What of Hartshorne’s own concept of God? In order to form a more adequate concept of 
God and the God-world relation, Hartshorne lists five principles that must be in place. First, such 
a philosophy must not place “being” over “becoming.” Second, such a philosophy must avoid the 
notion that all of existence is contingent, since there are things that exist that clearly do not 
depend on other things for their existence, namely mathematics and logic. Third, indeterminism 
must be an aspect to such a view. Fourth, within such a theistic system, other subjects other than 
God must share in creation. Fifth, such a system must emphasize relations that take place both 
internally and externally, as emphasized on Whitehead’s theory of prehensions.57 Hartshorne 
calls his own view “Neoclassical theism.” The reason for this is that for Hartshorne, the God of 
PT is not merely “infinite” and “absolute,” nor is He the “uncaused cause”; rather,  
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 55 Hartshorne, From Aquinas to Whitehead, 19. 
 
 56 Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company, 
1967). 
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 God is not on one side only of categorical contrasts; he is not merely infinite or merely 
finite, merely absolute or merely relative, merely cause or merely effect, merely agent or 
merely patient, merely actual or merely potential, but in all cases both, each in suitable 
respects or aspects of his living reality, and in such a manner as to make him unsurpassable 
by another. He is even both joy and sorry, both happiness and sympathetic participation in 
our griefs.58  
 
He does reject the notion, however, that God is both “goodness and wickedness.”59 Thus in his 
Neoclassical theistic view, Hartshorne seeks to hold on to certain aspects of traditional theism, 
while rejecting those aspects which go against any process or becoming in God. Like Whitehead, 
Hartshorne’s conception of God is dipolar. This is the crux of his philosophical and theological 
system.60 Hartshorne sees the importance of holding to the two aspects of God’s nature, which 
includes “both sides of the metaphysical contraries.”61 It is not enough, merely to hold to one 
aspect or the other; rather, it is important to emphasize that, even though there is contingency 
within God, He is a perfect being. But Hartshorne does not mean perfection in the same way that 
classical Christian theologians do. Traditionally, it has been thought that a perfect being cannot 
grow in greatness nor can such a being decrease in metaphysical stature. However, according to 
Hartshorne, God does not need to be “absolute”; rather, it is conceivable to think of a perfect 
being that, while He cannot decrease in metaphysical value, He can, nevertheless attain and grow 
in greatness. It is conceivable to think that God is, in this regards, the most perfect being.62   
Hartshorne calls this dual aspect in God’s nature the “principle of dual transcendence.”63 By this 
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 60 Geisler and Watkins, “Process Theology: a Survey and an Appraisal,” 17. 
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 62 Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven, CT: Yale 
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he means that “God is, in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite 
and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal.”64  
 Some have charged Hartshorne’s notion of the principle of dual transcendence with 
contradiction. How can something have two contradictory aspects together at the same time? For 
example, how is it possible that God is both timeless and temporal? Moreover, how can 
something be unchanging and yet change. Hartshorne believes he escapes this charge by arguing 
that someone or something can change in some respects but not in others.65 He goes on to say, 
 The world may be finite spatially and infinite temporally. God may be immutable in his 
ultimate purpose but adopt new specific objectives in response to new acts by the creatures. 
He may exist necessarily so far as his essence is concerned but contingently so far as 
inessential qualities are in question. The two aspects are not on the same ontological level; 
for the essence or ultimate purpose is abstract and the specific aims concrete. And we can 
appeal to the Aristotelian principle that the abstract is real in the concrete. God may have 
infinite potentialities but finite actuality. Potentialities are abstractions, only the actual is 
concrete. Moreover, it is possibilities that are infinite; actuality is always a decision among 
possibilities, excluding some from realization. Any possible state of the world would be 
content of God’s knowledge if it were actual, but not even God can contradictorily enjoy all 
possible world states as actual for there are mutually incompossible ones. Even the supreme 
artist must have something undone. Moreover, his creatures so far as free must do so also, 
and what they exclude is excluded even for God. God would have had me as doer of some 
deed I might have performed, but since I did not perform it he now can never have that 
possible me.66   
 
Thus God is, on one hand, the “simplest,” while on the other, “the most complex.”67 
 By speaking of God in such a way, so as to stress both aspects of His nature, one can 
truly say that “God is love.”68 In order to love, one must have the capacity to rejoice and to 
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sorrow with others, which entails that one have the capacity to be influenced by others. Such is 
not the case with the classical conception of God.  
Process Panentheism and Evil 
 
 Having examined the process thought of Whitehead and Hartshorne, how are we to think 
of the panentheism of process thought (henceforth PPT) and evil? Following the format in the 
previous chapters, four areas that be considered: life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and 
evil, and human responsibility. 
Process Panentheism and Life 
  After all, if PPT is to explain evil, it must also explain life—given that evil has to do with 
the existence of sentient creatures who experience pain and suffering in the world. But, in order 
to explain life, a metaphysical system must also be able to explain the existence and nature of the 
universe.  
 When it comes to the nature of the universe, Process theologians reject creation ex nihilo, 
opting for something more like the Platonic view that God created the world out of already pre-
existing matter (ex materia).69 In a helpful passage, David Ray Griffin provides a look at God’s 
relationship to the world and the Process view of creation: 
                                                 
69 Not all panentheists opt for this view, which is one of the reasons that I focus on Process panentheism in 
this chapter and not other forms of panentheism. Some panentheists, like Jürgen Moltmann, hold to a more Christian 
understanding of creation, opting for creation ex nihilo. Yet, Moltmann is a panentheist in the sense that, following 
the ancient Jewish Kabala tradition of God’s “self-limitation” (zimsum), God makes room or space within God’s 
self. In that sense, creation is in God, yet, God is distinct from the rest of creation. There is another sense in which 
Moltmann is panentheistic. For Moltmann, the relationship between the world and God is a “reciprocal” one. If God 
is love, then there is a real sense in which God not only gives love, but also that God needs love. Creation itself is a 
necessity in that God created in order to bring about an “Other” that is unlike the “Other” within God. See God in 
Creation, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 86-93; The Trinity and the 
Kingdom of God, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 19, 98-99, 105. 
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 According to process panentheism, God is essentially soul of the universe. Although God is 
distinct from the universe, God’s relation to it belongs to the divine essence. This does not 
mean, however, that our particular universe—with its electrons, inverse square law, and 
Plank’s constant—exists necessarily. This universe was divinely created, evidently about 15 
billion years ago. It was even created out of “no-thing” in the sense that, prior to the 
creation, there were no enduring individuals sustaining a character through time (such as 
quarks and photons), which is what is usually meant by “things.” With Berdyaev, therefore, 
we can say that it was created out of relative nothingness. This relative nothingness was a 
chaos of events, each of which embodied some modicum of “creativity,” which is the 
twofold power to exert self-determination and then efficient causation on subsequent events. 
Each event in this chaos, therefore, influenced future events after being influenced by prior 
events, so that the creation of our universe was not the beginning of temporal relations and 
hence of time. It was, however, the beginning of the particular contingent form of order that 
physicists have been progressively discovering. Our universe began when God got this order 
instantiated in what had previously been a chaotic situation consisting of extremely brief, 
trivial, random happenings in which no significant values could be realized.70   
 
It would seem, here, that Griffin has quite a few things going on that need unpacking.  
First, like Whitehead, Griffin recognizes that God has a significant role in the formation 
of the universe, much like the Platonic Demiurge. For Plato, the Demiurge infuses chaotic matter 
with form.71  In that light only can He be called “Creator.” In much the same way, God, for 
process thinkers, gets the whole process of our current universe going. God is not primary. God 
is neither the source of the universe’s being nor is God the source of the built-in self-creativity 
that makes up the underlying structure of the universe. But what is this self-creativity and why is 
it the primary metaphysical principle (or, at least, one of the primary metaphysical principles)? 
Furthermore, why think that the PPT view of the universe, along with its metaphysical 
underpinnings, is the correct one?  
As we have seen, self-creativity is a central feature of Whitehead’s metaphysics—
something that all process thinkers hold common in their view of the God-world relationship. 
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Unlike theism, PPT recognizes that God’s modus operandi of activity in the world is, indeed, one 
of persuasive activity rather than controlling activity. Some theists also embrace the notion of 
persuasive over controlling activity; however, the theistic view is different in that God does this 
out of God’s self-limitation. The reason is moral in nature. For defenders of PPT, on the other 
hand, the reason for God’s persuasive activity in the world is metaphysical. In other words, God 
has no power to control—only the power to persuade. It is a matter of necessity that God cannot 
control anything outside of God’s self.72  
The metaphysical category behind this necessity that we are now here concerned with is, 
as we saw earlier, what Whitehead calls the “ultimate,” and, as noted, the ultimate involves three 
elements: “creativity,” “many,” and “one.” According to Griffin,  
 ‘Creativity’ (by which the many become one and are increased by one) is a universal feature 
of actuality. It is inherent in actuality (AI 230). This does not mean that creatures derive their 
creative power from themselves, or that they are not dependent upon God for their existence. 
But it does mean that to be an actuality is to exercise creativity and that there is necessarily a 
realm of finite actualities with creativity of their own.73 
  
But this notion of the ultimate is precisely one of the peculiarities of this view. I would agree 
with Stephen Davis on this point that Process ontology raises some troubling difficulties. For 
Whitehead and other PT thinkers, there are no enduring substances; rather, what we have is 
something more like enduring events. Events consist of real changes in a thing, or, at least, 
relational changes between things. As Davis notes, this stands in contrast to the Aristotelian 
view, adopted by classical Christian theists (we will follow Davis in calling this Aristotelian 
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ontology), whereby a thing is said to be “an enduring object with properties, relations, and an 
identity apart from other things.”74  
Defenders of PPT are wont to reject any hint of Aristotelian ontology by denying that 
entities have substances altogether. But denying substances is difficult to do, even if something 
like actual occasions are true. Davis suggests that there are at least two reasons to think that 
process thinkers do not escape Aristotelian ontology. First, if these events endure for any finite 
amount of time, then such are, indeed, substances by virtue of being enduring property bearers. 
To say that these events do not endure would lead us to think that they are nothing more than 
mere limits or boundaries, much like Euclidian points. But why think boundaries can do things 
like create or consist within reality? Second, if Aristotle was correct in thinking that a substance 
persists through time, one can explain what a thing is without an event. However, the opposite is 
not true. We cannot explain events without reference to or presupposing things. In other words, 
things are individuated by their properties and relations; whereas events are individuated by 
things. A thing can exist without an event. After all, we can imagine a possible world whereby 
only immutable objects exist. Yet, it is difficult for us to imagine some event taking place apart 
from some entity. Substances, then, are ontologically superior to events.75 If Davis’s arguments 
are correct (and I believe that they are), then we cannot do without substances. But even the 
more, this would cripple Whitehead’s view that creativity lies behind the basic structure of 
reality, since events are not ontologically prior. 
There is yet another difficulty that we run up against in Process metaphysics—a difficulty 
that, as we saw in the previous chapter, pantheists, too, run up against. If God is not the primary 
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organizing source in the universe, as important as God is to the process system of thought, then 
what is? How can we explain the unity? In the Whiteheadian view of things, we have God and 
the multiplicity of others, all of which work together to make a tight unified overarching system. 
But how is this the case? W. Norris Clarke argues that Whitehead falls prey to the same 
difficulty that Plato faced. He explains it as follows:  
 If there is to be any ultimate source of unity in the universe at all—which is dubious, just as 
it was for Plato—it seems to be pushed back beyond even God to an inscrutable, faceless, 
amorphous force of creativity, which is just there, everywhere in the universe, as a primal 
fact with no further explanation possible—a kind of generalized necessity of nature, with 
striking similarities to the ancient Greek Ananke.76 
  
But the problem is further complicated. Creativity is not an actuality in-and-of-itself, says 
Clarke; rather, it is “a generalized abstract description of what is a matter of fact instantiated in 
every actual occasion of the universe. Creativity seems to be an ultimate primordial many, with 
no unifying source.”77 Clarke describes this as an “irreparable deficiency” that any “dualism” or 
“multiplicity” faces when not grounded in the “prior unity of creative mind.”78 Further, if such 
creativity does not find its source ultimately in God, from whence does it come? “[W]hy,” asks 
Clarke, “does this creativity continue to spring forth endlessly and inexhaustibly, all over the 
universe, in each new actual occasion, from no actually existing source?”79 It would seem as 
though such bursts of individual self-creativity, which bring about each and every actual 
occasion, emerges ex nihilo, since there is no prior source. Some friends of PPT bite the bullet 
and recognize the difficulty, suggesting that if one were to grant this first step all else follows. 
                                                 
76 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, 102. 
  
77 Ibid.  
 
78 Ibid.  
 
79 Ibid., 103.  
 
119 
 
Clarke (and most other theists) finds such an enigma too high a price to pay and metaphysically 
untenable.80   
Lastly, regarding panentheism and life, it seems that process panentheists run up against 
the same problem of infinite regress that both naturalists and pantheists face. I will not rehearse 
those issues here, but will only stress that one must face the complications implicit in positing an 
infinite universe (or multiverse).81 Furthermore, in positing something like evolution behind the 
PPT portrait of the emergence of sentient life (or biological life in general), it would seem that 
process panentheists have, as we will consider below, a better theory behind the process of 
evolution than, say, naturalists do (since there is, at least, something—God—giving each actual 
occasion an initial direction or aim); however, as specified earlier, defenders of PPT will need to 
sort out just what lies behind Whitehead’s notion of creativity. Until they are capable of doing 
so, it would seem that defenders of PPT are at a metaphysical disadvantage for explaining life 
within the universe. 
In what follows, I will consider in more detail how evolutionary theory dovetails with the 
process theory of consciousness. This will also setup a discussion on the process view of the 
metaphysics of good and evil.     
Process Panentheism and Consciousness 
 Keeping in line with our approach, any metaphysical system that attempts to explain evil 
must also explain consciousness. How does PPT fare with respect to consciousness?   
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Consciousness is grounded in experience; yet while consciousness presupposes 
experience, experience itself is not consciousness.82 For defenders of PPT, then, there is no 
separation between an entity and experience, nor is there any dualism between entities that 
experience and entities that do not experience. There are, nevertheless, different levels of 
experiences among entities. In order to see this, one must grasp the central role evolution plays in 
PPT ontology, along with the key process concepts of “concrescence” and “transition,” which 
are central to the process view of creativity.83  
The evolutionary development of our world is a manifestation of God’s work and 
creative purposes in the world.84 Whitehead called each stage of the evolutionary process of the 
universe “cosmic epochs.” Central to each epoch is a particular form of order. God’s purpose in 
bringing order out of the chaos is to evoke certain intensities among the occasions by means of 
persuasion. God sends each actual occasion an “initial aim.” It is up to the occasion to accept or 
reject the aim. Order is needed to maintain the intensity among the various occasions, thus God 
seeks to bring about and maintain order through each initial aim, which occurs through God’s 
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83 “An occasion comes into being as an experiencing subject. The data of its experience are provided by 
previous actual occasions. Its reception of these data is called its “feelings” or “positive prehensions” of those 
previous occasions. (There are also “negative prehensions,” which are said to “exclude from feeling.”) It becomes a 
unified subject by integrating these feelings. . . . When the process of concrescence is complete, so that the actual 
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“objective datum” and its “subjective form” of response to the datum), the occasion becomes an objective 
experience, i.e., an object from other subjects. Its subjectivity perishes, and it thereby acquires objectivity. It 
transmits some of its feelings to subsequent actual occasions. . . . These two processes, concrescence and transition, 
embody the two forms of creativity, the two types of power, inherent in each actual occasion. The process of 
concrescence embodies the occasion’s power of self-determination, its power of final causation. Although the 
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persuasive power. Each stage of the evolutionary process is gradual, bringing more and more 
order out of chaos.  
Actual occasions, retaining the datum from prior prehensions, begin to form into 
societies, beginning with the most primitive of forms, such as the proton, neutron, or electron, on 
to the atom and molecule, and finally up to more complex enduring entities such as the cell. With 
each advancement, enduring entities increase in intrinsic value. It should also be noted that each 
actual occasion has its own “mental pole.” This does not mean that every occasion has some 
form of thought or consciousness; rather, “mentality” refers to the occasion’s ability to receive 
and respond to data from other actualities.85 In this case, then, PPT is a form of “panpsychism” 
or, more specifically, “panexperientialism,” as Griffin calls it.86 As actual occasions become 
more complex structured societies, they increase in intensity and beauty, and hence in intrinsic 
value. The “soul” or “psyche” is not, however, something ontologically different from other 
things; rather, “[i]t is simply a higher-level series of occasions of experience.”87 Given the 
Process notion of panexperientialism, consciousness, then, is not so much a function of the brain; 
rather, it is a function of experience.88 It is, in the words of Griffin, a “very high-level form of 
experience, enjoyed by relatively few individuals.”89  
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 The Process understanding of consciousness, compared with, say, materialism, is quite 
impressive and novel, to say the least. Yet, the panexperientialism of PPT is not without its 
difficulties. It suffers from many of the same difficulties as its older cousin, panpsychism.90 We 
shall now turn to some objections to panexperientialism?  
One of the central issues of the Process view of panexperientialism is, as we have already 
discussed, the problem with Whitehead’s metaphysics and ontology. It is not at all clear that 
experience stands as the fundamental ontological structure of reality, and it is hard to think that 
Process thinkers believe that it is experience all the way down, either. To show this, let us 
consider a passage of Griffins where this comes out: 
 Each event . . . is experiential from beginning to end, which means that, in distinction from 
usage reflecting dualism, the physical aspect of the event is not devoid of experience, hence 
the mental aspect is not uniquely associated with experience. An event’s mentality is simply 
its experience insofar as it is self-determining. Whitehead emphasizes the experiential nature 
of unit-events by calling them “occasions of experience.”91 
 
Griffin is considered to be one of the ablest Process thinkers alive today, and I believe that he has 
explained the above concept as clearly as one might be able. Yet, even with such clarity it seems 
that he cannot but help fall into what sounds like substance language. In order to speak of both 
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“experience” and “event,” he must employ words like “physical aspect” or “mental aspect,” even 
if it seems that he is equating the mental with experience itself. Nevertheless, he cannot but help 
speak of the event or experience apart from that to which it is happening. Now, it would seem 
absurd to think that the experience is experiencing itself. But perhaps that is what Griffin and 
other Process thinkers have in mind. Either way, I find such a view difficult to accept on 
metaphysical grounds.92 Even more, it seems that much of Whitehead’s rejection of substance 
had to do with a Cartesian understanding of substance, and not the classical notion, which 
understood substance, in the words of W. Norris Clark, “as active nature imbedded in a network 
of relations resulting from its acting and being acted on.”93 Lastly, there are problems, as we 
have seen, with thinking that creativity is the primary metaphysical principle behind the four-
dimensional space-time universe.   
Even if one were to grant the Process metaphysical and ontological understanding of 
reality (which I am unwilling to do), there is a further problem with panpsychism/ 
panexperientialism—a problem philosopher J. P. Moreland calls “the Combination Problem” 
(henceforth CP).94 Moreland states CP in the following way: 
 There are different ways of stating the problem. For example, if each particle of matter has 
its own unified point of view, how do they combine to form the same sort of unity when 
they interact to form larger wholes, a unity that appears to be unanalyzable and primitive? 
How do low-order experiences of ultimate atomic simples combine to form a single, unified 
field of consciousness or a unified self in larger wholes? Some panpsychists hold that all 
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composed objects above the level of atomic simples have their own unified consciousness 
while others distinguish mere mereological aggregates without such a unity from “true 
individuals” that have it. Those who make such a distinction face two additional problems: 
How does one characterize the difference between the two? How could “true individuals” 
arise from processes that are combinatorial?95  
 
Moreland’s understanding of CP is largely set against the backdrop of panpsychism, but it seems 
that he has something like PPT’s panexperientialism in mind, especially with respect to the 
Process distinction between aggregates and “true” or “genuine” individuals. How might we 
formulate CP specifically to PPT? Following Moreland here, it seems that there are three unique 
questions that the defender of PPT will need to face regarding what we will call the 
“panexperientialist combination problem” (henceforth PECP).  
(1) How is it that actual occasions combine to form into larger societies?  
 
(2) How do we draw the line between “aggregates” and “genuine individuals”? 
 
(3) How could “genuine individuals” arise from such combinatorial processes? 
 
Having stated PECP, I will begin with (2) and then take (1) and (3) together, since the answer to 
(3) anticipates both (1) and (2).  
 Regarding (2), Griffin makes a distinction between mere “aggregates” and “genuine 
individuals.” There are two kinds of genuine individuals—“simple” and “compound.” What is it, 
however, that qualifies some entity a genuine individual? We have such things as animals, 
human beings, single-celled organisms, viruses, molecules, and atoms, which all qualify as 
genuine individuals. There are, however, certain qualities, that if an entity lacks them, then it 
would not be counted as a genuine individual. For example, some items, such as ceramic cups, 
safety pins, and pencils all lack “natural bodies” and an “evolutionary history,” and these would 
not be counted as genuine individuals. Rocks would be disqualified by the fact that, as an 
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aggregate, they have no overarching “organizing structure.” Trees, too, would not be considered 
as genuine individuals, since they have structures that serve to merely “transport nutrients to 
their constituent cells.”96 A central feature, then, that distinguishes genuine individuals from 
aggregate individuals is in how those individuals can be organized. A rock, says Griffin, has no 
experience of its own, and hence no power for response to its surrounding community; rather, the 
highest level of experience is found in the billions of molecules that are found within it. The 
organization into “aggregational societies” and “compound individuals” leads Griffin to call his 
own position “panexperientialism with organizational duality.”97  
Given this, certain criteria distinguish between aggregates and genuine compound 
individuals. Whether this is adequate or not must be left up to the reader. But what of (1) and 
(3)? In order to get at (3) we will need to consider (1), which is the central question of PECP, and 
to which we now turn.  
In Unsnarling the World Knot, Griffin makes an attempt at answering CP. He begins by 
giving consideration to William James’s version of CP in his Principles of Psychology. James’s 
argument goes as follows: 
 Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a 
hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that 
may mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, 
windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-
and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feelings were set up, a 
consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And the 101st feeling would 
be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might by curious physical law, be a signal for 
its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, 
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nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible 
sense) say that they evolved it.98 
 
Here, Griffin suggests that James’s argument was pointed at a particular type of “compounding,” 
one that does not touch his own Whiteheadian-Hartshornean view of compound individuals. The 
intended target was a form of “pantheistic idealism,” which suggests that the emergence of the 
collective experience is in some way logically identical to the individuated experiences of the 
group. “James’s point,” suggests Griffin, “was that the more inclusive experience is a new 
experience, numerically distinct from the more limited experiences it includes.”99 Griffin 
continues, “James’s argument, then, counts only against the identist form of panpsychism, 
according to which our unified conscious experience is supposed to be strictly (numerically) 
identical with the much more restricted experiences of the billions of neurons in the brain.”100 
Griffin would agree that such a view is unwarranted and “logically self-contradictory.”101 On the 
Whiteheadian/Hartshornean view, rather than saying that the many are one, it would be more 
accurate to say that the many become one, while also increasing by one. It is through his 
acceptance of the “subjective” and “objective” modes of the existence of each occasion that, 
Griffin believes, Whitehead avoids the self-contradiction. Take, for example, neuronic 
experiences. When such occasions occur simultaneously, in their subjective mode they are many, 
but in their objective mode, they are the “many becoming one.”102  
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Despite Griffin’s response, it seems that the fundamental difficulty of the Process notion 
of consciousness still runs up against CP, though the problem is not quite how Griffin has spelled 
it out; rather, the problem is one of the continual subsistence of such combinatorial states. Let us 
call this the “panexperientialist continual combination problem” (henceforth PECCP). To see 
this, it is important to briefly rehearse how Process thinkers understand God’s role in the whole 
ordeal.    
God seeks to woo the various occasions into some directed aim, which I would take it to 
be how PPT would explain (3). Given that each occasion has its own level of freedom to accept 
or to reject God’s initial aim, then, metaphysically speaking, neither God nor anyone else can 
cause them to do otherwise. This, it would seem, requires quite a bit of cooperation between the 
various occasions as they form into societies, especially as this process has been going on since 
the original chaotic state. But why do these various occasions move toward societies? Why 
cooperate in the first place (in whatever capacity they can)? What keeps them together? 
Furthermore, what keeps the whole ordeal from stopping and going back on itself? Perhaps the 
defender of PPT will want to say that it is God who keeps the whole thing going by repeatedly 
sending out initial aims. Given the sheer amount of occasions within the cosmos (and, perhaps, 
beyond), how is it, one wonders, that God keeps up with it all (especially since God is part of the 
mix)? Despite God’s intimate awareness of each genuine entity (whether “simple” or 
“compound”) and God’s ability to send initial aims, seemingly, at instantaneous speed—all the 
while providing the direction of the world through each initial aim—God can do nothing about 
whether occasions will follow suit. There is, however, another issue. These occasions are to 
make less than split second decisions. The decision making of occasions are meant to simulate 
something similar to how people make decisions. But the way occasions make decisions are not 
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always how people do. When humans make decisions, it often takes time and much thought. 
There are instances where a person will have to make a split-second decision, but that is not 
always the case. Yet, that is how it is for these occasions in every instance. There seems to be 
something of a paradox involved, as Hasker explains: 
  Now even the simplest actions take more than a tenth of a second or so during which the 
‘actual occasions’ are supposed to endure; furthermore, humans are capable of forming and 
carrying out plans over periods lasting weeks, months, or years. Clearly, the process of 
‘concrescence,’ in which the occasions selects its ‘subjective aim’ and is guided thereby in 
the way it incorporates past experiences into the present, is modeled on the process of 
decision making by actual persons as it is empirically observed. Yet the frame for an actual 
occasion (which is never actually specified but can hardly be more than a small fraction of a 
second) is far too brief for any meaningful decision making to occur.103 
 
The novelty of the PPT view on consciousness does not seem to outweigh the difficulties that the 
defender of such a view must take with respect to God’s role in sending out such initial aims and 
the even bigger difficulty that the occasions must make such split-second decisions, while 
maintaining unity within the various genuine societies, especially those which are of greater 
complexity, such as the human soul. This, I take, to be the first leg of PECCP. The second leg 
has to do with the nature of consciousness itself as an emergent property, to which I now turn. 
 “Consciousness” or “mind” or “soul” for Process thinkers remains, nevertheless, an 
emergent feature, or, at least, a “true individual,” especially since it is grounded in prehensions 
of a multiplicity of prior occasions. If consciousness is a society in-and-of-itself, then the 
defender of PPT runs up against another problem. Moreland argues: “if an emergent property is 
depicted as contingently linked to the base properties causing it to emerge, then apart from an 
appeal to God’s contingent choice that things be so and to God’s stable intention that they 
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continue to be so, there will be no explanation for the link or its constancy.”104 But this applies 
equally to CP, as Moreland further explains: 
 If a sui generis emergent property or a new “true individual” is acknowledged and its 
appearance is correlated with a certain set of circumstances formed by combinatorial 
processes acting on myriads and myriads of subvenient entities, then apart from an appeal to 
God’s contingent choice that things be so and to God’s stable intention that they continue to 
be so, there will be no explanation—naturalistic, panpsychist, or otherwise—for its 
appearance or constancy.105  
  
Here, I think, is the key weakness of the panpsychist/panexperientialist view of consciousness, 
which is the second leg of PECCP. But it is also a key weakness of process ontology in general. 
There is nothing that requires or causes the various societies—aggregational or genuine—to 
persist. As we saw, God, according to PPT, does not do this, nor could God ever do this. It is 
metaphysically impossible for God to do so. It is doubtful that something else lies behind the 
structure. Creativity is a central feature of PPT, but it is more of a description of what is taking 
place within the universe at all  times, rather than functioning as some kind of force (as one 
might see in pantheism) that controls, causes, or even sustains all things within existence.  
 PPT, by postulating panexperientialism is, it would seem, one-up on reductionisitic 
materialism for explaining consciousness, since the notion of “mental” is already a metaphysical 
fact of the universe. It avoids the complications of naturalistic viewpoints that posit that mental 
properties are in some way a new and novel part of the universe. Nevertheless, such a view fails 
to fully explain consciousness, in part due to CP, but more specifically PECCP, the version 
argued for, here.     
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Process Panentheism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility 
 Having explored life and consciousness, we now turn to the PPT view on good, evil, and 
freedom. Griffin suggests that there are two dimensions to something that is intrinsically evil. 
These two dimensions are the opposite of the two criteria for intrinsic goods. For Whitehead, 
claims Griffin, goodness is related to beauty, and hence the two criteria for intrinsic goodness are 
aesthetic in nature. The first is “harmony” and the second is “intensity.” To say that some 
experience is good is to say that it is both harmonious and intense. The opposite of harmony is 
“disharmony” or “discord.” Disharmony occurs through the clashing of elements within an 
experience, bringing about a “feeling of mutual destructiveness.”106 The opposite of intensity is 
“triviality,” which includes things such as boredom or lack of excitement.  
At times there is tension between harmony and intensity, which may endanger one or the 
other. For example, when there is an increase in intensity there is also an increase in complexity. 
The more complex that an experience may become, the more it may upset the harmony that has 
already been achieved. In order to maintain harmony, it (harmony), too, must become more 
complex. According to Griffin, there are two ways that an experience may be considered as 
“complex,” both of which contribute to its intensity. The first has to do with the amount and 
variety of elements belonging to the experience in question.107 Griffin explains it as follows: 
 Each experience begins by appropriating data from previous experiences. For example, an 
occasion of human experience receives influences from its own past experiences, from its 
body, and from God. The act by which an occasion of experience absorbs data from other 
experiences is called a “feeling” or a “positive prehension.” What is excluded are some of 
the feelings that were combined in the previous experience.108   
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An occasion has the ability to combine the received data either positively or negatively. A 
positive prehension of the data leads to the occasion accepting and accommodating it; whereas a 
negative prehension leads to its exclusion.109 Griffin continues: 
 To be able to appropriate the data means to be able to bring it together into effective 
contrasts. Some data which a more complex occasion would integrate into contrasts will 
constitute incompatibilities for a less complex occasion. Hence, the less complex occasion 
will negatively prehend feelings which a more complex occasion could have integrated into 
a more complex and thereby more intense harmony. Hence, the growth of complexity in his 
first sense means the growth in the intensity of experience.110  
 
The second kind of complexity has to do with the occasion’s ability to simplify. Once the 
complex occasion has sifted through the variety of data, it can then rid itself of unwanted or 
unnecessary data in order to integrate “a greater intensity of experience.”111 As we will see, 
complexity as a condition for intensity is a central feature of the process view of evolution.         
 Griffin further distinguishes between discord and triviality. Discord differs from triviality 
in the sense that it is “absolute” or “noncomparative,” that is to say, “it is evil in itself, apart from 
any comparison with that which might have been.”112 Triviality, on the other hand, is 
comparative in the sense that some experience is more “trivial” than it need have been. 
Whitehead (and Griffin, too, for that matter) rejects a “metaphysical” view of evil, one whereby 
something is considered “evil” simply by nature of it being finite.113 That is not exactly what the 
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adherent of PPT means when he speaks of triviality, either. It is evil not because it is trivial; 
rather, it is evil only relative to what it could have been.114 Griffin thinks that having forms of 
experience emerge that are more intense and more discordant is not “necessarily inconsistent 
with moral goodness.”115 Hence, the two kinds of evil—discord and triviality—cover the full 
range of intrinsic evil. Discord refers to the main kinds of evil that is often considered in these 
types of discussions: physical and mental suffering. Triviality, on the other hand, covers a kind 
of evil that is often overlooked—the loss of a higher experience for a lower one.116  
 Discord and triviality are the two forms of evil that prevent maximum enjoyment. Thus to 
speak of a morally responsible person is to speak of a person who seeks those things that are 
intrinsically good. Stated negatively, such a person would avoid or prevent any unnecessary 
triviality or discord that she could. This requires a certain amount of freedom. Incompatibilist 
freedom is a central feature of Whiteheadian/Hartshornean metaphysics. Whitehead’s entire 
notion of “creativity” requires that every actual occasion have a certain amount of freedom. The 
higher the complexity the greater the freedom. Besides God, the pinnacle of freedom is displayed 
in those creatures with a “soul,” “mind,” or “consciousness,” namely humans.117 
 For Process thinkers, in a real sense God is responsible for all the evil in the world, yet, 
God is not indictable or blameworthy of such evil. In God’s effort to lead the world to perfection 
out of triviality and chaos through persuasive activity, discord has appeared. Though, it should 
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be made clear that God is not totally responsible for the horrors that appear in the world, since 
creatures have a certain level of freedom for self-determination and other-determination.118 
 Griffin has suggested that critics have raised questions about God’s moral goodness on 
three levels. First, the God of PPT is morally deficient for primarily seeking goodness that is 
essentially aesthetic in nature. Second, the God of PPT is morally deficient since evil is 
overcome through God’s experience. Third, the God of PPT is morally deficient for leading the 
world out of chaos and, yet does not have the power to prevent discord or horrendous evils. Let 
us take each of these in order.119  
 Regarding the first level of criticism, Griffin believes that the critics of PPT have 
misunderstood what Whitehead meant by speaking of good and evil in primarily aesthetic terms. 
They assume that aesthetic goodness somehow excludes notions of “physical” and “moral” 
qualities. But if one were to take physical pain, for instance, there is sense in which pain 
represents a kind of “dis-harmony” or “discord.” With respect to moral goodness, such things as 
“rightness of conduct” are a kind of beauty in-and-of-themselves. The kind of beauty that God 
seeks, say Griffin, is one that includes moral goodness, not one that is indifferent to it.120   
 As for the second line of attack, it would seem that critics have again misunderstood 
Whitehead. Whitehead did hold that events that are intrinsically evil “are transformed or 
transmuted as they are received into the divine experience,” says Griffin, but “evil never loses its 
character of evil so that the divine experience would be . . . ‘pure bliss’” for God.121 Rather, 
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Whitehead thought ascribing pure happiness to God was a “profanation” and, instead, believed 
God’s happiness always to coincide with “sympathy and tragedy.”122 When speaking of God 
overcoming evil through good, Whitehead meant “that God, in responding to the evil facts in the 
world, provides ideal aims for the next state of the world designed to overcome the evil in the 
world.”123  
 How do defenders of PPT address the third line of attack from critics? Here, Griffin 
believes, critics have failed to see that discord is not the only kind of evil in the world. One must 
also come to terms with unnecessary triviality, which is also a kind of “genuine evil.” If God is a 
morally perfect being, then such a being would want to stop all genuine evil so far that it can be 
done. Since unnecessary triviality is a genuine evil, God could not leave things as they were in 
the original chaotic state. Another important consideration is that God is sympathetic toward the 
world. According to PPT, God is not the God of Classical theism, impassive and unconcerned 
with the world; rather, in bringing creation up out of the initial chaos, God is the great 
sympathizer sharing with creation in all of its suffering, pain, and sorrows. God suffers with 
us.124 “Since the world always contains a mixture of good and evil, beauty and ugliness,” says 
Griffin, “the divine beauty is always tragic beauty.”125 Risks for creation are also risks for God. 
As God stimulates the world toward greater intensity, God too risks the potential for a greater 
intensity of suffering.126   
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 So, how are we to think of the PPT view on the metaphysics of good and evil and on 
moral responsibility? One of the advantages of the PPT view is that it is far reaching. If PPT 
metaphysical and ontological perspectives on creativity and process are correct, then there is an 
explanation for why evil (understood in Process terms) affects all of reality, including not only 
human creatures, but also other areas of creation. God is at work moving all of creation out of the 
chaos of triviality toward greater enjoyment.  Granting such metaphysical and ontological 
commitments, it would seem that PPT provides both explanatory power and explanatory scope 
for the reality of evil in the world. Though, as we have seen, there are reasons to call into 
question the very notions of creativity and process as the underlining principles of all reality. 
Besides this, there seem to three other problems with the PPT view on good, evil, and moral 
responsibility:  
(4) The problem of redefining good and evil 
 
(5) The problem of a limited God 
 
(6) The problem of eschatological pay off  
 
Let us take each one of these in order. 
 Regarding (4), it would seem that Process thinkers have redefined good and evil. As 
shown earlier, criteria for intrinsic goodness includes harmony and intensity. God’s perfect 
goodness is seen in the attempt to bring about the world out of triviality and chaos, through 
discord, into greater harmony and intensity. The PPT view stands in stark contrast to the 
traditional theistic view and how most everyone understands good and evil, which is in moral 
categories. For theists, the criteria for moral goodness is found in God’s moral nature. But as 
Michael Peterson suggests, the problem is that now “good” and “evil” are understood in 
primarily aesthetic terms, instead of moral ones. Peterson, following Stephen Fry, objects to the 
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Process view that divine goodness would seek to bring about greater intensity and harmony in 
the world. By doing so, God may break a number of moral principles along the way. As we saw, 
Griffin addresses such a criticism. He argues that Whitehead’s view on aesthetics includes both 
“physical” and “moral” aspects. In other words, aesthetic aims include moral aims. Peterson 
thinks that this will not do, since moral values should be seen in their own right and not 
subordinate to aesthetic values. If the Process view were correct, then it would seem to make our 
ordinary moral principles illusory and it would make it difficult to see God’s goodness in any 
kind of way as recognizably good.127 But the problem is even more difficult, as Peterson 
suggests: 
 Process thinkers hold that God’s efforts to evoke beauty in temporal experience are not 
simply for the finite actualities involved, but ultimately to provide appropriate data for His 
own unified and comprehensive experience. In the Whiteheadian scheme, then, the suffering 
and difficulties, as well as the pleasures and achievements, of finite beings become material 
for God’s aesthetic composition, i.e., for fitting inclusion in His consequent nature. But the 
previous question simply recurs at another level: Is it morally permissible for deity to risk 
evil in order to enrich its own experience?128 
 
That God uses the experiences of creatures to maximize the divine experience calls into question 
whether God is worthy of all worship.129    
 How are we to understand (5)? Process thinkers recognize that their understanding is of a 
limited God. That God does not control all things, nor could God ever control all things, is a 
central feature of Process thought. Metaphysically it is impossible for God to coerce or control 
creatures. Furthermore, for PPT, it is impossible for God to exist apart from a world. God in this 
sense is not necessary, that is to say, though God may be, in some sense, everlasting, the nature 
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of God’s existence and God’s becoming are contingent features of the world, depending on the 
existence of a world. It may not be this world, but there must be a world nevertheless. This, 
again, stands in contrast to the theistic understanding whereby God is unlimited in nature. The 
theistic understanding is such that God has the power to bring about a world or to refrain from 
creating a world. God in no way depends on a world for His existence. Moreover, theists have 
understood God to have the power to control all things both “actually” and “potentially.”130 But 
it is at this point of God having the power to control all things (whether actually or potentially) 
that Process thinkers have issues.  
In his critique of the classical view of omnipotence, Griffin makes the following claim: “if 
the world is understood as actual, the traditional idea of what is entailed by ‘omnipotence’ 
involves a fallacy, and hence cannot be used as a standard by which to consider imperfect the 
power of God as conceived in a non-traditional way.”131 It is not exactly clear here what Griffin 
means by “actual,” but it seems that he means something like this: if the world is actual, then it is 
actual in the sense that it consists of entities that have self-determining freedom that is over 
against God. Griffin takes this as a metaphysical principle, which would require that such a state 
of affairs be what it is by necessity.132 Griffin brings up the principle on multiple occasions.133 
But, as Stephen Davis rightly suggests, Griffin never gives us any reason for thinking that such a 
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metaphysical principle is true.134 Rather, it is simply assumed and asserted without argument 
throughout. Why should the theist (or anyone else for that matter) accept this principle as true? 
Why think that the world “contains a multiplicity of beings with power” is a metaphysical 
necessity? Griffin’s objection turns on the assumption of process metaphysical and ontological 
commitments, which traditional theists would no doubt reject. Traditional theists would want to 
argue that the world is contingent, even if the world were in some sense everlasting. It would still 
depend, logically, on God for its existence. Since the world is ipso facto contingent, per the 
classical theistic view, then any power that the world has depends on God. But this does not 
mean that God gives no creatures power of their own to do otherwise in certain circumstances, 
especially if one holds to something like human libertarian freedom.135   
Griffin recognizes that Plantinga and others, in putting forth their responses to the logical 
problem from evil, have argued for such a view that God gives creatures a certain amount of 
power and freedom, but he thinks that such views simply will not do. The free-will defense has 
some difficulties. First, such a view opens up the possibility that God could, on occasion, violate 
human creaturely freedom, if He so chooses to do so in order to thwart some horrible evil. 
Griffin argues, “Of course, in those moments, the apparent human beings would not really be 
humans, if ‘humans’ are by definition free.”136 This is a non sequitur, however. One instance of a 
violation of a creature’s freedom does not mean that the creature would no longer have freedom 
in other instances. If my child was playing in the back yard and I stopped him just before 
stepping into a bee’s nest, it does not follow that by violating his freedom to step in that one 
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place at that one particular time that he no longer has the freedom to do otherwise. After all, our 
criminal systems are often designed to do exactly what Griffin thinks that God could not do by 
thwarting some evil action without also changing that person’s metaphysical stature. When a 
criminal has broken the law, depending on the crime, she might be thrown in prison. This type of 
punishment may be given as a consequence of the use of her freedom and, perhaps, in order to 
thwart other such crimes that the criminal may perform later on down the road. But the 
impingement of such freedoms does not mean that she can no longer exercise her ability to 
choose. She still remains, ontologically speaking, who she is, but now with just certain 
limitations. In the same vein, God’s interaction does not change who or what a person is 
ontologically.   
Griffin gives a second objection. Could not the a-theist suggest that it would be more 
preferable to bring about world with “happy beings who are just like us, except that they are 
predetermined always to do right” than a “world such as ours with genuine free will but also with 
all its correlative evils”?137 There are some problems with such an objection. First, the theist may 
respond that to have creatures who are predetermined to always do the right would entail a world 
in which the creatures would not be “just like us.” There would be a significant ontological 
difference between those creatures and us, viz. that they do not have libertarian freedom and, 
hence, are not free in any kind of morally significant way. But even more, a theist might respond 
that happiness itself may require some kind of freedom in the libertarian sense. Some naturalists 
have described a human person as a meat-machine. Like a computer or some other processor, the 
brain downloads information that is input into it. Computers and the like are programmed to do 
certain things by the person who programs them. They are, in a sense, predetermined to perform 
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and operate a certain way. If the human being is similar to some computational system or the 
like, programed to respond in such and such a fashion, then it is hard to see how she can be 
described as “happy.” After all, when I think of my computer, I might consider it to be running 
efficiently or that the programs are uncluttered and operating in some kind of optimal capacity. 
But I doubt that I would call my computer “happy.” I take it, and perhaps many other theists 
would as well, that without libertarian freedom, or something in this vicinity, we might think of 
our general overall stature as human beings as running efficiently or optimally, but it is unclear 
that we can call it happiness. Happiness, as understood by Aristotle, and many of a religious 
persuasion, does not mean pain-free living or that no suffering is involved. Quite the contrary. 
Some of the greatest joys of life come from or in the midst of great trials and struggles. Such an 
understanding of happiness that Griffin provides here is a deflationary, hedonistic understanding 
of happiness, which may be nothing more than pleasure. However, there are many pleasure 
seekers who are not happy. Happiness for finite creatures, however, requires something of risk 
(though not evil itself) and moral significance that can only come about if there is such a thing as 
genuine agency.    
Griffin provides a third argument that if one limits creaturely freedom to humans, then 
some other principle must explain all of the evil in the “subhuman world.” He believes that all 
such attempts are unsatisfactory. One might extend the free-will defense and posit something like 
Satan and his cohorts as behind much of the evil in the natural world not directly related to 
human moral agency,138 but he finds such a view somewhat implausible in our day and age. 
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Though I myself find such a view limited in explanatory power and wanting, it should be noted 
that just because something is unfashionable by today’s standards does not make it false. 
Furthermore, there are a number of responses to the problem of natural evil since before the 
reprinting of God, Power, and Evil in 2004; yet, Griffin does not interact with any of those.139  
 There are other reasons, however, for rejecting the notion of a limited God. It would seem 
that such a God as that of PPT would not be worship-worthy. Though God may be the greatest 
conceivable being (in Hartshorne’s understanding of Anselm), it would seem that such a God 
would be quite impotent—and God according to PPT, says Stephen Davis, must be “sufficiently 
impotent”140 in order for God not to be blameworthy of the horrendous evils in the world. “God,” 
continues Davis, “must be weak enough to be incapable of unilaterally preventing evil from 
existing.”141 The God of PPT can seek to persuade actual entities to do this or that, but there is no 
guarantee that it will ever happen. Furthermore, the kind of persuasive power that the God of 
PPT has is partial and in need of supplementation. Michael Peterson, following Nancy 
Frankenberry, suggests that “presenting to creatures purely ideal logical possibilities is a rather 
sterile kind of persuasive effort.”142 He continues,  
 [I]t is not clear that any notion which locates persuasive power in the subliminal, almost 
subconscious experience of creatures is fully adequate. The standard concept of moral 
persuasion denotes much more conscious and rational activity than the process concept of 
subconscious urges, experiential nudges, or lures for feeling. Persuasion is characteristically 
understood as a process of argumentation in which each party attempts to find premises 
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which the other accepts and which leads to the desired conclusion. Traditionally, the 
morality of persuasion has been mutual respect for the other’s rational dignity and thus not 
seeking consent on less than reasonable grounds. Ironically, process thinkers, who loudly 
decry the immorality of coercion, typically describes their rendition of persuasion in terms 
which do not even sound remotely similar to those of classical moral persuasion.143  
 
Peterson’s argument is on point. It is doubtful that actual entities, given the Whiteheadian notion 
of “mentality,” especially in lower forms, can discern anything like a rational understanding of 
what is and is not the best through the initial aims sent by God. What makes up the content of 
such nudges that God gives to His creatures. Davis is surely correct in saying that we may 
admire such a being for the hard work of bringing the world to the point where it is. 
Nevertheless, evil runs rampant within the world and there is no guarantee that it will ever get 
better. Griffin and other PPT defenders have responded that traditional theists have fallen into 
the worship of omnipotence. But as Davis rightly points out, it is not that omnipotence is to be 
worshiped. We might think, here, of an evil omnipotent demon, powerful as it might be, but not 
be worthy of worship. Rather, omnipotence/power is only one of the criteria for saying that some 
being is worship-worthy.144 There are many other qualities, as well, such as being morally 
perfect or eternal, just to name a few.  
 Besides not being worship-worthy, it would seem that such a God would also be 
religiously inadequate. By “religiously inadequate,” we mean that the God of PPT is incapable of 
answering certain kinds of petitions, such as petitions of prayer or deliverance from certain 
instances of evil. Any God that cannot answer such petitions is religiously inadequate. But I 
would agree, here, with Davis that there is another way to think of some being as religiously 
inadequate, viz. that such a being cannot accomplish its own purposes. In other words, if God is 
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to be religiously adequate, then God must be able to bring about God’s own purposes and 
desires. It may be, in the end, that the God of PPT will pull through but there is no guarantee, 
which leads us to (6).  
On the PPT hypothesis, God has gotten this whole process started, but there is no 
ultimate assurance that God will bring about His purposes in the end. Despite all of God’s efforts 
to persuade, struggle for, and suffer with the creatures in this world, we are left wondering 
whether God has the power to ultimately succeed. It would seem that God took a great risk in 
creating the world. If in the end God does not accomplish His aims, then it would seem that God 
is still indictable for the horrendous evils in the world.145 But even more damaging is that all 
hope of ultimate resolution is lost.   
Having examined PPT and evil, we now turn to theism. How well does theism fare? To 
what extent does theism answer the question of evil compared to the other three worldviews?  
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CHAPTER 5: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 4  
THEISM 
 
 
Introduction  
In the history of Western thought, perhaps the most influential worldview has been 
theism. Philosophers generally speak of theists in a “broad sense” and in a “narrow sense.”  A 
theist in the broad sense of the word refers to someone who holds to the belief that some sort of 
divine being or reality exists; whereas, a theist in the narrow sense is someone who places 
emphasis on certain attributes of a divine being, such as, a being who is an “omnipotent, 
omniscient, eternal, supremely good being who created the world.”1 Paul Tillich would be an 
example of a theist in the broad sense and Thomas Aquinas would be an example of a theist in 
the narrower sense. When speaking of theism in this chapter, we are going to focus more on the 
narrower sense of the word, especially since some might classify pantheism, deism, polytheism, 
or panentheism as forms of theism.2 
 Here, I take theism to mean that exactly one God exists who is non-physical, perfect 
moral goodness, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, necessary and creator of all things.3 Christian 
theists have often held to a variety of other attributes, such as, pure actuality, immutability, 
impassibility, timelessness, simplicity, and omniscience.4 I will not pursue these attributes, here, 
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unless our discussion requires such interaction, but will give further consideration to some of 
these in Chapter Six. In this chapter I want to stick with as bare a variant of theism (in the narrow 
sense) as possible, since I am not at this point arguing for one specific brand of theism.  
 Before moving on, it would be helpful to consider each of these definitional points in 
order. By saying that only one entity exists, I mean that only one God exists, excluding anything 
like a cosmic dualism of beings or the polytheism of ancient Greek, Roman, Egyptian, or Norse 
religions. This God does not have a body, nor is the world God’s body, as some pantheists and 
panentheists hold. Further, being a non-physical being, God is in no way constrained by the laws 
of physics that govern the universe.5  
When theists say that God is good, they mean that God is perfectly good. God’s perfect 
goodness might be taken in two ways. First, we might understand God’s goodness as wholly 
good. By this, theists mean that goodness is such that there are no defects in God’s character or 
God’s actions. Taken negatively, God never does any action that could be considered as evil. 
That God is necessarily good is a second way that theists have understood God’s perfect 
goodness. This claim is stronger than the first, in that, it entails that goodness is such a part of 
God’s nature that it would be impossible for God to have any kind of flaw or blemish.6 In the 
words of Thomas Morris, “[t]o claim that God is necessarily good is to claim that he is utterly 
invulnerable to evil.”7 
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To say that God is omnipotent is to say that he has maximal power. This does not mean, 
however, that God can do just anything that He so chooses. Omnipotence is limited by certain 
logical restrictions. For example, God could not create a square circle or make a married 
bachelor. Furthermore, when considering the problem from evil, I take it that, if God grants his 
human creatures something like libertarian freedom, then it is not possible for God to actualize 
just any world that He so chooses. Alvin Plantinga defines libertarian freedom as follows: 
If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform that action and 
free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine 
that he will perform the action, or that he won’t. It is within his power, at the time in 
question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.8  
 
If something like libertarian freedom is true, then it is solely up to the individual to perform or 
refrain from some action. If God were to cause some person to do or refrain from an action, then 
the person would not be free in the libertarian sense. This does not mean that God is incapable of 
causing someone to do some action—God has the power to do so—but God, in His choosing to 
create free creatures, has given them certain powers of their own. Now, what God can do, with 
respect to power, is to create a world, but how that world turns out, if creatures are free in the 
libertarian sense, is partly up to the creatures. Such a world would be a weakly actualized world, 
as opposed to one that is strongly actualized. While it might be logically possible for God to 
create a world in which creatures always did that which is right, it would be logically impossible 
for God to cause such a world to exist, since how the world turns out is partly up to the creature. 
Furthermore, along the lines of God’s power, theists have held that God has maximal knowledge. 
There are differences of opinion among theists as to whether or not God could know the future 
free actions of His creatures. I take it that He can, but some theists, particularly Openness theists, 
                                                 
 
8 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, 29. 
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argue that it is logically impossible for God to know the future free acts of His creatures. For 
those theists who believe that God knows the future free actions of His creatures, they hold to 
something like simple foreknowledge or middle knowledge (Molinism). 
When theists speak of God as eternal, they mean, minimally, that God has always existed. 
Some theists have taken God’s eternality to mean that God’s temporal mode of existence is 
timelessness, that is to say, God’s temporal mode of existence is such that God has no temporal 
location or extension. Generally, the timelessness view goes along with a number of other theses, 
viz. that God is immutable, impassible, and simple. The total combination of such a view is 
known as eternalism.9 Other theists have held that God is omnitemporal or everlastingly eternal, 
that is to say, God is temporal in some sense. Such a view does not mean that God is bound by 
the four-dimensional space-time universe. Nor does it require God to be in some way limited by 
the laws of nature.10 These thinkers believe that God transcends all created time, but is, perhaps, 
temporal by virtue of being in a causal relationship to the universe.11 In some ways, this is an “in 
house” debate, which I will not take space to discuss here. I will only mention that a good 
argument can be made for the coherence of either position, though, not without some theological 
costs on either side.12 
                                                 
9 For modern defenders of this view, see Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 78, no. 8 (Aug 1981), 429-458; Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991).  
 
10 Some modern representatives of this view include William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring 
God’s Relationship to Time (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001); Alan Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1992); John Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine of God (Wheaton, 
IL: Crossway Books, 2001); Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 210-229.  
 
11 For an excellent discussion on omintemporality and divine causation see Garrett J. DeWeese, God and 
the Nature of Time (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004), 239-276. 
12 For discussion on the theological costs, see Ronnie P. Campbell, Jr., “The Eternality of the Immutable 
God in the Thought of Paul Helm” [master’s thesis, Liberty University, 2008], 59-83.   
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Regarding necessity, there are two important ways that theists understand the proposition 
that God is necessary: de dicto necessity and de re necessity. Take, for example, the following 
propositions: 
(7) Necessarily, God is good 
(8) Necessarily, God is omnipotent 
(9) Necessarily, God is omniscient13 
 
Each of these propositions are expressions of de dicto necessity. There can be no being that 
counts as God who does not also have such properties as omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect 
goodness in each and every world in which such a being exists. Each property is a conceptual 
requirement for deity. We may understand de re necessity, on the other hand, by considering the 
following propositions:    
(4) God is necessarily good 
(5) God is necessarily omnipotent 
(6) God is necessarily omniscient14 
 
Such propositions tell us something that is essential about the individual involved. In this case, 
God is essentially omnipotent, essentially omniscient, and essentially good. The Being who in 
fact is God has such properties in this and all possible worlds.15 Hence, when we say that some 
entity E has property P essentially, we mean that that E has P in every possible world that E 
exists. In other words, there is no possible world in which E exists that E does not also have the 
property P. Furthermore, if E has P essentially, then there are no worlds in which E has the 
complement ~P.16 Here, we must also distinguish essential properties from contingent properties. 
                                                 
13 Thomas V. Morris, Our Idea of God: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology (Vancouver: Regent 
College Publishing, 2002), 106. 
  
14 Ibid., 107. 
 
15 Ibid., 106-107.  
 
16 Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 56. When 
philosophers speak of “possible worlds,” they mean the sum total or compossible collection of states of affairs. 
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A contingent property is a property P such that an entity might have it in one world, but have its 
complement ~P in another. Contingent properties are such that they do not alter the essence of 
the person in question. There are some possible worlds where I became a barista or a rock star 
instead of an academic. But becoming a rock star or a barista does not change who I am 
essentially. There is, however, one additional claim that theists make when speaking of God as 
necessary. Theists believe that any individual who is God exists in every possible world. There 
are no possible worlds in which God does not or could not exist. It is impossible for God not to 
exist. This is known as necessary existence.17  
Lastly, theists believe that God is the creator of all things. Unlike process theists, who 
hold to creation out of pre-existing materials, theists believe that God created all things out of 
nothing (ex nihilo), including the entirety of the four-dimensional space-time universe. By 
“nothing,” theists mean that no prior thing existed other than God. All created entities are 
contingent and dependent on God for their existence. Furthermore, theists believe that there is a 
clear ontological distinction between God and creation, which theists call the Creator/creature 
distinction. God is infinite and unlimited whereas creatures are finite and limited. Theists 
recognize that any being or power that creatures have is given to them by God, who continually 
upholds and sustains them in their existence. Yet, unlike deists, who hold to a radical 
transcendence, theists argue that God is both transcendent and immanent. God is transcendent in 
the sense that God, as the creator of all things, exists apart from and is not in any way dependent 
on His creatures for His own existence. God is immanent in the sense that He cares for the world, 
                                                 
There is the actual world—the world as it has turned out—but some worlds are merely possible, that is to say, the 
states of affairs that make up the actual world could have turned out otherwise than they did. We can imagine some 
world in which my mother and father never married. The result of such a state of affairs would have consisted of 
Ronnie Campbell, the person who is now typing this sentence, never existing. Some of the circumstances 
surrounding such a world would have been completely different from those found in the actual world.  
 
17 Morris, Our Idea of God, 108; Nash, The Concept of God, 107.  
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intervenes through miraculous interaction, sustains it in its existence, and is religiously available 
to his creatures in a variety of capacities.     
 
Theism and Evil 
 As with the other three metaphysical systems, there are four areas that test the theistic 
hypothesis to explaining evil: life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human 
responsibility. To each of these we now turn. 
Theism and Life 
 If theism is to explain evil in the world, then it must be able to explain life. In order to 
explain life, theists must explain the existence of the universe. According to the theistic 
hypothesis, God created the entire space-time universe a finite time ago in the past. In 
postulating a created universe, theists avoid certain dangers seen in the three other worldviews 
considered thus far, namely, the brute fact that the universe has always existed. Theists do not 
run up against the problem of infinite regress, since the universe has a first cause for its existence 
who is also a necessary being. Furthermore, the finite existence of the past seems to be 
confirmed scientifically by the Big Bang, which suggest that the universe exploded into 
existence some 13.8 billion years ago from infinite density. As we saw in Chapter Two, in order 
to counter the conclusions from the Big Bang, some naturalists have postulated something like a 
multiverse, according to which the universe is just one of an infinite number of universes. I will 
not rehearse the complications of such a view, here. Suffice to say, even if something like the 
multiverse hypothesis was true, there is still the difficulty of infinite regress that a defender of 
such a position must consider. But even if we were to find out that, indeed, something like the 
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multiverse is true, there are still resources within the theistic worldview that would allow for 
such an option without damaging the theistic hypothesis.18 
 But what of the development of life in the universe? Theists have long held that God is 
the originator of life in the universe. Recently theists have put forth powerful arguments 
demonstrating the fine-tuning of the universe. Philosopher Robin Collins has suggested evidence 
for fine tuning comes from three areas: laws of nature, constants of nature, and initial conditions 
of the universe. Regarding the laws of nature, Collins argues that if certain laws or governing 
principles, such as that of gravity, the strong nuclear force, or the electromagnetic force, did not 
exist, or, at least, if they were not replaced with a similar principle that serves the same function, 
“complex self-reproducing material systems could not evolve.”19 The same goes with certain 
constants of physics, such as the constant of gravity, which I considered in Chapter Two, and the 
initial conditions of the universe. If these constants and conditions were slightly different, then 
the basic structure of the universe would be quite different and life as we know it would not 
exist. Collins provides the following helpful analogy: 
 Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of fine-tuning as a radio dial; unless all the 
dials are set exactly right, life would be impossible. Or, one could think of the initial 
conditions of the universe and the fundamental parameters of physics as a dart board that 
fills the whole galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist as a small one-foot wide 
target: unless the dart hits the target, life would be impossible. The fact that the dials are 
perfectly set, or that the dart has hit the target, strongly suggests that someone set the dials or 
aimed the dart, for it seems enormously improbable that such a coincidence could have 
happened by chance.20 
 
                                                 
18 For a recent defense, see W. David Beck and Max Andrews, “God and the Multiverse: A Thomistic 
Modal Realism,” Philosophia Christi 16, no. 1 (2014): 101-115.  
 
19 Robin Collins, “The Teleological Argument,” in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, edited 
by William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 211. 
  
20 Robin Collins, “A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God,” in Reason for the Hope Within, ed. 
Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 49-50. 
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The fine-tuning argument, taken with other theistic arguments, such as certain versions of the 
cosmological argument, provide the theist with the resources needed for thinking that the 
universe is caused and that an intelligent mind is behind the existence of life in it. If other 
naturalistic hypotheses fail, as I have argued so far, then the theist is on good epistemic grounds 
for thinking that God designed the universe. 
 Granted, not everyone will accept this line of reasoning. Perhaps one objection to the 
theistic hypothesis from naturalists is the “Who designed God?” argument. Such an argument, 
popularized by Richard Dawkins in the God Delusion,21 is also found among some 
philosophically astute thinkers, such as J. J. C. Smart. Smart reasons: “If we postulate God in 
addition to the created universe we increase the complexity of our hypothesis. We have all the 
complexity of the universe itself, and we have in addition the at least equal complexity of God. 
(The designer of an artefact must be at least as complex as the designed artefact.)”22 According 
to this line of thinking, postulating a designer does not really solve the issue; rather it moves the 
apparent design of the universe back one more level. There are, at least, three lines of response 
the theist can give to this argument.  
First, the theists might respond that postulating the designer to be more complex than the 
design is not, necessarily, obvious. Nevertheless, as Collins suggests, there is something intuitive 
about the critic’s belief, here, namely that when we see such organized complexity in the world, 
it generally is produced from systems that also demonstrate such complexity. Collins believes a 
there is a better, second response to the critic’s objection. The critic’s argument stands only if the 
                                                 
21 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Mariner Books, 2006), 147, 151. 
  
22 J. J. C. Smart, “Laws of Nature and Cosmic Coincidences,” The Philosophical Quarterly 35, no. 140 (Jul 
1985), 272-280, accessed February 11, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/stable/2218906?seq=5#page_scan_tab_contents 
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design argument in question claims that every instance of organized complexity in the world 
needs explanation and that the theist suggests that God is the ultimate explanation for such 
complexity in the world. But not all design arguments require this; rather, all that the design 
argument needs to show is that the fine-tuning of the universe be more probable given theism 
than naturalism. In this way, the requirements have been met, says Collins, even if it turns out 
that God “exhibits tremendous internal complexity.”23 Hence, even if the theist were to grant the 
critic’s point that God is as least as complex as the artifact, the fine-tuning argument would still 
provide reason to prefer the theistic hypothesis over the naturalistic one.  
Third, the critic’s challenge based on the complexity of God assumes that God is like the 
universe, or, at least, the individual things found within the universe, that is to say, that God at 
some time came into existence. But that is precisely where the critic misunderstands the theistic 
hypothesis. According to the variety of theism understood here, God is both eternal and 
necessary. Regarding God’s eternality, there was never a point when God came into existence. 
God was never created nor could God ever be destroyed. Furthermore, as a necessary being, 
there are no possible worlds in which God does not exist. God instantiates those properties that 
are essential to Him in every possible world. On what basis do theists believe that God is a 
necessary being in the sense described above? First, theists arrive at this conclusion based on 
“perfect being theology” (PBT). According to the medieval philosopher and theologian St. 
Anselm of Canterbury, God is by definition “that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought.”24 
Most theists take something like Anselm’s notion of perfect being as a proper method for 
thinking about God. Based, then, on PBT, theists recognize that there are many things within the 
                                                 
23 Collins, “A Scientific Argument,” 59.  
 
24 Anselm, Proslogium, 3.  
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universe that are contingent—things that are fragile, vulnerable, and tenuous in their existence; 
things that move in and out of existence; and things that could have been, but never exist. But 
there is a greater mode of existence imaginable than what we see in contingent things. We can 
conceive of a being of which whose existence is such that it never ceases to exist or that it never 
came into being “from nothing.”25 As Thomas Morris argues, such a being’s “anchorage in 
reality is so great that it is not even possible for the being to have failed to exit.”26 Morris 
continues, “[s]urely it is only this necessary existence, this firmest possible foothold in reality, 
which is appropriate for a maximally perfect being.”27 There is a second way that theists arrive at 
God’s necessary existence—from their understanding of creation. If God is conceived of as the 
creator of and ultimate cause for the existence of all things that are distinct from himself, then it 
follows that God must be conceived to exist in all possible worlds. If God does have necessary 
existence, as theists believe, then God is not in any sense cobbled together from various parts.  
 Some critics have argued against the theistic hypothesis by suggesting that evolution 
removes the need for a creator. Such an objection is faulty from the start. While I myself am 
sympathetic to something more akin to intelligent design, I do not find such an objection to hold 
for two reasons.  
First, if it turns out that evolution is true, as most naturalists and a growing number of 
theists hold, there is no contradiction between evolutionary theory and the existence of God. 
Some theists may argue that while there is a good amount of support for evolution, it is doubtful 
that one can understand it in any mechanistic manner. It would be more plausible to see it as 
                                                 
25 Morris, Our Idea of God, 108.  
 
26 Ibid.  
 
27 Ibid., 109.  
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guided. Further, as we saw in Chapter Two, critics of physicalism, such as Thomas Nagel, find it 
implausible that something such as consciousness could come about through evolutionary 
processes alone. Other theists may concur with all of the scientific conclusions of evolution, and 
yet question whether or not it could provide any ultimate explanation. Mechanical explanations 
and design are not, necessarily, at odds. It may be the case, argue such theists, that evolution is 
the process or mechanism by which God brings about His ultimate purposes for human life.28  
There is a second response that the theist may give based on the incompatibility of 
evolution and naturalism. Both Thomas Nagel and Alvin Plantinga have advanced such 
arguments. Plantinga, in Where the Conflict Really Lies, has argued that there is deep conflict 
between naturalism and science, and particularly between naturalism and evolution. Plantinga’s 
argument centers on our cognitive faculties—faculties such as memory, perception, a priori 
intuition, and sympathy—and their reliability. Theists believe that our cognitive faculties are 
reliable since God has made humans in His image and likeness (or something of the like). 
Naturalists, on the other hand, understand our cognitive faculties as a direct result of coming 
together by the processes of evolution and natural selection. Given the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties, which, asks Plantinga, seems more plausible? Evolution, it would seem, at best 
guarantees that we humans behave a certain way. Evolution, understood by naturalists, promotes 
such things as survival or reproductive success. Our cognitive faculties, however, are not geared 
toward producing true beliefs; rather, they are geared toward contributing to the specie’s 
survival.29 On this point, following non-theist Patricia Churchland, Plantinga says, “What 
                                                 
28 C. Stephen Evans and R. Zachary Manis, Philosophy of Religion, second edition (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2009), 82-83. 
  
29 Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 201l), 308-316.  
 
156 
 
evolution underwrites is only (at most) that our behavior is reasonably adaptive to the 
circumstances in which our ancestors found themselves; hence it does not guarantee mostly true 
or verisimilitudinous beliefs. Our beliefs might be mostly true or verisimilitudinous. . . ; but there 
is no particular reason to think they would be: natural selection is interested, not in truth, but in 
appropriate behavior.”30 Naturalistic evolution gives us reason to doubt that: (a) the purpose of 
our cognitive faculties is to supply humans with true beliefs and (b) that such faculties, do, 
indeed, supply us on most occasions with true belief. Plantinga continues by arguing that when 
they are not malfunctioning, we all tend to rely or our cognitive faculties. We all, naturalists and 
theists alike, tend to go through life assuming that such faculties are reliable and that they 
produce true beliefs. But why should the naturalist think this? Plantinga believes that the 
naturalist is “rationally obliged” to give up such an assumption, if the naturalist holds to 
something along the lines of our underlying neurology as being products of adaptive behavior.31 
Plantinga explains: 
 And here’s the question: what reason is there for supposing that this belief content is true? 
There isn’t any. The neurology causes adaptive behavior and also causes or determines 
belief content:  but there is no reason to suppose that the belief content thus determined is 
true. All that’s required for survival and fitness is that the neurology cause adaptive 
behavior; this neurology also determines belief content, but whether or not that content is 
true makes no difference to fitness.32 
 
The whole scientific and naturalistic program rests on the ability to know and understand the 
world in a rational way. But on what basis is there for thinking that the world, as we understand 
it, is true? Why think that we have a grasp of the basic structure of our world? Why think that the 
contents of our beliefs are true? Given naturalism, at best, we can be agnostic. Hence lies the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 316. 
 
31 Ibid., 316-328.  
 
32 Ibid., 328.  
157 
 
conflict between naturalism and evolution. If such is the case, as Plantinga has argued, given the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties and their ability to lead us to true belief, evolution would 
seem more probable given theism than naturalism.     
 If, as theists argue, the universe has an ultimate cause and design behind it, and if God 
serves as a suitable candidate for such an ultimate cause and design, then, it would seem, there is 
good reason to suppose life given theism. But what of consciousness?  
Theism and Consciousness 
If theism is to explain evil, it must also be able to explain consciousness, given that much 
of the evil that we see in the world does not result merely from pain but also from suffering, 
which requires one’s ability to reflect on one’s pain. Theists believe that consciousness is the 
result of something like the Judeo-Christian view that God created humans in His image and 
likeness. I am not saying, here, that every theism will hold to this view; rather, that various 
theisms may hold to something similar to this view, especially certain Christian, Jewish, and 
Muslim theistic views. The imago Dei, as Christian theists call it, suggests that God has endowed 
His human creatures with certain capacities to perform acts, to be intentional, to have beliefs, and 
to be relational. In order to function in such a way, it would seem that such creatures would 
require something like consciousness—an ability to not only understand themselves and their 
environment, but also to reflect on, ponder, and respond to it in such a way that goes beyond a 
mere instinctual kind of response. So far, so good. It would seem that something like 
consciousness might be expected given theism. But the theistic view of consciousness is not 
without its own problems, especially when considering the mind/body problem.   
As we have seen, the mind/body problem is something that each worldview must work 
through. This is true of theism nonetheless. With respect to human nature on the mind/body 
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problem, theists hold to a number of different views. Most theists fall into one of two categories: 
physicalism or some form of dualism. In Chapter Two I argued against physicalism. It is my 
contention that theistic physicalism is susceptible to some of the same dangers that naturalistic 
versions face. I will not revisit physicalism here. Rather, I will focus on dualism as a viable 
option for explaining consciousness, which is, at any rate, the more common position among 
theists.     
 When considering dualism, there is more than one variety. There is substance dualism as 
well as emergent dualism. Among substance dualisms, there is the Cartesian variety as well as 
the Thomistic sort. Cartesian dualists focus on mind as distinct from the body, which is an 
externally related entity that is causally related to the body. Thomistic dualism takes it that mind 
is a function of the soul. The soul serves as the primary integrating feature of the person, by 
which it has certain capacities for both biological and mental functioning.33 In what follows, I 
will not discuss each kind and variety of dualism. All that the theist needs to show is that at least 
one variety of dualism explains consciousness. My focus here is not to argue for one specific 
form of dualism; rather, I will only put forth a general argument for mind/body dualism. 
 What do theists mean when they speak of dualism? If theists believe that there is an 
ontological distinction between God and the rest of creation, then, at minimum theists are 
dualists of sorts. God is considered by theists to be something like an unembodied, uncreated 
mind or entity, without any physical body. With respect to human nature, and perhaps the natures 
of some animals too, dualists recognize that there is some entity that is distinct from the body or 
brain. Property-event dualists believe that there is a significant distinction between mental 
                                                 
33 J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 21. 
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properties and physical properties. Mental events such as thoughts, sensations, beliefs, or desires 
are all distinct from brain states or events. Substance dualists take this further and recognize that 
what one calls the “soul,” “self,” “I,” or the “mind” is a distinct entity from the body.34 
Substance dualists, suggest J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae, are committed at minimum “to the 
claim that the soul is an immaterial entity that could, in principle, survive death and ground 
personal identity in the afterlife.”35 There is, yet, one more important distinction that substance 
dualists make—a distinction between functional holism and ontological holism. Functional 
holism recognizes (1) that the soul is in some sense in the body; (2) that the body and soul 
function as a unity that is both complex and deeply integrated; and (3) that the soul can exist 
without the body and survive death. Functional holism can work with either Cartesian or 
Thomistic dualisms. Ontological holism, on the other hand, suggests that the body and soul are 
so tightly integrated that the soul depends on the body, and when it dies, so, too, does the soul. 
Disembodiment is impossible. In this case, ontological holism is consistent with property-event 
dualism, but not with Cartesian or Thomistic versions.36 I take it something like functional 
holism to be the case, as I will argue below. 
 What evidence, then, is there for thinking that something like dualism is true? There are, 
at least, three lines of evidence for thinking that dualism is true: (1) the paradigm-case argument; 
(2) NDE’s and Post-death visions argument; and (3) the unity-of-consciousness argument. Let us 
take each one of these arguments in order.  
                                                 
34 Ibid., 20. 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
36 Ibid., 21.  
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 In their book, Body and Soul, J. P. Moreland and Scott Rae introduce what I will call the 
Paradigm-Case Argument. According to this argument, God and, perhaps, angels are paradigm-
case persons. Their argument goes as follows: 
 If God and, perhaps, angels are paradigm-case persons and since they are immaterial spirits, 
then it is at least consistent that something be both a person and an immaterial spirit. But 
more than this, if the paradigm-case persons are immaterial spirits, then this provides 
justification for the claim that anything is a person if and only if it bears a relevant similarity 
to the paradigm cases. Arguably, the relevant similarity between other (kinds of) persons 
and the paradigm cases is grounded in something all persons have in common and that 
constitutes that which makes the paradigm cases to be persons in the first place, namely, 
personhood. Personhood is constituted by a set of ultimate capacities of thought, belief, 
sensation, emotion, volition, desire, intentionality and so forth.37 
 
What benefit is there to such an argument? It at least shows that the concept of an unembodied 
soul is not unreasonable given theism. After all, the chief exemplar of such a notion of person is 
God, whom theists believe to be something like an unembodied mind. But such a view is not 
without its critics. Some theistic physicalists will want to argue that personhood is not so much a 
nature as it is a function of a complex organism realized by the individual. The defender of 
dualism will answer such a charge by arguing that God is often understood as thinking, feeling, 
acting, and the like, and that such are descriptions of attributes of God and not some functional 
states that are in some way external to Him. But there is a second reply. As Moreland and Rae 
put it, “if various mental states are really functional states whose description is neutral to whether 
the entity realizing that state is a spirit or a brain, then just exactly what is the content of ‘spirit’ 
when we say that God is a spirit?”38 This seems to be an issue that theistic physicalists will have 
difficulty answering if they are adamant about functionalism. 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 25.  
 
38 Ibid., 26.  
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 The second line of evidence for dualism comes from the overwhelming data on near-
death experiences (NDEs) and post-death visions.39 For now, I will only be able to cover, briefly, 
NDEs, though there are some compelling data on post-death visions.40 
 People reporting near-death experiences (NDEs henceforth) generally provide several 
similar experiences, such as leaving, floating above, and seeing their lifeless bodies. Such 
experiences are called out of body experiences (OBE). Others claim to have been met by an 
angel or some other kind of heavenly being, to have encountered a barrier of sorts or a bright 
light, or to have met deceased loved ones.41 While not the norm, there have also been some 
“hellish” cases.42  
 Many NDE reports, while they may be true for all we know (and thus epistemically 
possible), are not the kinds of experiences that can be empirically verified, and thus provide little 
or no import as to an explanation for or reasons to believe that there is such a thing as a soul or 
an afterlife. After all, as some skeptics claim, many who report NDEs generally interpret their 
experiences in such a way as to fit their specific cultural and religious biases, for example, 
Christians claim to have met Jesus or an angel while Hindus report seeing their deities, and so 
                                                 
39 I came across the term “post-death visions” from Gary Habermas through personal correspondence. 
 
40 For discussion on methodology and veridical cases of post-death visions see C. D. Broad, “Phantasms of 
the Living and of the Dead,” Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 50, no. 183 (1953): 51-67; Hilary 
Evans, Seeing Ghosts: Experiences of the Paranormal (London: John Murray, 2002); Erlendur Haraldsson, 
“Alledged Encounters with the Dead: The Importance of Violent Death in 337 Cases,” The Journal of 
Parapsychology 73, no. 1 (Spring-Fall 2009): 91-118; idem. “Surveyed of Claimed Encounters with the Dead,” 
Omega 19, no. 2 (1988-89): 103-113; idem. “The Iyengar-kirti Case: An Apparitinal Case of the Bystander Type,” 
Journal of the Society for Psychical Research 54, no. 806 (January 1987): 64-67; Ian Stevenson, “The Contribution 
of Apparitions to the Evidence for Survival,” The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research 76 
(October 1982): 341-358; Bryan J. Williams, Review of Phantasms of the Living (2 Vols) by Edmund Gurney, 
Fredric W. H. Myers, and Frand Podmore, Journal of Scientific Explorations 25, no. 2 (2011): 367-424. 
 
 41 For a description of such events, see Raymond A. Moody Jr., Life After Life (Harrisburg, PA: StackPole 
Books, 1976), 19-103.   
 
 42 Michael Sabom, Light and Death: One Doctor’s Fascinating Account of Near-Death Experiences (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1998), 165-173. 
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on.43 According to one critic, Michael Marsh, NDE researchers need to be more critical of 
reports given that “NDE accounts are non-identical, non-uniform, and hence personally 
idiosyncratic.”44 Other skeptics claim that such experiences are nothing more than the firings of 
synapses in the brain gone wrong or that the persons having said experiences are, in reality, 
hallucinating.45   
 While the majority are non-evidential, there are a number of such accounts that are 
veridical and provide empirical evidence for the existence of the soul and an afterlife. But what 
kind of evidence counts? According to Terence Nichols, there are four lines of evidence that 
NDE researches put forth: (1) people are capable of describing events that they could not have 
known beforehand or otherwise; (2) meeting dead loved ones or people not previously known to 
have died; (3) change in life perspective; and (4)  a vast amount of testimony that transcends 
gender, age, class, and ethnicity, all of which goes beyond that which can be explained by 
materialist explanations.46 For our purposes, I will only examine the first kind of evidence.47 
                                                 
 43 Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief, 232; Michael N. Marsh, “The Phenomenology of the Near-
Death Experience (NDE): An Encounter with Eternity – or Simply an Aberrant Brain State?” Modern Believing 52, 
no. 2 (April 2011), 41-42. Cf. Moushumi Purkayastha and Kanchan Kumar Mukherjee, “Three Cases of Near Death 
Experience: Is it Physiology, Physics or Philosophy?, Annals of Neurosciences 19, no. 3 (July 2013), 104-106.    
  
 44 Marsh, “The Phenomenology of the Near-Death Experience,” 41.  
 
 45 Skeptic Michael Shermer argues that new evidence supports the belief that NDE’s are nothing more than 
a product of our brains. According to Shermer, neurologist Michael Persinger of Laurentian University in Sudbury, 
Canada, can induce NDE’s by subjecting a person’s temporal lobes to varying patterns of magnetic fields. Having 
subjected himself to Persinger’s tests, Shermer claims to have had “a mild out-of-body experience.” Michael 
Shermer, “The Great Afterlife Debate: Michael Shermer v. Deepak Chopra,” Skeptic 13, no. 4 (2008): 53. See also 
Peterson et al. Reasons and Religious Belief, 231.  
 
 46 Terrance Nichols, Death and Afterlife: A Theological Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 
2010), 110.   
 
 47 Though there is substantive weight on the other three kinds of evidence. For the second type of evidence, 
see Bruce Greyson, “Seeing Dead People Not Known to Have Died: ‘Peak in Darien’ Experiences,” Anthropology 
and Humanism 35, no. 2 (2010): 159-171; Patrick Glynn, God: The Evidence (Rocklin, CA: Forum, 1997), 117.  For 
the third and fourth types of evidence, see Melvin Morse and Paul Perry, Transformed by the Light: The Powerful 
Effect of Near-Death Experiences on People’s Lives (New York: Villard Books, 1992); Jeffery Long and Paul Perry, 
Evidence of the Afterlife: The Science of Near-Death Experiences (New York: HarperCollins, 2010), chapters 9-11; 
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 With respect to the first type of evidence, a variety of collaborative accounts can be 
adduced.48 Cardiologist Pim van Lommel provides a veridical account of a man in his forties, 
who, when he arrived at the hospital, was comatose. The coronary-care-unit nurse on duty 
reported taking the man’s dentures out of his mouth and placing them on a ‘crash car’ in order to 
“intubate” the patient.  Upon seeing the nurse a week later, the man responded to her, “Oh, that 
nurse knows where my dentures are.”49 He proceeded to tell her, “Yes, you were there when I 
was brought into the hospital and you took my dentures out of my mouth and put them onto the 
car, it had all these bottles on it and there was this sliding drawer underneath and there you put 
my teeth.”50 From the nurse’s perspective, she “remembered this happening while the man was 
in deep coma and in the process of CPR.”51 After questioning the man further, she reported, “it 
appeared the man had seen himself lying in the bed, that he had perceived from above how 
nurses and doctors had been busy with CPR. He was also able to describe correctly and in detail 
the small room in which he had been resuscitated as well as the appearance of those present like 
myself.”52  
                                                 
Bruce Greyson, “Near-Death Experiences and Spirituality,” Zygon 41, no. 2 (June 2006): 393-414. There have also 
been cases where people who were born blind have had NDEs and were able to explain visual phenomena that 
would otherwise be impossible for those who have never had visual experiences before. See Jeffrey Long and Paul 
Perry, Evidence of the Afterlife (New York: HarperOne, 2010), 85. 
 
 48 For a variety of cases and extended discussion, see Gary R. Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Beyond 
Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishing, 2004), 155-172. See also  
Moody, Life after Life, 94-95.   
 
 49 Pim van Lommel, Ruud van Wees, Vincent Meyers, and Ingrid Elfferich, “Near-death Experiences in 
Survivors of Cardiac Arrest: A Prospective Study in the Netherlands,” The Lancet 358 (December 15, 2001): 2041. 
   
 50 Ibid.  
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 One NDE that was significantly evidential involves a woman named Pam, who had a 
brain aneurysm, and who had to have two extraordinary medical procedures back-to-back. 
During the second procedure, nicknamed “standstill,” her body was cooled to 60 degrees and the 
blood was drained from her head. At this time, her heart was stopped and she had no brain 
waves.53 According to cardiologist Michael Sabom, three clinical tests are administered to 
determine whether a person experiences brain death. He explains that, “her 
electroencephalogram was silent, her brain-stem response was absent, and no blood flowed 
through her brain.”54 Pam had met all three criteria. Sabom, who lays out the medical procedure 
in detail, reports that Pam, claiming to have had an out of body experience, was able to describe 
the events of her operation providing specific details, such as the odd shape of the bone saw used 
on her head and certain conversations had by the medical team. Her descriptions were then 
corroborated by the medical records from the operation.55 One interesting aspect of Pam’s story 
is that, while she was not brain-dead at the time of her OBE (though she would be during the 
second procedure, during which she continued with her NDE), it seems implausible that she 
could see or hear anything, since her eyes were taped shut and her ears had speakers in them 
giving clicking sounds, which measured her brainstem activity.56  
 The cases given here only scratch the surface of the many NDEs reported throughout the 
world. But some question as to whether these NDEs really do occur or whether there is some 
                                                 
 53 Sabom, Light and Death, 37.  
 
 54 Ibid., 49.  
 
 55 Ibid., 37-47.  
 
 56 Cheryl Fracasso and Harris Friedman, “Near-Death Experiences and the Possibility of Disembodied 
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165 
 
naturalistic explanation for NDE phenomena. Though critics have put forth a number of 
naturalistic explanations, two are prominent: hallucinations and anoxia.57 Problems attend each 
of these. Regarding hallucinations, there are some reported cases of people who have had NDEs 
and who have also experienced drug-induced hallucinations. In such cases, though, serious 
differences obtained between the two accounts. Further, those who have had hallucinations 
report that after the fact it was clear that they were experiencing hallucinations. That is not the 
case with NDEs. Generally, unlike hallucinations, the NDEs are ordered and reality is not 
distorted, as is often the case with hallucinations. One other significant fact is that when people 
experience hallucinations, there is no overall life change. But the opposite is the case with 
respect to NDEs. Those who have had an NDE generally report a life change and a significant 
change in their beliefs and spirituality. But the real difficulty with claiming that NDEs are 
hallucinations is that hallucinations do not account for those parts of the NDE that can be 
verified empirically, such as those considered in the two cases mentioned above.58 But what 
about anoxia?   
 Anoxia is a condition that happens when the brain is starved of oxygen, a condition often 
seen in fighter pilots and mountain climbers. Those who experience anoxia often experience 
confusion and distortion in their mental processes. The problem with chalking NDEs up to 
certain physiological explanations, such as anoxia, is that in many of the anoxia cases there is no 
coherence to a person’s thoughts. But that is not what we see with respect to NDEs. Often NDE 
experiences are crisp and clear, containing vivid details of all that was experienced. The British 
neuropsychiatrist, Peter Fenwick, has this to say about NDEs and anoxia: 
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 As the brain becomes anoxic it ceases to function. It becomes disrupted and disorganized, so 
that you become gradually confused, disoriented, your perception fragments and finally you 
become unconscious. You do not think clearly, you don’t have insights, you don’t have 
clear, coherent visions. . . . [I]f anoxia is to be the major cause of NDEs we have to postulate 
a series of very unlikely events. The brain has to be able to synthesize a complex internal 
world and to be able to remember it, despite a lack of oxygen which is so profound that 
brain function is widely disrupted so that consciousness is lost.59   
 
Lastly, as with hallucinations, anoxia does not account for the kind of veridical experiences 
shown above.  
 If acceptable, then, certain phenomena such as NDEs and post-death visions provide 
veridical evidence not only for the existence of something like the soul, which exists apart from 
the body, but also for an afterlife. Here, we would concur with philosopher Andrew J. Dell’Olio, 
when speaking of the empirical nature of near-death experiences, “naturalistic materialists, if 
they are to be true to their empiricist heritage, must . . . take seriously the phenomenology of 
experience and its impact on the formation and justification of belief.”60 Having examined such 
empirical arguments, now we shall turn to our third and last argument for the soul—the unity-of-
consciousness argument.   
 Something like the unity-of-consciousness argument was first put forth by Leibniz, but a 
modern defender of such an argument is William Hasker.61 Hasker’s own view on the mind/body 
problem is called “emergent dualism.” Whether Hasker’s emergent dualism fails or succeeds is 
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up for grabs, but the unity-of-consciousness argument is a powerful argument against the 
physicalist view on consciousness.  
 The chief difficulty that the materialist or physicalist must face is twofold. On the one 
hand, the problem lies in the complexity of the physical equipment, that is to say, the brain to 
physicalism seems to be something like a machine, computer, or the sort, made up of a variety of 
distinct parts. Yet, on the other hand, it is not at all clear how a unified complex conscious 
experience can be distributed to any one location of the brain or to be distributed among all of 
the various parts of such a complex entity. Here, Hasker argues, if we were to take an aspect of 
our conscious experience, say, our visual field, the information that it yields cannot be contained 
in something like one single transistor or neuron. Here, the materialist may want to suggest that 
such a state is broken up into various parts of the brain. Suppose this is the case. The question 
still remains: “who or what is aware of the conscious state as a whole?”62 Hasker believes that 
the answer to such a question is obvious: it is the person who is aware of her “conscious state, at 
any given moment, as a unitary whole.”63 But this leads to a second question for the materialist: 
“When I am aware of a complex conscious state, what physical entity is it that is aware of the 
state?”64 Hasker believes that the materialist cannot provide a plausible answer.   
The unity-of-consciousness argument, formally stated, is as follows: 
1. I am aware of my present visual field as a unity; in other words, the various components 
of the field are experienced by a single subject simultaneously. 
 
2. Only something that functions as a whole rather than a system of parts could experience a 
visual field as unity. 
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3. Therefore, the subject functions as a whole rather than a system of parts. 
 
4. The brain and nervous system, and the entire body, is nothing more than a collection of 
physical parts organized in a certain way. (In other words, holism is false.) 
 
5. Therefore, the brain and nervous system cannot function as a whole; it must function as a 
system of parts. 
 
6. Therefore the subject is not the brain and nervous system (or the body, etc.). 
 
7. If the subject is not the brain and nervous system then it is (or contains as a proper part) a 
non-physical mind or ‘soul’; that is, a mind that is not ontologically reducible to the sorts 
of entities studied in the physical sciences. Such a mind, even if it is extended in space, 
could function as a whole rather than as a system of parts and so could be aware of my 
present visual field as a unity. 
 
8. Therefore, the subject is a soul, or contains a soul as a part of itself.65 
 
The argument is sound, and I would agree with Hasker that if the materialist were to deny any of 
the premises, setting aside the notion of the soul in 7, it would be step 4. Hasker believes that the 
materialist, by denying 4, is forced to accept something like holism—but such is not without its 
own difficulties.   
One potential objection to the unity-of-conscious argument comes from reflection on 
neurological disunity brought about by commissurotomy and multiple personality disorder. 
Commissurotomy was once a procedure performed on people who suffered from severe forms of 
epilepsy, whereby the thick network of connective nerve tissue between the right and left 
hemispheres of the brain was severed. While such a procedure proved to help with the symptoms 
of severe cases of epilepsy, it also caused the patients who had the procedure to have a 
breakdown in communication between the two hemispheres of the brain. At times, it seems as 
though each hemisphere of the brain was doing its own thing apart from the other, especially 
when the subject was asked to do a unique or novel task. But, perhaps, more damaging to the 
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notion of a single-unified consciousness are from multiple personality disorder cases. Those who 
suffer from multiple personality disorder often display what seem to be two distinct conscious 
personalities, with memories and beliefs of their own.66 Would such cases, then, count against 
Hasker’s argument? It would seem not. Hasker’s argument is more modest in nature. All that he 
is arguing for is that (1) the various parts of the brain, brain stem, etc. cannot account for the 
unitary experience of consciousness; and (2) the kind of unity in question is a “modest” kind of 
unity, “consisting merely in the fact that one has at a given moment a phenomenal field (visual 
and/or auditory and/or tactual and/or . . .) which comprises a large amount and variety of data.”67 
If the above arguments are successful, then it would seem that we have good reason to 
think that there is something like the soul. If we have a soul, and having a soul is deeply 
consistent with theism (which seems to be the case), then it would seem that we have good 
reasons for thinking that theism succeeds in explaining consciousness. But what of our last two 
categories, the metaphysics of good and evil and human responsibility?  
Theism, Good, Evil, and Responsibility 
 How surprising is evil given theism? As the reader will recall, there are two basic kinds 
of evil, moral evil and natural evil. I will consider each below, along with some attention to the 
nature of gratuitous evil.   
Moral evil does not at all seem surprising given theism, especially if God has brought 
about human creatures who have the capacity to freely perform certain actions. As C. Stephen 
Layman rightly notes, the ability to love God and neighbor freely, as opposed to some 
automaton, which is programmed always to do the right thing, is a much higher good. If such 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 176-182.  
 
67 Ibid., 183.  
170 
 
choices were not up to the agent, then they would seem emptied of all significance. Therefore, 
we would expect God, if He were a morally perfect being, to create creatures with such a 
capacity to choose to love or to do otherwise. Furthermore, on theism, we would expect God to 
create human creatures with certain desires and the ability to reason and the sort, much like, as 
noted earlier, we see in the imago Dei. Many of the moral evils that occur in the world result 
from an agent’s wrongly desiring certain things. Layman provides several examples of this. 
There is nothing bad per se in a person desiring to eat food for nourishment and enjoyment; 
however, the evil may come about when the person desires to hoard all of the food keeping 
others from having what they need for nourishment. Again, the desire to control others is not 
always a bad thing. We want leaders who are capable of leading us in the right way, and 
sometimes that may require a certain amount of control, but the desire to control others when it is 
not best for the common good or the individuals controlled can also happen, and too often does.68   
Now a skeptic might respond by asking whether there might not be instances of 
wrongdoing without any kind of suffering—such as a person hoarding all the scarce food and 
God supplying more food so that those in need do not go hungry. Layman thinks that such is 
logically possible, but I would agree with him that the significance of our choices is intricately 
connected and organically to the consequences that ensue. On this point he argues: 
 If we can never benefit or harm others (or reasonably expect to do so), then we haven’t been 
given a significant degree of freedom or responsibility. Furthermore, if our actions never 
caused harm and suffering, we would surely fail to understand the seriousness of evil. Now, 
it might be replied that my choices will be significant provided I believe I can benefit or 
harm, even if the basis is false. And I will surely be apt to see the evil I do as egregious if I 
believe it causes others to suffer, even if it really doesn’t cause any suffering at all. 
However, if we believe we can benefit and harm others, when in fact we cannot, then we are 
systematically deceived about something extremely important and fundamental to our lives, 
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and such massive deception would itself be an evil; hence it is plausible to suppose that a 
perfectly good God would not set up a world involving such deception.69 
 
Deception is often thought of as a kind of moral evil in itself. If God were morally perfect and 
good, then to set up a world with such mass deception would itself be a great evil. God, in turn, 
would participate in evil. If God is morally perfect, as theists believe, He could not bring about 
such a world.  
 How are theists to respond to the total amount of moral evil and wrongdoing in the 
world? One way of responding is by way of skeptical theism.70 Skeptical theists argue that there 
are no so-called gratuitous (unnecessary) evils in the world. Given our limited cognitive 
faculties, it is impossible to know what reasons God might have for allowing certain evils in the 
world. Here I would agree with a number of other theists that it would be unwise to think that 
every form of evil has a corresponding greater good that is to come about as a result of God’s 
allowing them.71 Again, I think Layman’s insight is correct in thinking that the moral harms and 
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suffering that we humans can inflict is connected intricately to the significance of our choices. 
He thinks that it is better to consider such instantiations of wickedness as “collateral effects.” He 
suggests that they are “consequences of divine creative activity rather than necessary means to 
divine ends.”72  
One of the chief reasons that theists gravitate toward greater-good type arguments generally 
has to do with a certain understanding of God’s sovereignty. They take it that if such things as 
gratuitous evils exist, then God is in some sense not sovereign or in control. According to such 
an understanding of sovereignty, everything that occurs must have a purpose, including evil. But 
the question theists must ask centers on whether such an understanding of God’s sovereignty is 
required or is the best understanding. Must God cause, or at least, allow such evils in the world 
in order to bring about corresponding greater goods? I think not. The problem with such an 
understanding leads to a concept of God that is consequentialist in nature when dealing with his 
creatures. Bruce Little brings this point out clearly: 
Does it necessarily mean that if something happens on this earth without a divine purpose, 
this somehow strikes at the truth of God’s sovereignty? It seems to me that the answer is No; 
to maintain otherwise leads to questionable ends. For example, say a person commits 
adultery; is it gratuitous evil or is it an evil that God in His sovereignty planned? The plan 
would have had to be from before creation or at the moment of creation. The end is that God 
planned for a person to commit adultery, the very thing that God says is sin. God becomes 
the author of sin. Furthermore, the adultery was planned to bring about a good (under the G-
G theodicy), so now sin brings about good and it could be argued that more sin would bring 
about more good.73  
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In a similar vein, Kirk MacGregor argues that theists who hold to greater-good type arguments 
are faced with a dilemma. Either evil is necessary in order for God to bring about some greater-
good, or it is morally unnecessary. To claim the former goes against divine omnibenevolence, 
that is to say, to claim that evil is necessary in order for God to bring about greater goods is to 
say that “God operates according to the principle that the ends justify the means,” which, again, 
goes against a concept of God who is morally perfect and essentially good. 74 But greater-good 
responses, says MacGregor, would also count against divine omnipotence. It would seem that 
such an acceptance would lead to the unwanted result that if there are certain goods that can only 
come about through God’s allowance of evils, then there would exist certain “logically possible 
tasks that God could not perform—namely, bringing about various goods in the absence of 
evils.”75 Such an argument, believes MacGregor, leads to an indirect argument for gratuitous 
evils.  
But there is, I take it, another reason for thinking that something like gratuitous evils exist 
given significant moral freedom—that God wants for his human creatures to be morally 
responsible beings. William Hasker calls this the “principle of divine moral intention,” which he 
states as follows: 
 It is an extremely important part of God’s intention for human persons that they should place 
a high priority on fulfilling moral obligations and should assume major responsibility for the 
welfare of their fellow humans.76 
 
Such a principle, argues Hasker, stands in contradistinction to the idea of God permitting certain 
evils in order to bring about some greater good or to prevent some greater evil. To think that God 
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is running the world in such a way as to allow certain evils in order to bring about a greater good 
results in another principle he calls the “offsetting good principle.” The principle is stated as 
follows: 
 Any harm resulting from a morally wrong action will be offset by a “greater good” that God 
could not have obtained without permitting the evil in question.77 
 
Hasker believes that if things are really like what the second principle entails, then it would have 
a serious effect on our motivation to live morally good lives and to take responsibility for the 
wellbeing of others. But more than moral motivation, it would seem that there is a sense in which 
the two principles are contradictory. Take the following argument: 
(1) If God prevents all evils that He could without thereby losing some greater good or 
by bringing about some greater evil, then no gratuitous evils exist. 
 
(2) God commands humans to thwart evil. 
 
(3) If God commands humans to thwart evil, and if no gratuitous evils exist, then God 
commands humans to thwart those evils which are necessary for bringing about some 
greater good or for preventing some greater evil.  
 
(4) If God commands humans to thwart evils that are necessary for bringing about some 
greater good or stopping some greater evil, then God is requiring humans to do 
something that works against the maximal good.  
 
(5) To require humans to work against that which brings about maximal good is logically 
impossible for a morally perfect being to do.  
 
(6) Therefore, there exists gratuitous evils.78  
 
It seems that God’s command to thwart evil runs up against His work in bringing about the 
maximal good. Our actions really matter and there is a steep responsibility for humans to care for 
one another. Perhaps, it would be in the theist’s interest to give up such greater-good type 
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arguments and rather to recognize that such evils are a part of a world in which humans are given 
significant moral responsibility and freedom. 
 Another possible response by the skeptic is to suggest we could still have as much 
meaning and significance in the world that we do without also having certain types of evils, such 
as genocide or rape. There is no doubt that there are certain evils, such as the holocaust, that the 
world would have been better without (an admission that, by some definitions, again affirms 
there are gratuitous evils). But the problem with such objections as this one is that if there were 
no evils such as genocide or rape, then the critic might always find other evils, such as murder, 
that might come under scrutiny. And when murder is in question, the critic may propose another 
evil, and this could go on ad infinitum. But as Layman suggests, it may be that some people will 
be perfectly satisfied with a world in which the consequences of our actions would be trivial. 
Such a world, though it might have its attractions for having fewer risks, would, nevertheless, 
“pale in significance to the world we find ourselves in,” says Layman.79 Nevertheless, such a 
world does not seem surprising given theism, at least not on serious and sober reflection. Though 
our world, as it is, contains many risks, it also contains an abundance of meaning. Our actions 
really do count. Furthermore, when we demand a world other than the one that has obtained, we 
are, perhaps unwittingly, wishing for a world with much less significance as our current world 
now possesses.80   
In addition to the amount and kinds of moral evils in the world, at least two additional 
issues merit consideration: (1) what is the basis of morality; and (2) how are theists to understand 
God’s commands? Let us begin with the grounding of morality. What, then, is the basis for good 
                                                 
79 Layman, “Moral Evil,” 12.  
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and evil according to theism? Many theists believe that God not only does that which is good and 
that He always acts justly, but that God is, in God’s very nature, something akin to the Platonic 
notion of “the Good.”81 God in the theistic sense, however, differs in two quite different ways. 
God is, as Robert Adams suggests, “a concrete individual.”82 God is essentially a person or 
essentially personal in some significant way. Second, God, as the Good, is not some abstract 
object; rather, He is a “real being.”83 When theists say that God is “the Good,” they do not mean 
that God, by being the Good, encompasses just anything that a person takes in common language 
as “good.” Rather, as Adams emphasizes throughout Finite and Infinite Goods, he couches the 
notion of good in terms of something more along the lines of excellence.84 It is God Himself as 
the Good that grounds any finite goods that might exist in the world. God, then, is neither 
dependent on or looks to anything other than Himself with respect to perfect moral goodness. 
God Himself becomes the measure for any commands that He issues. Thus when God issues 
                                                 
81 Not all theists are theistic Platonists; nevertheless, there is overlap between theistic Platonists and other 
theists in their analysis of moral goodness, namely in the sense that both root it in God. Take, for example, C. 
Stephen Evans who is a natural law theist. He recognizes that non-theists can have a good idea of moral obligation 
(epistemologically), yet, moral obligations are ontologically dependent upon God. C. Stephen Evans, God and 
Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 21. 
  
82 Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Good: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 42.  
 
83 Ibid.  
 
84 Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14. When 
speaking of God as the Good, Adams point is not merely that the Good depends on God; rather, God is the Good, 
thus endorsing something akin to an identity relation between God and goodness. This is not something that he 
merely asserts; rather, he offers a principled argument by appealing to value theory. Plato scholars often differ over 
whether or not the Forms are best understood as universals or as exemplars. Adams opts for the latter. Desires, too, 
play a central role in Adam’s theory, as Baggett and Walls explain: “The role of our desires . . . is to fix the 
reference of our value terminology to a property or object that has its own nature independent of our desires.” 
[David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 94]. They continue: “if there is indeed a single best candidate for the role of the Good itself, or the 
property of goodness,” then it is reasonable for one infer it as the likely essence of goodness. Lastly, for Adams, 
“whatever best fills the role of Goodness is an object of admiration, desire, and recognition, at least commonly and 
to some degree” (p. 94). Without rehearsing the entirety of his discourse, Adams’s argument boils down to God as 
the most plausible candidate for filling this role. For their full summary, see Baggett and Walls, Good God: The 
Theistic Foundations of Morality, 93-95. 
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commands, those commands are not arbitrary, but have ramifications for flourishing and 
wellbeing among His human creatures. This does not mean, however, that the commands that 
God issues are always for everyone in all times and in all places. It may be that God issues 
certain commands that are contextually oriented, that is to say, God issues certain commands that 
are geared toward a specific group for a specific time in history, but which are, nevertheless, in 
accordance with His divine purposes. These commands would not, however, be arbitrary, so as 
long as they are grounded in God’s own moral goodness and are meant for the flourishing of 
those with whom God gives the command.  
Lastly, what about natural evil? Natural evil, I take it, provides the more difficult problem 
for theists. Not only must theism answer the question of devastation caused by things such as 
natural disasters or disease, but they must also answer the question of animal pain and suffering.  
Before responding to the question of natural evil, it would be helpful to consider some 
important distinctions. First, it is important to recognize that not everything that appears to be 
natural evil can rightly be labeled as such. There are many evils that, although they do appear in 
nature, are, nevertheless, at least a partial result of human doing. Flooding caused by the 
breaking of dams, damage to the ozone layer and natural habitats due to pollution and human 
waste, animal death through the changing or destruction of natural habitats, damage to land and 
animals caused by nuclear explosions and other forms of war, famine caused by the overuse of 
land, extinction or near-extinction of animals due to poaching, and acid rain due to air pollutants 
are just some of the kinds of evil that appear in nature, but that, in reality, are a result of human 
destructive tendencies.  
Second, there are other items that must also be taken into consideration, such as human 
ignorance, neglect, and the choice of risk. Often humans move into areas of the world that are 
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prone to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, tornados, and the like. For many of these people, 
the goods that come from living in such an area outweigh the potential for harm caused by such 
natural disasters. There have also been reports of people refusing to evacuate a city even 
knowing that something like a hurricane is coming. It is also understood that sometimes people 
are ignorant of upcoming natural events, such as tsunamis, that cause vast amounts of 
destruction. But even in such instances, there may be an element of human responsibility. In the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that killed over 250,000 people, there was no tsunami detection 
system in place, even though the technology had been around for some time. Having such a 
mechanism in place could have saved thousands of lives.85 The point here is not to make light of 
the tragedy that comes with such disasters, but only to point out that living in such areas that 
have an elevated risk factor or refusing to evacuate despite the risk of an impending destruction 
or the failure to implement strategies for protection despite the capacity to do so are all matters 
that involve human choice. Our choices are significant and often carry with them certain risks. 
Making this point does not entail that all evils occurring in nature are a result of human choice; 
rather, the point is only that some are connected to moral action and choice.  
Third, it should be noted that some diseases, which are thought to be forms of natural 
evil, are either caused by humans or are perpetuated by humans. Some diseases are brought 
about through neglect of taking care of one’s body. Lack of exercising or lack of control in 
eating certain things can often lead to disastrous effects on the body, such as heart disease or 
diabetes. Active use of certain drugs can also cause the body’s organs to shut down or to cause 
certain cancers. Having multiple sexual partners may lead to certain sexually transmitted 
                                                 
85 Tim Folger, “Will Indonesia Be Ready for the Next Tsunami?,” National Geographic, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141226-tsunami-indonesia-catastrophe-banda-aceh-warning-
science/ [accessed February 26, 2015]. 
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diseases. Sometimes hospitals, which are to be places of healing, may transmit certain diseases 
through acts like blood transfusions, when the blood has not been properly screened. Pollutants 
in the water or in the ground where we grow our foods may result in ill effects on the body. 
Again, not to make light of these tragedies in the world, but many of these, again, show that there 
is a significance to our actions and choices. Further, this is not to say that all diseases are in some 
way related to human freedom; rather, it is only to point out that some are.   
 Having said that, it is not at all surprising on theism that God would create such a world 
as ours. If God exists, then it would seem that He would have good reasons for creating, not only 
human life, but also nonhuman life, such as found in the great diversity of plants and animals in 
the world, reflecting His fecundity. But such a world, is the kind of world where we also find a 
great amount of natural evil, particularly evils brought about through natural disasters, predation, 
disease, and the like. How might the theist explain this?  
First, it may be helpful to consider that many of the events that bring about great 
destruction are also the same kinds of events that are necessary for the normal operations of our 
world and that, often, bring about some of the greatest wonders. Take, for example, plate 
tectonics crashing together. These are often the cause of such events as earthquakes, tsunamis, 
and volcanoes. Yet, without plate tectonics, we would not have the beautiful mountain ranges or 
tropical islands that we see. But the importance of plate tectonics goes beyond aesthetic reasons. 
The earth’s climate is remarkably stable, and this is due, in part, to plate tectonics, which, 
through volcanoes, cycle out CO2 into the atmosphere. The release of CO2 through volcanic 
activity is important for warming the earth’s atmosphere and for the water cycle. Moreover, plate 
tectonics are involved in producing the biodiversity on the earth, which allows complex life to 
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flourish. Without the effects brought about through plate tectonics, while there may be life, there 
could be no human life as we know it.86   
Second, I am going to suggest something that goes against the intuition of many who 
discuss the problem of evil—not all pain amounts to evil. It may be that certain kinds of pain are 
similar to plate tectonics, in the sense that, without them, our physical bodies would not function 
properly and flourish as they do. If pain is an important part of proper function, then pain itself 
may be seen as a good, in the sense that it is better to have certain pains than not to have them. 
As discussed in Chapter One, there are many great advantages to having pain. When we consider 
those people suffering from Hansen’s disease (leprosy), many of the complications that plague 
their bodies stem from an inability to feel physical pain. Without pain they do not have the same 
advantage that I do of feeling certain pains. If I am out walking in the yard and contort my leg in 
such a way that I sprain my ankle, my body’s response is to swell in the area and the result is that 
I feel pain. Pain, in this instance, is like a warning system telling my body that something is not 
quite right. The pain that I feel may be a discomfort (given that we all have different tolerances 
of the pain that we feel, it may be a big discomfort), but even here the pain itself is not the 
problem, as much as one of my body parts has been injured and is not functioning properly. Pain 
is the consequence of the sprained ankle. Moreover, as noted in Chapter One, people will often 
put themselves through great pains in order to accomplish goals. Some of the cases considered 
are athletes who put themselves through great pains to become better or women who choose to 
experience child birth naturally apart from any epidurals or pain medicine. Yet we do not 
generally classify such pains as evils, especially when they were endured willingly. So, at least to 
                                                 
86 Dinesh D’Souza, “Why We Need Earthquakes,” Christianity Today 53, no. 5 (May, 2009), 58; Richard 
Lovett, “Unknown Earth: Why is Earth’s Climate so Stable?” New Scientist 199, no. 2675 (September 2088): 34. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.liberty.edu:2048/science/article/pii/S0262407908624409 [accessed February 
26, 2015]  
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me, it seems that the hedonistic principle that all pain is evil is wrong. But someone might object, 
“What about mental pain?” Even with respect to mental pains, it does not seem to me that we 
ought to classify all such pains as evil. Perhaps, like physical pain, mental pain, too, functions 
like a warning system telling us that something is not quite right. For example, suppose I see 
some heinous act carried out and my immediate response is one of anger and sorrow. At the 
same time, I feel a great amount of mental pain for the person because of what I saw. If our 
emotions are in any way connected to our beliefs, then perhaps the pain itself is a way of telling 
me that something is not quite right. Yet again, there are many individuals who would endure a 
great amount of mental pain, brought about by ridicule, mental abuse, psychological torture and 
the like, in order to hold unswervingly to some conviction or to accomplish some task. Here we 
might think of a P.O.W, who, despite both physical and mental torture, endures a great amount 
of mental pain for the sake of defending her country. Or, again, we might think of an athlete who 
willingly takes certain forms of ridicule and embarrassment from a coach or peers in order to 
achieve the goal of winning or becoming the best that he can be. In each case, the person may be 
in quite a bit of mental pain, but nevertheless shows resilience and fortitude. Now, to be clear, 
that is not to say that there is no evil involved in what is going on in either case; rather, the point 
is that mental pain, much like physical pain, may not itself be evil. The evil is in the fact that 
there is something that is not quite right, which was brought about ultimately through an agent. 
In the former case the agent using torture and in the latter the person bringing about the ridicule, 
but the physical or mental pain itself need not be an evil.87 
                                                 
87 For a helpful article that provides insightful discussion on differences between pain and evil, see John 
Kemp, “Pain and Evil,” Philosophy 29, no. 108 (January 1954): 13-26.  
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Third, it seems to me that the real issue involved in the discussion of the problem from 
evil is not so much pain as it is in suffering or misery brought about through certain instances of 
pain. Suffering, I take it, as discussed in Chapter One, is closer to a lack of flourishing in the 
person. Severe pain may be the catalyst for suffering, but it is not necessarily equivalent to 
suffering. We can think of pain, whether mental or physical, as having a threshold of sorts. Much 
like any physical object, when enough force or pressure is applied the pain may become so 
unbearable that the object which feels the pain breaks or becomes debilitated in some way. That 
is what we often see in some cases of people suffering from certain types of depression. The 
person’s mental pain becomes so unbearable that she cannot function properly. Sometimes, 
however, the depression is brought about through a physical deficiency, such as a lack in 
neurotransmitters. In both cases, the person is suffering. In a similar fashion, people who have 
cancer often times experience excruciating pain, which may result in suffering. These are all 
instances of misery or suffering linked to certain forms of pain. Yet, on the flip side, we can 
imagine people who have no or little experience of either mental or physical pain, but who are, 
nevertheless, dying from some unknown disease. In such instances, the persons involved do not 
realize it but their bodies are no longer flourishing as they should be, because they are suffering 
from the disease.   
Having made the above qualifications, now are we ready to answer the question of 
natural evil. In order to flesh this out, I will consider an argument first presented by Ed Miller 
and expanded on by Kirk MacGregor. Miller’s argument goes as follows: 
 It would be logically impossible to have a world without evil: Anything created by God 
would have to be less than God just by virtue of being dependent on him, and this means 
immediately that it must be less than perfect, and this means immediately the presence of 
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various sorts of imperfections. How could God create something that was perfect and 
therefore independent, and therefore uncreated? It is logically impossible.88 
 
MacGregor expands on Miller’s argument in the following way: 
 In other words, it is logically impossible for God to create a world without evil; if God chose 
to create anything at all, evil would necessarily come into existence, not because God 
created or caused it, but because whatever God created would not be God. Notice that all 
such evils are, in and of themselves, gratuitous or pointless; their only raison d’être is the 
logically unavoidable privation of ontological necessity exhibited by created entities. The 
only way that any created entity could display perfection is nonessentially, that is, God 
supernaturally acting to overwhelm or ‘make up for’ its resident imperfections; it could not 
display perfection in and of itself. Therefore, gratuitous evil is ontologically inescapable for 
contingent being every bit as much as perfection is essential to Necessary Being. Such 
immediately explains the existence of gratuitous natural evil; it is logically necessary to the 
universe, and God simply has to put up with it if he chooses to create a universe at all.89 
 
This argument by Miller and MacGregor includes some rather strong statements. On the one 
hand, there is something right about this argument, and I think that it points the theist in the right 
direction; however, it needs some qualifications. The central problem with the argument is that 
we can imagine all kinds of worlds, worlds that might even be metaphysically possible, that 
would not contain evil. We can imagine a world in which God creates one immutable object and 
sustains that object in existence everlastingly. While this object is both contingent and less than 
perfect, it does not seem to me, at least, that such a world requires evil or that evil will inevitably 
take place due to the contingency and less-than-perfect nature of the thing involved. Neither 
contingency nor imperfection nor finiteness requires evil in-and-of-themselves. Even if we were 
to take all of these together, as in the case of the finite object, no evil is required. Now whether 
God has good reasons to create such a world or not is beyond the point. It seems to me that such 
a world is logically (and metaphysically) possible, and hence the Miller/MacGregor argument 
                                                 
88 Ed L. Miller, Questions that Matter, 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992, 356 (emphasis in original) as 
quoted in MacGregor, pp. 173-174. 
 
89 MacGregor, “The Existence and Irrelevance,” 174.   
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fails in that sense. But here is where I think their argument got it right. They grounded their 
argument in the Creator/creature distinction. There are certain logical limitations to any world 
that God might create due to the sheer nature of its being finite, imperfect, and contingent. 
Perhaps they could have qualified their argument to say something to this effect: It would be 
logically impossible for God to create a world that is dynamic with natural processes such as 
ours without some ensuing evil due to its imperfect, finite, and contingent nature.  
Given the above insights form the Miller/MacGregor argument, the theist might put forth 
an argument for natural evil as follows: 
(1) If God exists, God would have strong reasons for creating a complex, multileveled 
world with a great diversity of biological creatures, including creatures that are 
sentient and intelligent. Some of the highly complex intelligent creatures, namely 
humans, are capable of having meaningful experiences and entering into significant 
relationships with God, one another, other creatures, and their environments.   
 
(2) Because such creatures are biological and physical in nature, the world had to be 
ordered according to a set of natural laws or law-like regulating principles. Given 
what we know scientifically about the universe, physical life, and especially human 
life, as we know it, could not exist unless things were ‘fine-tuned’ in such a way.  
  
(3) The universe, as it now stands, consists of a great variety of goods, both in its 
physical grandeur and beauty and in the flourishing of a great diversity of biological 
life that it contains. Consequently, such a world also brings with it the possibility that 
sentient and intelligent life will be negatively affected by the physical processes that 
govern the formation and operations of the universe, resulting in a great amount of 
suffering and death.   
 
(4) Since we have no reason for thinking that God could have brought about a world with 
alternative natural laws for supporting life as we know it, and yet a world that consists 
of great potential for good, or, at least, a balance of good and evil, God is morally 
justified in creating such a world that contains natural evils.90 
 
                                                 
90 This argument is adapted from several other natural order arguments: Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a 
Good God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), 101-103; William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil, 
138; Layman, “Natural Evil,” 12. For a similar argument, see Garrett DeWeese, “Natural Evil: A ‘Free Process’ 
Defense,” in God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain, ed. Chad Meister and James K. Dew 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2013), 53-64. 
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Perhaps the skeptic might respond in a couple of ways. She might ask, “Why could God 
not have changed the natural processes in order to bring about a world free of evil?” There are 
several problems with this response. First, we have no guarantee that, even if God were to 
change the natural processes, they, too, would not go wrong. How do we know that such 
processes would not result in much greater natural evils than what we see in the world already? 
Second, why should we jettison processes that work well most of the time? Take, for instance, 
our genetic processes. Though genetic processes do sometimes result in mutations, this is not the 
norm. The same might be said with respect to the case of natural disasters. As noted previously, 
the same mechanisms that cause these great disasters are also essential for normal operations in 
the earth. Most of the time these processes function extremely well.91 Third, as Bruce 
Reichenbach argues, changing or altering the natural laws would affect the various constituents 
that make up the world. He explains, 
 The introduction of different natural laws affecting human beings in order to prevent the 
frequent instances of natural evil would entail the alteration of human beings themselves. 
Human beings are sentient creatures of nature. As physiological beings they interact with 
Nature; they cause natural events and in turn are affected by natural events. Hence, insofar 
as humans are natural, sentient beings, constructed of the same substance as Nature and 
interacting with it, they will be affected in any natural system by lawful natural events. 
These events sometimes will be propitious and sometimes not. And insofar as man is 
essentially a conscious being, he will be aware of those events which are not propitious and 
which for him constitute evils. Therefore, to prevent natural evils from affecting man, man 
himself would have to be significantly changed, such that he would be no longer a sentient 
creature of nature.92    
 
There is a second response the skeptic might put forward. Since God is omnipotent, as 
theists believe, why could God not create a world in which He miraculously intervenes to 
                                                 
91 John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil (Wheaton, IL: 
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prevent natural evils? There are several responses to this objection. First, could it not be that God 
is already miraculously responding to certain natural evils, such that His working is keeping 
more natural evils from happening than what we are aware of? Second, a world whereby God 
always miraculously intervenes would result in creatures who are incapable of understanding the 
significance of their actions. It is only in a world such as ours, with natural processes and one 
governed by natural law-like features, that human freedom can be exercised in a meaningful 
way. 93 Third, such a world would be highly unpredictable and irregular. As Reichenbach further 
explains: 
But without the regularity which results from the governance of natural laws, rational action 
would be impossible. Without regularity of sequence, agents could not entertain rational 
explanations, make predictions, estimate probabilities, or calculate prudence. They would 
not be able to know what to expect about any course of action they would like to take. 
Whether or not such action would be possible, what they would have to do to have God 
bring it about, whether it could occur as they planned (supposing agents could plan, which is 
doubtful), what the consequences would be—all this would be unknown and unknowable. 
Hence, agents could not know or even suppose what course of action to take to accomplish a 
certain rationally conceived goal. Thus rational agents could neither propose action nor act 
themselves.94 
 
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that humans could be fully functioning moral agents in such a 
world, since being a moral agent requires not only the ability to act but also to propose some 
course of action. A highly irregular world would prevent both proposing a course of action and 
acting on it.95 But suppose the critic responds by suggesting that there is a middle ground, so to 
speak, that is to say, a world partially ruled by natural processes and partially ruled by 
miraculous intervention. Again, Reichenbach is insightful on this point: 
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 But what would such a world be like? Presumably, a world which was only partially 
operated by miracle would be one in which God would allow events at some times to follow 
a “regular pattern,” and at other times not. That is, sometimes causal conditions x and y 
would result in effect z, and at other times they would be followed by an effect of a different 
sort. For example, heavy snowfall in the mountains and collapse of snow walls will cause an 
avalanche to proceed down the mountain slope according to the law of gravity when no 
sentient creatures is in its path; but should a climber be present, either that which causes the 
avalanche “regularly” will not have this effect this time, or the avalanche will still occur but 
will swerve around the climber or halt at his feet. But natural laws such as the law of gravity 
assert universal and necessary connections between phenomena. Then if events sometimes 
followed a “regular pattern” and sometimes not, there would be no natural laws regarding 
that particular event. But then the appeal to a “regular pattern” is specious, for “regular 
pattern” presupposes that there are normative natural laws which describe or govern the 
course of events, so that one can distinguish what is regular from what is irregular. “Regular 
pattern” has meaning only within the context of natural laws. Furthermore, if this absence of 
universal and necessary connections is widespread, as would seem to be required in order to 
prevent all natural evils, the world would have few if any natural laws; it would, in effect, be 
governed by miraculous intervention. Thus, though this so-called middle ground would 
remove the contradiction with respect to the possibility of human action vis-à-vis being free, 
the consequences of it still would be such as to make rational prediction and rational action 
impossible, and hence to make moral action impossible.96 
 
It would seem, then, that theists have good reasons for supposing the need for a world such as 
ours.  
 Before moving on to a comparison between the four metaphysical systems on explaining 
evil, it would be helpful to consider one last issue—the difficult problem of animal pain and 
death. How might the theist respond? 
Unlike its metaphysical rivals, theism provides within it the resources for thinking that 
there might be some kind of compensation for animal life in the end. Many theistic traditions 
hold to something like an afterlife, and all three major theistic traditions hold to the resurrection 
of the dead. Christianity and Judaism both take it that there will be a future restoration of 
creation. Now, there are differences of opinion on what things will be like in the end times, and 
each theistic tradition will have to work this out. All that I am suggesting, here, is that there is a 
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significant possibility for animal compensation and that theism, if God is omnipotent, could 
bring about such a state.97  
 
 
                                                 
97 Given space and the overall purpose of this chapter, it will be impossible to consider with any kind of 
detail this important, but difficult problem. I will point the reader to recent theistic responses to animal pain and 
suffering. Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008); Ronald E. Osborn, Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the 
Problem of Animal Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2014); Trent Dougherty, The Problem of 
Animal Pain: Theodicy for All Creatures Great and Small (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 6: METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND EVIL PART 5 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 Having examined each of the four metaphysical systems, I now turn to a comparative 
analysis, examining how well each answers the phenomena evil based on the following criteria: 
(A) Factual Adequacy 
(B) Logical Consistency 
(C) Explanatory Power 
(D) Explanatory Scope 
(E) Ad hoc-ness  
(F) Plausibility 
(1) How Plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis in itself? 
(2) How plausible of an explanation is the theory/hypothesis relative to the other 
hypotheses? 
(G) Livability 
 
Factual Adequacy 
 Regarding factual adequacy (A), to what extent can the naturalist or pantheist make sense 
of the salient facts of evil—the types and kinds of evil in the world (moral and natural), along 
with the quantity and intensity of such evils? It would seem that, if one were take a position such 
as Levine’s, a pantheist may have a better time of making sense of moral evil in the world than 
those forms of pantheism which deny the reality of good and evil altogether, or at least see evil 
as nothing more than an illusion. One would have to adopt some kind of principle which always 
promotes the good. But making sense of how a principle enforces or promotes the good is 
difficult and needs further explication on the part of the pantheist. Given something like the 
karmic system, how can such a law or principle judge as to whether a person has done the right 
or enough good, especially since laws, principles, and forces are not the kinds of things that can 
judge?  
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For naturalism, in order to make sense of evil, apart from adopting some ad hoc 
hypothesis, such as Platonism or moral supervenience—both of which are not a given from 
naturalistic assumptions—it seems that all the naturalist can do, given her system, is to say that 
evil (if we can call it that) is a by-product of the way things are. Richard Dawkins has this to say 
about evil, pain, and suffering in the world: 
 The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent 
contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of 
animals are being eaten alive, many others are running their lives, whimpering with fear; 
others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds 
are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this 
very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of 
starvation and misery is restored. . . . In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind 
physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are 
going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The 
universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, 
no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.1  
      
It would seem that naturalism is, at bottom, incapable of providing a satisfactory understanding 
of evil. Moreover, both pantheistic and naturalistic systems deny such a thing as natural evil in 
the world. No doubt that the effects of things like hurricanes or disease are tragic, but those kinds 
of things cannot be properly called evils, despite how it affects either the human or the animal 
realm. Naturalism also has a difficult time explaining moral evils, since a world like “evil” where 
moral evils are considered is hard to square with its determinism or near determinism. 
 But what of process panthentheism (PPT) and theism? Here, I take it that both Process 
panentheism and theism fare better at explaining the salient facts of evil than either naturalism or 
pantheism. Each system recognizes that there is such a thing as evil in the world and both have 
unique ways of answering the question of evil. Moral evil, given libertarian freedom, is not at all 
surprising in either system. For the defender of PPT, while it possible to explain the notions of 
                                                 
 1 Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 131-
133.  
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good and evil in the world, there are some central difficulties. One difficulty is that the PPT view 
of good and evil depends heavily on process metaphysics. While certain aspects of process 
metaphysics may turn out to be true, it is difficult to understand how we can have events without 
things. Moreover, the whole process metaphysic centers on creativity, but, even, here, there is 
nothing that underlines or grounds the creativity necessary for the various occasions to take 
place. A second difficulty is that Process thinkers must couch good and evil primarily in 
aesthetic terms rather than moral ones. This goes against how good and evil are usually 
understood, despite the fact that there may well be all manner of organic connections between 
the good and the beautiful. But even more so, if aesthetic principles take priority, then a number 
of moral principles may be violated in order to achieve the aims of those aesthetic principles. 
Even more damaging, however, is the fact that it seems the sufferings and pains of creatures 
become a means to an end in order for God to achieve certain aesthetic purposes.  
Perhaps, the greatest difficulty for theism is explaining the existence of natural evil, and 
particularly animal pain, although a world that operates according to certain stable natural laws is 
better than one ruled by unpredictable miraculous intervention. Furthermore, as argued in the 
previous chapter, such a world that has elements of risk, as our world does, has greater 
significance than ones without such risks. Lastly, theists recognize that such a world, finite, 
dynamic, and limited, inevitably leads to imperfection, especially if God has granted the creation 
to have a certain amount of freedom to be and to operate as He created it to be. This 
understanding demonstrates an important metaphysical principle recognized by theists that there 
is a significant difference between the Creator and the creature, which theists base on the 
contingency of the world (whether logically or temporally) and the necessity and eternality of 
God. Regarding animal pain, while theists face difficulties, there are resources within theism that 
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provide partial explanations of the facts. For example, animals, like humans, are part of a 
dynamic, contingent, and limited system that, while on the whole operates and functions 
properly, may nevertheless result in some destruction when animal and human life are affected 
by such processes. Furthermore, as we saw, theists might rightly reject the hedonistic principle 
that all pain is evil. Pain, much like tectonic plates and the like, though it may lead to suffering, 
is an important part of the proper function of certain forms of biological life. In addition, pain 
may even lead to certain forms of flourishing (e.g., when someone perseveres through a rigorous 
physical routine in order to achieve a goal). While no doubt animal pain and predation provide 
difficulties for theists, and there is much more work that needs done in this area, there is reason 
to believe, however, that (1) pain in humans is quite different than pain in animals and (2) that 
theism likely features resources to redeem animal suffering that exceed those of this world.   
Logical Consistency 
 As far as logical consistency (B) is concerned, naturalism is a fairly consistent and 
straightforward system; yet it stumbles in explaining moral facts. Many naturalists try to hold to 
some kind of objectivist view of morality, but naturalism as a system likely does not provide its 
best explanations, apart from ad-hoc explanations. Furthermore, if one finds Alvin Plantinga’s 
evolutionary argument against naturalism successful, it would seem that one of the key tenets of 
naturalism—belief in evolution—does not fit well within the naturalistic schema.2 Regarding evil 
in the world, given how we normally classify something as evil, in order to remain consistent 
with the naturalistic worldview, such classifications as moral and natural evil do not make nearly 
                                                 
 2 Alvin Plantinga’s “Is Naturalism Irrational?” in The Analytic Theist: an Alvin Plantinga Reader, edited by 
James F. Sennett (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998), 72-96; idem. Where the Conflict 
Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201l), 307-350. Also, see my 
comment regarding this in footnote 67 of Chapter Two.  
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as good sense within the naturalistic worldview as some of the other alternatives considered. The 
various kinds and variety and intensity of evil are just a part of the way things are.  
Pantheism is much less straight forward a system. It is difficult to nail down just what a 
pantheist means by things like the divine, all-inclusive Unity, or Absolute. Minimally, pantheists 
agree that there is a Unity and this Unity is in some sense divine. But with respect to the Unity, 
how much better off is the pantheist than the naturalist?  How is the pantheistic Unity any 
stronger of a unity than the naturalistic understanding of the four-dimensional space-time 
universe? Furthermore, pantheists are not agreed over whether all reality is one substance 
(monism) or if a plurality of substances (pluralism) exists (or exist) in the world. Pantheists like 
Levine seek to eschew, or at least put on hold, a conclusion about the notion of substance, opting 
for some minimal kind of explanation like a force or organizing principle that brings order to the 
various parts of the universe. But it is hard to see how this solves the problem of ambiguity 
within the pantheistic system. Epistemically, what reasons do we have for thinking something 
like Levine’s notion of the organizing principle or force is the case? Perhaps the pantheist can 
employ the anthropic principle and something like neo-Darwinian evolution as supporting 
evidence that something is behind the events in the universe. But as shown earlier, the pantheist 
will run up against the difficulties that such a system face with the notions of eternity and 
necessity. With respect to the metaphysics of good and evil, it does seem that a pantheist can, at 
least, provide some categories for thinking about morality and evil that are consistent within its 
system. If one were to take a view such as Levine’s, then one might say good is that which 
promotes the divine Unity, while evil is that which goes against it.  
Process panentheism is less straight-forward than naturalism, yet it is generally 
consistent. This consistency, however, depends quite a bit on Whitehead’s complex process 
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metaphysics. For PPT, the “many,” the “one,” and “creativity” are central features of reality, 
although, as we have suggested throughout, serious difficulties saddle Whitehead’s metaphysics, 
namely, the concept of creativity. If God is not the primary organizing source, then what is? 
Process thinkers believe that it is creativity, but just what is “creativity”? It is not its own entity, 
nor does anything ground it; nevertheless, it is behind all the goings on in reality. This leaves us 
wondering: From whence does the energy that fuels the universe come? What perpetuates this 
endless supply of creativity? Many defenders of PPT bite the bullet and accept the principle of 
creativity as brute fact. If one were to grant it, suggests the process theists, then all else would 
follow. But this is something that theists will be unwilling to do. Furthermore, much rides on the 
notion that the fundamental basic unit of reality is the actual occasion or event, instead of 
substance. Here, too, as I have argued in Chapter Four, there is reason to doubt this particular 
tenet of process metaphysics. Much of the PPT view on good and evil is parasitic on these two 
features of process metaphysics. Despite these difficulties, taken on its own terms, PPT is 
logically consistent—more so than either pantheism or naturalism. 
 Theism, like naturalism, is a straightforward system, though it is more complex. Despite 
its complexity, theism is, nevertheless, overall consistent. Most attacks on theism come from the 
phenomena of evil in the world. As I have argued, given something like human libertarian 
freedom and a natural order that is governed by laws or law-like regularities, and given the finite 
and dynamic nature of the world that is other than God, there is nothing logically inconsistent 
about God’s existence and evil in the world. Furthermore, Alvin Plantinga, in God, Freedom, 
and Evil, has shown that there is no logical inconsistency between the existence of God and the 
existence of evil in the world, something to which most atheists will agree. This still leaves 
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important questions to ask concerning evil, to which distinctive aspects of Christian theology, I 
will argue in later chapters, are relevant. 
Explanatory Power and Scope 
 How well do each of the metaphysical systems fare at explanatory power (C) and 
explanatory scope (D)? As noted, in order to explain the concept of evil, one must explain life, 
consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and moral responsibility. Naturalists, 
pantheists, and panentheists all have a hard time explaining the nature of the universe, which is 
essential to explaining the existence of life. 
Each of the three non-theistic systems runs up against the problem of infinite regress. 
Naturalists often posit something like the multiverse in order to explain the anthropic principle. 
But positing the multiverse only complicates the naturalistic hypothesis. Not only now do they 
need to explain the anthropic principle, but an eternal universe generator of sorts. Pantheists, too, 
have their own troubles. While a pantheist may hold to something like the anthropic principle 
and neo-Darwinian evolution in their systems, given that the pantheistic understanding of a force 
or unifying principle is at work at organizing the universe, it runs up against the problem of 
necessity and the eternality of the universe. If the universe at any time began to exist, as 
confirmed by standard Big Bang cosmology, then it would seem difficult to explain how the 
universe is identical to God in any meaningful way. For if God transcends the universe, would 
we, then, truly have a pantheistic system? But on the other hand, if all things exploded forth 
through the Big Bang, this leaves the problem of where it all came from—something would have 
truly come from nothing. Yet, as noted, actual infinites are impossible in the world and would 
lead to all kinds of absurdities. Defenders of PPT, too, fail in adequately explaining the existence 
of the universe. Like naturalists, process panentheists take it that something has always existed—
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though the universe, as we know it, has not. More so than pantheism or naturalism, PPT as a 
metaphysical system provides some explanation for the anthropic principle. God is the 
motivation behind the universe getting its start and direction, but how the universe has turned out 
is not entirely up to God. Yet, why is there a God or nature in the first place? Here, the theist can 
press the defender of PPT. While there is a sense that in the “primordial pole” God is both 
“eternal” and “infinite,” we cannot, nevertheless, properly call God “necessary” or “eternal” in 
the same sense that theists can. God, for defenders of PPT, is dependent on a universe for His 
actualization. It does not have to be this universe; rather, all that is needed is a universe. But not 
only is God’s actualization dependent on a universe, so too is God’s existence. God and the 
world are co-dependent and intricately connected. If there were no world (pre-existing matter 
and the like before the Big Bang), then we can presume that there would be no God, either. 
Theists take it that God is both eternal and necessary. God’s eternality and necessity are 
fundamental features of God’s nature, that without which God would not be God. Theists, then, 
do not run up against the problem of infinite regress as naturalists, pantheists, and panentheists 
do.   
Regarding consciousness, physicalism cannot provide an adequate explanation. 
Naturalistic and pantheistic physicalists cannot properly explain consciousness within their 
systems. But as was shown, a pantheist may hold to any number of other possibilities, such as 
animism, dualism, or panpsychism, which may provide grounds for consciousness. 
Consciousness, then, is more likely within a pantheistic system than in naturalism. As was shown 
in the discussion on PPT, however, there are some major difficulties with panexperientialism, 
such as the combination problem. The combination problem not only affects panexperientialism; 
it also affects pansychist theories on consciousness. How about theism and consciousness? As 
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with naturalistic and pantheistic views, any attempt at adopting a physicalist form of 
consciousness fails; however, most theists hold to dualism, the view whereby the mind is in 
some sense distinct from the body. In Chapter Five three lines of argument were given in support 
dualism. First, if God Himself is an unembodied mind, then theists have as an exemplar or 
paradigm-case of what an unembodied mind is like. Second, theists have at their disposal certain 
empirical evidence from NDEs and post-death visions. Third, and lastly, theists have the unity-
of-consciousness argument. As argued, all that one need to show is a minimalistic version of 
dualism in order to have consciousness, which theists can do.  
 Lastly, how does each of the four metaphysical systems fare at explaining the 
metaphysics of good and evil and moral responsibility? It would seem that a pantheist can better 
accommodate the notions of good, evil, and morality than can a naturalist, provided that one hold 
to something like Levine’s modified command theory, whereby one does what promotes the 
Unity and avoids those things which defy it. The ground for the “good” is the Unity itself, which 
always promotes the good and moral rightness. Evil and moral wrongness, then, is that which 
goes against the Unity. But what exactly is it that promotes the Unity? How are we to make 
sense of this? The pantheist will need to flesh this out more if he expects for his system to 
provide greater explanatory power. The strength of the pantheistic system—that such a system 
can provide some explanation for morality—is counteracted by the lack of clarity in the 
metaphysics behind key parts of the system. Arguably the best that a naturalist can do for 
explaining morality, without adding ad hoc hypotheses, is to offer a naturalistic explanation 
grounded in neo-Darwinian evolution. But such attempts are ultimately insufficient. No matter 
how deeply committed to and intent on doing the just or virtuous thing that a naturalist might be, 
it is difficult to see how one can get obligation out of genetic predispositions, imperatives out of 
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indicatives. Furthermore, within the naturalistic system, what we generally call evil is a 
necessary feature of the cosmos. Regarding human responsibility, for pantheistic systems that are 
deterministic in nature, it is hard to make sense of human responsibility. But as Levine has 
argued, pantheism need not entail determinism. Some kind of libertarian freedom, I have argued, 
is necessary if we are to make sense of human responsibility.  If we are to understand human 
freedom as libertarian, it must be seen in connection to the divine unity and in some sense found 
within the basic structures of the universe. Both defenders of PPT and theism can accommodate 
human freedom within their systems. For theists, humans were created with libertarian freedom, 
and, hence, they generally have the capacity to do otherwise. Process panentheists, on the other 
hand, recognize that freedom is a basic feature of all actual entities, and especially human 
creatures, who have a greater capacity of freedom. Regarding good and evil, as I have argued 
throughout, neither is surprising given theism. There is reason to expect certain forms of moral 
evil given human libertarian freedom. Furthermore, based on the Creator/creature distinction, the 
finite and limited nature of the world, the various processes needed to sustain biological life, and 
that the world is dynamic, it is not at all surprising that certain kinds of natural evil may result. 
Theists also believe that God is the good, or at least perfectly good, and the ground for all moral 
action, both our source and moral telos. For theists, not only is God the ground for good, but God 
has also established a moral order that humans are to abide by. Lastly, theists believe that not 
only does God have the power to overcome evil, but eventually He will do so, carving out 
important room for rational hope in the face of the problem of evil. For process panentheists, 
good and evil can be explained; however, it is at the risk of redefining evil to fit in primarily 
aesthetic categories. This is problematic, however. While doing so does not completely wipe out 
evil in moral terms, the moral categories become subordinate to aesthetic ones, which, as 
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discussed earlier, allows for certain moral principles to be violated, perhaps even vitiated. There 
are, however, two other problems with PPT, as we saw. God, for process panentheists, is limited, 
and there is no eschatological payoff. There is no guarantee that evil will ever be thwarted in the 
end. The problem of evil defeats hope of ultimate resolution.  
Ad Hoc-ness 
 To what extent do these metaphysical system provide ad hoc explanations (E)? It would 
seem that both naturalistic and pantheistic systems have some elements of ad hoc-ness. For 
naturalists, and pantheists like Harrison, this is mostly seen with respect to positing something 
like the multiverse—whether such a thing as the multiverse is true or not—in order to explain the 
anthropic principle. Yet it is also taken to be somewhat of a backdoor way of arguing for certain 
metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the universe (e.g., that nature is all there is, was, or 
ever will be). But as Paul Davies pointed out, this only puts the problem one step removed. The 
same could be said with respect to positing something like Stephen Hawking’s space-time 
curvature hypothesis. Both the multiverse and space-time curvature hypotheses come across as 
ad hoc efforts to provide explanation for the apparent design of life and to show that the universe 
is all that there is. 
What of pantheists? Whether one takes it as ad hoc or not, it seems that for both Harrison 
and Levine, with respect to their brand of pantheism, the standard method of argumentation is to 
show why various other systems do not work, and then to make assertions regarding their own 
systems about how things either are or could be. Assertions, however, are not arguments, nor do 
they sufficiently ground metaphysical positions.  
Perhaps the chief difficulty of process panentheism is its postulation of creativity as the 
underlying metaphysical principle. Yet defenders of PPT have not given reason to think that such 
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a principle underlies all of reality. Furthermore, they have not shown what this principle is, the 
very principle on which the whole process system stands or falls.  
Theists too may be charged with some ad hoc-ness in their system, especially pertaining 
to the afterlife. The notion of an afterlife is an important aspect of the theistic system, without 
which it would be difficult to make sense of God’s bringing the world to rights and final justice. 
What reason is there for thinking that something like the afterlife is true? How might the theist 
respond? There are at least two lines of argument a theist might give regarding an afterlife. First, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter, there is veridical evidence for both near-death experiences 
and post-death visions. Furthermore, there are modern documented cases of people returning to 
life after having been prayed for.3 While the evidence does not conclusively guarantee an 
afterlife, it does give theists reasons for thinking that there might be something like an afterlife. 
Second, if God is omnipotent, there is reason to believe that He could do something like bring 
people back from the dead, as in the notion of the resurrection. For example, Christians take it 
that God raised Jesus from the dead. They base this on a variety of historical evidences.4 Now, if 
the Christian theist can show that God raising Jesus from the dead makes better sense of the 
historical data than do the best naturalistic theories, and if they can show that miracles are 
possible in a world such as ours, then the theist is within her epistemic right to believe in 
something along the lines of an afterlife. Taken together, these reasons for thinking there is such 
a thing as an afterlife can do much to dispense with the charge of ad hoc-ness in theism.   
                                                 
3 For a detailed discussion of raisings of people both in antiquity and the present, see Craig S. Keener, 
Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Account, Vol 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 536-
579.  
 
4 This historical data for the disciples seeing Jesus after his crucifixion is quite strong. See Gary R. 
Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 3-51; 
Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2010); N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2003).   
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Plausibility  
 Regarding plausibility (F), it seems that neither the naturalistic nor the pantheistic 
hypothesis, by itself, is plausible given evil, or at least given how we generally think of evil, in 
the world. Perhaps the critic might think this judgment unfair, especially since pantheism 
provides some reasons for thinking that something like evil exists as something that disrupts or 
goes against the divine Unity. Perhaps it would increase the plausibility of pantheism if it could 
explain just what it is that such a disruption consists of, or, more importantly, just what the 
divine Unity is. Yet, in comparing the two hypothesis, it would seem that the notion of evil is 
more plausible given pantheism than naturalism. Though naturalism as a metaphysical system is 
more consistent than pantheism (provided that we grant neo-Darwinian evolution), it lacks in 
both explanatory power and scope when it comes to our general understanding of the concepts of 
evil. It fails to adequately explain life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and 
human responsibility. Pantheism, though it lacks overall coherence and consistency, fares much 
better at explaining each of these, particularly the latter three. Yet its overall explanatory 
adequacy depends on whether or not pantheism can give us good reason to think that the 
universe has always existed. From the above analysis, it does not seem that it can.   
 PPT as a metaphysical system provides a better explanation of the salient facts of good 
and evil, morality and human responsibility, the anthropic principle, and consciousness than do 
either pantheism or naturalism. However, while there is an overall greater explanatory force to 
PPT, it too suffers from the same major difficulty that both pantheism and naturalism face, 
namely, the problem of infinite regress. There is also a yet more damaging difficulty with the 
PPT view: it cannot adequately explain the nature of its fundamental metaphysical principle. 
What is this creativity grounded in? What supplies it with its endless energy? Process 
panentheists do not have an answer for this. Granting such a principle as creativity (which theists 
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are unwilling to do) would elucidate the concepts of good and evil from the process panentheistic 
perspective, though, as we have seen, it requires redefining good and evil in primarily aesthetic 
terms, which is problematic, since moral principles become subordinate to aesthetic principles. 
Lastly, there are two additional problems with PPT. First, the concept of a limited God 
raises several difficulties. Can such a God really do anything about evil in the world? Perhaps the 
process panentheist will argue that the God of panentheism can suffer along with his creatures 
and provide them with the initial aims to direct them toward a more harmonious and intense 
reality. As discussed, we might commend such a God for the work in thwarting evil and choose 
to fight along in the good fight, but in the end, would such a God be worship worthy? It seems 
not. Furthermore, it is not at all clear how the God of PPT directs the affairs of all the world in 
sending the initial aims, given that the actual entities are responding to such aims immediately. 
How does such a God send these aims instantaneously without the kind of omniscience ascribed 
to the God of theism, particularly some kind of knowledge of the future free acts of the actual 
entities? It would seem that this would be needed for the creatures to make the right decisions 
necessary to follow God’s aims and purposes. Second, there does not seem to be much of an 
eschatological payoff for God’s creatures if they choose to follow God. At most, all of God’s 
creatures’ lives are in some sense absorbed into God’s experience, remaining a part of God’s 
self-actualization. Some process thinkers are open to the idea of an afterlife, but do not press it as 
a significant part of the PPT view. Thus while PPT is more plausible of a system for explaining 
evil than either naturalism or panentheism, this is necessary but not sufficient to argue that it is 
plausible in and of itself. It is quite an ingenious system, but quite a few unexplainable features 
undermine its utlima facie plausibility. 
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 Lastly, we consider theism. Of the three systems, theism can genuinely explain evil based 
on its major tenets. It can do so without redefining good and evil, and it can do so by 
understanding such locutions how most people understand the words, that is, without equivocal 
or idiosyncratic meanings. Furthermore, theism adequately answers each of the four areas: life, 
consciousness, the metaphysics of good and evil, and human freedom. This does not mean that 
there are no difficulties for theism. There are still many areas that theists must work out. The 
areas of consciousness and the problem of animal pain are just two key areas that need further 
attention. That additional work is needed does not hinder theism from providing a partial 
explanation to such issues. Moreover, theists believe that God has created the world with a moral 
order, and it is God Himself who is the standard for the good that we see in this order. If we take 
it that God made humans to be like Him in certain respects (e.g., the Christian and Jewish 
understanding of the imago dei), we have good reason for thinking that the world and its order is 
knowable and understandable. It is because of the established moral order and God’s creating 
humans to be like Him that people can recognize that certain things are right and wrong. They 
can see the moral order of things, even if they chose not to follow it. Lastly, the God of theism 
can genuinely do things about the evil in the world. While God may have general policies in 
place such as libertarian freedom with respect to His human creatures and law-like regulatory 
processes in nature, it does not mean that God is inactive or can do nothing about the evil in the 
world. Furthermore, given the theistic understanding of afterlife, it does seem that there is 
something akin to eschatological payoff for God’s creatures when it is all said and done (e.g., 
resurrection, restoration of creation, and so on). Lastly, there is the possibility of final justice for 
the evils committed in this world. In all, it seems that theism not only provides a more plausible 
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explanation given the other metaphysical systems when it comes to explaining evil, but theism 
provides a plausible explanation in and of itself. 
Livability  
There is, however, one more consideration: How livable is each of the four metaphysical 
systems (G)? Naturalism, at bottom, is the thinnest of the four systems. Not only does it provide 
no grounding for objective morality or for human responsibility, it has a bleak outlook on life. 
There is no afterlife or personal immortality. Moreover, there is no ultimate assurance that the 
work we do on the earth provides any ultimate significance. Nor is there any final vindication for 
the evils that we experience in the world.  
Certain forms of pantheism hold to laws or principles within the Unity, such as karma or 
dharma, which suggestively promote justice within the universe. But the critic will want to know 
just how such laws or principles of cause and effect bring about justice? Do they function like 
the laws of nature? It is hard to see how the effects of morally significant actions can be equated 
with the effects brought about by the laws of physics, unless, of course, all things are determined. 
After all, many theists would agree with something like natural law theories of ethics, that such 
laws are in some sense “built in,” but they also recognize that the universe itself cannot explain 
such theories. Furthermore, another issue is the administration of justice. How can such laws 
administer justice if broken? It is not at all clear that a law or principle can. A yet further issue is 
this: Are the laws themselves eternally existing, or were such laws put in place by God? 
Pantheists are in basic disagreement about this. Regarding immortality, some pantheists teach 
that there is such a thing as an afterlife. Some hold to the existence of individual souls living on 
after death, while others hold that eventually all things will be absorbed back into Absolute or 
the Unity. While there is some hope in the former, the latter leads to a bleak outlook on life.  
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 Defenders of PPT recognize that there is a moral order. The God of PPT sends initial 
aims to its creatures in hopes that the actual entities will chose the right path which will 
ultimately lead to higher levels of harmony and greater intensity. But why should any of God’s 
creatures follow suit? Why should these actual entities heed God’s initial aim? But even more 
damaging is that many of these actual entities are incapable of making any kind of rational 
decision. Such capacities are found only in the higher forms of genuine societies. If these entities 
rebel against God (if we can even call it that), there is no ultimate justice for their rebellion, 
despite their response to God’s initial aims. Even more troubling is PPT’s theodicy. The process 
theodicy is not strongly eschatological. I would agree with Stephen T. Davis that any theodical 
solution to the problem of evil must maintain some kind of reference to the future. In response to 
the theodicy put forth by Griffin, Davis asks “[D]oes God have the power, influence, or 
persuasive ability to make the divine intentions succeed?”5 If the process understanding of God 
is correct, then all that we can say is that God’s desires might come out in the end. There is, 
however, no ultimate assurance or guarantee that they will. At best, Davis says, we might say 
that God is a good being who works hard. We might even sympathize with such a God, joining 
in the fight to thwart evil. But such a God would not be worthy of worship. Unless God is able to 
bring about more good in the world than evil, such a God would be fully indictable.6 Davis puts 
it as follows: “God will be something like a mad scientist who creates a monster he hopes will 
behave but whom he cannot control; if the monster does more evil than good the scientist’s 
                                                 
5 Stephen T. Davis, “Is the God of Process Theology a Valid Option?,” in Disputed Issues (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2009), 130.  
 
6 Ibid., 130-131.  
 
206 
 
decision to create the monster will turn out to have been terribly wrong. The scientist will be 
indictable.”7  
Naturalism, pantheism, and panentheism also each face the same fate—the pending doom 
of the universe. As William Lane Craig so forcefully puts it: 
 And the universe, too, faces a death of its own. Scientists tell us that the universe is 
expanding, and the galaxies are growing farther and farther apart. As it does so, it grows 
colder and colder, and its energy is used up. Eventually all the stars will burn out, and all 
matter will collapse into dead stars and black holes. There will be no light at all; there will 
be no heat; there will be no life; only the corpses of dead stars and galaxies, ever expanding 
into the endless darkness and the cold recesses of space—a universe in ruins. This is not 
science fiction. The entire universe marches irreversibly toward its grave. So not only is the 
life of each individual person doomed; the entire human race is doomed. The universe is 
plunging toward inevitable extinction—death is written throughout its structure. There is no 
escape. There is no hope.8    
 
For the naturalist, there is no escaping that such an outcome is the conclusion of all of our human 
efforts to achieve greatness. What, in the end, have all of our scientific progress and discoveries 
accomplished? For the pantheist, the same organizing force lying behind all of life, animating the 
very world we live in, ultimately leads the world to its final demise. It is hard to see how a God 
that is not all-powerful could turn things around for the hope of the world. In the end, would such 
a God—indifferent as it may be—care? What of the God of PPT? Could such a God do any 
better? Here, it would seem, the mad scientist strikes again. Just as there is no guarantee that the 
world will turn out with more good than evil, so too is there no guarantee that the world will 
avoid its impending doom. What, then, becomes of all of God’s work? What becomes of God? 
Would God, then, begin the whole evolutionary process over again, keeping at it until all things 
                                                 
7 Stephen Davis, “God the Mad Scientist: Process Theology on God and Evil,” Themelios 5, no. 1 
(September, 1979), 23.  
 
8 William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd edition (Wheaton, IL: 
Crossway Books, 2008), 72.  
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finally turn out as planned? In the end, we might forecast the eschatological payoff of each 
metaphysical system as follows: bleak (process panentheism); bleaker (pantheism); and bleakest 
(naturalism).  
Of the four systems, only theism provides a metaphysical system that is livable in the 
face of evil. Theism provides within it the resources needed to not only explain why the world is 
in the shape that it is, but it also provides a solution to the evil in the world. Theism recognizes 
that there is something really wrong with the world. It is not how it should be. As Stephen Davis 
rightly points out, “[t]he world is not worthwhile as it stands: it needs to be redeemed.”9 Only a 
God who is powerful enough to act in the world and who is religiously available to His creatures 
can bring about the kind of changes needed to thwart evil. Moreover, theists believe that the 
world will eventually be put to right. There will be final vindication for all wrongs committed, 
and many of God’s creatures will share in a blissful afterlife. Lastly, if God created all things, 
including the entire four-dimensional space-time universe, as theists believe, then there is no 
reason to think that God could not stop the impending doom that lies in store for the universe. 
Only a God who is infinite in power can keep the universe from reaching its ultimate doom and 
restore it to its original intended goodness.  
Concluding Thoughts 
 In Chapters Two through Five, I have sought to compare four metaphysical systems. 
Throughout, I have argued that of the four metaphysical systems considered, theism best 
explains the phenomena of evil in the world. I have not argued that theism explains all things 
well or that it explains every instance of evil. That was not my goal; rather, I have only sought to 
                                                 
9 Davis, “Is the God of Process Theology,” 131.  
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argue that theism explains evil as well as or better than its metaphysical rivals. In the previous 
chapter I argued that theism adequately explains life, consciousness, the metaphysics of good 
and evil, and human responsibility, and does so better than its rivals. Moreover, I argued that 
theism is livable in the face of evil and provides an overall thicker worldview response. 
Before moving on to the next chapter, there is one final challenge the theist must face. To 
see this challenge, it will be helpful to consider a quote from H. P. Owen summarizing Charles 
Hartshorne’s critique of Classical theism: 
In particular, Hartshorne maintains that the self-sufficient, changeless God of classical 
theism cannot possess the property of love that Christian theists attribute to him. If God is 
love he must be a ‘social’ being. He (like any member of human society) must be affected 
by the objects of his love; he must be pained by their sufferings and enriched by their 
achievements. If he did not need his human creatures for the completion of his being he 
would not have any reason for creating them. ‘A being which contains, in sheer 
independence of others, all possible perfection and value must surely know better than to 
clutter up existence with beings which can add nothing to the value that would exist without 
them’ (50).10  
 
There is much going on, here, and I cannot feasibly consider the entirety of this objection in 
these concluding remarks. Much of this objection I will consider in the final chapters. For now, I 
would like to focus on Hartshorne’s point that if God is love, then it necessitates that God be a 
social being. If Hartshorne is correct, then it raises a fundamental problem for the theist. Either 
God needs the world to demonstrate His love or God does not have love as an essential attribute. 
Many if not most theists recognize that love is an essential attribute of God. Moreover, if God 
were not loving, as the preponderance of theists believe, then could theists provide an adequate 
answer to the problem from evil? But in order for God to feature love as an essential property, 
there must be something for God to love. Theists will want to avoid saying that God must create 
in order to love something other than Himself, since such an admission suggests that God is not 
                                                 
10 H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971), 82. 
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complete in-and-of-Himself, deficient in aseity. God would then need something other than 
God’s self for His completion, which results in a form of panentheism.  
 A way out for the theists is available, however. We can make a distinction here between 
“Unitarian” theism and “Trinitarian” theism. Unitarian theists believe that God consists of only 
one person. Trinitarian theists, on the other hand, recognize that God is more than one person 
(presumably three). By this, they do not mean that there is more than one God; rather, they mean 
that within this one God there exists more than one person (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). If one 
were to accept a Trinitarian understanding of God over a Unitarian view, one can avoid either 
horn of the Hartshornean dilemma. This is the move that I will pursue and argue for in the pages 
that follow. We shall we now turn to the Christian worldview. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD  
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Christian theists have a different perspective on the 
concept of God from other theists. Central to the Christian claim is a concept of God that is tri-
personal in nature. It is precisely this concept of a Trinitarian God that enables a theist to resist 
slipping into panentheism, whereby God is in some sense dependent on creation for His 
actualization—something from which most all theists will want to steer away. If God depends on 
creation, then God would not be the greatest conceivable being, since such a view would call into 
question God’s perfection and necessary existence. In what follows I will outline a sketch of the 
mere Christian concept of God and worldview proposed in Chapter One. I do not claim that all 
Christians will accept my conclusions, but this will be, rather, a sketch of what I take most 
Christians to believe. As noted in the introduction, it may be that some denominations or 
traditions will want to tweak what I say below. That is fine. My intention is to put forth a basic 
overview of what I take to be the Christian worldview, centered on the perichoretic relationship 
of the Triune God. I want to show how the perichoretic relationship of the persons of the 
Godhead may shed light on various other core doctrines of the Christian faith.  
I begin by showing that there is a clear connection between God’s nature and morality. I 
then argue that the perichoretic relationship between the persons of the Trinity provide the 
paradigm for thinking about God’s intentions for creation and that it gives us a clue for the telos 
of creation, that is to say, from the beginning of creation, God has had intentions of bringing 
about, what I will call, the perichoretic kingdom.      
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Light, Love, and Fellowship  
 The brief New Testament letter of 1 John makes two striking claims about God—“God is 
light” and “God is love.” These claims provide for the Elder a theological framework and ethical 
vision for the small community of believers.1  
 Throughout Scripture, ‘light’ is often used as a metaphor to reflect certain characteristics 
of God, His revelation, or salvation.2 Discernable from the context of 1 John, the Elder uses 
‘light’ as a metaphor to reflect God’s flawless perfection, truthfulness, impeccability, and moral 
goodness. Immediately following the words “God is light,” the author of 1 John clarifies what he 
means by reminding his readers that in God “there is no darkness at all” (1 John 1:5). The Elder 
is setting up for his readers a strong contrast between God, who is light, and darkness. As noted 
by I. Howard Marshall, “The contrast between God and darkness is expressed as strongly as 
possible. The point is not so much that God did not create darkness but rather that living in 
darkness is incompatible with fellowship with God. This makes it clear that the writer is thinking 
of light and darkness predominately in ethical terms.”3  
I agree with the Marshall’s basic thrust, but I think there is some need to clarify his point. 
First, he is right in asserting that the words ‘light’ and ‘dark’ are used “predominately in ethical 
                                                 
1 Yarbrough provides four reasons for thinking this is the case. First, it has the ring of a summary 
statement. It is the message that the elder heard “from him” and declares to his readers. Second, the verse comes 
after four introductory statements, which would seem to indicate, based on positioning, its overall importance. 
Third, when the elder speaks of the Son, he ipso facto speaks of the Father, since it is the Son who came from the 
Father and reveals Him to us (a major theme in the Johannine writings Jn 1:1-2, 18; 14:8-11; 1 Jn 1:2-3). Fourth and, 
perhaps, most critically, the language is deeply rooted in OT theology. Robert W. Yarbrough. 1-3 John. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008. 46-47. Similarly, Kruse argues “God is light” “defines the content of his [the 
elder’s] message . . . which provides basis for the ethical implications the author makes” in the rest of the passage 
that follows (John 1:6:2:2). Colin G. Kruse, The Letters of John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 
60-1. 
 
2 I. Howard Marshall The Epistles of John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1978), 109.   
 
 3 Ibid.  
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terms.” This becomes clear given certain statements by the Elder which speak of the believer’s 
having or not having fellowship with God and others. Hating one’s brother results in walking “in 
the darkness” (1 John 2:9); loving one’s brother results in walking “in the light” (1 John 1:7). 
Those who walk in the light have fellowship with God and with other believers (1 John 1:7). The 
confusion may occur in how “light” and “dark” are used with respect to God. The Elder is not 
saying that God walks in the light, which would have to do with ethics, but that “God is light.” 
This leads to my second point. When the Elder says that “God is light,” he is making an 
important ontological claim with respect to God’s nature. Ontologically speaking, “God is light” 
is reference to God’s perfect moral goodness.4 The negative that follows, that “there is no 
darkness at all,” serves to intensify the previous point. In other words, the Elder is saying that 
God is morally perfect.5       
 There is another important aspect with respect to the proposition “God is light” that needs 
to be addressed, namely, that ‘light’ also has to do with, in the words of Millard Erickson, God’s 
“integrity” or “truthfulness.”6 With respect to truthfulness, Erickson lists three dimensions: “(1) 
                                                 
4 See James 1:16-18, which is considered to be much earlier text than 1 John, and it, too, provides a deep 
connection between God’s nature and ethics.  
  
5 For a different perspective, see Daniel L. Akin, 1, 2, 3 John. Nashville (TN: Broadman and Holman, 
2001), 65. While I do not disagree with Akin that God is the source of all life, biological and spiritual, it seems to 
me that Akin’s argument is confused primarily in that his argument depends on the Gospel writer’s use of light in 
the prologue in order to interpret 1 John. Rather than clearing things up, Akin muddies the waters by equivocating 
on the way in which the writer of the Gospel of John uses the metaphor of ‘light’ in the prologue and how the Elder 
uses it in 1 John 1:5 to speak of God’s nature. Akin understands “the Word’s life” as equivalent to “human being’s 
light” based on the Gospel writer’s declaration, “In him was life, and the life was the light of men” (John 1:4, NIV). 
It is not clear to me, at least, that we can make “life” and “light,” as used in the prologue, equivalents in the sense 
that Akin wants. While “life” is something that the Word has in Himself, “light” is derivative or the result of the 
Word’s life. In other words, the metaphor of light,’ for the Gospel writer, is used in the sense of the Word’s life as 
revelatory. Its use is primarily epistemological in nature, not ontological. This seems to be made clear by the 
author’s next statement, “The light shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it” (John 1:5, NIV). 
In the epistle, the content of the message that the Elder has heard and is passing on is that “God is light.” This is 
ontological, not epistemological.  
 
 6 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 316. 
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genuineness—being true; (2) veracity—telling the truth; and (3) faithfulness—proving true.”7 
That God always tells the truth (veracity)8 and that God never breaks His promise (faithfulness)9 
are grounded in God’s genuineness.10  
 Here we may conclude that the Elder’s reference to God as light contains within it a close 
connection between God’s perfect moral goodness and his genuineness or integrity, which would 
also indicate for humans that there is a close connection between moral goodness and 
truthfulness in character and living. As Yarbrough reminds us, the theme of the epistle, then, “is 
not dominated first of all by his [the Elder’s] teaching, his commands, or his encouragement to 
love, or even the occasions that call all these forth”; rather, “It is dominated  . . . by his vision of 
God—God’s light, his moral excellence and efficacious purity.”11 A proper “vision of God” 
provides for us a proper framework for ethical thinking and living.  
 The second claim that “God is love” also weighs significantly in the thought of the Elder. 
As noted with “God is light,” “God is love” is an ontological claim about the very nature of 
God.12 On the one hand, we must be careful not to mistake function with ontology. The Elder is 
                                                 
 7 Ibid.  
 
 8 Scripture repeatedly emphasizes that God cannot tell a lie (1 Sam 15:29; Tit 1:2). Moreover, Jesus speaks 
of God’s word as truth (Jn 17:17).  
 
 9 Cf. Hebrews 6:18. 
 
 10 Erickson, Christian Theology, 316. Cf. 2 Timothy 2:13. Within the context of 1 John, claiming to have 
fellowship with God, while walking in the darkness, results in the person lying and not living by the truth. Further, 
to claim that one is without sin means that one is deceiving oneself and that truth is absent from her life. Yet, 
walking in the light results in a person’s having fellowship with God and with fellow believers (1 John 1:6-8). Given 
the contrast, here, it would seem that walking in the light has a quality of being truthful. If walking in the light has 
within it a quality of being in the truth, then we can assume that God as light involves truthfulness.   
 
 11 Yarbrough, 1-3 John, 50.   
 
 12 “God is light” and “God is love” are claims about God’s metaphysical nature, and not merely about His 
character, as Marshall and Kruse seem to imply. See Marshall, The Epistles of John, 212 and Kruse, The Letters of 
John, 157. I hope to explicate my reasons later on in this chapter. Preliminarily my reason is as follows: if God is 
triune, then what we have within the divine Trinity is an eternal movement of divine persons toward one another in 
love. This eternal movement of love is an essential part of God’s nature, and not merely something that God does.    
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not saying, here, in 1 John 4:8, that God loves; rather, God is love. 13  Yet, on the other hand, it is 
equally important not to think that love is, in some sense, an abstraction. In Hebraic and 
Christian thought, God is personal. Love, then, is an essential quality of the nature of the (tri-) 
personal God.  Moreover, “God is love” (as with “God is light”) provides further theological 
grounding and additional framework for ethical living (1 John 4:7-12).  
The reason that the Elder’s readers should love one another is because love “comes from 
God,” who “is love” in His very essence. Those who love God “know God” and have “been born 
of God.” Those who do not love do not know God.14 But what does the Elder mean by “love”? 
He gives his readers a clue earlier in the epistle when he says, “This is how we know what love 
is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us” (1 John 3:15, NIV). Jesus, who is God incarnate, 
exemplifies love in the giving of Himself for others. For this reason, believers are to lay down 
their lives for one another; loving not merely in word, but by action “in truth” (1 John 3:17-18). 
God, too, shows His love toward us in that He sent His Son. God sent His Son, not because we 
loved God, but because of His love for us. “God’s love is,” as Millard Erickson points out, “an 
unselfish interest in us for our sake.”15 Similarly, C. S. Lewis speaks of God’s love in the 
following way: “He can give good, but cannot need or get it. In that sense all His love is, as it 
                                                 
 
 13 I want to be clear that in other passages the Elder does speak of God’s love toward others (1 Jn 3:1; 4:9). 
My only point is that we cannot conflate “God is love” with “God’s love toward His creatures.” If God is love, His 
loving actions are a natural result, so this should not be suprising. 
 
14 See 1 John 4:7-12. Yarbrough elaborates on the Elder’s thought: “Love, John seems to be saying, is to be 
sought, hollowed, nurtured, and guarded simply by virtue of its inherent God-rootedness. . . . In a sense, ‘all things’ 
are from God (1 Cor. 11:12). But love for John is not merely one among many things finding distinctive rootage in 
God. It is rather a primary attribute of God. . . . John will go on to state that to fail to love aright is to belie one’s 
Christian confession (4:20). Love among Christian believers (and, judging from Jesus’s example, love for 
nonbelievers too) is a nonnegotiable necessity in the household of faith.” Yarbrough, 235.  
 
 15 Erickson, Christian Theology, 319.  
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were, bottomlessly selfless by very definition; it has everything to give and nothing to receive.”16 
Thus the Elder’s understanding of God as love suggests that in God’s very essence is a sense of 
selflessness or giving up of one’s self toward the “other.”17 
  “God is love” and “God is light” are two sides of the same proverbial coin. It would 
seem that the Elder is painting a vision of God which informs how we humans ought to be—a 
life lived in truth, in harmony with God, and with the other’s best interest in mind. Yet the 
Elder’s reasoning for our living this way is grounded in the very nature of God. As light, God 
cannot do anything that is morally evil. As love, God seeks out the best for the “other.” It is 
God’s moral character that grounds His love, and it is His love that seeks out what is best and 
good and holy for the “other.” Hence God’s loving actions toward His creatures are always for 
their best; He cannot do otherwise. His desire is for His creatures to be in fellowship with Him, 
because He is the source of all that is good, true, and holy.     
 Since God is light, what God desires for His children is for them to “walk in that light” 
and to be in fellowship with Him (1 John 1:7). What does walking in light and fellowship with 
God consist of? First, the Elder reminds us that walking in the light means that we are to be 
truthful with ourselves. To deny that we have sin in our lives or to claim that we have fellowship 
with God when we are walking in the darkness causes us to be liars and the truth not in us. When 
we acknowledge sin in our lives before God, God forgives and purifies us through the blood of 
Jesus (1 John 1:6-10). Second, one must have true beliefs about God and His Son (1 John 2:22-
23; 3:23; 4:2-3; 5:1-5). At face value, this may seem a bit odd. Why must one have true beliefs 
                                                 
 16 C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), 43.  
 
 17 For now, I will leave our discussion on God as love as selflessness toward the other, but I will resume the 
discussion below.  
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about God and His Son? A significant aspect of being in the light and having harmony with God 
is living in truth. To deny truth about the Son results in having a false belief about God. Jerry L. 
Walls presents a similar argument when speaking of belief in Jesus as necessary for one’s 
salvation. According to Walls, salvation is “about a perfect relationship with God.”18 He goes on 
to argue: 
 If God is a Trinity and Jesus is God the Son incarnate, as Christians teach, then a perfect 
relationship with God entails knowing Jesus is God the Son. Not to believe Jesus is God the 
Son would involve a fundamentally mistaken understanding of God, which would be 
incompatible with a perfected relationship.19 
 
God has given humans revelation about Himself, which is clear about Jesus’ identity as the Son 
of God. Furthermore, “revelation is sufficiently clear,” says Walls, “that those who have access 
to it are responsible to believe.”20 Further, when rejecting Jesus, one is not only rejecting the 
source of truth (Colossians 2:3; John 14:6), but also the source of all life. Both the Gospel of 
John and 1 John provide pictures of Jesus as being the source of truth and of life.21  
 Since God is love, believers are to love one another, as noted earlier, with self-giving 
love. This kind of love looks out for the benefit of the other. Love that is selfless is the same kind 
of love that God has. The Elder points out that those who fail to love their brothers remain in 
death (1 John 3:14). Death, here, does not refer to physical death, but it points to a lack of life 
and of fellowship with God and with others (1 John 2:9; 3:15). Moreover, one cannot claim to 
                                                 
 18  Jerry L. Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 48. 
 
 19 Ibid., 49. See also John 1:14-18, which points to Jesus, who is the “only unique Son,” as being the one 
who exegetes or explains God.  
 
 20 Ibid.  
 
 21 John 17:3 “Now this is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom 
you have sent.” Eternal life—abundant life—is ultimately found in having personal knowledge of God and of the 
Son.  
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love God and not love one’s brother. In doing so, that person becomes a liar. Love for God and 
love for one’s brother are closely connected. Those who love God must also love one’s brother. 
Yet, the Elder makes it clear that the reason that brothers can love one another is because God 
first loved us (1 John 1:19-21). It was out of our need that God responded to us. It is not that we 
initiated it, but only that we responded to it. Receiving God’s love is transformational, for in it, 
God demonstrates to us what love truly is (1 John 3:16; 4:9). Lastly, believers are to love God 
above all, doing His will, not loving their own worldly desires, which, as part of the world, pass 
away (1 John 2:15-17).  
Before moving on, it would be helpful to consider what Christians mean by loving one’s 
neighbor, since the command is potentially ambiguous and often misunderstood. In modern 
Western culture, love is often associated with an emotion or affection. C. S. Lewis found such an 
understanding of love inadequate. “Charity means ‘love, in the Christian sense’,” says Lewis, 
“But love, in the Christian sense, does not mean an emotion. It is a state not of the feelings but of 
the will; that state of the will which we have naturally about ourselves, and must learn to have 
about other people.”22 It seems that Lewis is on to something important here. Love cannot be 
equated merely with an emotion. Based on our study of 1 John, having pity on a brother or sister 
in need requires also loving through actions “in truth” (1 John 3:17-18). However, one must 
proceed with caution not to chalk loving one’s neighbor up solely to a matter of the will or to 
some sort of loving behavior. In 1 Corinthians 13:3, Paul tells us that “If I give all I possess to 
the poor and surrender my body to the flames, but have not love, I gain nothing.” Given Paul’s 
words, love cannot be equated merely with acting in such a manner. One’s inner state is at least 
                                                 
 22 C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1980), 129.  
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as important as one’s actions.23 Francis Howard-Snyder believes that loving one’s neighbor 
requires, at minimum, some amount of benevolence; however, it cannot be limited to that. She 
writes, 
 The second great commandment is like the first. It is fair to assume that the love we owe our 
neighbor is of the same kind as the love we owe God. Our love for God ought to include an 
appreciation of him and a desire for union with him, in addition to a desire that his will be 
done. If our love for our neighbor is to be like the love we owe God, this suggests that the 
love we have for our neighbors should involve the same elements. Indeed, it makes sense 
that our love for other people should not be simply benevolence or sheer concern for their 
well-being, but should also involve desires to be related to them, and an appreciation of what 
is valuable in them, and enjoyment of them. For if one’s attitude toward others was solely 
that of benevolence, it would seem that one wouldn’t want anything they have to offer. 
Sheer benevolence looks like a kind of arrogance, an attitude of independence and inequality 
vis-á-vis our neighbors.24 
 
 Similarly, Alexander R. Pruss suggests that biblical concept of love includes three 
“intertwined aspects.”25 Not only must one show benevolence, but also an appreciation for and 
“a striving for union” with the other.26 Pruss argues that benevolence without appreciation turns 
toward “a proud and superior philanthropic attitude.”27 The reason that we pursue union with the 
other is because of the value that we see in the other. In seeking union with the other, the 
benefactor becomes not merely the giver of good things, but places herself “on a more equal 
plane with the beloved, and is vulnerable to being rejected by the beloved.”28 Yet, the recipient 
of the goods cannot take the actions of the benefactor for granted. If the benefactor seeks union 
                                                 
 23 Francis Howard-Snyder, “Christian Ethics,” in Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael J. Murray 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 386.  
 
 24 Ibid.  387-88. 
 
 25 Alexander R. Pruss, “One Body: Reflections on Christian Sexual Ethics,”2. Accessed November 12, 
2012, http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_Pruss/www/papers/OneBody-talk.html. 
 
 26 Ibid.  
 
 27 Ibid., 3.  
 
 28 Ibid.  
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with the other, it breaks down the barrier of the recipient’s feeling shame for being helped.29 
Pruss continues by arguing that appreciation is not enough. Appreciation without union is 
bankrupt, since a failure to “possess” or to be “joined with the beloved” results in an inability of 
fully appreciating the other. Lastly, pursuing union and appreciating the other is not enough. One 
must also seek the other’s good. Failure to do so results in “a self-defeating selfishness.”30 Pruss 
continues, 
 For genuine union with the other involves pursuit of the other’s goals, and an appreciation of 
goods is incomplete when it does not motivate us to further those goods. And it is only if, 
with a mixture of humility and surprised joy, we see our being united with the other as good 
for the other that we can hope that the other will fully (and not merely by being deceived, 
say) be joined to us.31 
 
 Lastly, the expression “love your neighbor as yourself” in Jesus’ command implies an 
element of self-love. This does not demand, however, that one fall into vanity or nihilism. As C. 
S. Lewis aptly puts it, love for ourselves “means that we wish our own good.”32 Further, self-
love, suggests Howard-Snyder, should serve for us as a blueprint for how we ought to respond to 
others. While we often find ourselves having greater love for those we find attractive or find 
deserving of our love, self-love, on the other hand, is generally not as temperamental. While the 
object of our focus in self-love may change, say from being upset with some performance or 
being glad when we do well at some goal, our overall concern, whether being upset or glad, is 
for our well-being. Sadness and gladness point to that same desire.33 Further, union with the 
                                                 
 29 Ibid.   
 
 30 Ibid.  
 
 31 Ibid.  
 
 32 Lewis, Mere Christianity, 130.  
 
 33 Howard-Snyder, 388.  
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‘other’ is not merely what’s best for her, but it is also what’s best for the self. Lastly, it is not 
selfish or wrong to appreciate one’s self. The self’s identity is found in relationship to others. 
Appreciation for the self, then, is formed through one’s relatedness with others within the 
community. The self is an important part of the community, which without the community would 
not be what it is.     
 The New Testament concept of love, then, is unconditional in nature. Jesus’ parable of 
the Good Samaritan exemplifies unconditional love.34 Unconditional love is an overall attitude 
and movement toward the other, looking out for the best interest of the other, while also seeking 
union. It is directed toward all, whether or not the other responds back in the same manner, or 
even if the other retaliates in hostility or in hurt.35     
Trinity, Human Freedom, and Sin 
 Not only do Christians affirm with the Elder that God is “light” and “love,” they also 
hold to the central claim of the Christian faith that God is triune. But why think God triune? 
What advantage does a triune God have over Unitarian view of God? In response to these 
questions, J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig put forth the following argument: 
 (1) God is by definition the greatest conceivable being 
 (2) As the greatest conceivable being, God must be perfect 
 (3) A perfect being must be a loving being 
 (5) If God is perfectly loving by his very nature, he must be giving himself in love to 
another 
 (6) The other cannot be a created person 
Therefore 
 (7) The other to whom God’s love is necessarily directed must be internal to God 
himself36  
                                                 
 34 Luke 12:25-37.  
 
 35 Snyder, 388. 
 
 36 Adapted from J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian 
Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 594-595. Similarly, Richard of St Victor argues: “On the 
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They conclude,  
 
 God is not a single, isolated person, as unitarian forms of theism like Islam hold; rather, God 
is a plurality of persons, as the Christian doctrine of the Trinity affirms. On the unitarian 
view God is a person who does not give himself away essentially in love for another; he is 
focused essentially on himself. Hence, he cannot be the most perfect being. But on the 
Christian view, God is a triad of persons in eternal, self-giving love relationships. Thus, 
since God is essentially loving, the doctrine of the Trinity is more plausible than any 
unitarian doctrine of God.37   
 
Perhaps the weakest premise of Moreland and Craig’s argument is (6). Most theists would not 
doubt that God is the greatest conceivable being, nor would they doubt that God is love and that 
love belongs to divine perfection. But why think that the object of God’s love cannot be (merely) 
directed toward something outside of God Himself, say, His creatures? Craig and Moreland 
respond with the following thought experiment. Creation is a free act of God. God was neither 
compelled nor caused to create. But we can think of a possible world in which God exists 
without having created. If love is essential to God’s nature, then God must be perfectly loving. 
Yet, in such a world, no humans, angels, or other agents exist. Thus created agents cannot 
sufficiently explain God’s love.   
 If God is, as Craig and Moreland argue, “a triad of persons in eternal, self-giving love,” 
then within the triune God is the deepest relationship in all of reality. This relationship—the 
perichoretic relationship between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—forms the heart of Christian 
theism. But how are we to understand the doctrine of perichoresis? 
                                                 
basis of these considerations, it is clearly impossible that any one person in the divinity could lack the fellowship of 
association. If he were to have only one partner, he would not be without anyone with whom he could share the 
riches of his greatness. However, he would not have anyone with whom he could share the delights of love. There is 
nothing which gives more pleasure or which delights the soul more than the sweetness of loving. Only someone who 
has a partner and a loved one in that love that has been shown to him possesses the sweetness of such delights.” See 
Of the Trinity, in The Christian Theology Reader, 4th edition, ed. Alister E McGrath (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2011), 178.   
 
 37 Ibid., 595. 
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 John of Damascus employed the word ‘perichoresis’ in order to describe “the mutual 
indwelling” or “mutual interpenetration” between the Father, Son, and Spirit.38 He borrowed the 
word from Gregory of Nazianus, who used the concept largely in connection to Christology.39 
For John and other Eastern fathers, perichoresis was an important theological concept, which 
expressed, in the words of Verna Harrison, “the conjunction of unity and distinction, stability 
and dynamism, symmetry and asymmetry.”40 They noted that perichoresis gave insight into three 
key areas: the Trinity, the incarnation, and life in the Kingdom.41 
 In recent years, theologians have rediscovered the importance of perichoresis. Karl Barth 
describes perichoresis in the following way:     
 The triunity of God obviously implies, then, the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among 
themselves. God’s essence is indeed one, and even the different relations of origin do not 
entail separations. They rather imply—for where there is difference there is also 
fellowship—a definite participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being, and 
indeed, since the modes of being are in fact identical with the relations of origin, a complete 
participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being.42 
 
Barth did not like the modern understanding of “person,” that is, an autonomous and isolated 
individual. As a corrective measure, he preferred the term “mode.” 43 But what is significant 
                                                 
 38 S. M. Smith, “Perichorasis,” Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 2nd edition, ed. Walter A. Elwell 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics, 2001), 906-907.  
 
 39 Verna Harrison, “Perichorasis in the Greek Fathers,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 35, no. 1 
(1991), 55. 
 
 40 Ibid., 63.  
 
 41 Ibid., 63-65.   
 
 42 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I.1 The Doctrine of the Word of God, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. 
Torrance, first paperback edition (New York, NY: T &T Clark International,  2004), 370. 
 
 43 Barth is not buying into the older heretical notion of modalism, as some have falsely misunderstood him. 
Rather, Barth’s emphasis on ‘modes’ was an attempt to break away from the modern notion of person found in 
theological liberalism of his time. Barth continues to express differentiation within the Godhead, while continuing to 
emphasize oneness of essence. The notion of perichoresis is essential to Barth’s understanding of the divine relation 
within the triune God. However, many modern theologians find Barth’s rejection of the word ‘person’ as 
unfortunate and his use of ‘mode’ inadequate for bringing about a robust understanding of the Trinity. 
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about Barth’s notion of perichoresis within the triune God is his emphasis on “fellowship” and 
“complete participation” among each of the “modes,” or, in the terms of classical Christianity, 
“persons.”  
But how might we understand this complete participation? Here I would like to suggest 
that at the deepest level of the perichoretic relation is the notion of interpenetrating love between 
each of the persons of the Trinity. Not only is God one in essence, but God is also one through 
love toward the other. This is the deepest love possible. It is a love that is active and self-giving; 
whereby, the Father eternally gives of Himself toward the Son, and the Son eternally gives of 
Himself toward the Father, and the Spirit eternally gives of Himself toward the Father and the 
Son.44   
                                                 
44 The notion of perichoresis, however, is not merely a theological concept, but one that is grounded within 
the language of scripture. In the Gospel of John, the apostle provides for us glimpse of the internal relationship of 
God, when he tells us that the “World was with God” (John 1:1). The preposition pros could be translated, literally, 
as “toward.” The expression itself is difficult to translate in the Greek, but roughly has the understanding of 
“accompaniment and relationship.” Leon Morris, The Gospel According to John (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1995), 67. According to Andreas Köstenberger, pros “indicates a place or 
accompaniment, but also a disposition and orientation.” This goes beyond mere co-existence to express “active 
relationship,” or more radically put, “intercourse ‘with’.” Andreas J. Köstenberger, John (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2004), 25. Not only is John showing that the Word was God, but that there is differentiation and 
movement toward the other within the triune God. John elsewhere records Jesus’ words, indicating, not only His 
oneness with the Father, but His being “in” the Father. Take the following statement from Jesus, “the Father is in 
me, and I in the Father” (Jn 10:38; Cf. John 14:20; 17:11, 21-23), or more strikingly, Jesus’ words to Phillip, 
“Anyone who has seen me has seen the Father. . . . Don’t you believe that I am in the Father, and that the Father is in 
me? . . . Believe me when I say that I am in the Father and the Father is in me” (Jn 14:7-11). The Father’s presence 
in Jesus is such that Jesus can declare to His disciples that seeing Him is the same as seeing the Father. J. Scott 
Horrell, “Toward a Biblical Model of the Social Trinity: Avoiding Equivocation of Nature and Order,” in Journal of 
the Evangelical Theological Society 47, no. 3 (Sept 2004), 407. An analogy may be helpful to demonstrate the 
concept of perichoresis. We can think of three tuning forks that are tuned to the exact pitch. Now imagine placing 
the tuning forks [say, TFA, TFB, and TFC] in such a way that each can equally penetrate the others. TFA is placed 
in such a way that it is directed toward TFB and TFC. TFB is placed so that it is directed toward TFA and TFC. 
Lastly, TFC is placed so that it is directed TFA and TFB. When simultaneously struck, each individual pitch of the 
tuning forks mutually penetrates the others. On the one hand, the three tuning forks are putting forth distinct sounds, 
yet, on the other, the pitch from each tuning fork is exactly the same, interpenetrating one another. Now, all 
analogies break down, and surely this one has its limitations. For instance, tuning forks are not personal kinds of 
things. Moreover, in order for a tuning fork to work, it needs an agent to strike it for the sound to release. But what’s 
key is the picture of interpenetration that takes place. Each pitch is distinct, yet unified as they penetrate one another. 
Here, we may think of each person of the Trinity as distinct (not separated), yet mutually indwelling the other. Each 
person is open up to, and moving toward, the other in mutual interpenetration.  
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 Given the doctrine of perichoresis, we can now see how the Elder could proclaim such a 
statement about God’s nature. God is love is not merely a statement about God’s character, nor is 
it a statement primarily about how God acts towards His creatures; rather, it is an ontological 
claim about the very nature of the inner life of the triune God. The very nature of God is such 
that the three persons of the Trinity exist in eternal self-giving love toward the ‘other’. There is 
complete indwelling and mutual interpenetration between the persons of the Trinity. As 
philosopher Stephen T. Davis suggests with respect to perichoresis, “the core of God’s inner 
being is the highest degree of self-giving love. The Persons are fully open to each other, their 
actions ad extra are actions in common, they ‘see with each other’s eyes’, the boundaries 
between them are transparent to each other, and each ontologically embraces the other.”45 At the 
core of all of existence is a dynamic “loving relationship among persons.”46  
 In creating humans, it may be suggested that, what God wanted to do was to bring about 
in his creatures what we see in the perichoretic relationship of the divine persons. God wanted to 
create individuals who could, in a very real sense, be like God, in that they share in the same 
kind of or similar capacity for, what I shall call, deep love, as exemplified within the 
interpenetrating life of the persons within the tri-unity of God. This deep love is God’s own love. 
At its heart, deep love is active movement toward the other. It is not the kind of love that is “self-
seeking” or “boastful” (1 Cor 13:4-7), nor is it passive sympathetic response; rather, it is self-
giving in nature, seeking out union with and what’s best for the other. Human persons, as 
creatures, then, were created with the ability to relate with and love other persons on the deepest 
                                                 
 45 Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2006), 72.  
 
 46 Stephen T. Davis, “God’s Action,” In Defense of Miracles, eds. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary Habermas 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 176.  
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levels possible. It is this capacity for deep love and relationality that separates humans from all 
other created beings.  
 From a Trinitarian grounding, then, this means that humans not only have certain 
qualities (structure) like God, and that they are capable of performing certain tasks (function) 
like Him, but that they are also created to be relational like God. The very notion of relationality 
like God’s own—relationality that can demonstrate itself in deep love for another—can only be 
so if the human person is freely capable of being relational, that is, if the person is capable of 
freely reciprocating or not reciprocating love. Humans, then, who were created in God’s image 
and likeness, were not only capable of receiving love from God, but also capable of reciprocating 
such love. As Marilyn Adams suggests, “God made human beings to enter into nonmanipulative 
relationships of self-surrendering love with himself and relationships of self-giving love with 
others.”47  
 If humans have the capacity for loving God, then it would also imply that the opposite is 
true. From the biblical narrative we see that is what happened with humans. Rather than 
choosing to love God, humans sinned and rebelled against Him. Christians typically define sin as 
disobedience to or rebellion against God’s law or commands. Sin is surely that, but this 
definition does not go far enough. It does not capture the nature or essence of just what sin is. At 
its core, sin is violence and opposed to love. It is violence because, rather than looking out for 
what’s best for the other, it exalts the self at the expense of the other. All sin, whether intentional 
or unintentional, brings division, separation, and alienation. It is violent in that it breaks harmony 
between humans and God, humans and humans, and humans and nature. Thus such a rift finds its 
                                                 
 47 Marilyn M. Adams, “Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil,” in The 
Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, edited by Michael L. Peterson (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992), 173. 
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way throughout all sociological, cultural, and ecological structures. But God does not leave it at 
that. As Steven Davis suggests: 
 Cosmically, the relationship between God and human beings was severed by the entrance of 
sin into the world. Personally, it is broken whenever we separate ourselves from God by sin. 
All of God’s actions in history are expressions of the personal relationship that is at the 
center of reality. God is attempting redemptively to restore human beings to the splendor of 
that relationship. Christians affirm that the relationship is fully restored through the action of 
God in the world and preeminently through God’s action in Jesus Christ. Its essence is 
summed up sublimely by the prophet Jeremiah: “I will be your God, and you shall be my 
people” (Jer 7:23). At the center of the universe is a personal relationship and a God who 
acts on its behalf.48 
 
According to Christian theism, God’s desire is for humans to have abundant life. The very 
essence of such life is in knowing God49 and living in accordance to His own being. Yet, because 
of sin, this life can only come about through the death and resurrection of Jesus, and through the 
power and work of the Holy Spirit in the life of those who believe. Because of God’s own work 
in human history, and by means of His own love toward us, humans can be set free from the 
power, corruption, and effects of sin—such freedom overturns sin that brings about alienation 
from God, other people, and creation.  It is to this Christian hope that we now turn. 
The Kingdom, Creation, Gospel, and Church 
Perhaps there was no other doctrine that Jesus taught on more often than that of the 
kingdom of God. After John the Baptist’s imprisonment, Jesus began to “proclaim” the “good 
news of God” (Mk 1:14, NIV). He proclaimed that the “kingdom of God is near” and called for 
the people to “repent and believe the good news” (Mk 1:15, NIV). Here we see an intricate 
                                                 
 48 Davis, “God’s Action,” 177.  
 
 49 John 17:3.  
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connection between the gospel, “good news” and the nearness of the kingdom of God. But how 
shall we understand the kingdom of God?     
 Robert Saucy defines the kingdom of God in the following way: “The Kingdom of God 
in Scripture is the all-embracing program of God’s divine salvation history. All ages, peoples, 
and saving activities are in some way related to it.”50 Yet, for Saucy, the concept of the kingdom 
is much broader. He explains it as follows: 
 Involved in the term kingdom (basileia) are both the sovereignty or royal dignity of a king, 
and the realm or territory in which the kingship is exercised. The kingdom of God thus 
refers to the sovereign rule of God over His creation. Although there is, in the ultimate 
sense, one kingdom of God, the Scripture uses this term for two distinct aspects of this 
kingdom. On the one hand, it signifies God’s universal, eternal rule over all creation. . . . On 
the other hand it refers to the eschatological Messianic kingdom which is to be established in 
history, which Christ announced as at hand, and for which He taught His disciples to pray. 
While the first kingdom is ruled directly by God, the second aspect is founded upon the 
covenant promises and ruled through the God-Man, Jesus Christ, the Seed of David.51  
  
Given Saucy’s understanding of the kingdom, God’s rule is, on the one hand, over all of creation. 
Consider the Lord’s Prayer. In this prayer that Jesus gave to the disciples, he instructed them to 
pray, “Your kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” (Mt 6:10, ESV). It is 
possible to understand the “your will be done, on earth as it is in heaven” clause as subordinate 
                                                 
 50 Robert L. Saucy, The Church in God's Program (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972), 83. It is unclear why 
Saucy’s definition only concerns salvation history. As noted below, especially in regards to the aspect of God’s 
universal kingdom, God’s rule expands beyond our space-time universe, even to the heavenly realm. This invites an 
important question. To what extent does salvation history, within our space-time universe, affect the heavenly realm 
or beings such as angels, if at all? Unfortunately, while the Bible does speak on heaven and angels, very little is 
given to us in regards to the effects of salvation history on these two aspects of God’s universal rule. As 1 Peter 
1:12, in regards to our salvation, that “[e]ven angels long to look into these things” (NIV).  
 
 51 Ibid; Charles C. Ryrie makes a distinction between four different “kingdoms” within the biblical text: the 
universal kingdom; the Davidic/messianic kingdom; the mystery form of the kingdom; and the spiritual kingdom. 
While these distinctions are helpful, one must wonder if it is necessary to make each distinction a separate kingdom. 
[See Charles C. Ryrie, Basic Theology: A Popular Systematic Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth (Chicago, IL: 
Moody Press, 1999), 460-461.] Perhaps it may be clearer to understand, as Saucy does, each of the so-called 
“kingdoms” as various aspects of the already/not yet kingdom of God, which is encompassed by the universal rule 
of God. For example, Richard Bauckham argues persuasively that Jesus is currently on the cosmic throne, something 
that was unheard of in Judaism. See Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other 
Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 2008), 152-181. 
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to the “Your kingdom come” clause.52 If that is the case, then Jesus is making a direct link 
between God’s will and the kingdom of God, that is to say, the coming of the kingdom on earth 
as in heaven is an expression of the will of God. The implication of this interpretation of 
Matthew 6:10 is that God’s kingdom rule extends and includes both heaven and earth. There are, 
in addition, various other depictions within Scripture which would lead one to conclude that the 
kingdom is broader in scope than to humans and the created space-time universe. For example, 
in 1 Chronicles 29:11, we are told that God’s dominion extends both to heaven and earth: 
“Yours, O LORD, is the greatness and the power and the glory and the victory and the majesty, 
indeed everything that is in the heavens and the earth; Yours is the dominion, O LORD, and You 
exalt Yourself as head over all” (NASB). Psalm 145: 13 informs us of the everlasting nature of 
God’s kingdom and dominion. God’s dominion, says the psalmist, “endures throughout all 
generations.” Thus God’s rule is not limited merely to future generations, but throughout the 
entire creation history.  
 For theologian Stanley Grenz, one cannot properly understand the concept of kingdom 
apart from the concept of community:  
 From the narratives of the primordial garden which open the curtain on the biblical story to 
the vision of white-robed multitudes inhabiting the new earth with which it concludes, the 
drama of the Scriptures speaks of community. Taken as a whole the Bible asserts that God’s 
program is directed to the bringing into being of community in the highest sense—a 
reconciled people, living within a renewed creation, and enjoying the presence of their 
Redeemer . . . The concept of community fills the idea of the kingdom of God with its 
proper content. When God’s rule is present—when God’s will is done—community 
emerges. Or viewed from the opposite direction, in the emergence of community, God’s rule 
is present and God’s will is accomplished.53      
                                                 
 52 N. T. Wright, “The Lord’s Prayer as a Paradigm of Christian Prayer,” originally published in Into God’s 
Presence: Prayer in the New Testament, ed. R. L. Longenecker, 132-54 (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2001), accessed 
December 9, 2011, www.ntwrightpage.com/Wright_Christian_Prayer.htm. 
 
 53 Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2000), 24. 
In the context of this passage, Grenz takes the concept of community, along with the kingdom of God, as his chief 
theological motif for his systematic expression of theology.  
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 Grenz defines the kingdom, quite simply, as the “divine reign.”54 But what does such a 
reign look like? Having surveyed the biblical material and current debate on the various issues 
revolving around the biblical understanding of kingdom, Grenz makes a helpful distinction 
between de jure (in principle) and de facto (in fact) rulership. Out of principle God is the ruler of 
all things. This right is His because He is the creator of all things. “Consequently,” says Grenz, 
“the entire universe is the kingdom of God or the realm of God’s dominion de jure.”55 Yet, as 
one considers the biblical data, “what is true de jure is not yet fully true de facto.”56 The reason 
for this stems from the God-given human capacity to respond to God’s rule. Thus because of our 
sin and rejection of the Creator king, “we have erected an enclave of rebellion in which another – 
Satan – appears to reign. As a creature, this de facto ruler is a usurper, for he does not possess the 
right to rule that is God’s alone.”57  
 On the one hand, the kingdom is already here, but only in part. “The divine reign,” 
explains Grenz, “is related to Christ’s first advent.” Furthermore, 
 It is a reality that people can enter (Mark 9:47; Matt. 21:31-32), for it is the kingly power of 
God. Hence, the kingdom is a “sphere of existence” in which people are called to live. It is 
incorporation into God’s powerful invasion of our world. As such it consists in doing the 
will of God (Matt. 6:10; 7:21-23), and it demands a radical decision (13:44-46).58 
 
There remains a future eschatological aspect to the kingdom connected to Christ’s Second 
Advent. With the second coming of Christ “all creation will be brought into conformity with the 
                                                 
 54 Ibid., 472. 
 
 55 Ibid., 476.  
 
56 Ibid. 
  
 57 Ibid.  
 
 58 Ibid.  
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divine intent.”59 It is only then that the earth will be in conformity to God’s will as it is in 
heaven.  
 Grenz’s analysis of the kingdom is helpful for several reasons. First, much like Saucy’s 
definition, it encompasses the whole of creation (heaven and earth). By defining God’s kingdom 
as the “divine reign,” Grenz properly gives consideration both to the cosmic reign of God and the 
future aspect of His reign that occurs at the second coming of Christ.60 But he also recognizes 
God’s reign exists apart from salvation history (e.g., God’s reign over heaven), without 
neglecting the important role that redemption has in both the present and future aspects of the 
eschatological aspect of the kingdom. Second, Grenz’s emphasis on community is helpful. As 
Grenz rightly notes, stress on community helps to divert radical individualism. Moreover, as will 
be expressed below, the inclusion of community into the kingdom motif fits with a proper 
reflection on creation (and re-creation).  
 In the creation account we find that God created the entire space-time universe (Gen 1:1; 
cf. Jn 1:1-3; 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:16-17; Heb 1:2-3), and that on the sixth day He created humans in 
his “image” according to His “likeness” (v.26-27). In this passage we see clearly that God gave 
to humans the task of taking care of and ruling over his good creation. Humans were God’s vice-
regents, ruling over the creation under God’s authority. On the one hand, as God’s vice-regents, 
they were to serve the creation, to take care of it, and to watch and care for it (Gen 2:15, 19-20; 
Ps 8:6). Yet, on the other hand, the creation is something that was (and is) to be enjoyed (Gen 
                                                 
 59 Ibid.  
 
 60 Saucy provides a helpful analysis of the already/not yet nature of the Kingdom as he works through 
Christ’s teaching in the parables on the presence of the kingdom. He argues that Jesus placed emphasis on the 
spiritual, hidden nature of the kingdom (Mk 4:26-29; Mt 13:19). Yet, Jesus also emphasized the future manifestation 
of the kindom (e.g., the parables of the musterseed and leaven). Lastly, Jesus spoke often of the present work of the 
kingdom as God’s sovereign work. See Robert L. Saucy, “The Presence of the Kingdom and the Life of the 
Church,” Bibliotheca Sacra (January-March 1988), 37-38.  
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2:9; cf. Jer 2:7; 31:5; 1 Tim 6:17; Eccl 9:9). As God’s image bearers, humans were to be “like” 
God, as His representatives to the creation.  
 The first humans were one aspect of God’s overall reign and universal kingdom. They 
were to participate in God’s universal kingdom, which includes, not only His divine authority 
ruling over all of creation, but also, such a rule which included, at its core, all that is good, pure, 
and beautiful. The creation itself is a product of God’s own love and grace, by which he allows 
something other than Himself to exist and to have life. In creating, God shares life with 
something other than Himself. As the giver of life, the kingdom of God is a kingdom of life, by 
which God shares that which is central to his own life, that is, all that is good, pure, and 
beautiful, apart from any corruption. Within the intra-trinitarian relationship we find a dynamic 
relationship between each of the persons of the Tri-une God, and that God, in making a world 
like ours, decided to share His own life with His creatures.    
 Because of sin humans are estranged from God, one another, and the creation. They are 
in need of redemption, that is to say, they need to be brought back into right relationship with 
God, one another, and creation. This is the great message of the gospel. Not only does God offer 
forgiveness of sin, but he also offers new life through the finished work of Jesus and through the 
empowering by the Holy Spirit. But how are we to understand the nature of the gospel, 
especially in relation to the kingdom of God? 
 Christians often have a limited view of the gospel. As Darrell Bock rightly points out, too 
often Christians see the gospel as being a “transaction” of sorts and miss the full meaning and 
ramifications of all that the gospel entails.61 Central to the gospel is the cross of Christ (1 
                                                 
 61 Darrell L. Bock, Recovering the Lost Gospel: Reclaiming the Gospel as Good News (Nashville, TN: 
Broadman and Holman, 2010), 2. 
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Corinthians 1:23; 15:3-5). It is the core of the good news; however, that is not the full message of 
the gospel. As Bock relays,  
 When Paul refers to the cross in this early part of 1 Corinthians, the term cross functions as 
the hub and a synecdoche for all that Jesus’ work brings. A synecdoche is a part that 
represents the whole. I mention one central thing to picture all of it. For example, if I speak 
of the Law and the Prophets, I am speaking of the whole Old Testament. If I speak of fifty 
head of cattle, I’m talking about fifty whole cows—heads, hooves, bodies, and tails—not 
just fifty heads. Likewise, when Paul speaks of the cross here [in 1 Corinthians 1:23], he is 
using the word as a synecdoche for the whole of the gospel.62 
 
Bock further notes that the gospel began with a promise of new life, and this new life is brought 
about through the giving of the promised Holy Spirit. In Genesis 12:1-3 God made a promise to 
Abraham that He would make him a great nation and that all the peoples of the earth will be 
blessed through Him. God’s faithfulness to His creation begins with the Abrahamic covenant and 
continues through the Davidic and New Covenants.63   
 There are several central themes that come out in each of these covenants. As noted, in 
the Abrahamic covenant, God promised Abraham that all the peoples of the earth would be 
blessed through him. In the Davidic covenant, God promised David an ancestor and a throne that 
would last forever. In the New Covenant God promised that He would bring about renewal to 
His people (Jer 31:31-34). Similarly, in the book of Ezekiel, God promises to “cleanse” His 
people from all their “filthiness,” to give them a “new heart and put a new spirit” within them, 
and to remove their “heart of stone,” giving them “a heart of flesh.” He will then put His “Spirit” 
within them and “cause” them “to walk” according to God’s “statutes” (Ezek 36:25-28, NASB). 
We see from these two passages an emphasis on God’s renewal in two ways, first through 
cleansing and making His people clean, removing their hearts of stone, and, second, through 
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writing His law upon their hearts, giving them a heart of flesh, and putting His Spirit within 
them.  
 The promise of the forgiveness of sins and the coming of the Holy Spirit is what we see 
fulfilled through the finished work of Jesus in the Gospels and Acts, and thus mirrors the two 
works of Christ, His death on the cross for forgiveness of sins and His resurrection, which is a 
foreshadowing of our own resurrection. In Luke 3:16, John the Baptist proclaims that “One is 
coming who is mightier than I, and I am not fit to untie the thong of His sandals; He will baptize 
you with the Holy Spirit and fire” (NASB). Furthermore, in Luke 24:49, Jesus tells his disciples 
that the Scriptures predicted “that the Christ would suffer and rise again from the dead on the 
third day,” and that “repentance for forgiveness of sins would be proclaimed in His name to all 
the nations, beginning from Jerusalem” (NASB). In the book of Acts, the giving of the 
forgiveness of sins and the promised Holy Spirit is a continual theme throughout the various 
proclamations. In Acts 1:8, Jesus tells his disciples that they are to wait in Jerusalem until they 
receive the Holy Spirit; when they do they will “receive power.” On the day of Pentecost, the 
disciples were given the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:1-13). This fulfilled the prophecy in Joel 2:28-32 
that God would “pour forth” His “Spirit on all mankind” (NASB), the same Spirit give to the 
Gentiles, as shown later throughout Acts (Acts 10:47; 15:7-8). As Bock points out, the first 
gospel message presented in Acts, not only included mention of the forgiveness of sins, but also 
the promise of “the reception of the Spirit of God, the reception of a promise God had made to 
enable His people.”64    
 The effects of the gospel are not limited, however, to human redemption, but also entails 
God’s saving work throughout all of creation, which is mirrored in Christ’s resurrection. God’s 
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plan includes reconciling creation to Himself, as noted in Colossians 1:20, “and through him to 
reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, making peace by the blood of his 
cross” (ESV). Similarly, in the book of Romans, Paul connects directly the redemption of the 
creation with human redemption. The creation itself “waits in eager longing” and “has been 
groaning together in the pains of childbirth” (Rom 8:19, 22, ESV). Yet, as Paul notes, we have 
been given the “first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, ESV). It is unclear exactly what Paul means 
by this. Within the context, Paul contrasts the life lived in the flesh with the life lived in the 
Spirit. Believers are “in the Spirit” and the Spirit indwells them (Rom 8:9, 11). Those living 
according to the Spirit, and not the flesh, “set their minds on the things of the Spirit” (Rom 8:5), 
which results in “life and peace” (Rom 8:6, ESV). Furthermore, it is the Spirit who raised Christ 
and who gives those who are in Christ life (Rom 8:11). Given the context, it would seem that 
Paul is indicating that creation, too, will one day receive the effects of the Spirit’s work just as 
those who are in Christ are now experiencing His work and are indwelt by Him.  Interestingly 
enough, the book of Revelation gives a glimpse of the renewed creation, which includes 
language which speaks of God dwelling among His people: 
 2Then I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, made 
ready as a bride adorned for her husband. 3 And I heard a loud voice from the throne, saying, 
“Behold the tabernacle of God is among men, and He will dwell among them, and they shall 
be His people, and God Himself will be among them, 4 and He will wipe away every tear 
from their eyes; and there will no longer be any mourning, or crying, or pain; the first things 
have passed away.”5 And He who sits on the throne said, “Behold, I am making all things 
new.” (Rev 21:2-5, NASB) 
 
Note that God Himself will “tabernacle,” “dwell,” and “be among them.” Interestingly enough, 
this language is strikingly similar to the language found in the Gospel of John, when the Gospel 
writer speaks of Jesus’ incarnation, “And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we 
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saw His glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father” (Jn 1:14, NASB). Millard Erickson 
captures well the essence of the incarnational language: 
 The most amazing assertion is that “the Word became flesh” (1:14). The reference is not to 
some timeless occurrence, but to a specific event at a definite point in history. Note that 
John does not say that the Word “appeared as” or “showed himself in” flesh, but that he 
actually “became” flesh. That this was not only a definite historical occurrence but a 
continuing fact is seen in the phrase “and dwelt among us” (v.14). The term is a strong one, 
which literally means “tabernacled among us” or “pitched his tent among us.” It conveys the 
idea of a lengthy period of residence rather than a temporary visit.65 
 
While there is some parallel between Revelation 21:2-5 and John 1:14, it must be made clear, 
however, that there is one central difference. In the incarnation the Son of God became flesh. 
Scripture is not speaking of God adding creation to Himself, as the Son of God added a human 
nature in the incarnation. Nevertheless, what we do see taking place in the eschaton is something 
radical—God himself will dwell among His people. It is unclear how exactly this will take place. 
Several places in Scripture speak of the impossibility of humans seeing God. In John 1:18 the 
text says that no one has “seen God at any time” except for the Son who was at the Father’s side. 
In a similar vein, Paul tells his readers that God alone “possesses immortality and dwells in 
unapproachable light, whom no man has seen or can see” (1 Tim 6:16, NASB). If my assessment 
of Romans 8:23 is correct, perhaps, then, it is the Spirit, the same divine person of the Trinity 
working in and indwelling us, who will be the one who indwells creation. At the very least, it is 
the Spirt, who is the agent of re-creation, who will be involved in not only our own redemption 
and renewal, but the renewal of all creation.66  
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Lastly, we find similar language regarding God’s cosmic plan for redemption employed 
in the book of Ephesians. Yet the language is intricately connected to the mission of church. 
Howard A. Snyder defines the church as, “The community of God’s people—a people called to 
serve God and called to live together in true Christian community as a witness to the character 
and virtues of God’s reign.” 67 As Snyder further reminds us (and as we saw in the previous 
section), God is about saving souls; however, such a definition of the gospel is much too narrow. 
The church’s mission is much broader than that.68  
 According to Snyder, the mission of the church “is nothing other than bringing all things 
and, supremely, all people on earth under the dominion and headship of Jesus Christ.”69 As 
Snyder reminds us, in the book of Ephesians we catch a glimpse of the church’s role in God’s 
cosmic plan. In Ephesians 1:7-10 Paul expresses that, 
 in him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, in accordance with 
the riches of God’s grace that he lavished on us with all wisdom and understanding. And he 
made known to us the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure, which he purposed 
in Christ, to be put into effect when the times will have reached their fulfillment—to bring 
all things in heaven and earth together under one head, even Christ. (NIV) 
 
God’s plan is, in the words of Snyder, “that God may glorify himself by uniting all things in 
Christ.”70 The biblical vision is that of the whole creation as coming together to worship God, 
and hence, the key concept is that of reconciliation. As expressed by Snyder, “God’s plan is for 
the restoration of his creation, for overcoming, in judgment and glorious fulfillment, the damage 
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done to persons and nature through the Fall.”71 This plan took place before “the foundation of the 
world” (Eph 1:4, NASB). God is reconciling all things to Himself, not just humans, but all of 
creation (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20; Rom 8:18-23; Rev 21:1-5). It is the restoration of all things to his 
original intentions that will finally be brought about through the eschatological coming of the 
King of Kings and Lord of Lords. The church’s role, then, is to be a part of God’s plan for 
reconciliation. As Paul expresses in his second letter to the Corinthians, “God was in Christ 
reconciling the world to Himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and He has given to 
us the word of reconciliation” (2 Cor 5:19, NASB). Therefore, those who belong to the church 
are to be “ambassadors for Christ” (2 Cor 5:20, NASB), and thus, ministers of reconciliation.  
 Before moving on, it should be noted that there is another relation between the kingdom 
of God and the church, namely, the church is a glimpse of what is to come. Those who have been 
reconciled to Christ have been given the “first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, NASB). They are 
“in Christ” through the indwelling Holy Spirit. It is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit that brings 
new life, and it is only through the empowering of the Holy Spirit that the church can fulfill its 
mission of reconciliation. Jürgen Moltmann captures this rather clearly, in his seminal work, The 
Church in the Power of the Spirit: 
 The church as the community of justified sinners, the fellowship of those liberated by Christ, 
who experience salvation and live in thanksgiving, is on the way to fulfilling the meaning of 
the history of Christ. With its eyes fixed on Christ, it lives in the Holy Spirit and thus is itself 
the beginning and earnest of the future of the new creation. It proclaims Christ alone, but the 
fact that it proclaims him is already the advent of the future of God in the word. It believes 
Christ alone; but the fact that it believes is already the sign of hope. In its liberation it 
follows Christ alone; but this is already the bodily anticipation of the redemption of the 
body. In the Lord’s supper it remembers and makes present the death of Christ, which leads 
to life; but the fact that this happens is a foretaste of the peace to come. It only confesses 
Jesus, the crucified, as Lord; but the kingdom of God is anticipated in this confession. This 
relationship between what happens and the fact that it happens can only be understood 
pneumatologically. The community and fellowship of Christ which is the church comes 
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about ‘in the Holy Spirit’. The Spirit is this fellowship. Faith perceives God in Christ and 
this perception itself the power of the Spirit.72 
 
In this passage, Moltmann captures the already/not yet aspect of the kingdom. It is the church 
“in” God’s kingdom that stands in tension and hope between the current indwelling and 
empowering of the Spirit, the abundant life that only God can provide, and the final 
eschatological promise of reconciling all things to God and making all things new in heaven and 
on earth.  
Theosis and the Kingdom of God 
 Having given consideration to the relationship between the kingdom of God, creation, the 
gospel, and the church, I now turn to the Eastern Orthodox teaching of theosis. What relation 
does this ancient doctrine bear to God’s original intentions for His creation and the kingdom, and 
what are the implications for the church today, if any at all? I begin by sketching a brief 
theological and biblical view of the doctrine, stressing the work of Irenaeus and Athanasius, 
followed by an examination of the doctrine of theosis as connected to God’s work in the 
reconciliation of “all things.”   
 In its basic understanding, theosis means “deification” or “becoming God.”73 The first 
historical Christian expression of the doctrine is found in Irenaeus’s Against Heresies. Here 
Irenaeus expresses that no one else could obtain the throne of David other than Jesus Christ. He 
was the one whom God “promised by the law and the prophets that He would make His salvation 
visible to all flesh; so that He would become the Son of man for this purpose, that man also 
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might become the son of God.”74 The reason for the incarnation was for the redemption of our 
human nature. The Word became flesh so that “He might win back to God that human nature 
(hominem) which had departed from God.”75 Similarly, humanity could not have learned the 
ways of God apart from the Word becoming man.76 The incarnation ultimately brought about our 
union with God: 
 Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, 
and His flesh for our flesh, and has also poured out the Spirit of the Father for the union and 
communion of God and man, imparting indeed God to men by means of the Spirit, and, on 
the other hand, attaching man to God by His own incarnation, and bestowing upon us at His 
coming immortality durably and truly, by means of communion with God.77 
 
It was through incarnation that Christ took upon our human nature, giving up both soul and body 
for our behalf. It is by the blood of the Lord that humans are redeemed. In so becoming incarnate 
we receive “immortality.” We should note, too, the significant connection between Christ’s work 
and the work of the Spirit. As noted, in giving us the Holy Spirit humans receive God, and, thus 
share in “union and communion” with God.  
 We also see the doctrine of theosis expressed in the thought of Athanasius. Central to 
Athanasius’s doctrine of theosis is his anthropology. Like many of the Greek Fathers, he made a 
clear distinction made between the Creator and the creature, but such a distinction did not result 
in a disjunctive dualism. The Creator alone is immortal, eternal, and incorruptible. All that exists 
was created out of nothing, unlike the Platonic doctrine that saw the artificer as forming the 
universe out of some kind of pre-existing and uncreated matter.78 In the same way, humanity was 
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created out of “non-existence.” God is the giver of life, and humans were created in a state of 
innocence, that is, a state of “incorruption.” Athanasius saw evil as “non-being, the negation and 
antithesis of good,” and thus, turning away from God, humanity became corrupted and, as a 
result, they were “in process of becoming corrupted entirely.”79 It was the Word who “had called 
them into being,” but through rebellion they “lost the knowledge of God,” and “they lost 
existence with it.” The reason for sending the Word, says Athanasius, “was for our sorry case.”80 
The beauty of the incarnation is that the very God who brought all things into existence, and who 
fashioned the very body in the virgin that he would take on, died on our behalf through His great 
love for us: 
 Thus taking a body like our own, because all our bodies were liable to the corruption of 
death, He surrendered His body to death instead of all, and offered it to the Father. This He 
did out of sheer love for us, so that in His death all might die, and the law of death thereby 
be abolished because, having fulfilled in His body that for which it was appointed, it was 
thereafter voided of its power for men. This He did that He might turn again to incorruption 
men who had turned back to corruption, and make them alive through death by the 
appropriation of His body and by the grace of His resurrection. Thus He would make death 
disappear from them as utterly as straw from fire.81 
 
Toward the end of his work on the incarnation of the Word of God, Athanasius says something 
surprising and startling: that the Word “assumed humanity that we might become God.”82 This 
may sound strange to our modern ears, but it was a common thought among the Greeks of 
Athanasius’s time. His readers would have understood the implications. According to 
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Athanasius, the Son took on our human nature that we might “perceive the Mind of the unseen 
Father” and that He “endured shame from men that we might inherit immortality.” 83 In so doing, 
He did not cease being who He was, that is, He remained “impassible and incorruptible” in His 
divine nature; nevertheless, it was through His impassibility “He kept and healed the suffering 
men on whose account He thus endured.”84  
 We see the thread of theosis throughout other Fathers, particularly in the works of 
Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and 
Maximus the Confessor.85 The Fathers never understood theosis to mean that humans become 
God in some ontological sense. Only the Triune God is a se, eternal, and without generation. In 
becoming deified, humans never cease being what they are; rather, they are transformed and are, 
thus, fulfilled in their humanity. While they were created “sinless,” there was always the 
possibility of corruption. In the eschaton, humans will be transformed and brought into a state of 
“maturity and perfection through the regenerative grace of God and become not only sinless but 
also incapable anymore of falling into sin.”86 
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 According to Eastern Orthodox thinkers, there are key Scriptures which point to the 
doctrine of theosis (2 Pet 1:4; Ps 82:6; and John 10:34-35; 17:21-23).87 Perhaps the strongest 
passage is 2 Peter 1:4, which informs us that believers, through God’s promise, “may become 
partakers of the divine nature, having escaped the corruption that is in the world by lust” 
(NASB). Because of their becoming “partakers of the divine nature” and because they have 
“escaped corruption,” believers are to apply diligence “in” their “faith,” adding spiritual 
qualities, which include, “moral excellence,” “knowledge,” “self-control,” “perseverance,” 
“godliness,” “brotherly kindness,” and “love” (2 Pet 1:5-7, NASB). These qualities should 
belong in the life of believers and they should be “increasing” (2 Pet 1:8, NASB). When a 
believer lacks such qualities, he is “blind” and has “forgotten his purification from his former 
sins” (2 Peter 1:9, NASB). Note the comparison between “having escaped the corruption that is 
in the world by lust” and having received “purification.” Thus believers have been purified and 
are to practice such qualities, that is, such qualities that are consistent with becoming “partakers 
of the divine nature.” Believers are capable of such qualities because God’s “divine power has 
granted to us everything pertaining to life and goodness” (2 Peter 1:3, NASB). And, in so doing, 
believers are being like God, “who called us by His own glory and excellence” (2 Pet 1:3, 
NASB).    
 Another significant passage is John 17, where Jesus prays that all those whom He has 
been given by the Father “may all be one; even as You, Father, are in Me and I in You, that they 
also may be in Us, so that the world may believe that You sent Me. . . . I in them and You in Me, 
that they may be perfected in unity, so that the world may know that You sent Me, and loved 
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them, even as you have loved Me” (Jn 17:21, 23, NASB). This unity that Jesus prays for is a 
unity that He and the Father share, and, yet, it seems that in some way believers will also be “in” 
both the Father and Son. This instance in John 17 is not, however, an anomalous thought in the 
New Testament. Similarly, throughout the Pauline epistles Christians are said to be “in Christ” or 
that Christ is “in” believers. 2 Corinthians 5:15-21, which I touched on earlier, states that the 
reason Christ died was “so that they who live might no longer live for themselves, but for Him 
who died and rose again on their behalf” (2 Cor 5:15, NASB). In verses 16-17, Paul goes on to 
reiterate that we do not know anyone according to the flesh, but rather, “if anyone is in Christ, he 
is a new creature; the old things passed away; behold, new things have come” (2 Cor 5:17, 
NASB). Those who are in Christ have been changed, they are a new creature, and are thus to be 
ministers of reconciliation (2 Cor 15:18-20). In verse 21, Paul tells the Corinthians that God 
“made Him who knew no sin to be sin on our behalf, so that we might become the righteousness 
of God in Him.” Thus we are given reconciliation to God so that we may be like God, that is, to 
“become the righteousness of God.” This takes place “in” Christ. This “in” language occurs in 
other places throughout the Pauline corpus (Eph 1:3-4, 26; 2:10; 4:12-16; 5:23-32; Col 1:27; Gal 
2:20).88 Furthermore Christ is the true “image” of the Father (Col 1:15-18), and Christians are to 
be renewed in the image of God (Eph 3:16-19; 4:13-15).89  
What, then, is the connection between theosis, the church, and the kingdom of God? As 
noted, there is a distinction between the church and the kingdom of God. Moreover, the church’s 
mission is to share in the ministry of reconciliation, taking the “good news” of Christ to the 
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world, and being a part of what God is doing to reconcile all things to Himself. Central to the 
gospel message is Jesus’ death and resurrection. It was Jesus’ death that secured for us our 
salvation, and it was his resurrection which points to our future renewal, yet there is a sense in 
which we experience our future reality now, especially when Paul iterates to us that we are the 
“first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom 8:23, NASB). We enter into this salvation by grace through faith 
because of the finished work of Christ (Eph 2:8-9). Believers are said to be justified (Rom 4:3, 
16; 5:1); adopted as sons and daughters (Rom 5:15, 23; 9:4; Gal 4:5; Eph 1:5); sanctified (1 Cor 
1:2); washed, regenerated, and renewed by the Holy Spirit (Tit 3:5); and given the Holy Spirit 
(Titus 3:6) as a deposit and guarantee of our future redemption (2 Cor 1:22; Eph 1:13-14; 4:30). 
It is the Holy Spirit who brings life and works in us (sanctification) to bring about people who 
are transformed, and who are to be workers for the kingdom. Paul tells the church in the letter to 
the Ephesians that believers have working in them God’s “incomparably great power . . . like the 
working of his mighty strength, which he exerted in Christ when he raised him from the dead and 
seated him at his right hand in the heavenly realms” (Eph 1:19-20, NIV).   
 Further, in the initial creation we find God’s good intentions for his creatures, that is, that 
they were to share in life, which reflects his own beauty and goodness. Yet, because of sin, our 
human ancestors brought about disunity between them and God, one another, and the creation. 
God is working to bring about harmony and reconciliation—the effects of the gospel in its wider 
context. The doctrine of theosis, when understood properly, refers to the entire context of human 
salvation and reconciliation, not merely of our justification, but also in regards to our 
sanctification—the part of our salvation where believers are called to “work out,” through the 
gift and empowerment of the Holy Spirit, and through God who works in them (Phil 2:12-13, 
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NIV). Further, theosis refers to the believer’s glorification, where she is finally and completely 
made new, free from sin, and brought into full union with God and creation.  
 Emphasis on theosis does not entail either pantheism or panentheism. There is no 
ontological union with God where a blending between natures takes place. God remains who He 
is and humans remain what they are. Perhaps we may understand theosis, like Myk Habets 
suggests, as “the re-creation of our lost humanity in the dynamic, atoning interaction between the 
divine and human natures within the one person of Jesus Christ, through whom we enter into the 
triune communion of God’s intra-trinitarian life.”90 It is through Jesus Christ and Holy Spirit that 
humans participate in God. As Habets clarifies, this union is a “thoroughly personal and 
relational experiencing of the triune relations.”91 Ultimately, theosis is the bringing about of 
God’s original intentions for humans from the beginning, the capacity to share in the life of God, 
but not only that, to obtain ultimate human fulfillment. It points to our future hope and to the new 
creation, where humans will fully receive their final redemption, and ultimately obtain human 
fulfillment. Yet, this is not something that believers wait for in the eschaton. It begins now 
through the empowering work of the Holy Spirit, who works in us to bring us into a right 
relationship with God, and who also gives believers the energy and ability to live out Christian 
lives. Furthermore, the doctrine of theosis helps to redirect the proclamation of the Christian 
gospel. There is no doubt that Scripture expresses God’s wrath against sin and the sinner. 
Nevertheless, there is much more to the proclamation of God’s love, the gospel, and salvation 
than this. Again, in the words of Habets, “The ultimate goal of salvation is no longer to appease 
the wrath of an angry God but to attain to participation in the divine life through the Son by the 
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Holy Spirit. This still necessitates judgment on sin and justification of the sinner, but it does not 
end there.”92 The church can begin to preach a gospel which reflects “good news,” that is, a 
gospel grounded in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which brings hope of new life to a 
lost and dying world.  
Concluding Thoughts 
I began this chapter by giving consideration to how the doctrine of the Trinity, 
particularly the perichoretic interpenetrating relationship among the divine persons, impacts a 
variety of other Christian doctrines. Not only is the doctrine of the Trinity essential to Christian 
theology, but, as I will show in the next chapter, it is central in mounting a theodicy.   
Finally, when we reflect on each of the above themes—the kingdom, creation, gospel, 
and theosis—we see that God is doing something radical in the world. According to Christian 
theology, He is bringing about a world in which His everlasting kingdom will reign supreme. 
This kingdom resembles the perichoretic relationship within the Trinity. There is a sense in 
which God’s human creatures are taken into the divine relationship through divine activity, 
though we must be careful here and recognize that there is some mystery to it. God and His 
creatures become one in union, though this union is not ontological. Furthermore, it is not that 
God’s creatures penetrate God, as we see in the interpenetration of the divine persons of the 
Trinity. Rather, the penetration seems one way. God, through God’s dynamic working and 
movement, and through God’s indwelling Spirit, will bring about a world by which His presence 
will penetrate all of creation in such a way that His divine beauty, goodness, and radiance will 
fill all of creation. This, we may call, the perichoretic kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 8: TOWARD A FULLER THEODICY 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will attempt to bring together all that I have argued thus far by means of 
a theodicy. I begin by sketching out three theodicies that have been suggested by Christians. I 
will attempt to show the limitations of such theodicies, while recognizing that some, more so 
than others, have their own merit and should be worked into an overall theodicy. I will then 
move on to formulate a proposed theodicy grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine 
Trinity, which I have dubbed the “Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy” (TPT). But one further 
point must be considered, which I will tackle in the conclusion of this chapter. 
Any adequate theodicy must not only answer why God allows for the amount, types, and 
kinds of evil that He does, but it must also answer the existential question of evil. While no doubt 
the problem of evil has its share of philosophical and theological difficulties, I believe at the 
heart of the issue of evil is the question: If God exists, what is He doing about all of the evil in 
the world? This is an existential or religious question as much as it is a theological and 
philosophical one. This question has been the motivation and drive behind this present work. 
When people ask questions such as Why does God allow X?, they often do not see God at work. 
After all, if God were working, then X would not have occurred. Providing justifying reasons for 
why God allows evil in the world is only part of the equation. They also want to see that God has 
not abandoned us and that He is really doing something to stop evil in this world. It is to these 
two questions—the “why” and the “what”—that I now turn. It is my contention that TPT 
provides not only an adequate justifying reason for why God allows evil in the world and redeem 
those sufferings already experienced, but also gives a parameter and framework for thinking 
about an adequate response to the religious or existential problem from evil.  
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Theodical Suggestions 
 In what follows I work through three theodicies often proposed by Christians to justify 
God’s reasoning for allowing evil in the world. While each has its own merits, there are certain 
limitations of each theodicy. Despite such limitations, we should not jettison them entirely. 
Rather, each provides important angles for thinking through an adequate response to why God 
allows evil in the world. 
Freewill Theodicy 
 I begin by discussing, perhaps, the most popular response to why God allows evil in the 
world—the Freewill theodicy.1 Before moving on to the main line of argument, it would be 
helpful to consider what it means to say that a creature is free. 
 A creature is significantly free if, say, given a choice between two morally significant 
actions x and y, it has the capacity to make such a choice, without thereby being determined or 
forced into performing one action over the other,2 or as Plantinga puts it, “no antecedent 
conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won’t.”3  If a 
creature is significantly free, not even God can bring it about that the agent chooses one action 
                                                 
1 The Freewill theodicy was first proposed by Augustine, but has been adapted over the years by various 
theologians and philosophers. Perhaps the clearest expression is put forward by Alvin Plantinga. It should be noted, 
however, that Plantinga’s own version is not a theodicy; rather, it is a defense. A theodicy, according to Plantinga, 
seeks to show God’s reason for allowing certain evils. A defense, on the other hand, is much more modest in what it 
claims. It does not attempt to show why God allows evil; rather, it only attempts to show that there is no 
inconsistency between God’s existence and evil in the world. While I recognize the difference between a defense 
and a theodicy, I am concerned more with understanding it as a theodicy for the purposes of this chapter, since I do 
recognize in formulating a fuller theodicy that the notion of libertarian freedom is a central feature of God’s reason 
for allowing certain kinds of evil in the world. For a fuller discussion of the difference between a theodicy and 
defense, see Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977), 
28-29.  
 
 2 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 29-30; Peter van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil,” in Christian 
Faith and the Problem of Evil, edited by Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2004), 64.     
 
 3 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 29.   
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over the other.4 Now that an understanding of what I mean by “freewill” has been given, an 
exposition of the Freewill theodicy will follow.  
 According to the Freewill theodicy, among those possible worlds that God could have 
created, a world in which significantly free creatures exist would be more valuable than a world 
without such creatures. But if God creates a world in which creatures have the capacity for moral 
good, then it must also be the case that such creatures have the capacity for moral evil. Given 
such a capacity to perform morally significant actions, some of those creatures rebelled against 
God. As many theists will argue, creaturely free agency is the cause of moral evil in the world.5  
 Some atheologians, however, find such a theistic response deficient on several fronts. I 
shall consider three. First, the atheologian may argue that the Freewill theodicy, while it answers 
the problem of moral evil, says nothing about natural evil. This objection, however, may be a bit 
premature. Some have argued that even so-called natural evils are, in actuality, the result of the 
moral choices of God’s free creatures, specifically powerful beings that rebelled against God and 
that seek to wreak havoc on God’s good creation. So, in the end, all evils that occur are 
ultimately moral.6 Not everyone, however, is keen on holding fallen angels responsible for 
natural evil. For instance, Richard Swinburne and Peter Harrison find the suggestion that angelic 
beings are behind natural evils ad hoc, and caution against such a view.7 While I can sympathize 
                                                 
 
 4 Van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil,” 64.  
 
 5 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 30. 
  
 6 See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 59-64 ; Gregory Boyd has constructed a defense of what he 
calls the “Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.” In this theodicy, natural evils in large part fall on the actions of free 
agents, particularly demonic agents-chiefly Satan—who have power to destroy, manipulate creation, and cause 
much harm. But Boyd would argue that Satan is not sufficient to explain natural evil. Gregory Boyd, Satan and the 
Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 17-
18, 29-49.  
 
 7 Richard. Swinburne, “Natural Evil.” American Philosophical Quarterly 15, no. 4 (October 1978): 296; 
Peter Harrison, “Theodicy and Animal Pain.” Philosophy 64, no. 247 (January 1989): 80. Just to be clear, 
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with Swinburne and Harrison’s fear, it is not at all implausible, given that an omnipotent being 
exists, and when taken into connection with the data that we view from our own world, such as 
the great variety and complexity of creatures that we observe. Could God not have created beings 
that are equally or more powerful than we are, yet creatures that are very much like the kind we 
find in the Bible, who seek to ruin God’s good creation? Perhaps if such creatures are as 
powerful as described in the Bible, they could be behind much of the goings on of evil in nature. 
So, at least these powerful beings could stand behind some of the natural evils in the world. So, 
one cannot fully rule out the Freewill theodicy as a partial response to natural evils. But like 
Swinburne and Harrison, the atheologian may not be satisfied. So, in this sense, the Freewill 
theodicy is limited.8  
 The second objection centers on whether God could have made free creatures in such a 
way that they would always freely perform morally good actions. Or at least, could not God have 
brought about the world in such a way in which creatures would always choose what is right? H. 
J. McCloskey makes the following argument:  
 might not God have very easily so have arranged the world and biased man to virtue that 
men always freely choose what is right?  Clearly theists cannot consistently argue that free 
will and necessitation to virtue are incompatible, for they represent God himself as 
possessing a free will and as being incapable of acting immorally.9 
 
There are two problems with this sort of objection. First, if God “biased” his free creatures, then 
could one really say that such creatures have free will? There is no doubt that it is logically 
                                                 
Plantinga’s argument was a defense and not a theodicy. His appeal to the free agency of demonic creatures was 
intended to show that it was logically possible for God to allow such natural evils in order to meet the requirements 
for his defense.     
  
8 Due to space, I cannot rehearse the arguments, here, but in Chapter Five I address the question of natural 
evil by putting forth a natural order response. I will take the conclusions of those arguments from Chapter Five and 
wed them to the proposed theodicy below.   
  
 9 McCloskey, “On Being an Atheist,” Question 1 (February 1968), 66.  
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possible for God to have created a world in which creatures always do his bidding. Let us 
suppose that God, in some way, built into a creature’s psychological make-up a strong desire to 
always do His bidding. For example, suppose He installed some complex, say, something similar 
to a phobia, that, when faced with a choice between x and y, the creature would always act upon 
its desire to please God. But let us suppose further that this same complex would keep the person 
from performing the wrong action out of a fear of displeasing God.10 Now such a view is 
plausible; however, it is not libertarian freewill. If a creature is free, according to the libertarian 
understanding, then it is not up to God or anyone else what action some creature might choose. 
If, however, God has “built” into the creature such a mechanism so as to always desire what is 
right, then, the choice is based on that desire, which was “fixed” by God, and not a response 
from the agent’s willing. But, as Plantinga has forcefully shown, the heart of the freewill 
argument is to suggest that it may have been metaphysically impossible for God to actualize such 
a world.11 Plantinga gives an example of a politician named Curly, who accepts a bribe of 
$35,000. But Smedes, the one who bought Curly with the bribe, wonders if he could have gotten 
Curly for less, say $20,000. Given this scenario, it seems that one of two outcomes is possible: 1) 
If Curly had been offered $20,000, he would have taken it; and 2) If Curly had been offered 
$20,000, he would not have taken it. Either choice is logically possible; however, if Curly is 
significantly free, then whichever of the two actions he chooses, whether Curly accepts the bribe 
or whether he rejects it, it means that the other is a state of affairs (possible world) such that God 
                                                 
 10 Van Inwagen, “The Argument from Evil,” 66.   
 
 11 Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 31. Note here that I am speaking of metaphysical possibility and not 
logical possibility. Without doubt it was logically possible for God to create such a world, whereby creatures with 
libertarian freedom could always do the good, but given that humans have libertarian freedom, whether such a world 
ever takes place or not is not entirely up to God. Not every logically possible world, in others words, is a feasible 
one, one able to be actualized by God. 
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could not have actualized it. So the moral of the story is that, if Plantinga’s argument is 
successful, there are some worlds that God could not have weakly actualized.12  
 Concerning the second part of McCloskey’s objection, it seems that he is mixing 
proverbial apples with oranges. There is a difference between a necessary being, who has as His 
essential nature the quality of being good, and that of a finite, contingent being, who does not 
have “goodness” as an essential part of its nature. Moreover, there is a significant difference 
between being good and the capacity to do good.    
 William Rowe provides a third objection to the Freewill theodicy. In Response to 
William Alston, Rowe makes the following claim: 
 But, of course, it is sometimes right to curtail a particular exercise of free will when one foresees or 
predicts that its exercise is evil and/or will result in considerable suffering. Since curtailing a 
particular exercise of free will does not significantly diminish a person’s overall degree of freedom, 
the question at hand is whether it is rational to believe that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good 
being would have prevented the particular exercise of free will (if that is what it was) Sue’s attacker 
engaged in when he brutally beat, raped, and strangled the five-year-old child.13 
 
Here, it may be true that by “curtailing” some exercise of free will that it would not take away or 
diminish a person’s overall freedom. But there are several items to consider. First, while God’s 
curtailing one act of freewill may not, necessarily, diminish that person’s overall degree of 
freedom, we must discern how that one act of freedom interconnects with a variety of other acts 
of freedom. Would God, by removing some exercise of free will, eliminate several other inter-
connected acts of freewill? Second, how would one draw the line in the curtailing of such 
freedoms? Just because it may appear to us, in this one particular instance, that it would have 
been better for God to curtail a certain exercise of freedom, we cannot see the ripple effects or 
                                                 
 12 Ibid., 45-49.  
 
 13  William L. Rowe, “The Evidential Argument from Evil: A Second Look,” in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 279-280. 
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repercussions that such might cause. Without drawing the line in a way that inevitably may seem 
to those afflicted with cognitive limitations such as ours, God’s interventions would almost 
certainly prove to become ubiquitous. 
Soul-Making Theodicy 
The Soul-making theodicy has been proposed by such theological figures as the Church 
Father, Irenaeus, and the Protestant liberal theologian, Frederic Schleiermacher.14 But, perhaps, it 
was John Hick who most famously advanced this argument in his work Evil and the God of 
Love. Hick, working from the theological anthropology of Irenaeus, suggests that God created 
human beings in two stages. The first stage was to create human beings with personal life, who 
were rational and capable of having a relationship with God. This, says Hick, was easy 
(anthropomorphically speaking) for God to do. The second stage, however, was not something 
that God could bring about by “divine fiat.”15 Concerning this second stage, Hick says “personal 
life is essentially free and self-directing. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through 
the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and 
reactions in the world in which God has placed them.”16 What is it, then, that God wanted to 
bring about in His creatures? Hick believes that God, in wanting to “bring many sons to glory,”17 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of their views  see James Spiegel, “The Irenaean Soul-Making Theodicy,” in God and 
Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain, eds. Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr. (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2013), 81-86.   
 
15 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love. Reissued (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 255. 
 
16 Ibid.  
 
17 Ibid., 256. Here Hick quotes Hebrews 2:10.  
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put human beings into the kind of world that would produce certain characteristics within them. 
Through the world that God created He wanted to build souls.18   
Hick believes that Irenaeus provides an “outline” to approaching the problem from evil in 
his theology that stands in contrast to the Augustinian model of the tragic Fall of humanity.19 He 
goes on to explain: 
 Instead of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then incomprehensibly 
destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and misery, Irenaeus suggests that man 
was created as an imperfect, immature creature who was to undergo moral development and 
growth and finally be brought to the perfection intended for him by his Maker. Instead of the 
fall of Adam being presented, as in the Augustinian tradition, as an utterly malignant and 
catastrophic event, completely disrupting God’s plan, Irenaeus pictures it as something that 
occurred in the childhood of the race, an understandable lapse due to weakness and 
immaturity rather than an adult crime full of malice and pregnant with perpetual guilt. And 
instead of the Augustinian view of life’s trials as a divine punishment for Adam’s sin, 
Irenaeus sees our world of mingled good and evil as a divinely appointed environment for 
man’s development towards the perfection that represents the fulfillment of God’s good 
purpose for him.20 
 
For Hick, humans were created with an epistemic distance from God. He thinks the Christian 
creation “myth” provides a basic portrait of human freedom. Humans were not created in a high 
and lofty state, where they were in “a continuous awareness of God’s environing presence”; 
rather, what we see is a portrait of “a frail, uncertain creature living in his own world, to which 
God is but an occasional visitor.”21 Hick continues, “when God summoned man out of the dust 
of the evolutionary process He did not place him in the immediate consciousness of His own 
presence but in a situation from which man could, if he would, freely enter into the divine 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 257.  
 
19 Ibid., 214. 
 
20 Ibid., 214-215. 
 
21 Ibid., 282.  
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Kingdom and presence.”22 For Hick, however, the epistemic distance that humans now face was 
not a result of the Fall; rather, it is the situation of our human experience as being a creature of 
God who has not yet fully arrived to his destination. God’s human creatures, left in such an 
environment, would lead, inevitably, to turning away from God.23  
For Hick evil is a necessary feature of our world without which certain goods could not be 
had. He posits two worlds, one a “hedonistic paradise” and the other the world in which we live 
that has a great amount of evils in it. The atheistic antagonist, says Hick, expects the world to be 
like the former. Since the world is not like that, “it proves to them that God is either not loving 
enough or not powerful enough to create such a world.”24 But what was God’s ultimate purpose? 
Was it to make a world that is convenient and comfortable, or does God aim to create a world 
with an environment that builds “moral beings . . . through their own free insights and 
responses”?25 On this point, Hick continues by providing an analogy between a parent and his 
children, which he believes clarifies God’s purposes in creating this world: 
 I think it is clear that a parent who loves his children, and wants them to become the best 
human beings that they are capable of becoming, does not treat pleasure as the sole and 
supreme value. Certainly we seek pleasure for our children, and take great delight in 
obtaining it for them; but we do not desire for them unalloyed pleasure at the expense of 
their growth in such even greater values as moral integrity, unselfishness, compassion, 
courage, humour, reverence for the truth, and perhaps above all the capacity for love. . . . 
And to most parents it seems more important to try to foster quality and strength of character 
in their children than to fill their lives at all times with the utmost possible degree of 
pleasure. If, then, there is any true analogy between God’s purpose for his human creatures, 
and the purpose of loving and wise parents for their children, we have to recognize that the 
presence of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for 
which the world exists. Rather, this world must be a place of soul-building.26 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 282-283.  
 
23 Ibid., 284. 
  
24 Ibid. 257.  
 
25 Ibid. 
  
26 Ibid., 258-259.  
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Thus God’s ultimate intention in creating was to produce a world in which His creatures could 
grow and obtain a certain character. In order to build souls, God would have to create a world 
that contains evil.   
 There is much that can be gleaned from Hick’s soul-making response to evil. The 
Christian theist will no doubt agree that God created the world in such a way that it was meant to 
produce a certain quality of life for His human creatures, not just bios (biological) but zoe 
(qualitative).27 In creating a world such as ours, God did not seek to create a “hedonistic 
paradise,” but as Hick rightly points out, God sought to create a world whereby His human 
creatures exhibit a character that is full of “moral integrity, unselfishness, compassion, courage, 
humour, reverence for the truth, and perhaps above all the capacity for love.”28  
Furthermore, there is a sense in which God created his human creatures with some 
epistemic distance.29 Upon a careful reading of Genesis narrative, Scripture seems to indicate 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 257.  
 
28 Ibid., 259.  
 
29 Hick has this to say regarding epistemic distance: “In creating finite persons to love and be loved by Him 
God must endow them with a certain relative autonomy over against Himself. But how can a finite creature, 
dependent upon the infinite Creator for its very existence and for every power and quality of its being, possess any 
significant autonomy in relation to the Creator? The only way we can conceive is that suggested by our actual 
situation. God must set man at a distance from Himself, from which he can then voluntarily come to God. But how 
can anything be set at a distance from One who is infinite and omnipresent? Clearly spatial distance means nothing 
in this case. The kind of distance between God and man that would make room for a degree of human autonomy is 
epistemic distance. In other words, the reality and presence of God must not be borne in upon men in the coercive 
way in which their natural environment forces itself upon their attention. The world must be to man, to some extent 
at least, etsi deus non daretur, ‘as if there were no God.’ God must be a hidden deity, veiled by His creation. He 
must be knowable, but only by a mode of knowledge that involves a free personal response on man’s part, this 
response consisting in an uncompelled interpretive activity whereby we experience the world as mediating the 
divine presence. Such a need for a human faith-response will secure for man the only kind of freedom that is 
possible for him in relation to God, namely cognitive freedom, carrying with it the momentous possibility of being 
either aware or unaware of his Maker” (Ibid., 281). While I agree with Hick that some amount of epistemic distance, 
perhaps a partial epistemic distance, is needed, I find his argument that such a distance “as if there were no God” a 
non-sequitur, since we do see in the Genesis narrative that God makes Himself known to His creatures and seems to 
do so on a regular basis. 
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that while God’s human creatures were aware of His presence, there is a sense, nevertheless, that 
His presence was not an immediate and overtly pervasive presence (Gen 3:8). The garden, 
according to the Genesis narrative, was something like a sacred space.30 It was a place where our 
original parents met with God. Kenneth Matthews describes this meeting as follows, along with 
the impending effects of broken fellowship sin brought about: 
 The anthropomorphic description of God “walking” (mithallēk) in the garden suggests the 
enjoyment of fellowship between him and our first parents. . . . “Walked with God” is a 
favorite expression in Genesis, depicting the righteous conduct of Israel’s heroes, including 
Enoch, Noah, and Abraham.191 Yet now the man and the woman are hiding from God in 
fear. God’s presence is also noted by his “walking” in the camp and sanctuary of Israel. 
Later Israel recognized that God demanded holiness and obedience if he were to continue to 
“walk” among his people. It was part of the sad deception that the man and woman who 
wanted so much to be “like God,” rather than obtaining the stature of deity, are afraid even 
to commune with him. The language of the verse, “the man and his wife,” imitates the 
description of the couple when in their innocence they had lived without shame (2:25). Now 
they have lost their innocence, their childlike trust in the goodness of God. “Among [i.e., in 
the midst of] the trees of the garden” echoes v. 3, which describes the forbidden tree “in the 
midst of the garden.” Their disobedience at the “tree” of knowledge leads to this hiding 
among the “trees.” They are pictured in the narrative like children hiding in fearful shame 
from their father.31 
 
Before the Fall, our original parents had fellowship with God and maintained a status of 
something like an “unconfirmed creature holiness.”32 So the Christian theist will want to nuance 
Hick’s perspective on epistemic distance a bit to suggest that it was only a partial distance, that is 
to say, such a distance did not necessitate moral evil and that there was only enough of an 
                                                 
30 For discussion of the notion of sacred space and the garden, see John H. Walton, Ancient Near Eastern 
Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2006), 118-119, 124-125.  
 
31 K. A. Mathews, Genesis 1-11:26, vol. 1A, The New American Commentary (Nashville: Broadman & 
Holman Publishers, 1996), 239–240. 
 
32 Charles C. Ryrie, Dispensationalism, revised and expanded (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 2007), 58; idem.  
Basic Theology: A Popular Systematic Guide to Understanding Biblical Truth (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1999), 
231. Ryrie’s definition of humanity’s nature as a moral being before the Fall is helpful. It recognizes that there was a 
certain quality of holiness to humanity before the Fall, though the holiness was creaturely and incomplete. 
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epistemic gap in their awareness of God that would allow them to respond in a significant 
manner. Such a distance, then, does not require evil.  
Lastly, to support the notion of soul-making, there are numerous instances within 
Scripture that would suggest our experiences—some of which are full of pain and suffering—
build our characters (Jas 1:2-4; 1 Pet 1:6-7; Rom 5:3-4; 8:17-18; Phil 3:10-11), and that these 
painful experiences often bring about great goods. 
  Hick’s soul-making theodicy, however, is not without its difficulties. The first difficulty 
is Hick’s insistence that evil is a necessary feature of this world in order to produce certain 
virtues, such as courage, patience, and compassion.33 I do not disagree with Hick, here, that in 
creating His human creatures, God wanted them to have certain virtues. But I am not convinced 
that evil, and particularly moral evil, was necessary for God to do this. All that is required is a 
world, such as ours, with some amount of risk. If, as argued in the previous section, that God 
created humans to “subdue” the earth, then there is quite a challenge in that—a challenge that 
comes with significant risk attached to it. In order to subdue the creation, to populate the earth, 
and the like, it would mean that Adam and his descendants were to travel outside of the 
boundaries of the safety of the garden paradise. Leaving safety to go out to an untamed world 
would be quite risky. Moreover, a virtue like courage does not require evil, but it does require 
risk. We can think of various kinds of projects that humans might take on, but that, nevertheless, 
may result in failure. The failure may lead to disappointment, but it does not seem to me, at least, 
that disappoint is an evil (especially if we take it that not all pain or displeasure is an evil, as I 
have argued). The disappointment of failure may lead us to step out to fulfill our goal with 
greater determination. Part of the problem that humans face is that we do not know what it is like 
                                                 
33 Spiegel, “Irenaen Soul-Making Theodicy,” 86.   
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to experience such things as failure and disappointment apart from our fallen nature. We are 
epistemically challenged by such a limitation.    
 A second difficulty is that Hick denies the Fall. While there are questions regarding the 
extent and ramifications of the Fall, it is, nevertheless, an important feature of Christian theology 
and should not be done away with. Further, like the Freewill Defense, the Fall provides some 
valuable insights for a genuine Christian theodicy.   
  The third and last difficulty is the divine determination of evil in the world so that good 
may result. In his book, God, Why This Evil?, Bruce Little takes it that any position that requires 
evil as necessary in order to bring about a greater good is problematic. 
 If the good is necessary, then so is the particular evil, for if the good could be accomplished 
with a lesser evil, then the all-good God would use the lesser evil. The end is, that the 
particular evil is necessary, for the good could not obtain without the evil and the good must 
obtain because it is necessary. If the good is necessary, and it is dependent on the evil, then 
the evil must also be necessary. If the evil is necessary, I see little hope of escaping the 
conclusion that God must have determined the evil. Otherwise, there could be no assurance 
that there would be the good. 34 
 
By affirming such a view, says Little, it “makes God directly responsible for the evil—not in a 
contingent way, but in a necessary way.”35   
Not everyone, however, finds Little’s dilemma problematic for the theist. For example, in 
a recent article, Christian philosopher James Spiegel defends a version of the soul-making 
theodicy. While he recognizes that the soul-making theodicist is forced to embrace the first horn 
of Little’s proposed dilemma, he does not find it to present a difficulty for the theist, especially 
when we consider the difference between moral evil and natural evil. By natural evil, Spiegel 
                                                 
34 Bruce A. Little, God, Why This Evil (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Books, 2010), 68. 
 
35 Ibid. 
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means any evil that refers to pain and suffering, and by moral evil he means those evils that are a 
result of immoral choices. Regarding natural evil, he says: 
 Is it problematic, from a Christian perspective, to suggest that God ordains pain and 
suffering? I don’t see why it would be, given that Scripture contains many assertions of 
God’s doing just this, such as when he punishes people for their sin (e.g., Sodom and 
Gomorrah, the Canaanites, Ananias and Sapphira) or when he tests or disciplines the 
righteous (e.g., Abraham, Job, Jesus).36 
 
I find Spiegel’s response problematic for three reasons. First, unless we hold to the hedonistic 
principle that all pain is evil, then we must be careful in nuancing our discussion of “pain” as 
being an evil. We cannot lump all forms of pain together into one category. Moreover, as argued 
in chapter four, it does not seem that pain is the real culprit; rather, it is the effect that severe pain 
has brought on us or it is the condition that brought on the pain itself in the first place that is the 
real issue. Second, it seems that Spiegel is confusing God’s permission to allow certain instances 
of evil with God’s determining certain instances of evil. If God has ordered creation in such a 
way that it allows for libertarian freedom, on the one hand, and natural processes to be as they 
were designed to be or to operate as they do (e.g., plate tectonics, quarks, atoms, biological 
processes, and so on), on the other, then there is a fair amount that God has not determined, but 
allows. Third, we must be careful not to confuse God’s bringing about judgment or discipline on 
individuals, which results in pain and suffering for the individual, with God’s determining all 
pains and suffering that take place.   
 But what about moral evil? Spiegel finds this much more problematic (as he should), but 
points to Genesis 50:20 and Acts 2:23 as possible examples. We will consider each passage in 
order.  
                                                 
36 Spiegel, “The Irenean Soul-Making Theodicy,” 89.  
261 
 
Regarding the first passage, Joseph, after having been sold into slavery by his brothers 
and eventually restored to them, proclaims, “As for you, you meant evil against me, but God 
meant it for good, to bring it about that many people should be kept alive, as they are today” 
(ESV). No doubt we see from this passage God’s sovereignty at work; however, the passage 
does not require determinism. We see determinism in this passage only if we assume 
determinism at the start.  
Consider the following analogy. Suppose that my son is about to do something to his 
sister, whereby it might cause some pain or suffering, such as pushing her down or the like. 
Now, I could either choose to stop him or I can choose to let him go through with it. Whichever 
choice I make, in either case I did not determine nor did I ordain either my son’s intentions or his 
actions, even if I have good reasons for allowing him to go through with it. Rather, what I have 
done is to permit my son to follow through with his intentions. Yet, despite my son’s actions, I 
may choose to bring some good out of it. Suppose that I send my son to time out and, in order to 
cheer up my daughter, allow her to eat ice cream while watching her favorite T. V. show. 
Through this experience my daughter might rightly say, “he meant it for evil, but you, Dad, 
meant it for good.” In the same way, why could we not understand the story of Joseph in a 
similar way? Rather than God determining the events of Joseph’s life, He brought good out of 
the free choices of His human creatures.  
Acts 2:23 is a bit more challenging than Genesis 50:20. In his sermon at Pentecost, Peter 
proclaims to the Jews listening, “this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and 
foreknowledge of God, you crucified and killed by the hands of lawless men” (ESV). No doubt 
that such a passage as Acts 2:23 demonstrates God’s sovereignty over all that takes place, but 
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does it require that God determined certain evils? Much of the answer to that question depends 
on the relationship between boulē (plan) and prognōsei (foreknowledge).  
Given the nature of the construction of the text, there is more than one possibility: (1) the 
concepts are distinct; (2) one of the concepts is subsumed under the other; (3) the concepts are in 
some sense overlapping; or (4) the terms are identical.37 Of these options, that the two are 
identical is least likely, as Daniel Wallace explains:     
 If “foreknowledge” defines “predetermination,” this opens the door that (according to one 
definition of πρόγνωσις) God’s decree is dependent on his omniscience. But if the terms are 
distinguishable, the relationship may be reversed, viz., omniscience is dependent on the 
eternal decree. Without attempting to resolve this theological issues entirely, it can 
nevertheless be argued that the “identical” view is unlikely: the least attested meaning of 
impersonal constructions is referential identity. The relationship between the two terms here 
may be one of distinctness or the subsumption of one under the other.38 
 
In this case, then, the debate cannot be solved by the construction alone. In his own view, 
Wallace takes the side of God’s prognōsei (foreknowledge) as grounded in God’s hōrismenē 
boulē (definite plan). He bases this on what he considers to be a key foci of the chapter, namely, 
“the divine plan in relation to the Messiah’s death and resurrection.”39 Whether one agrees with 
Wallace’s reasoning for grounding prognōsei in the hōrismenē boulē of God or not (I am not 
convinced that his reasoning requires it to be taken that way), the key is that the construction 
itself does not demand one way or another. Other factors must be considered, particularly the 
context, and, perhaps, other theological reasons, too. 
Historically, there was not just one position on predestination and free will in the Greco-
Roman world, nor was there only one view in Palestine during the time of Jesus and Paul. While 
                                                 
37 Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 286. 
  
38 Ibid. 
  
39 Ibid. 
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God’s sovereignty over history was a central belief of most Jews, it by no means excluded 
human free choice.40  But what if Wallace is right that prognōsei is subsumed by hōrismenē? 
Does it require determinism? Here, I think not. Suppose we translate horizō as the NIV14 has: 
“deliberate.”41 This is somewhat of a weaker word than “determined” or “predetermined,” but, 
nevertheless, seems to be a genuine possibility. When we think of “deliberate,” we have 
something in mind like “conscious” or “intentional.” Now, let us consider an analogy to flesh 
                                                 
40 For an extensive and well documented discussion, see Craig Keener, Acts: An Exegetical Commentary, 
Vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012), 927-938. 
  
41 Such a translation is justified. As for the passage in question, Luke’s use of hōrismenē (definite) is an 
attributive participle, which means that it attributes some kind of characteristic to God’s boulē (plan). In its basic 
sense, horizō means “to separate entities and establish a boundary.” [ὁρίζω. A Greek-English Lexicon of the New 
Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, ed. Frederick William Danker (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), 723.] This is how it is often taken in the LXX, as in to separate, marking out land territory or 
boundaries, or dividing/allotting an inheritance (Nu 34:6; Jos 13:7, 27; Jos 15:12; 18:20; 23:4; Pr 18:18; Ez 47:20). 
The New Testament, however, seems to use the word in a more nuanced way. For example, for the verse in 
question, the ESV and RSV renders hōrismenē as “definite”; whereas the NASB takes it as “predetermined,” the 
HCSB as “determined,”  and the NIV14 as “deliberate.”  Apart from one occurrence in Romans (1:4 “declared”) and 
one in Hebrews (4:7 “appoints”), the word is primarily found in Luke and Acts, which the ESV translates as 
“determined” (Luke 22:22; Acts 11:29; Acts 17:26) and “appoints” (Acts 10:42; Acts 17:31) in those passages. 
Interestingly enough, N. T. Wright translates Luke 22:22 much closer to how we see the word used in the LXX: “as 
it is marked out for him” [N. T. Wright, The Kingdom New Testament: A Contemporary Translation (New York: 
HarperOne, 2011), 162]. Again, Acts 17:26 seems to carry this LXX understanding, as Wright translates it, 
“allotting them their properly ordained times and the boundaries for their dwellings,” [Wright, The Kingdom New 
Testament, 276.] or the NIV14, “he marked out their appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands.” 
Even the ESV carries this idea, though it uses “determined.” What is interesting about this passage is that the 
reasoning for God marking out such “appointed times in history and the boundaries of their lands” was so that “they 
would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him” (Acts 17:27, NIV14). God no doubt is in control of 
these events, as this passage affirms; nevertheless, this passage seems to make it clear that though God has “marked 
out” or “determined” certain “appointed times in history” and “the boundaries of their lands,” He does so without 
determining their actions of seeking and reaching out to Him. The verbs for seeking psēlaphēseian (groping) and 
heuroien (find) are in the optative, which means that they carry with them the possibility that people can, indeed, 
“reach out” and “find” God, though the outcome may be bleak and their efforts in vain apart from God’s revelation 
[See Darrell L. Bock, Acts (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 567]. I take it that, perhaps, we may be 
seeing something similar with respect to the usage of horizō in Acts 2:23, since Peter singles out that it was the 
“Men of Israel” who had “crucified and killed” Jesus “by the hands of lawless men.” In other words, horizō does not 
require that God cause all actions. If that is the case, then, even if God’s plan is “determined,” “predetermined,” 
“deliberate,” or “definite” (or however one translates it, here), it does not entail determinism, that is to say, it does 
not entail the view that God caused all events or that all events must have taken place. That some events have taken 
place does not entail that they had to have taken place. Now, it may seem that what I am advocating is that 
prognōsei (foreknowledge) grounds God hōrismenē boulē (definite plan). That may be right, and that would be my 
take, but it need not be the case. Perhaps there is a third option, that, though God’s determined plan and 
foreknowledge are related, there is a genuine “distinctness” between them, as Wallace seems to leave open as a 
possibility. Must one be subsumed under the other? Perhaps both are subsets of another category. With either 
interpretation of prognōsei, the passage does not demand that God cause all events, particularly those events 
surrounding Jesus’s crucifixion, even if they are part of God’s “definite plan.”   
264 
 
this out. Suppose that a CEO has a plan of letting the company go. Before taking action, he turns 
to his consultants for advice (interestingly enough, boulē could also mean counsel). Now, while 
it is the CEO’s plan, it is a deliberate (or well thought out) plan, since he sought counsel from his 
advisors. Perhaps, here, we can think of the relation between God’s plan and foreknowledge in 
the same manner. God’s plan is not grounded in His foreknowledge; rather, God’s 
foreknowledge, much like the consultants, informs His plan. 
There is also a theological reason for thinking that God did not determine the evil that 
Christ experienced. In John 10:17-18 we read:  
17 For this reason the Father loves me, because I lay down my life that I may take it up 
again. 18 No one takes it from me, but I lay it down of my own accord. I have authority to lay 
it down, and I have authority to take it up again. This charge I have received from my 
Father” (ESV). 
 
In this passage we see that Jesus suffered, because Jesus gave himself freely. Jesus freely giving 
of Himself is in compliance with God’s plan (perhaps, worked out in the divine counsel of the 
persons of the Trinity?), but not determined. So, it would not seem, then, that Acts 2:23 require 
that God determine evil, even if God had a “determined plan.” 
 Lastly, to say that omniscience (if one interprets prognōsei that way, as Wallace seems to 
be doing) is a subset or subsumed under God’s plan seems philosophically, theologically, and 
logically untenable. In order to plan something, one must know quite a bit. Take, for example, 
the simple act of making scrambled eggs. In order to make scrambled eggs, one must know that 
there are such things as eggs, that eggs are good and edible, and how to crack said eggs in order 
to put it into the skillet. But even more, one must know that a stove exists, that the stove must be 
turned on to cook, and so on. There is much knowledge and thought that goes into the task of 
making something as simple as scrambled eggs. Now, when we consider the complexity of the 
universe alone, human history, God work in restoring humanity, and so on, obviously much more 
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knowledge is needed. So, in this sense, knowledge must be logically prior to any plan. 
Furthermore, Christians rightly acknowledge that God might not have created. If God exists a se, 
then creation was not necessary. Suppose that God had not created. We would, then, not have 
had need of a plan; however, God would have still been omniscient. Things like plans are 
contingent features of any state of affairs; whereas omniscience, on the other hand, is not. It is an 
essential feature of God’s nature, that without which, God would not be God, and it is something 
that God must have in all possible worlds.     
 Despite its limitations, the soul-making theodicy does provide some valuable features that 
can be part of an overarching theodicy, which I will consider below. Before concluding this 
section, it would be helpful to consider one additional theodicy—Alvin Plantinga’s ‘O Felix 
Culpa’ theodicy.   
 ‘O Felix Culpa’ Theodicy  
 In his ‘O Felix Culpa’ theodicy,42 Alvin Plantinga begins by considering what sort of 
world God could have created. Rejecting the Leibnizian view that God must have created the 
best of all possible worlds, Plantinga argues that God only needs to weakly actualize “an 
extremely good feasible world.”43 But considering those possible worlds with “good-making 
qualities,” what makes one possible world more valuable than any other? Plantinga suggests that 
out of all the possible worlds that God could have created, those worlds in which God exists are 
extremely more valuable than any world in which He does not. But given that God is a necessary 
                                                 
42 Which means something like “O happy fault” in reference to Adam’s sin. 
 
43 Alvin Plantinga, "Supralapsarianism, or 'O Felix Culpa'," in Christian Faith and the Problem of Evil, 
edited by Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2004), 6.  
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being, any world that He so chooses is a world in which He exists.44 This, in and of itself, is a 
great good, for, as Plantinga asserts, “God is unlimited in goodness and holiness, as well as in 
power and knowledge; these properties, furthermore, are essential to Him.”45 Thus any world in 
which God exists is enormously valuable. And if one were to take a world in which God does not 
exist, but in which all of the creatures always acted in the rightly, and compared that with a 
world in which God exists, the goodness of the world in which God exists is incommensurable to 
the (impossible) world with merely creaturely goods.46 Taking this further, Plantinga suggests, 
given Christian theism, out of all the possible worlds that God could have created, those worlds 
which have divine-incarnation and atonement tower above all of the rest.47 But such worlds also 
include evil and suffering. So, given Plantinga’s view, how might he respond to the question: 
“Why is there evil in the world?” Evil exists in the world, says Plantinga, because “God wanted 
to create a highly eligible world, wanted to actualize one of the best of all the possible worlds; all 
those worlds contain atonement, hence they all contain sin and evil.”48 Therefore, in the debate 
between infralapsarianism and supralaspsarianism, the Supra’s got it right!49  
 While there are many difficulties with this view, which I will get to below, I do believe 
that Plantinga has provided us with a framework for thinking about theodicy. Surely, as 
Plantinga suggests, there are certain worlds that are better than others that God could create. I 
                                                 
 44 Ibid., 7.  
 
 45 Ibid., 8.  
 
 46 Ibid., 9.  
 
 47 Ibid., 7. 
 
 48 Ibid., 12.  
 
49 Infralapsarianism is the view that God decreed to permit sin before decreeing to save some of the fallen; 
whereas, the Supralapsarian view takes it that God decreed to save some before decreeing to permit sin. See 
Plantinga, "Supralapsarianism, or ‘O Felix Culpa’,” 1.  
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would also agree with Plantinga that there may not be a best of all possible worlds (perhaps there 
is a tie, for all we know). So, out of all the possible worlds that God could weakly actualize, such 
a world must be “an extremely good feasible world.”50  
So far so good, but what makes one world better than other worlds? For Plantinga, it is 
those worlds with incarnation and atonement. Why, then, is there sin and evil in the world? On 
Plantinga’s theodicy, William Hasker puts it as follows: 
 The reason there is sin and evil in the world is not, as the free-will defense would have it, 
that they are the byproducts, which God cannot prevent, of a world containing free will. The 
reason, rather, is that they are among the necessary conditions of a world containing 
incarnation and atonement. God doesn’t just put up with sin and suffering in his world; he 
positively seeks them out by selecting a world to actualize that contains plenty of both. The 
free-will defense is not, perhaps, invalidated by this; it may still perform its function of 
showing that God and evil are logically compatible with each other. But the “real reason” 
for sin and evil (and Plantinga does seem to think he has found the real reason; that is, he 
thinks his theodicy is true) is something else entirely.51 
 
In such a theodicy, then, while the free-will defense maintains some force in answering the 
logical problem of evil, it becomes deficient in answering both the evidential, and I believe, the 
existential problems, especially if sin and evil become a necessary feature of the world in order 
to arrive at a divine end. In such a theodicy, God is, as Hasker suggests, “using his creatures, 
treating them as a means and not as ends in themselves, placing them in great peril in order to get 
the glory of saving them.”52  
Plantinga recognizes the above objection and likens it to a father throwing his son into 
the river only to heroically rescue him. He seeks to stifle this objection by providing cases in 
which it is perfectly legitimate to treat someone as a means and not an end. Take, for example, 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 6.  
 
51 William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2008), 168.  
 
52 Ibid., 168-169. 
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when someone hires a person to perform a task. In both cases, it may be that the person is using 
the other as a means. The employer is using the employee as a means to accomplish a job; 
whereas the employee is using the employer as a means to earn money. The problem, however, 
is that the employee was offered the job. She could have easily refused it. Plantinga suggests that 
with God it is different: 
 He doesn’t ask our permission before creating us, before actualizing this world in which we 
are called upon to suffer. We don’t accept the suffering voluntarily; we don’t get a choice; 
God doesn’t consult us before actualizing this world, this world that requires our suffering. 
Obviously he couldn’t have consulted us about whether we wish to be created in a world 
such as this, but still he doesn’t; and isn’t that somehow unfair? So with respect to this 
strand of the objection, the charge is twofold: (a) God requires his creatures to suffer, not for 
their own good, but in order to advance some aims or ends of his own; and (b) God does this 
without asking their permission.53 
 
Plantinga seeks to solve this conundrum by making several distinctions. Surely there would be 
no such issue if a person were to freely consent to suffering so that God might bring about a 
greater good for another or for the world as a whole. But what if the person does not consent? 
For those who are incapable to consent (e.g., a person in a coma), there are times that it is 
acceptable for another person to make the choice for them. Suppose further, however, that the 
person freely chooses not to consent, but God recognizes that she does so out of ignorance. If she 
only knew the real reasoning and great benefits the suffering will bring, she would gladly accept 
it. Lastly, consider that the reason she freely rejects such suffering in her life is because she has 
disordered affections. God knows that if her affections were ordered rightly, then she would 
freely accept the suffering. In each of these cases, Plantinga believes that God’s being perfectly 
loving would not preclude the individual from suffering.54  
                                                 
53 Plantinga, "Supralapsarianism, or 'O Felix Culpa'," 22-23. 
 
54 Ibid., 23-24.  
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 How might we respond to Plantinga? To begin with, I take it as problematic that sin is 
necessary for God to bring about His purposes. There is no doubt that Christ’s incarnation and 
atonement are immensely important to Christian theology and are very great gifts as a result of 
humanity’s sin. But regarding incarnation, Plantinga is assuming that God might not have had 
any other reasons for becoming incarnate. In fact, some Orthodox traditions believe that it is 
perfectly conceivable to think of Christ becoming incarnate, even if Adam had not sinned. Such 
an act would be a result of His divine love and grace. I suspect that much of what is driving 
Plantinga’s theodicy stems from his Reformed tradition, namely Reformed soteriology. Involved 
in our salvation is both redemption and glorification; however, the assumption, I believe, is that 
one is logically connected to the other. Given the Fall, I would agree. But, perhaps there is a 
sense in which humans were not complete before the Fall and were still in need of divine help to 
obtain God’s goal for humanity (e.g., glorification). Perhaps, as the doctrine of theosis suggests, 
the goal of creating humans was so that they might grow in greater and greater love and unity 
with their Creator, with one another, and with creation. To achieve this, perhaps all that is 
required is for the world to be such that it allows for significant choices, difficult tasks, and 
assistance from the incarnate Son. Or, as Hasker suggests, “If suffering is as good as Plantinga 
thinks it is (which is certainly open to doubt), then those sin-free worlds might contain extremely 
difficult tasks, set both for the incarnate Son and for his followers (i.e., in such worlds, for 
everyone)—tasks that would involve serious suffering, though not of course separation from God 
and his love.”55 In such a case we might have had suffering without sin. 
Regarding Plantinga’s conundrum and the distinctions he makes, I find them wanting. 
Biblically speaking, Paul was adamant that we should not do evil so good may come about (Rom 
                                                 
55 Hasker, The Triumph of God Over Evil, 168.  
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3:8). In the same sense, I find it difficult to believe, based on what we know of God’s goodness, 
God would bring about evil (sin) so that good may obtain.    
 As noted, I do think Plantinga has clued us in on an important requirement for theodicy, 
namely, that God had specific intentions of bringing about a world—an extremely good and 
feasible world. But rather than thinking that God’s intention in creating was to save (redeem) a 
people for His own, which requires both sin and the Fall, as is often emphasized in Reformed 
theology, it would be better to think that all along God had intended on bringing about something 
else, namely, a kingdom that is filled with a great diversity of creatures, some of which have the 
capacity to freely choose to serve and love their Creator. Bringing about such a kingdom does 
not require evil, but only a world with great freedom, significance, and challenges, such as are 
found in our world.      
Concluding Thoughts  
 Upon examining each of the three theodicies, it is clear that no single one provides a full 
explanation for why God allows evil in the world. It seems that for any theodicy to be successful, 
it must be multi-dimensional and cumulative in nature. As I will show below, when we put 
together the strengths of the above three theodicies, along with some of the conclusions reached 
from previous chapters, a fuller theodical response begins to emerge.  
Trinitarian Perichoretic Theodicy 
Having worked through certain conclusions above and in Chapters Five through Seven, 
shall we now bring it all together? I will do so by means of a story. 
  There is one, eternal, all-mighty, all-knowing, and all-good God, who is the Creator of 
all things. Central to the very nature of this God are two positive ontological affirmations: 
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God is light and God is love. These two affirmations provide a theological vision for 
Christian ethical living. As light, God cannot do anything that is morally evil. As love, God 
seeks out the best for the ‘other.’ It is God’s moral character and essential goodness that 
grounds His love, and it is His love that seeks out what is best and good and holy for the 
“other.” Hence God’s loving actions toward His creatures are always for their best. His 
desire is for His creatures to be in fellowship with Him, because He is the source of life and 
of all that is good, true, and holy.   
  Yet, not only is God light and love, but God is also a tri-unity of persons. Within God’s 
triune nature is the deepest love relationship in all of reality. The kind of love found in the 
interpenetrating, perichoretic relationship of the Trinity is such that it is self-giving and 
eternally moving toward the other. Such love is not a passive sympathetic response, nor is it 
inert; rather, it is active, by which each person is opened up to and gives fully toward the 
other.  
  In creating the world, God sought to bring about an extremely good feasible world. The 
world was not made out of necessity, but out of the abundant overflow of the 
interpenetrating love relationship of the divine persons. Creation, then, is a gift of divine 
grace and love. Furthermore, in seeking to create the world, God sought to bring about a 
kingdom—a kingdom filled with a variety of complex creatures with whom He could share 
life. The kingdom that God sought to build was one full of goodness, peace, and great care.  
Some of the creatures that make up this kingdom are biologically complex, including 
creatures with sentience and intelligence. Some of the highly complex intelligent creatures, 
namely God’s human creatures, are capable of having meaningful experiences and entering 
into significant relationships with God, one another, other creatures, and their 
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environments. Because such creatures are biological and physical in nature, the world had 
to be ordered according to a set of natural laws or law-like regulating principles. Therefore, 
God brought it about so that the world was ‘fine-tuned’ to support such life. The universe, 
as it now stands, consists of a great variety of goods, both in its physical grandeur and 
beauty and in the flourishing of a great diversity of biological life that it contains. 
Consequently, such a world also brings with it the potential that sentient and intelligent life 
will be negatively affected by the physical processes that govern the formation and 
operations of the universe. Therefore, any world with great significance, such as the one 
God created, that is both finite in nature and dynamic, brings with it great risks.    
In creating humans, God bestowed great worth upon each of them equally and 
unqualified. Moreover, God wanted to bring about creatures who could exhibit the same 
kind of deep love found within the interpenetrating relationship of the Godhead, making 
them in His image and likeness. God wanted to create individuals who could care deeply for 
the other; creatures who could love on the deepest levels possible—to love one another in 
the same way that He Himself loves them—and to care for God’s good creation. However, 
deep love can only occur from creatures with the capacity of freely giving themselves to 
others. Because of this, creaturely freedom must resemble, in the closest way possible, the 
same kind of freedom that God Himself has, that is, a freedom that is non-coerced or 
determined. Yet, in giving them such freedom, these creatures also had within them the 
capacity to rebel against their Creator.  
  Yet, in creating a world with free creatures (angelic and human), God knew that some of 
them would rebel against Him, rejecting His goodness toward them, and rejecting one 
another. He also knew that they would bring about great pain and suffering on one another. 
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This is exactly what took place. God’s creatures sinned against Him, bringing violence to 
the creation order. Rather than completing their task of subduing and taking care of the 
earth, God’s human creatures sought their own agendas and brought the creation under 
great distress. Rebelling against God is a rejection of life and goodness, which, ultimately, 
brings death—both spiritually and physically. Some of God’s angelic creatures, too, have 
brought about great destruction both in the natural world and in the lives of God’s human 
creatures.  
God did not leave it at that. Out of His great love, God provided a means for His human 
creatures to enter back into a relationship with Himself, and to live in such a way that they 
could, once again, love one another deeply. God’s intentions for His creatures from the 
beginning was for them to have and share in His own life—life that is abundant. This life, 
however, can only come through intimate personal relationship and knowledge of the Triune 
God, and the radical moral transformation that this knowledge makes possible.  
In order to solve this problem of separation and to restore His human creatures and the 
creation order, God has been working in and through human history. God the Son took on a 
human nature in order to defeat death and to conquer all that opposes His kingdom. In the 
person of Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of God died on a cross and was raised back to life by 
the power of the Spirit. With the death and resurrection of God’s Son, God inaugurated 
something new in the creation order—the end of death and destruction and the beginning of 
new life—life that begins now for all who believe and trust Him. Through the death and 
resurrection of His Son, and through the power of the Holy Spirit, God’s human creatures 
can now experience abundant life—life that is God’s own life, found only in relationship to 
Him—and demonstrate deep love toward others. They have also been given the power to 
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overcome sin and violence and oppression in their lives. Salvation is not merely about what 
takes place in the eschaton, but it is for healing to take place in the here and now. God 
offers this new life to all his human creatures who will embrace His goodness through the 
work of His Son on the cross and through His resurrection from the dead. 
God the Spirit, too, has been moving throughout the world, bringing about new life. It is 
through God’s Spirit that God has made Himself known to the world through the Bible and 
the creation. God’s Spirit has also been at work enlightening people to the truth of God’s 
work in restoring fallen humanity, convicting the world of sin, changing the hearts of 
people, and actively indwelling and moving through the people of God—the church.  
  The role of the church, then, through the power of the Spirit, is to be an ambassador of 
God’s deep love to the world. God has called the church to be involved in overthrowing sin 
and violence among the oppressed, seeking out the good for the other, being bearers of 
peace, helping the widow and orphans in their time of need, blessing those who persecute it, 
feeding its enemies, defending the weak and victimized, taking care of God’s good creation, 
and sharing the good news of God’s work in restoring all things. When the church 
participates in deep love, the kingdom of God breaks through to the here and the now. We 
catch a glimpse of God’s ultimate triumph, when the world will be rid of sin, oppression, 
and death. Christian ethics, which is ultimately grounded in the paradigm of God’s 
interpenetrating love, gives the church the resources to bring about real difference now, but 
will ultimately escalate when the Son of God brings about His Kingdom, renewing all 
things. But moreover, God has called his people to recognize that the present suffering they 
are now going through leads to a maturity in character and will ultimately advance God’s 
kingdom as they are faithful to His goal. Furthermore, what they are presently going 
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through pales in comparison to what awaits them when God makes all things new—a newly 
resurrected body in the eternal kingdom of God of the restored creation. In this restored 
creation we find heaven and earth coming together under the reign and rule of our Great 
God. 
  One day God will bring it about that all sin, death, and evil will be overcome. Just as 
God has redeemed His human creatures, reconciling them to Himself, He will also restore 
all of creation. In reconciling all things to Himself, God will bring about His kingdom—the 
perichoretic kingdom—which was His intentions from the beginning. It will be a kingdom of 
peace and shalom, whereby, there will be no more pain, suffering, violence, or hurt. God’s 
human creatures will demonstrate God’s own love, reciprocating it not only to God, but to 
one another and to creation. This kingdom will be a kingdom of flourishing and life, 
whereby God’s creatures will live to their fullest. In this kingdom, God’s righteousness, 
holiness, and love will reign supreme. Through the indwelling Spirit, God’s people will be 
united to Christ and to the Father, and all of creation, full of God’s presence, will rejoice in 
the greatness of God for its redemption. It is in this way that God will be All and in all.  
  Because God is that which nothing greater can be conceived, God is the ultimate Good—
a good incommensurate to all of the created goods and temporal evils found in this world.56 
In contrast to other worldviews, which the joys we experience are destined for extinction, 
the incommensurate good relation of the Triune God of Christian theism defeats any of the 
sufferings that may be endured in this life, including those horrific evils that rob us of any 
meaning, turning our deepest tragedies into victories and our greatest sorrows into joys.    
   
                                                 
56 Marilyn McCord Adams, “Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God,” in The Problem of Evil, ed. 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 218.  
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TPT and The Existential Problem  
 Having proposed TPT, we now turn to the Existential Problem from Evil (EPE). As 
suggested earlier, an adequate theodicy not only answers why God allows evil, but it must also 
give us reasons for thinking about what God is doing about all of the evil in the world. God may 
be justified in allowing evil; but is He doing anything to stop it? I believe that TPT satisfies both 
conditions. In what follows, I want to flesh out how the proposed theodicy gives us a framework 
for thinking about the existential and pastoral question of suffering.     
Evil and Divine Suffering 
One’s theology, which is intricately connected to one’s theodicy, shapes not only how 
one responds to the problem of evil, but also how one responds to those who are suffering great 
evil. I will return to this below, but for now, it is important to see God’s own response to evil in 
the world.  
At the center of TPT is, as I have argued, the notion of deep interpenetrating love. Love is 
at the center of who God is. This love is not a passive kind of love; rather it is an active love that 
is selfless and seeks out the good for the other. This love is grounded in God’s goodness; yet, this 
love also directs God’s goodness. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter Five, the God of Christian 
theism is a God who can act in the world to stop evil, in contrast to the pantheistic and process 
panentheisitc conceptions of God. 
Some Christian theists have argued, not only can God act in the world, but that God also 
suffers along with His creatures. Take, for example, the view of Alvin Plantinga: 
God’s capacity for suffering, I believe, is proportional to his greatness; it exceeds our 
capacity for suffering in the same measure as his capacity for knowledge exceeds ours. 
Christ was prepared to endure the agonies of hell itself; and God, the Lord of the universe, 
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was prepared to endure the suffering in order to overcome sin, and death, and the evils that 
afflict our world, and to confer on us a life more glorious than we can imagine.57 
 
A variety of theologians, too, take it that God is passible. Regarding God’s suffering, Clark 
Pinnock believes that God’s “suffering or pathos . . . is a strong biblical theme.”58 The German 
theologian, Jürgen Moltmann, takes the suffering of God to be central to any theodicy. “If God 
were incapable of suffering in every respect, then he would also be incapable of love,” says 
Moltmann.59 He continues,  
 He would at most be capable of loving himself, but not of loving another as himself, as 
Aristotle puts it. But if he is capable of loving something else, then he lays himself open to 
the suffering which love for another brings him; and yet, by virtue of his love, he remains 
master of the pain that love causes him to suffer. God does not suffer out of deficiency of 
being, like created beings. To this extent he is ‘apethetic’. But he suffers from the love 
which is the superabundance and overflowing of his being. In so far he is ‘pathethic’.60 
 
Baptist theologian, Millard Erickson, too, thinks that God suffers. Time and again, says 
Erickson, we see in the Old Testament that God is abandoned by His people, Israel. Furthermore, 
in passages such as Genesis 6:6 and Psalm 103:13, we are told that God “grieves” over human 
sin and “pities His children.” There is no doubt some anthropomorphism going on in such 
passages, but we must not dismiss such images as having no import with respect to God’s nature. 
But most importantly for Erickson is the incarnation. It is in the incarnation of the Son of God 
where we see, most clearly, God’s experience of evil. Jesus weeps over the death of his friend, 
Lazarus (John 11:35). Through this he experienced sorrow. Moreover, Jesus experienced 
                                                 
57 Alvin Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1985), 36. 
 
58 Clark Pinnock, “Systematic Theology,” in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional 
Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 118.  
 
59 Jürgan Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, translated by Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1993), 23. It should be noted, here, that by “pathetic,” Moltmann does not refer to how we usually 
understand the word; rather, it has to do with the capacity for suffering.  
 
60 Ibid.  
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abandonment, suffering, ridicule, physical abuse—and, ultimately, death on the cross.61 When 
we consider the incarnation, says Erickson, it is difficult to escape the conclusion of divine 
suffering.  
 Some theologians have sought to avoid this conclusion and to preserve the impassibility of 
God by maintaining that Jesus’ suffering was a function only of his human nature. Gregory 
of Nyssa, for example, held that as God, the Son is impassible. Augustine maintained that 
“passion,” suggesting disturbance and changeableness, is incompatible with the divine 
nature. This, however, seems not only to impose upon Jesus a set of conceptions not based 
upon clear biblical witness, but to divide the unity of the two natures in the one person. It 
may in effect be a variety of incipient Nestorianism.62  
 
Erickson cautions that any suffering that God partakes in, however, is endured voluntarily. God, 
says Erickson, has chosen at several points certain imposed self-limitations (e.g., creation, 
making covenants with His people, incarnation). None of these self-limitations, however, leads 
to any kind of deficiency in the divine nature.63 God’s suffering is never more clearly seen than 
in the Son’s death upon the cross, the ultimate outworking of His love toward us. Moreover, it is 
through the suffering on the cross that God makes possible for His free creatures to be reconciled 
to Him. Reconciliation does not come without great cost. As Erickson further explains: 
 Reconciliation, the restoration of relationships that have been broken, always requires some 
cost, some pain. In quarrels there is an exchange of harsh statements. Each is followed by a 
similar or perhaps more bitter response. If the quarrel is to cease, someone must decline to 
respond or retaliate. This means forgoing the satisfaction of returning the pain to the other: 
And this decision means absorbing the pain into oneself.64 
 
                                                 
61 Millard Erickson, The Word Became Flesh: A Contemporary Incarnational Christology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker, 1991), 607-609. 
 
62 Ibid., 609-610.  
 
63 Ibid., 611-612. 
 
64 Ibid., 616.  
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Erickson suggests this is what God, through Christ, has done on our behalf. He has absorbed the 
pain and suffering brought about by human sin.65  
Unlike these theologians and philosopher, however, I am hesitant to say that God suffers, 
especially if we understand suffering to mean that God in some sense would not flourish.66 How 
could the giver of all life not flourish? Such an understanding of God would imply that there was 
a deficiency in the divine nature. Yet, we must deal with the biblical evidence? Are such 
passages merely anthropomorphic? How might we resolve this?  
On the one hand, there is some bite to the above arguments. There is a real sense in which 
God experiences the full effects of evil, particularly through the incarnation. Yet, on the other 
hand, we may not call the experience of these effects of evil suffering. I believe it is precisely 
because of God’s impassibility—the inability to suffer—in His essential nature that God can 
withstand the evils in the world. When the Fathers spoke of impassibility, they primarily meant 
                                                 
65 Not everyone agrees that God can suffer. There has been much written in recent years on the important 
topic of divine immutability and impassibility. I cannot sufficiently defend, here, whether God suffers or not While I 
have not, yet, reached a clear conclusion, myself, a helpful article addressing the topic is Bruce Ware’s “An 
Evangelical Reformulation of the Doctrine of the Immutability of God,” The Journal of the Evangelical Theological 
Society (Dec. 1986): pp. 431-446. For additional discussion on God’s immutability and impassibility see Terence E. 
Fretheim, The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1984); Richard E. 
Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Issac August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1994); 
Michael J. Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary Theology on Divine 
Immutability, second edition (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University American Press, 2008); James F. Keating 
and Thomas Joseph White, eds, Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009); Rob Lister, God is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a Theology of Divine 
Emotion (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2013).   
 
66 In Chapter One I distinguish between physical pain, mental pain, and suffering. While both mental pain 
and physical pain might lead to suffering, nevertheless one might experience suffering apart from either kind of pain 
altogether. So, in that sense, suffering belongs to a different category. Furthermore, following Stump, I argued that 
human suffering has to do primarily with what a person most cares about. There are two sides to suffering, as 
considered in the first chapter, one objective and one subjective. The objective side has to do with someone being 
kept from flourishing; whereas the subjective element has mostly to do with the desires of a person’s heart not being 
met. If we take suffering to mean something as we defined it in Chapter One, then it would seem that God is 
excluded from it. It seems more reasonable to think that God might experience pain than thinking of God as 
suffering. The experience of pain, as I have argued in both Chapter One and Chapter Five, does not require that one 
suffer. The experience of pain does not require that one become debilitated by it nor does it cause a lack of 
flourishing, both of which are impossible for God.    
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that God is in no way “debilitated” or “crippled” by passions, as humans are, or as one might see 
among the gods of the Greek and Roman pantheon.67 In other words, God is not fickle in His 
response to His creatures. It is the doctrines of impassibility and immutability that ensure that 
God remains steadfast in His nature, character, and responses to His creatures. Furthermore, 
impassibility does not mean that God is unresponsive. He is not apathetic as the Stoics believed. 
God is really related. There is genuine love, long-suffering, compassion, and so forth. The 
doctrine of impassability, then, in the words of Thomas McCall, “safeguards and protects the 
fact that holy love is the essence of the triune God.”68 He continues, “Rather than a denial of the 
love of God, it resoundingly affirms that holy love.”69 Perhaps a better word to use when 
speaking of divine immutability and impassibility is Karl Barth’s emphasis on “constancy.” God 
is constant in His nature, character, and responses to His creatures.70  
But how, then, does God experience the full effects of evil? Pace McCall there is a sense 
in which God experienced evil through the incarnation. Following Aquinas and others, McCall 
                                                 
67 Thomas H. McCall, Forsaken: The Trinity and the Cross, and Why It Matters (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2012), 68. For an excellent discussion on the Patristic understanding of divine impassibility, see 
Paul Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialecticts of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  
 
68 Ibid.   
 
69 Ibid.  
  
70 “The immutable is the fact that this God is as the One He is, gracious and holy, merciful and righteous, 
patient and wise. The immutable is the fact that He is the Creator, Reconciler, Redeemer and Lord. This 
immutability includes rather than excludes life. . . . God’s constancy—which is a better word than the suspiciously 
negative word ‘immutability’—is the constancy of His knowing, willing and acting and therefore of His person. It is 
the continuity, undivertability and indefatigableness in which God both is Himself and also performs His work, . . .  
It is the self-assurance in which God moves in Himself and in all His works and in which He is rich in Himself and 
in all His works without either losing Himself or (for fear of this loss) having to petrify in Himself and renounce His 
movement and His riches. The constancy of God is not then the limit and boundary, the death of His life. For this 
very reason the right understanding of God’s constancy must not be limited to His presence with creation, as if God 
in Himself were after all naked ‘immutability’ and therefore in the last analysis death. On the contrary it is in and by 
virtue of His constancy that God is alive in Himself and in all His works.” Karl Barth, The Doctrine of God, vol. 2.1 
of The Church Dogmatics, eds. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 2000), 495.  
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believes that one must maintain a clear “distinction between the humanity and the divinity of 
Christ.”71 Failure to do so, says McCall, may lead to Docetism. But I would agree with Erickson 
that to deny that God was somehow affected by the evil that Christ experienced may just as 
easily lead to some form of Nestorianism. Perhaps the solution is in holding to something like 
Thomas Morris’s two-minds view of Christ. According to Morris there are two distinct centers of 
consciousness—the divine mind and the human mind. The eternal divine mind of the Son 
“encompasses the full scope of omniscience.”72 The human mind, however, came into existence 
a finite time in the past. “The earthly range of consciousness, and self-consciousness,” says 
Morris, “was thoroughly human, Jewish, and first-century Palestinian in nature.”73 It would be 
impossible for the earthly mind to contain the divine mind; rather, what we see is that the divine 
mind contained the earthly mind. There was an “asymmetric accessing relation between the two 
minds.”74 Morris goes on to explain: 
 The divine mind had full and direct access to the earthly, human experience resulting from 
the Incarnation, but the earthly consciousness did not have such full and direct access to the 
content of the overarching omniscience proper to the Logos, but only such access, on 
occasion, as the divine mind allowed it to have. There thus was a metaphysical and personal 
depth to the man Jesus lacking in the case of every individual who is merely human.75 
 
Morris believes that this solution allows for, on the one hand, the human growth and 
development of Jesus, and, yet, on the other, his cry of dereliction.76 If Morris is correct, and 
                                                 
71 McCall, Forsaken, 69.  
 
72 Thomas V. Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1986), 102-
103.   
 
73 Ibid. 103.  
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something like the two-minds view of Christ is correct, it would mean that the divine mind of the 
Son had full access to all of the emotions, experiences, pains, and horrors felt by the human 
nature of Christ. It would go to stand that, though there is a distinction within the persons of the 
Trinity, and though it was Christ alone who suffered on the cross (on pain of the heresy of 
patripassianism), nevertheless, given that the Father, Son, and Spirit share divine omniscience, it 
would seem that each of the divine persons of the Trinity have access to the horrors that Christ 
suffered and faced through His work and His death in the human nature. In this sense, via divine 
omniscience, the divine Trinity can relate to the various horrors that people in the world face 
because of the tragedies that Christ went through on the cross.  
 Yet, there is another way to think of the divine experience of evil. Having an experience 
of evil against you is not the same thing as experiencing suffering from the evil. We can make 
such a distinction in our everyday human experiences. We can imagine cases where a person 
hurls insults at another, but the person receiving the insults is in no way fazed by the insults, 
perhaps, because this person has a strong and immovable character when it comes to such things 
as being insulted. Nevertheless, though not fazed by the insults, the person may take the right 
steps to reconcile with the one doing the insulting. In this case, the person receiving the insults 
could retaliate, but, instead, absorbs any effects of evil against her, and then seeks to reconcile 
with the other. But let us suppose further that some pain is involved. The person receiving the 
insults feels pain, perhaps even deep pain, from the insults, but nevertheless remains steadfast in 
character and immovable in resolve. Here, again, the person absorbs the effects of evil—pain in 
this instance—and, yet, does the good despite the evil. In the same way, God can experience the 
effects of evil, even if the deliverance of such evils causes deep pain, and He can respond to 
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them, yet He can do so without being affected by the evil so as to debilitate Him or to change His 
metaphysical stature in anyway.   
Evil and Divine Action 
As noted from the above discussion, there is a sense, particularly through the incarnation, 
that God knows what it means to suffer and to experience the tremendous horrors of the world. 
Not only does God know these things, there is a real sense in which God is active in defeating 
evil. In order to see this more clearly, it would be helpful to consider a passage from the book of 
Job.  
In chapter 41 of Job, we see God answering Job out of the windstorm. Job has asked for 
his day in court with God, and he gets his wish. Rather than Job questioning God, however, it is 
the Lord who questions Job. The standard reading of this passage takes it that God reminds Job 
who is in charge and that Job has no right to question Him on these matters. In the end, Job is 
silenced and realizes his folly. But there is much more to the passage than this. Often, readers fail 
to recognize the use of Job’s allusions to the ancient Near-eastern mythic tradition throughout in 
his complaints. As John R. Schneider explains: 
 In his very first oration, Job uses the mythic tradition to curse the night he was conceived. 
The anti-cosmic symbolism is powerful: “let those curse it who curse the day, who are 
skilled to rouse up Leviathan, let the stars of its dawn be dark” (Job 3:8-9). In his second 
oration he ironically equates himself with chaos.” Am I the sea, or a sea monster, that 
though hast set guard over me?” (Job 7:12). His personal complaint is expanding swiftly to 
become global—better no world at all than one in which chaos lives. His distress over the 
injustice of history reaches its peak when Job considers God’s power over chaos. “By his 
power he stilled the sea, by his understanding he smote Rahab, by his wind the heavens were 
made fair, his hand pierced the fleeing serpent” (Job 27:12-13, [his italics]. But this of 
course is no more the triumphant declaration of praise, as it functions in the tradition. In 
view of what has happened, and in light of what Job now realizes about the world, it has 
become an ironic lament, the confession of a bitter, broken and thoroughly bewildered 
man.77 
                                                 
77 John R. Schneider, “Seeing God Where the Wild Things Are,” in Christian Faith and the Problem of 
Evil, edited by Peter van Inwagen (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004), 251.   
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In the ancient Near-east, the sea is often understood as chaos. It is the unknown and often 
symbolizes evil. It is also the place where Leviathan—the chaos monster—dwells. Psalms 74 
and 83, along with Isaiah 51, provide images of God’s defeat over the various manifestations of 
chaos. Job’s complaint was that the chaos had not died, but was still very much a part of the 
world.78 It is no wonder that in chapter 41 God begins His divine speech with the Leviathan. God 
asks Job, “Can you draw out Leviathan with a fishhook or press down his tong with a cord?” 
(Job 41:1, ESV) Then in vv. 10-11 we read, “No one is so fierce that he dares to stir him up. 
Who then is he who can stand before me? Who has first given to me, that I should repay him? 
Whatever is under the whole heaven is mine” (ESV). In other words, God is affirming to Job that 
the chaos monster is still very much a part of this world. No human can think of stopping or 
resisting him. But, despite this, God is very much in the midst of the chaos. Rather than the chaos 
monster being in control, it is God who can lead the chaos monster around, as imaged, by a hook. 
On this point, Schneider provides helpful insight: “God acknowledges the reality of the chaos, 
but he now reveals, and Job now sees, that he is in complete control of events. The relationship 
between God and Leviathan is not friendly, but rather one of grudging domestication.”79  
 From this reading of Job, we see that God is in the midst of the evil that is taking place in 
the world, and He is doing something about it. In dealing with evil, it takes, in the words of N. T. 
Wright, God getting his “boots muddy” and “his hands bloody” in order “to put the world back 
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to rights.”80 This is most clearly seen in the life and person of Jesus of Nazareth. As Wright 
explains, 
Jesus on the cross towers over the whole scene as Israel in person, as YHWH in person, as 
the point where the evil of the world does all that it can and where the Creator of the world 
does all that he can. Jesus suffers the full consequences of evil: evil from the political, 
social, cultural, personal, moral, religious and spiritual angles all rolled into one; evil in the 
downward spiral hurtling toward the pit of destruction and despair. And he does so precisely 
as the act of redemption, of taking that downward fall and exhausting it, so that there may be 
new creation, new covenant, forgiveness, freedom and hope.81 
 
He continues: “What the Gospels offer is not a philosophical explanation of evil, what it is or 
why it’s there, nor a set of suggestions for how we might adjust our lifestyles so that evil will 
mysteriously disappear from the world, but the story of an event in which the living God deals 
with it.”82 
 This work of God is connected with our future hope. As Paul tells us in 1 Corinthians 
15:54, because of Christ’s work on the cross, “Death has been swallowed up in victory.” God has 
defeated death and this will ultimately come to fruition. The vision that Revelation 21 paints for 
us is an image where God will bring about a new heavens and a new earth (v. 2). In this passage 
we see that there will be “no more death or mourning or crying or pain” (v. 4), but we also see 
that there will be no more sea (v. 1). The old order, with its chaos, death, and destruction will be 
done away with (v. 4). God’s presence will be fully felt throughout all of the created order (v.3).  
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Evil and the Church 
 Having seen God’s work in defeating evil through Christ, there is one final area to 
consider. God has called the church to action in defeating evil in the world. As we begin to think 
about the church’s response to the existential problem from evil (EPE), there are several 
important things that we must keep in mind. To begin with, in answering EPE, it is precisely at 
this point that our theology comes together with praxis. How we respond to EPE is ultimately 
grounded in what we believe, particularly about God, people, sin, salvation, hope, and so on. In 
other words, our theology should ground our response to the problem of existential suffering.  
 In Chapter Seven I gave significant consideration to the doctrine of the Trinity, 
particularly the doctrine of perichoresis. Furthermore, I discussed how this doctrine informs our 
thinking about how we should respond to others. If at the center of all reality is this 
interpenetrating, dynamic, and self-giving love relationship between the persons of the Trinity, 
then this should inform us about how we are to interact with creation, and particularly  human 
beings. Humans were created in the image and likeness of God. Part of what it means to be 
created in this image and likeness is to be in relation to one another. Yet, our relationships, as I 
have argued, should be ones that represent deep love—the same kind of deep love that we see 
within the perichoretic relationships among the persons of the divine Trinity. When thinking 
about our response to EPE, the center of our response should be one of self-giving deep love. In 
other words, our response should be that of care. This response is not merely sympathy toward 
the other; rather, a deep care that is ultimately self-giving and other-centered.  
 Reflecting on the doctrines of sin, gospel, and church, too, as we considered in Chapter 
Seven, should inspire thought about how we should respond to those who are suffering 
existentially. Sin has caused deep rifts within our relationships—rifts that affect our relationship 
with God, one another, and with the creation itself. Sin, at its very core, is oppressive and self-
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centered. Often, many of the existential sufferings that we see taking place in the world are a 
direct result of sin. Yet, through the good news of the gospel, we see God’s response to evil and 
sin in the world. It was through Christ’s broken body and resurrection that God defeated death. 
Nevertheless, we live in an already/not yet realization of the defeat of evil. As noted above, 
Christians have hope that because of Christ’s work in the world a day will come when there will 
be no more suffering, pain, and sorrow. Death will be no more (Rev 21:4). Yet, we still live in a 
world where pain, death, and suffering are very much reality. But the gospel does not stop with 
the reality that death has been defeated through Christ; sin, too, along with its effects, has been 
defeated. God, through the gospel, offers new life—eternal life. This life is not something that 
begins in the future; rather, it begins now. It was through Christ that God defeated death and sin, 
but it is through the Spirit that God brings new life to the world. As the redeemed community of 
Christ, then, it is the Spirit who is the agent of change, and it is He who provides the church with 
the power to make a difference and to confront the evil in the world. Through the Spirit, God has 
supplied all of the power and energy needed to truly be agents and ambassadors of reconciliation. 
The church never replaces His work; rather, it is the church in-and-through the power of the 
Holy Spirit that God has chosen to confront evils in the world. Therefore the church should be on 
the front lines confronting sin, particularly the many social injustices that we see taking place in 
the world today, as well as bridging the gap of broken relationships through the preaching and 
proclamation of the gospel. Social justice and the gospel are not opposed to one another. Rather, 
both have at their center the care and concern for the other.  
 God has called the church to love its neighbors (Mk 12:31); to help widows and orphans 
in their distress (Js 1:27); to love enemies and to make peace so much as it is within its power 
(Mt 5:44; Rom 12:14, 16, 18); to forgive unconditionally and to reconcile with those who sin 
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against it (Mt 5:44; 18:15, 21-22); to turn the other cheek (Mt 5:39) and not seek revenge (Rm 
12:19); to give of its material possessions to those in need (Ps 82; Mk 12:31; Lk 10:25-37; Rom 
1:13, 20; Js 1:27; 2:14-17; 1 Jn 3:16-18). The church has been called to a life of self-giving 
love—a love that does not retaliate when wronged or seek revenge. The kind of life that the 
church has been called to is a kingdom life. Such a life represents God’s intentions all along in 
creating. This is the very life that we see in the interpenetrating relationship of the divine persons 
of Trinity and demonstrated in God’s selfless actions toward His creation. Lastly, the church has 
been called to be a part of God’s work in building His kingdom. When the church accepts its 
call, it becomes a part of what God is doing (and has been doing throughout the entirety of 
human history) to confront the evils and horrors in the world. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING MATTERS 
 
 
This project sought to show that no worldview is exempt from answering the problem 
from evil. Each worldview must account for the amount, types, and kinds of evil in the world. Of 
the four worldviews considered, only theism provides a robust and adequate response to the 
philosophical and theological difficulties raised by evil in the world.  
But I have also argued that theism in-and-of-itself is not enough. A specific form of 
theism is needed—a form of theism that is grounded in the perichoretic relationship of the divine 
Trinity. Chapter Seven argued that our understanding of the Trinity, particularly the perichoretic 
relationship of the divine persons, informs our understanding of the world, and particularly 
human nature. The Trinity is at the center of not only our theology as Christians, but the intra-
Trinitarian love relationship between the persons of the Father, Son, and Spirit is at the center of 
all reality. Reality is deeply and essentially relational. This interpenetrating relationship between 
the persons of the Triune God is dynamic and one that is moving toward and opening up to the 
“Other.” The Father gives of Himself fully to the Son and the Son gives of Himself fully to the 
Father and the Spirit gives of Himself fully to the Father and the Son. What we see in the 
dynamic love relationship between the persons of the Trinity is the deepest love possible. As 
argued, this deep love that we see within the dynamic relationship of the persons of the Trinity is 
the same love that, on the one hand, created something “other” (creation) than God out of sheer 
selfless giving of divine love and grace, and, yet, on the other hand, the kind of love that God 
lavished upon His human creatures in making them in His image and likeness. It is this same 
kind of deep love that God expects for his human creatures to have in their relationships with one 
another and with creation.  
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Because a deep rift separates humans from God, one another, and creation, God’s human 
creatures suffer from a multiplicity of evils: war, disease, famine and starvation, chronic pain, 
depression, anxiety, rape, homicide, genocide, the loss of loved ones, and death. Creation itself is 
groaning and is in need of liberation. We must not be concerned merely with the question of why 
evil exists and why God allows it; we must also be concerned for the sufferer. Any theodicy, 
then, which seeks to answer the theological and philosophical problems brought on by evil in the 
world, must also address the existential problem of suffering.  
As I have argued, it is precisely a theodicy grounded in the interpenetrating love 
relationship of the Triune God—a theodicy I have dubbed the “Trinitarian Perichoretic 
Theodicy” (TPT)—that provides not only a robust response to the philosophical and theological 
challenge of evil, but also a way forward in answering the existential problem from evil. As 
argued in Chapter Eight, what God sought to bring about was a dynamic and loving kingdom 
that was full of life, harmony, and peace and that was essentially relational. Such a kingdom does 
not require evil, nor does it require sin; but it does require a certain kind of freedom—freedom 
that resembles God’s own freedom. Though sin and moral evil is a product of the human abuse 
of freedom and rebellion, God does not leave it at that. God has responded to the evil in the 
world through the agency of His Son and through the agency of His Spirit. Through the death 
and resurrection of His Son, God conquered death; through the work and empowerment of the 
Holy Spirit, God has given His human creatures new life and power to overcome evil in the 
world. The church, empowered by the indwelling Spirit, is God’s instrument for bringing about 
change in the world in the here and now. God has called the church to a life of self-giving love—
a love that reflects the very dynamic love relationship we see among the Persons of the Trinity. It 
is this kind of love that transforms a world that is full of evil, since such a love is at bottom 
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selfless, dynamic, and active, seeking out the best and good for the other. God’s work in the 
world will escalate until He fully brings about His kingdom—a kingdom where heaven and earth 
unite and God’s presence penetrates all of the created order. In this kingdom evil will be 
defeated. There will be no more sorrow, pain, or death. All wrongs will be righted and justice 
will prevail.  
Objections Considered 
Along with any new proposal, there will be some resistance, doubts, and loose ends that 
must be considered. In what follows I consider two potential objections to my proposal, though 
more could be considered. Given that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is a central teaching of 
Christian theism, and since it is a central feature of this work, it is important that it can hold up to 
scrutiny with respect to its coherence.  
There is more than one charge of incoherence that could be brought up against the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In what follows I consider two issues related to its coherence. 
First, I consider the problem of monotheism. How is it that a Christian can claim, on the one 
hand, that God is one, and yet, on the other, proclaim that He is three? Would not such an 
understanding preclude, mark a departure from, monotheism? Second, I consider a fuller charge 
of incoherence surrounding the problem of identity. How is it that the each of the divine Persons 
can be said to be God, and yet, each of the persons is not also identical to the others?  
The Problem of Monotheism 
First, an objector might claim that the doctrine of the Trinity contradicts the very concept 
of monotheism. Take, for example, this Christian claim: The Father is God, the Son is God, and 
the Holy Spirit is God. Would not such a claim lead to something like tri-theism—the view that 
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three divine beings exist—instead of monotheism? Would not the acceptance of more than one 
divine person contradict the Jewish understanding of monotheism? How might the Christian 
theist respond?1  
To begin with, it may be helpful to consider just what it is that one means by 
“monotheism.” Traditionally philosophers of religion have understood monotheism to mean 
something like: there is only one God who exists and that this God alone is ultimate.2 Yet, if not 
careful, certain other expectations might be read into this understanding of God, such as any 
being who is considered to be God must have a certain property X.  In the case of Christian 
theism, critics often assume that for some being to be classified as God, such a being must have 
the characteristic or property of being only one person. Therefore, trying to understand Jesus and 
the Holy Spirit as God would be a violation of basic monotheism, and especially Jewish 
monotheism. But as recent investigations into early Judaism, particularly Second Temple 
Judaism, have shown, we must be careful not to impose categories upon a Jewish understanding 
of monotheism that were not necessarily a part of it, while at the same time we must allow that 
some development has taken place in Jewish thinking as it pertains to monotheism. There has 
been much in recent discussion on just what Jewish monotheism entails.3 Just what is it that sets 
the God of Judaism apart from other deities?    
                                                 
1 In this first part I will consider the question of monotheism. In the next section, I will focus more on the 
question of unity between the divine Persons. 
 
2 For a discussion on various kinds of monotheistic views, see Keith Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A 
Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1999), 86-97.   
 
3 See especially Richard Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998; idem, “Monotheism, and Christology in the Gospel of 
John,” in Contours of Christology in the New Testament, ed. Richard N. Longenecker (Grand Rapids, MI: William 
B. Eerdmans, 2005 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 148-166; idem, Jesus and the God 
of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2008); Larry W. Hurtado, One Lord, One God: Early Christian Devotion 
and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1988); idem, “First-Century Jewish 
Monotheism,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 71 (1998): 3-26; idem, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to 
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In his work on monotheism during the Second Temple period, Larry Hurtado has argued 
that what set the God of Christians and Jews apart from other conceptions of deity in the ancient 
world was a radical devotion to and exclusive worship of this one God. Early Christians and 
Jews during this period held to a diversity of heavenly beings, “whom they regarded very 
positively, typically as part of the entourage of the one God (e.g., angels).”4 But these beings 
were not the recipients of worship. Hurtado contends that such devotion “means that the ‘God’ of 
the NT is posited, not as one among others, or as one member of a divine genus, but as sui 
generis, unique and solely worthy of worship.”5 Interestingly enough, within the New Testament 
documents, Jesus, claims Hurtado, received the same devotion that was reserved for God alone. 
Early on there was a binitarian shape to worship among Christians, which began after Jesus’ 
death and resurrection. Some of the earliest Christological materials in the New Testament are 
hymns and confessions embedded within the New Testament documents, giving primacy and 
devotion to Jesus (John 1:1-18; Rom 1:3-4; 3:24-26; 1 Cor 15:3-5; Gal 3:26-28; Eph. 5:14; Phil 
2:6-11; Col. 1:15-20; 1 Tim 3:15; Heb 1:3;).6  
                                                 
Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2003); idem, How on Earth 
Did Jesus Become God? Historical Questions about Earliest Christian Devotion (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005); idem, God in New Testament Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2010); 
James D. G. Dunn, Did the Early Christians Worship Jesus?: The New Testament Evidence (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2010); Peter Hayman, “Monotheism—A Misused Word in Jewish Studies?” Journal 
of Jewish Studies 42, no. 1 (Spring 1991), 1-15; Paul A. Rainbow, “Jewish Monotheism as the Matrix for New 
Testament Christology: A Review Article,” Novum Testamentum 33, 1 (Jan 1991), 17-91; Michael S. Heiser, 
“Monotheism, Polytheism, Monolatry, or Henotheism: Toward an Assessment of Divine Plurality in the Hebrew 
Bible,” in Bulletin for Biblical Research 18, no. 1 (2008), 2-4. 
    
4 Hurtado, God in New Testament Theology, 28.  
 
5 Ibid., 29.  
 
6 Within the body of the New Testament, there are numerous creedal, hymnic, and confessional materials. 
These statements are often short, pithy statements; however, there are some longer statements, as well. In addition, 
theses early creedal and hymnic formulas were often used within a variety of settings and contexts, such as baptism, 
exorcism, worship, and instruction. The reason that such formulas are important to discussions in Christology is that 
the writers of the New Testament utilized these sources in developing their material. Thus such formulas predate the 
actual writings in which they are found. See Oscar Cullmann, The Earliest Christian Confessions, trans. J. K. S. 
Reid (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949), 18-34; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3rd ed. (Burnt Mill, UK: 
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Richard Bauckham, too, has done significant work in the area of Second Temple 
monotheism. Rather than focusing on either a “functional” or “ontic” Christology, as many 
biblical critics and theologians are often prone to do,7 Bauckham begins his investigation by 
working from within the category of, what he calls, “Christology of divine identity.”8 A 
Christology of divine identity, which was the Christology of the earliest Christian communities, 
“was already the highest Christology.”9 Making such distinctions as “ontic” and “functional,” 
Bauckham thinks, distorts our understanding of how the earliest Christians understood God and 
how they did their Christology. On this point, Bauckham asserts: 
 When we think in terms of divine identity, rather than divine essence or nature, which are 
not the primary categories for Jewish theology, we can see that the so-called divine 
functions which Jesus exercises are intrinsic to who God is. This Christology of divine 
identity is not a mere stage on the way to the patristic development of ontological 
Christology in the context of a Trinitarian theology. It is already a fully divine Christology, 
maintaining that Jesus Christ is intrinsic to the unique and eternal identity of God. The 
Fathers did not develop it so much as transpose it into a conceptual framework more 
concerned with the Greek philosophical categories of essence and nature.10  
 
 There are two basic ways that one can approach monotheism during the Second Temple 
period. The first is to argue that the monotheism of the postexilic period was “strict” in such a 
way that it would have been “impossible to attribute real divinity to any figure other than the one 
                                                 
Longman Group Ltd., 1972), 13-29; Vernon H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Confessions (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1963), 1-12; Richard N. Longenecker, “Christological Materials in the Early Christian 
Communities,” in Contours of Christology in the New Testament, edited by Richard Longenecker (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005), 68-74; Ralph P. Martin, Worship in the Early Church (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1974), 39-65; Gary R. Habermas, The Historical Jesus: Ancient Evidence for the Life of 
Christ (Joplin, MS: College Press Publishing Co., 1996), 143-170. 
  
7 For a detailed discussion of Functional Christology, see Millard J. Erickson, The Word Became Flesh 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, second printing, 2000), 215-241, 507-530. 
  
8 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel, x. 
 
9 Ibid.   
 
10 Ibid. 
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God.”11 Within the context of Jewish monotheism, there is no way that Jesus could have ever 
been considered divine. The second is a “revisionist” approach to understanding Jewish 
monotheism during the Second Temple period. According to Bauckham, this second approach, 
which places focus on intermediary figures, such as principal angels, exalted patriarchs, and 
personification of divine attributes, tends toward blurring the distinction between the one true 
God and “all other reality.”12 Bauckham recognizes that both approaches are somewhat 
misguided. With the first view, Bauckham believes that Jewish monotheism is indeed strict. The 
Jews during the Second Temple period were self-consciously aware of their monotheistic beliefs, 
and, for them, there was a clear distinction between the one true God of Israel and all other 
reality. Despite an abundance of intermediary figures within the literature of postexilic Israel, 
and the fact that such figures had some relevance within the matrix of the Israelite worldview, it 
is a major point of contention as to whether such figures provide any key insight into the study of 
Christian origins. A high Christology developed within such a context not because the Jews 
applied to Jesus a “semi-divine intermediary status”13 but because they identified “Jesus directly 
with the one God of Israel.”14  
 According to Bauckham, what has been lacking in the whole discussion is a proper 
understanding of how the Jews during the Second Temple period understood the uniqueness of 
the true God of Israel. When a proper understanding of what made the God of Jewish 
monotheism unique is rightly considered, then can one appropriately assess and understand just 
                                                 
 
11 Ibid., 2  
 
12 Ibid.  
 
13 Ibid., 3.  
 
14 Ibid.  
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exactly what the early Christians were doing with Jesus when they included Him into the unique 
identity of the one true God of Israel. How, then, are we to understand “divine identity”?15 
 “Identity” is a term that Bauckham coined to describe his findings in the literature of the 
Second Temple period.16 For Jews during the Second Temple period, their entire worldview 
revolved around a certain pattern of “cultic worship,” which was “formed by exclusive 
allegiance to the one God”.17 Yet, this presupposes that God was in some way “identifiable,” that 
is, this God had a unique identity. “Since the biblical God has a name and a character, since this 
God acts, speaks, relates, can be addressed and, in some sense, known, the analogy of human 
personal identity suggests itself as the category with which to synthesize the biblical and Jewish 
understanding of God,” 18 says Bauckham. This is not to say, however, that Jews were 
unconcerned with metaphysical statements about God. It is clear from some of the literature of 
the Second Temple period that certain writers, for example Josephus and Philo, adopted Greek 
                                                 
 
15 Ibid., 4.  
 
16 It is important not to equivocate and confuse Bauckham’s use of “identity” with the philosophical notion 
of the “is” of identity (usually distinguished from the “is” of predication). As I discuss below, rather than making an 
identity claim, Bauckham is perhaps doing something more like making an “is” of predication claim despite his use 
of the word “identity,” that is to say, Jesus belongs to the category of divine. It is interesting to note that Jesus and 
the Spirit are rarely called “God” in the New Testament. Instead, and especially in the Pauline literature, the word 
“God” is generally reserved for the Father. But a bit more reflection on the New Testament formulas will reveal that 
New Testament authors had other ways of speaking of someone as divine. Paul most often uses the following triadic 
formula to speak of the divine Persons: Father = God; Son = Lord; Holy Spirit = Spirit (Rom 1:7; 1 Cor 1:2; 8:6; 
12:4; 15:24-28; 2 Cor 1:2; Gal 1:3; Eph 1:2; 4:4-6; Phil 1:2; 2:9-11; Col 1:2-3; 1 Thess 1:1; 2 Thess 1:2; 1 Tim 1:2; 
2 Tim 1:2; Tit 1:4; Phlm 3). 1 Corinthians 8:6 is a significant passage in which Paul takes the Shema and 
reformulates it to account for both the Father and the Son: 
 [Y]et for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus 
Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist. (ESV) 
This passage takes place within the context of a discussion of idolatry. Paul is assuring the Corinthians that though 
there may be many “so-called” “gods” and “lords,” Christians serve one God and Lord, which is a reaffirmation of 
the Shema—as clear of an affirmation of monotheism as one can get—except in this context Paul is applying it (the 
Shema) to both the Father and the Son. Both the Father and the Son belong, to use Bauckham’s word, to the unique 
“identity” of the one true God.  
 
17 Ibid., 6.  
 
18 Ibid.  
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metaphysical language and applied it to God. Moreover, one of those aspects which distinguish 
the true God from all other reality is the belief that He is eternal, which is a metaphysical 
statement about God. But this was not the predominant conceptual framework from which Jews 
during this time period worked out their understanding of God. They were not so much 
concerned with “what” deity is, but rather with “who” the one true God is. But what are those 
characteristics that distinguish the one true God from all other reality, including the gods of the 
nations?     
 Bauckham recognizes two sets of “identifying features” that distinguishes the God of 
Jewish monotheism. First, there are features which speak to God’s relationship to His people 
Israel. It was to Israel that God revealed His divine name, Yahweh. Moreover, it was Yahweh, 
the God of Israel, Who made a covenant with His people, Who delivered His people out of the 
hands of Egypt, and Who gave them a Law. The second set of identifying features—the set that 
Bauckham is most concerned about for his argument—focuses on how Israel’s God relates to the 
rest of creation. Concerning this second category, there are two underlying themes that are seen 
throughout the literature—that God is creator of and sovereign ruler over all things. It is these 
two distinguishing factors (being creator and sovereign) that set apart the God of Israel from all 
other reality, including the gods of the nations. As the sole creator and ruler over all of reality, 
God employs a variety of servants to do His bidding. He is envisioned in the Second Temple 
literature as the great and supreme emperor ruling over all of reality.19  
There is a third aspect that one must take into account in connection with God as creator 
and sovereign ruler—monolarity, the view that God alone should be worshipped. Unlike the 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 7-10; Richard Bauckham, “The Worship of Jesus in Philippians 2:9-11,” in Where Christology 
Began: Essays on Philippians 2, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1998), 129. 
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gentiles, who thought that one could worship a high god, and, yet, at the same time worship 
lesser deities, the Jews during the Second Temple period reserved worship for the one true God 
alone.20        
When one takes these three aspects of Second Temple Judaism together, one can further 
differentiate between three main categories of Jewish monotheism: creational, eschatological, 
and cultic monotheism. God alone is the sole creator of all reality. He accomplished this without 
help or advice from any other. Yet, stemming from this first category of creational monotheism, 
comes the second, eschatological monotheism, by which God, as the sole ruler over all creation 
will ultimately fulfill His promises, establish His eschatological kingdom, and make His 
Lordship known to the nations. Only the sole ruler and Lord over all things should be 
worshipped—this is the notion of cultic monotheism.21 What Bauckham finds striking is that the 
earliest Christians applied these same categories to Christ, making up, what he calls, 
Christological Monotheism. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is the widely used expression 
found in Psalm 110:1, in which Christ is seated on God’s cosmic throne (Phil 2:9-11; cf. Isa 
45:22-23). Within the earliest Christian literature, Jesus is depicted as “the one who will achieve 
the eschatological lordship of God and in whom the unique sovereignty of the one God will be 
acknowledged by all,” and, moreover, he is “included in the unique rule of God over all things, 
and is thus placed unambiguously on the divine side of the absolute distinction that separates the 
only Sovereign One from all creation.”22 God does not share His throne with any other. Yet, by 
taking a place on the cosmic throne of God, by participating in the sovereign rule and Lordship 
                                                 
20 Bauckham and Hurtado are in agreement on this and find it to be a central feature of Jewish monotheism 
during the Second Temple period.  
 
21 Ibid., 184.  
 
22 Ibid.  
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of God, and by receiving worship due to God alone, Christ was depicted in the earliest Christian 
literature as sharing in the unique identity of the one true God, and thus was given the highest 
status that could have possibly been given (Phil 2:6-11). The earliest Christians attributed to 
Jesus the highest Christology possible within the Jewish monotheistic context. Moreover, in the 
earliest Christian formulations, Jesus is seen, not only as sovereign ruler, but He is also depicted 
as Creator of all things (John 1:1-3; 1 Cor 8:6; Col 1:15-17; Heb 1:2-3), which implies His pre-
existence (Phil 2:6-8). Lastly, we see within the literature that Jesus is given the divine name 
(Phil 2:9).23    
Given studies like Hurtado’s and Bauckham’s, it would seem that Jewish monotheism 
can accommodate for more than one person within its overarching schema, especially given 
Bauckham’s notion of “identity.” Holding to a concept of a tri-personal God in no way 
contradicts the concept of Jewish monotheism, unless, of course, one loads upfront what 
monotheism means and insists on saying more than what those during Second Temple Judaism 
would say.  The early church, then, found themselves with the task off translating ideas and 
concepts from one way of thinking to another. It is precisely because of what they found within 
the pages of the Scriptures that the early Fathers of the church wrestled through working out a 
formula that faithfully expressed their findings, yet doing so in such a way that that expressed the 
language and concepts found within the matrix of their own religious and cultural contexts.  
The Problem of Identity 
 Suppose there is room within Jewish monotheism for something like more than one 
person belonging to the unique identity of the one true God, there is still yet another problem that 
                                                 
 
23 Ibid.   
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critics raise—the problem of identity.24 How is it that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are 
understood by Christians to be identical? After all, The Father is God, The Son is God, and The 
Holy Spirit is God. Would not this imply that the Father is identical to the Son and to the Spirit, 
which is an apparent contradiction?   
 In order to answer this it will be helpful to consider the aforementioned distinction 
between the “is” of identity and the “is” of predication. When speaking of the “is” of identity, 
one aims at asserting that some object or person can be understood in at least two ways. For 
example, Ronnie Campbell is the father of Abby, Caedmon, and Caleb or Superman is Clark 
Kent. In each case, one could insert the words “the same thing as” or the “same person as.” The 
“is” of predication, on the other hand, is used to express that whatever is located on the left side 
of the equation has the property of that which appears on the right. “Superman is superhuman,” 
“Jack is furry,” and “Caspian is feline” are all examples of the “is” of predication.25  
 With respect to God, then, what is it that Christians are claiming? If by “is God” the 
Christian had something like the “is” of identity in mind, then she would be caught in a 
contradiction, since it would follow that the Father is identical with the Son and with the Spirit; 
however, if she takes “is God” to mean something like the “is” of predication, then she is saying 
something more along the lines of person P “is divine,” which would be much less thorny of an 
issue when it comes identity. But the Christian is not yet clear. It seems that for Christians to 
predicate of each of the persons “divinity” would render them susceptible to the charge of tri-
theism, the heretical view that three gods exist. Moreover, such a view would clearly contradict 
                                                 
24 Here, again it must be emphasized that we should not equivocate on Bauchkam’s use of “identity” with 
how philosophers usually intend it.  
  
25 Thomas D. Senor, “The Incarnation and the Trinity,” in Reason for the Hope Within, edited by Michael J. 
Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 247-248.  
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the Christian adherence to monotheism (that only one God exists). Prima facie Christians are 
stuck with the following juxtaposition: God is one and God is three. But the critic will point out 
that nothing can be both exactly one thing and three things without holding to a view that is 
logically incoherent. The doctrine of the Trinity, then, is logically incoherent.26 But as Thomas 
Senor as rightly suggested: “When the creeds say that God is three and yet one, they should not 
be understood as asserting that God is three and one of the same thing. That would be 
contradictory and obviously so. Rather, what is being claimed is that there is an important unity 
in the godhead as well as plurality.”27  
Christians have long recognized the tension between the three-ness and the one-ness of 
the Trinity. Steering too much toward the three-ness leads to tri-theism; steering too much 
toward the one-ness leads to modalism—the view that God manifests Himself in different modes 
of existence (at one time the Father and at another the Son or the Spirit). Both views were 
rejected by the early church as being heretical. So, how might the Christian make sense of the 
unity and plurality within the Trinity? 
Traditionally Christians have put it this way: God as being three individuals (hypostases) 
or persons (personae) in one substance (homoousios).28 Thomas Torrance expresses the classical 
Christian understanding of the Trinity in the following way: 
 In our understanding of the New Testament witness to God’s revelation of himself, ‘the 
Father’, ‘the Son’, and ‘the Holy Spirit’ are unique and proper names denoting three distinct 
Persons or real Hypostases who are neither exchangeable nor interchangeable while 
nevertheless of one and the same divine Being. There is one Person of the Father who is 
always the Father, distinct from the Son and the Spirit; and there is another Person of the 
Son who is always the Son, distinct from the Father and the Spirit; and another Person of the 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 255-256.  
 
27 Ibid., 256.  
 
28 Richard Swinburne, “A Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and 
Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 562-564.  
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Holy Spirit who is always the Holy Spirit, distinct from the Father and the Son. In this three-
fold tri-personal self-revelation of God one Person is not more or less God, for all three 
Persons are coeternal and coequal. They are all perfectly one in the identity of their Nature 
and perfectly homoousial or consubstantial in their Being. Each of the three Persons is 
himself Lord and God, and there is only one and the same eternal Being of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit. The Holy Trinity of three divine Persons is thus perfectly 
homogeneous and unitary, both in the threeness and oneness of God’s personal activity, and 
in the threeness and oneness of his eternal unchangeable personal Being. Three Persons, one 
Being.29 
 
Though Christians speak of the three persons as distinct, that must not be confused with 
separateness. As Torrance further explains, “No divine Person is who he is without essential 
relation to the other two, and yet each divine Person is other than and distinct from the other 
two.”30 In this sense, then, it is this relatedness of each divine Person to the other divine Persons 
that constitutes what and who They are. The Father cannot be the Father apart from His relation 
to the Son and the Spirit, and the Son cannot be the Son apart from His relation to the Father and 
the Spirit, and the Spirit cannot be the Spirit apart from His relation to the Father and the Son. 
“The relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of existence,” explains Torrance, 
“but hypostatic interrelations which belong intrinsically to what Father, Son and Holy Spirit are 
coinherently in themselves and in their mutual objective relations with and for one another.”31 
Thus when thinking of the doctrine of the Trinity, Christians cannot think of God apart from the 
interrelatedness of the three Persons. If one of the persons were absent, then we would not have 
the Christian God but something like ditheism. 
                                                 
 
29 Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (New York: T&T Clark, 
1996), 155.  
 
30 Ibid., 157.  
 
31 Ibid. 
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What is it, then, that constitutes the unity between the divine Persons? Here, something 
like the doctrine of perichoresis might provide a way forward. Before considering perichoresis as 
it relates to my proposal, it may first be helpful to consider Social Trinitarianism.  
There are two main views on the doctrine of the Trinity—the so-called Latin view (LT) 
and the so-called Social Trinitarian view (ST). I will not here defend either view, since this is an 
“in-house” debate.32 For now I will assume something like the ST view is true in order to defend 
against the charge of incoherence.  
ST begins with the three-ness of God instead of God’s oneness. Most versions of ST hold 
to each of the three Persons as existing as a society or community (perhaps a better 
understanding is that God is community-like) and each having something like a generic divine 
nature. The notion of Person for defenders of ST carries the idea of having a distinct mind and 
will or distinct center of consciousness. The word “God” then carries the notion of “the 
Godhead.”33  
In order to explain their version of ST, William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland use the 
example of the Greco-Roman mythological creature, Cerberus. Cerberus is a dog-like creature 
who has three heads. Given that Cerberus has three heads, we may assume that it has three brains 
with three distinct centers of consciousness. Yet because of its biology we might also assume 
that there is no one center of consciousness, which would indicate that in order for Cerberus to 
                                                 
32 For modern discussions on the Trinity by modern theologians and analytic philosophers see Stephen 
Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins, eds. The Trinity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Thomas 
McCall and Michael C. Rea, Philosophical and Theological Essays on the Trinity (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); John D. Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, ed. Paul McPartlan (New York: T &T Clark, 2009); 
Thomas McCall, Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism?: Philosophical and Systematic Theologians on the 
Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010); William Hasker, 
Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jason S. Sexton, ed. Two Views 
on The Doctrine of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2014).   
 
33 Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2006), 61. 
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function properly it would require a significant amount of cooperation between each of the 
minds. Despite there being three distinct heads with three centers of consciousness, given that it 
is a single biological entity we would still think that there is only one dog-creature, so say the 
authors. To flesh this out a bit more, the authors assign to each of the heads the following names: 
Bowser, Rover, and Spike. They then give the example of Hercules attempting to enter Hades 
and one of the heads, Spike, snarled at him in the act. In such a case, they explain, Hercules 
could accurately report that Cerberus snarled at him. They then ask their readers to suppose 
further that Cerberus is not merely canine, but has minds much like our own, endowed with 
rationality and self-consciousness, and each of the heads has personal agency. Would we not, 
then, have something like a tri-personal being? If Cerberus were to die in battle and its soul were 
to persist in the afterlife, might not we have something like what is pictured in the Trinity prior 
to the incarnation—three unembodied distinct centers of consciousness united as one being? The 
authors take it that God is a soul or is soul-like. Here we would have not one person; rather, we 
would have one being (a soul) with three distinct centers of consciousness.34 Does this model of 
ST work?  
 I find Craig and Moreland’s proposed analogy appealing, allowing for the “three-in-one” 
model that ST Trinitarians hold; however, I would like to bolster their view with some reflection 
on the doctrine of perichoresis. 
In working through his own model of the Trinity, which he calls “perichoretic 
monotheism,” Stephen Davis suggests the following are needed to show the Trinity to be a single 
individual (unity):  
                                                 
34 William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 593. 
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(1) Each of the Persons equally possesses the divine essence in its totality. (2) The three 
necessarily share a marvelous unity of purpose, will, and action; that is, it is not possible for 
them to disagree or to be in conflict. (3) They exist in perichoresis (circumincession, co-
inherence, permeation). That is, each is ‘in’ the others; each ontologically embraces the 
others; to be a divine Person is by nature to be in relation to the other two; the boundaries 
between them are transparent; their love for and communion with each other is such that 
they can be said to ‘interpenetrate’ each other.35    
 
Davis has provided a helpful grid for working through an ST understanding of the Trinity. One 
of the chief difficulties when working through this doctrine, and particularly the ST version, is 
that it would seem we have something like four individuals: God the Father, God the Son, God 
the Holy Spirit, and the Godhead. Getting back to our earlier distinction between the “is” of 
identity and the “is” of predication, the defender of ST will want to suggest that what is taking 
place is the “is” of predication. In other words, “God” is a reference to the divine essence (1). 
When we speak of “God,” there is a sense in which we have in mind a single being. That is not 
disputed; however, it must remain clear that it is more accurate to speak of God as personal 
rather than saying that God is a person. When the defender of ST says “God” has done X, she 
means that the entire Godhead (or, perhaps, one of the divine Persons) has accomplished X.  
Davis’s emphasis on perichoresis (3) allows the defender of ST to accommodate for the 
greater unity between the persons lacking in the Craig and Moreland analogy. Not only do each 
of the Persons share a divine essence, each divine Person is completely open up to and penetrates 
the other Persons. It is a moving toward the other in divine love. Thomas Torrance provides a 
helpful portrait of what this perichoretic love looks like within the Trinity: 
When we turn to the First Epistle of St John we learn that ‘God is Love’, and that this Love 
is defined by the Love that God bears to us in sending his Son to be the propitiation for our 
sins, and indeed for the sins of the world. That is to say, the very Being of God as Love is 
identical with his loving, for he is himself the Love with which he loves; his Being and his 
Act are one and the same. This very love that God is, therefore, is identical with Jesus Christ 
who laid down his life for us, and who in his own Being and Act as the Son of the Father 
embodies the Love of God. The self-giving of the Son in sacrificial love and the self-giving 
                                                 
35 Stephen T. Davis, Christian Philosophical Theology, 61. 
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of the Father in sacrificial love are not separable from one another, for the Father and the 
Son dwell in one another, together with the Spirit of God, whom we know through his 
witness to the Son, and through whose dwelling in us God dwells in us. This means that we 
are to understand the Love that God is in his being-in-act and his act-in-being in a 
Trinitarian way. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit who indwell One Another in the 
Love that God is constitute the Communion of Love or the movement of reciprocal Loving 
which is identical with the One Being of God. It is as God the Father, God the Son, and God 
the Holy Spirit that God is God and God is Love. As one Being, three Persons, the Being of 
God is to be understood as an eternal movement of Love, both in himself as the Love of the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit for one Another, and in his loving Self-giving to others 
beyond himself.36    
 
Divine Love, as Torrance explains, does not involve merely God’s being or merely His act but 
God’s “being-in-act” or “act-in-being.” It is precisely this dynamic and active eternal movement 
toward the other—being-in-act, which Torrance borrows from Barth—that makes the unity. It is 
also this perichoretic love relationship between the Persons that allows for a complete knowing 
of the Other because of the interpenetration and mutual indwelling of that relationship. The 
intimate knowledge between the Father, Son, and Spirit is nothing like anything a created being 
can experience. Each of the Persons of the divine Trinity knows the others intimately. It is such 
an intimacy that a divine Person is completed by the other Persons, so much so that He cannot be 
Himself apart from Them. Yet, the knowledge that the divine Person experiences is not merely a 
complete intimate knowing of the divine Self in relation to the Others, but a complete knowing 
of the Others as They exist in relation to one another. Here we might think of it as something like 
omnisubjectivity, whereby each divine Person shares fully His mental states with the other divine 
Persons—complete and total vulnerability.37  
                                                 
36 Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God, 165. 
 
37 For an interesting discussion on the possibility of divine omnisubjectivity, see Linda Zagzebski, 
“Omnisubjectivity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: vol. 1, ed. Jonathan L. Kvanvig (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 231-248. Zagzebski uses the sense of omnisubjectivity quite differently than how I 
am suggesting it here. Her version has to do with whether God has something like omnisubjectivity as it relates to 
His knowledge of His creatures. I am taking it only in the sense of how each of the divine Persons might know the 
other divine Persons.  
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 Given the above, I suggest that we understand God, in God’s essential nature,38 as three 
distinct (but not separate) unembodied centers of consciousness, all of whom are personal agents, 
having something like an intellect, emotion, and will of their own. The Persons are co-equal, 
sharing fully those properties of the divine nature, while existing eternally in divine perichoretic 
and interpenetrating relationship. This perichoretic relationship allows for full and complete 
unity and for each of the Persons fully to indwell, embrace, and intimately know the Other. The 
giving up of the divine Self to the divine Other reassures that all of the acts of the divine Trinity 
are one. Taking something like the above understanding of the Trinity answers, to my 
satisfaction, the critic’s charge of incoherence based on identity.   
Where to Go From Here? 
 This project was as much about methodology as it was about arguing for a particular 
position. My goal from the beginning was integrative. There is much that philosophers, 
theologians, and biblical theologians can learn from one another. As a Christian community we 
need to provide a united front, especially as we engage such a difficult issue as that of the 
problem from evil.  
Philosophers are challenged with providing a more robust response to the problem from 
evil, one that gets away from a generic theistic understanding of God, to one that gives more 
focus to the particulars of Christian theism. Theologians and biblical theologians are challenged 
with the task of becoming more attuned to subtleties in arguments, concepts, and distinctions. It 
is my hope that this work will motivate more dialogue between the various disciplines, seeking 
                                                 
38 For clarification, one of the divine Persons—the divine Son—has taken on and is united to a human 
nature, in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, which means that the Son now has a human body. While the incarnation 
was necessary for our human salvation, it is not an essential property for deity to have, and thus is a contingent 
feature of the Son of God. Hence we may then speak of God, in God’s essential nature, as three unembodied minds.   
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ways to integrate the best of our disciplines into a more coherent and cohesive understanding of 
our shared worldview.  
Furthermore, I have sought to show that the Christian worldview provides fertile ground 
for thinking about how one might answer the problem from evil. Within our own worldview, 
there are many areas and avenues that need further exploration, including but not limited to the 
following key doctrines: the doctrine of the Trinity, creation, salvation, sin, incarnation, 
pneumatology, and eschatology. The Christian Scriptures themselves provide for us the raw data 
for working out a more thorough and robust theodicy.  
This work also sought to provide a response to both the philosophical/theological and 
existential/religious problems from evil. Any adequate theodicy should meet both demands. It is 
my contention that reflection on the doctrine of the Trinity gives us the tools and resources for 
answering both. The ultimate goal of theological reflection is praxis. Theology, as well as 
philosophy, speaks to every area of life. It is my hope that this work has done just that as I have 
considered the problem of evil in the world.   
 
 “Therefore they are before the throne of God, and serve him day and night in his temple; and he 
who sits on the throne will shelter them with his presence. They shall hunger no more, neither 
thirst anymore; the sun shall not strike them, nor any scorching heat. For the Lamb in the midst 
of the throne will be their shepherd, and he will guide them to springs of living water, and God 
will wipe away every tear from their eyes.” (Rev 7:15-17, ESV) 
 
“Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed 
away, and the sea was no more. And I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of 
heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from 
the throne saying, ‘Behold, the dwelling place of God is with man. He will dwell with them, and 
they will be his people, and God himself will be with them as their God. He will wipe away every 
tear from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, 
nor pain anymore, for the former things have passed away.’” (Rev 21:1-4, ESV) 
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